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Preface and Acknowledgements
The exploration of possible futures of the study of culture is more than a prognos-
tic effort, diagnosis of trends, or progressive elaboration of theories and methods. 
It also requires the critical consideration of possible future topics, transforma-
tions, and potentials within an interdisciplinary and international research field 
that faces contested futures in a rapidly changing global world. This volume dis-
cusses recent developments, emerging directions, and concerns for the study of 
culture from a wide range of national and disciplinary contexts, while addressing 
pressing challenges and crucial issues found in contemporary public discourse. 
The articles in this volume have been written and edited well before there 
were any signs of the current global Covid-19 pandemic that has rapidly brought 
death, fear, and unforeseen challenges to individual lives and cultural systems. 
We, of course, do not know what the future will bring or hold in store for our 
world, but we sincerely hope that we will find ways to cope with all the challenges 
resulting from this global pandemic. What the corona crisis shows us already, 
however, is that we depend not only on political and economic systems, but also 
on ideas, common values, and cultural practices to shape a common future. We 
need the perspectives of the humanities and social sciences to understand and to 
create our society, culture, and global world.
We have rarely experienced this fragility of our globalized world and such 
uncertainty of any future outlook. In times when human lives, economies, and 
political systems are at stake, we grope our way forward taking very small steps 
at a time as the very foundations of future expectations seem radically shaken. 
Yet, although written well before this global crisis, the articles in this volume 
have approached the topic of ‘futures’ rather cautiously and with nuance. 
Instead of generating a global prognostic vision, this collection pursues incipient 
approaches that try to expand the limits of our established but often ill-suited 
conceptual settings and disciplinary and institutional arrangements. It aims to 
open up new horizons for the study of culture by bringing changed conceptual 
tools and research practices in sight that could perhaps make us better equipped 
for dealing with urgent concerns and future issues yet unknown. 
With the generous support of the University Library Giessen, we have made 
the book available through Open Access to maximize the accessibility and poten-
tial of its contributions to spark debates worldwide. Our goal was to produce a 
collection that is not only multidisciplinary but also multi-voiced, as exemplified 
by our two-perspective introductions and an interview with Peter L. Galison. 
Most of the contributions originated at the international symposium held 
in 2016 to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Giessen Graduate Centre for 
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Humanities (GGK) and the 10th anniversary of the Excellence Initiative-funded 
International Graduate Centre for the Study of Culture (GCSC). 
We would like to extend special thanks to our colleague and PhD candidate, 
Simon Ottersbach, and to our student assistant, Franziska Eick (both at the GCSC). 
Their support in formatting the manuscript has been invaluable. Anne Wheeler, 
Marie Schlingmann, and Elizabeth Kovach were of tremendous help as English 
language proofreaders of the manuscript. Finally, our thanks go to De Gruyter, 
in particular Manuela Gerlof, Stella Diedrich, Lydia White, Myrto Aspioti, and 
Dipti Dange for seeing the project swiftly through the publication process; to the 
series editors for their support; and last but not least to the GCSC, not only for 
generously supporting the Open Access publication of this volume but also for 
providing an intellectually stimulating environment that has been most fruitful 
for this endeavor.
Giessen, April 2020
Doris Bachmann-Medick, Jens Kugele, Ansgar Nünning
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Introductions: Futures of the Study of Culture
Have we now reached a plateau in which the future is likely to be one of consolidation, 
refinement, and continuity? Or are we at the threshold of new developments, whether reac-
tive rollbacks to earlier paradigms or dimly foreseen revolutions and emergent  innovations? 
 (Mitchell 2004, 330) 
For us, the future no longer presents itself as an open horizon of possibilities; instead, it is a 
dimension increasingly closed to all prognoses – and which, at the same time, seems to draw 
near as a menace.  (Gumbrecht 2014, xiii) 
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Doris Bachmann-Medick
Futures of the Study of Culture: 
Some Opening Remarks
In his book The Future as Cultural Fact the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai 
claims that the “orientation to the future” should be revalued as a main dimen-
sion of culture – though a dimension “that is almost never explicitly discussed” 
(Appadurai 2013, 179). In cultural anthropology, he observes, the future has so far 
been repressed in favor of tradition, heritage, and other past-oriented concepts. 
Cultural anthropology thus sharply contrasts with economics, a science explicitly 
of the future, of forecasting, prognoses, and expectations.1 Appadurai calls on 
cultural anthropology to redefine culture as the “capacity to aspire” (195), i.e., to 
view culture as that which strengthens impoverished or marginalized groups and 
social classes and allows them to develop. In Appadurai’s view, this would also 
strengthen cultural anthropology as a discipline, and allow it to unfold in the 
future. But what about the interdisciplinary study of culture? Has it perhaps been 
more open to “futurity as a cultural capacity” (180) that is based on anticipa-
tions, aspirations, and imaginations (286) from the beginning?2 Is it more future- 
oriented than the discipline of cultural anthropology?
Before answering this question, we must differentiate between futurity as a cul-
tural activity on the one hand, and the multidirectional future potential of cultural 
research on the other (see Andreas Langenohl in this volume). How closely are these 
two understandings of “futurity” related? Do they stand for two sides of the same 
coin, as they shape the entire “social formation as a configuration of unequal posi-
tions and relations” (Grossberg 2006, 3)? As Lawrence Grossberg claims in reference 
to Stuart Hall, engaging with this “social formation” in its entirety and contextu-
alizing instead of isolating categories and concepts is essential for a socially rele-
vant cultural studies. This leads to “conjunctural analyses” (5) of conflictual social 
formations that combine first- and second-order observations. Appadurai, however, 
engages mainly with first-order observation and the future-oriented capacities of 
culture itself. But the study of culture also needs to connect cultural aspirations 
much more strongly to new analytical research  categories and a conceptualization 
1 For a discussion of economics as a science of imagined futures, based on cultural tools such as 
“fictional expectations” and narratives that cope with the uncertainty of the future, see Beckert 
2016, 3.
2 See Andreas Langenohl in this volume for a more detailed interpretation of Appadurai’s con-
cept of a cultural “capacity to aspire.”
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of main entry points that structure future cultural research: risk, imagination, affects 
and anxieties, media representation, ecological crises, public health crises, etc.
1  Changing Positions, Changing Concepts, 
Changing Frames
What is the state of the art? Since the nineteenth century, we can no longer 
assume that the study of culture and other fields of the humanities and social 
sciences use the ‘future’ as a fixed frame of reference, let alone as a category of 
progress (see Freitag and Groß 2017, 8). Conceptions of the future today instead 
seem to oscillate between an evocation of crisis, a continuation of contemporary 
theory dynamics, and the generation of fundamentally new paradigms in the face 
of a “future as catastrophe” (Horn 2018, 5). Often these conceptions diagnose a 
massive disruption through unforeseeable destabilizing “tipping points” of social 
and theoretical processes (Horn 2017, 11, 2018, 5). Alternatively, they identify 
long-term transitions in the humanities, such as “a movement away from ‘signifi-
cation’ and ‘meaning’ toward ‘communication and affect’” (Venn 2007, 51); a shift 
from constructivist to non-constructivist approaches culminating in evidence, 
presence, and materiality (Gumbrecht 2010, 2014); or a technological transforma-
tion of literary representations into new sorts of texts and new forms of reading 
(see Frederik Tygstrup in this volume). Another strand of future research has 
extended the familiar pathways of humanist thinking in a post- or non- humanist 
direction – following explicitly programmatic ideas and critical-ethical aims for 
the humanities in the twenty-first century (see Braidotti 2013; Grusin 2015). But 
in the end, do all of these diagnoses of future transitions not remain within the 
framework of ‘change,’ do they not evoke a chain of developments and a linear 
projection into the future? It seems worth mentioning at this point that institu-
tional prerequisites for the development of the humanities and social sciences 
such as strategic financing schemes and research collaborations have played a 
key role in shaping such theories of the future according to the logic of their own 
project proposals. Questioning the frameworks that currently underpin theories 
of the future, however, could open up new ways of understanding and theorizing 
the future. We are not talking here about new ways of speculating on future possi-
bilities, problems, anxieties, key concerns and scenarios,  cutting-edge research, 
and emerging topics – such as, for instance, living in or constructing future cities, 
developing or applying future technologies, coping with surveillance cultures, 
etc. (see Folkerts, Lindner, and Schavemaker 2015). Nor are we talking about 
reframing how we acquire knowledge through distinct methods of scaling history, 
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for example, by turning our attention to the Anthropocene or epochal microsec-
tions and upheavals as the late Ulrich Beck does (2016, 51–60). After pointing to 
the Axial Age, the French Revolution, and colonial transformation, he empha-
sizes the current all-encompassing metamorphosis of the world. Our approach 
suggests something different: It encourages paying attention to the methodologi-
cal suppositions underlying the various conceptions of the future, which involves 
digging out and differentiating shared points of reference that could highlight 
significant issues for social action as well as for futures of cultural research in 
explicitly plural terms.3
Before outlining this new approach, however, we should first consider the 
study of culture in its dynamic unfolding, in its own theoretical and method-
ological development. This unfolding or Eigendynamik is inflected by the cul-
tural conflicts and asymmetries of global society, which is why a consideration 
of futures of the study of culture never only concerns prospective theories and 
methods. It demands engagement with the emerging futures of cultures and soci-
eties in their global conditions. Following this premise, Richard Grusin in this 
volume ties the futures of the study of culture to “the study of key concerns of the 
twenty-first century.” Referencing Ulrich Beck’s notion of a global risk society, 
which, in his view, we are increasingly becoming, Grusin contends that the study 
of culture can no longer be left to the traditional humanities alone. It should 
explicitly be blurred with scientific and public debates on the geological scale 
of the Anthropocene and the environmental threats facing it (see Chakrabarty 
2018), and with studies of media technologies, digitalization, and surveillance – 
to name but a few challenging fields of research. In the spirit of enriching cul-
tural research with such diverse paradigms, Isabel Gil in this volume focuses on 
surveillance, showing that the practice or even the system of surveillance not 
only shapes present and future cultural conditions but also changes the entire 
framing of the study of culture itself. This approach to surveillance indicates that 
the future study of culture will be obliged to address pressing problems within 
society.
Can this reference to the social sphere be seen as a moral-political common 
denominator for the study of culture? Is the familiar practice of working with 
‘concepts’ as analytical tools giving way to a deeper engagement with ‘concerns’ 
(on matters of concern, see Latour 2014, 231–232)? This question does not nec-
essarily call for a normative basis for the study of culture, but increasingly for 
3 On the significant shift at the end of the twentieth century toward reconceptualizing ‘the fu-
ture’ as a multiplicity of futures, see Gidley 2017 (ch. “The Future Multiplied”) and Seefried 2014, 
2015.
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a  commitment to responsibility, to rethinking the common denominators and 
points of reference of our work with concepts in the study of culture – rethinking 
‘humanity,’ ‘the world,’ ‘climate,’ ‘public health,’ ‘global justice,’ ‘human rights,’ 
or ‘humans’ as a species. Humans are no longer considered to be autonomous 
from the rest of being but are rather regarded as relationally woven into a network 
which includes non-humans, technologies, resources, objects, etc. (Horn 2017, 9). 
As  “re-thinking key categories like subjectivity and affect, the environment and 
technology” (Venn 2007, 49) is the challenge of the day, it is important to also con-
sider the categories with reference to which we analyze pressing global problems.
But where might potential research in the future of the study of culture take 
place? Though it would be naive to neglect the important institutional dimension 
of academic work, we should not confine research to the corporate, “entrepre-
neurial” university. However, the academic environment requires researchers to 
strategically position themselves in multiple competitive contexts. To position 
oneself in this field means to distinguish oneself by exploiting “ever more spe-
cialised niches” (Angermuller 2013, 265) within the academic market (on aca-
demic and financial markets in their potential of shaping research futures, see 
Tom Clucas in this volume). Alongside this established social-academic trajec-
tory toward marketable professional futures, one could identify a trend in the 
signature areas of Western research. I am referring to the increased relevance of 
a culture of singularities such as that outlined by Andreas Reckwitz both in his 
contribution to this volume and in his provocative book The Society of Singulari-
ties (2020). Does the tendency to find one’s place in society by choosing a position 
of singularity and uniqueness apply to the field of theory, too? Are we perhaps 
running into a multitude of singular approaches, “a canon of singularities, a 
collection of intellectual incursions that were, by definition, without precedent” 
(Potts and Stout 2014, 2) – not a traditional canon based on “singular names” 
(2) of outstanding theorists, but rather a new canon of singular approaches? A 
symptom of this trend could be the contemporary turning away from schools and 
key theorists in favor of transformative theoretical breaks and new orientations 
such as the “cultural turns” of the past two decades (see Bachmann-Medick 2016). 
These “turns” suggest that there is a tendency amongst researchers to carve out 
and occupy specific research fields exclusively: “Working academics struggle to 
publish before the flag under which they began their research has been captured 
and replaced with another” (Potts and Stout 2014, 3). The quick turnover rate that 
comes with the flagging of claimed research fields seems to be accountable for 
an almost never-ending compulsion to produce newness. But what about already 
existing conversations and debates? Why should they be overrun by the obsession 
with newness that governs current research dynamics? Reflecting on the future of 
the study of culture must not necessarily repeat this entanglement between linear 
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theory developments and the obsession with (their) newness. Perhaps it would 
be more effective to employ practical-theoretical tools that follow innovative and 
future-oriented paths by focusing on new ways of synthesis and linking, critical 
revision and delinking.
2 Changing Turns or a Grand Paradigm Shift?
Will the emergence of ever-new theoretical turns make the future of cultural 
research more diverse, more pluralistic? The range of recent turns has drawn 
attention to a number of emerging topics or concerns which show and demand a 
deeper involvement with cultural realities (such as global migration, pandemics, 
climate change, the Anthropocene, etc.). Do we need to rethink our key research 
categories in light of increased involvement of research with cultural realities and 
the resulting ‘turns’ or transdisciplinary ‘studies’ – such as the ontological turn, 
or posthumanist, animal, disability, sustainability, etc. studies – before we can 
even speak of the future of the study of culture? Or will it become inevitable to 
break entirely with familiar theories and concepts, the longue durée constella-
tions of interwoven turns and their increasing differentiation into a prolonged 
series of sub-sections and studies? In the end, any linear trajectories of theory 
might prove to be inadequate to analyze and address the contemporary dynamics 
of newly emerging global problems and systemic disruptions. Will it thus become 
unavoidable to suggest a hitherto unheard-of paradigm shift in a Copernican 
sense? In any case, the overarching question is: Are we forced to leave familiar 
theoretical frameworks behind and adjust our terms and concepts to a world that 
is “fundamentally different” (Beck 2016, 9) from what we have experienced so 
far? Ulrich Beck takes a clear position towards this question, claiming that we 
will be forced to carry out “epochal change” (5) in how we think about the future, 
to conceptualize a void that until now was never thought to be thinkable at all 
(see 28–30).
What, then, is the starting point for reflecting on the future of the study of 
culture? A good starting point would be a new conceptualization of the past. 
We need to historicize the key concepts that guide our engagement with the 
future. Historian Dirk van Laak maintains that it is a precondition for dealing 
with the future: We need historians to act as “prophets of the past” (van Laak in 
this volume, 215) and reject the assumed continuity between past, present, and 
future in favor of an openness for “different rhythms and paces of change” (van 
Laak, 215). But would the reflection on the future not go even further if we started 
with a new conceptualization of the present? In any case, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 
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is  convinced that the “broad present,” in order to be grasped, requires a new epis-
temological framework. This unaccustomed framework has to be developed out 
of an enlarged notion and awareness of a present that is no longer informed by 
the persistent concept of “historical consciousness” and temporal sequence, but 
which instead suggests a new “chronotope,” one that is shaped by simultane-
ity and oscillation (Gumbrecht 2014, 75–76). Gumbrecht’s postulate of a “broad 
present” thus implies that before we can even begin to reflect on future devel-
opments, we must question the adequacy of our temporal mindset by asking 
whether we can still rely on our familiar “epistemological habitat” (xiii).4 Such 
skeptical interrogation is all the more necessary in view of the global simultanei-
ties of uneven cultural and political conditions that are a challenge to any linear 
projections of the future. In this context the epistemological lens could also be 
an eye-opener for the multiple pathways of future research that should no longer 
be confined to Western scholarship (see Schulz 2019, 4–5), but rather exposed to 
cross-cultural efforts to address the complexities, diversity, and unevenness of 
the contemporary world. An interdisciplinary switch to cultural anthropology/
ethnology might be a productive starting point for grasping such complexities, as 
this discipline of complex entanglements has been critically taking up the issue 
that “new forms of globalization and modernization are bringing all parts of the 
earth into greater, uneven, polycentric interaction” (Fischer 2003, 3).
3  Changing Points of Reference, Grasping  
Various Futures
The complex cultural entanglements of the present and the increasing experience 
of the present as uneven and multiple are good starting points for reflecting upon 
the future in the plural. This does not mean we should project specific frames 
of reference onto an unknown future. It means seeking, encouraging, question-
ing, and critically developing new frameworks in contemporary cultural theory. It 
means engaging in practice-related knowledge production, not least through the 
work of above-mentioned multifaceted transdisciplinary ‘studies’ “that are cur-
rently cross-breeding nomadically” (Braidotti 2018, 10), with their broad range of 
disciplinarily hybrid critical terms. Contributors to this volume exemplify such 
4 “… the narrow present of ‘history’ was the epistemological habitat of the Cartesian subject, 
another figure of reference (and self-reference) must emerge in the broad present” (Gumbrecht 
2014, xiii).
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transgressive approaches: Silke Schicktanz draws new ethical inspirations from 
biomedicine; Hubertus Büschel critically exposes entanglements between eth-
nography/anthropology and new cultural history; Andressa Schröder outlines 
arts-based cultural research on ecological issues; and Laura Meneghello offers 
a new cultural perspective on global economy. In cultural life itself, cross- border 
perspectives have been made productive for elaborating critical frames or shared 
points of reference. To name an example: The polyphonic negotiation of ‘univer-
sal’ human rights in the context of local social conflicts or clashes shows that 
such conflictual scenarios can often be mastered only by seeking shared frames 
of reference. To look for common frames of reference with regard to future cultural 
and sociological research is certainly challenging as well. However, it demands a 
new epistemological starting point: a fundamental “transformation of the refer-
ence horizon” (Beck 2016, 17).
As Ulrich Beck, among others, maintains, the future can only be approached 
if we break down our certainties and, above all, leave behind our traditional 
perceptions of social ‘change’ and ‘transformation.’ Instead, the future opens 
up in a world where change, with its reference to existing orders and institu-
tions, is replaced by the emerging concept of ‘metamorphosis’ (Beck 2016, 29). 
Beck identifies a radical shift and break between the age of change, up until the 
present, and a coming age of metamorphosis. Global turmoils and global prob-
lems have become so complex that they can no longer be grasped and analyzed 
with familiar concepts. Even the concept of culture itself has to undergo massive 
 transformation. More than ever before, culture is about to be re-envisioned as 
“more-than-human” (see Ursula Heise in this volume), critically engaging with 
the rapid developments of artificial intelligence located at complex intersec-
tions between fields of the material and ‘non-human,’ technology, medicine, 
ecology, computer science, biopolitics, design, and the environmental human-
ities. Climate change is only one significant reason for this new cultural assem-
blage. The familiar nature-culture divide is no longer valid; the traditional human 
subject has been mutated into a “controllable consumer” (Beck 2016, 9); human 
life has turned into “manufacturability” (25). In these terms Beck outlines a new 
paradigm which he calls – quite loftily – the ensuing “metamorphosis of the 
world.” This metaphoric phrase points to a complete change of worldviews: a 
“new way of generating critical norms” (39), new concepts, frameworks, and con-
ditions, “creating a cosmopolitan frame of reference” (40). It represents the acute 
sense that we can no longer stick to the familiar horizon and extrapolate possible 
future developments from this present situation.
And yet we can only approach the future by working in the present. Indeed, 
metamorphosis is for Beck a “characteristic feature of the present age” (20). 
Finding ways to implement such grand Copernican paradigms, to put them into 
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practice, helps us not to get overwhelmed by them. But how should we imple-
ment these new conceptual frames in our investigations? A first “point of entry” 
might be to focus on a “future sense” already at work within the present, as 
Andreas Langenohl suggests in his contribution. Langenohl refers to Leslie Adel-
son’s conceptual elaboration of “futurity”5 but focuses on its applicability in the 
practical sphere of “prefigurative politics.” In the face of new radical transforma-
tions in medicine and biotechnology, global risks and catastrophes, and – last 
but not least – the digital revolution, the focus must shift onto new forms of col-
laboration and competition, new global climate and health alliances, strategies 
for traffic and transportation, efforts of global social justice, and increased atten-
tion to urban rights in world cities. Focusing on such mobilizing pivot points for 
analysis enables us to develop the paradigm of metamorphosis in concrete fields 
of action. Thus, the cultural and cultural-analytical reflection on futures of the 
study of culture could affect more important areas of investigation and research 
than just the isolated sequence of theories, turns, and paradigms. It would focus 
the study of culture on the emergence and elaboration of rather practice-oriented 
approaches, more so than has been done in the past. 
Concerns with the dynamic of ‘turns’ and transdisciplinary ‘studies’ in their 
“hybrid cross-fertilization” (Braidotti 2019, 43) have already created a “nomadic 
expansion of multiple practices and discourses” (44). These practices across and 
beyond disciplines (that also find expression in this volume) have already paved 
the way in such a pragmatic or practical-theoretical direction. But one of the main 
challenges from now on is to come up with new operative tools and practices for 
“making” futures. Translation may well constitute such an operative tool – be it 
the translation of cultural-analytical concepts into societal-political concepts, the 
translation of academic issues into the public humanities, the study of culture as 
a capacity to translate between disciplines and cultures,6 or – facing the Anthro-
pocene – the “displacement-translation of ‘force’ into ‘power’” (Chakrabarty 
2018, 13), especially when it comes to the translation of physical-geological cat-
egories into social categories of action and responsibility. This translational or, 
more generally speaking, operative concern goes hand in hand with a new sen-
sibility for processes of transition and lenses of liminality, contact zones, and 
mechanisms for coping with passages and context shifts. It could encourage the 
creation of liminal third spaces as possible junctions for giving terms such as 
5 Leslie Adelson elaborated the “future sense” as a disjunctive, counterfactual, “long-distance 
sense organ of temporal perception” (2017, 200, also 40–41).
6 On the study of culture/the humanities as translation studies, see Bachmann-Medick 2012, 
35–40; on complexities of ‘cultural translation’ seen through the lens of “grafting,” see Uwe 
Wirth in this volume.
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‘humanity,’ ‘the world,’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’ substance. In other words, all new 
theoretical tools which will be developed must still be made relevant to practice. 
Sociology and the study of culture could once again learn how to do so from cul-
tural anthropology: “anthropology operates in a set of third spaces (…) where 
new multicultural ethics are evolving (…)” and its “challenge is to develop trans-
lation and mediation tools for helping make visible the differences of interests, 
access, power, needs, desire, and philosophical perspective,” as Michael Fischer 
writes in Emergent Forms of Life and the Anthropological Voice (2003, 3). And yet, 
as Hubertus Büschel argues in this volume, one has to be aware of the colonial 
roots of cultural anthropology and their lasting impact, especially on the recently 
reconceptualized new cultural history. Referring critically to examples of the 
entanglement between new cultural history and modes of colonial knowledge 
production, he also reflects on important operative tools: on practices of provin-
cializing and decentering, delinking with Western mindsets, and border thinking.
Such operative approaches do not have prophetic qualities, nor do they advo-
cate big paradigm shifts or make predictions about future developments. Rather 
they allow us to start at a different point, perhaps at some impasse or rupture of 
seemingly continuous trajectories of theory, with stronger regard to breaking and 
groundbreaking practices of agency and theoretical (trans)formations as well – 
with a special focus on their non-linear, network-like, translational modes. If we 
follow Beck, for example, and consider metamorphosis to be a new paradigm, we 
still need to employ the “jeweler’s-eye work of ethnography and social anthro-
pology, the back and forth of detail work and sitting back to view the settings” 
(Fischer 2009, 270). What is meant here is a fine-tuning of context-related and 
 situation-adequate research attitudes. In the end, such nuanced attitudes will 
lead to a reconceptualization of the study of culture itself: The study of culture 
thus turns into a mode of translation studies. As I have tried to explain in other 
contexts, the study of culture could in a fundamental sense be considered trans-
lation studies, since it also strives to pluralize relations and phenomena precisely 
through the disruption of concepts of wholeness and unity that each translation 
process inevitably accretes (see Bachmann-Medick 2009, 12). Returning to an idea 
discussed above, translation as an analytical category could be made fruitful and 
future-promising if we further connected it with a practical-theoretical, transla-
tional mode of acting and agency. Peter Galison’s concept of “trading zones” could 
be especially useful in such an effort (see Galison in this volume). This concept 
suggests that we can ensure the collaboration of seemingly incompatible language 
and knowledge communities in interdisciplinary academic contexts and hetero-
geneous social encounters by establishing a “restricted” exchange language that 
allows a coordination of action. In a broader historical sense, however, transla-
tion as a mode of action could have strategic potential for “making” futures: Past 
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experiences can be reinterpreted and translated by taking up their symbols and 
shapes and by inserting them into new contexts. In this process new meanings are 
made more acceptable in traditional forms. Thus, by such innovative translations 
new horizons can be opened up (see Bachmann-Medick 2017).
To conclude: Discussing the future of the study of culture means much more 
than elaborating on emerging concepts or even paradigms. It means engaging 
with innovative methodological infrastructures – such as scaling, zooming 
(Hannerz 2016, 5), translation, grafting (see Uwe Wirth in this volume), linking 
or delinking, and other practical efforts to find “strategic switches and pressure 
points” (Fischer 2009, 270) that have the potential to transform entire research 
scenarios. But paying attention and fostering new methodological approaches or 
developing practice tools in fields of action has its limitations, too. It in no way 
makes the trajectories towards a plural future more manageable. The future of 
the study of culture is by no means to be understood as a matter of management 
(see Bachmann-Medick 2017a). The illusion that the future of the study of culture 
can be managed is maintained, on the level of individual scholars, by activities 
such as continuously writing reports, peer-reviewing, forming working groups, 
taking part in evaluation processes, participating in appointment committees, 
and – on the level of academic organizations and university institutions – by 
building research associations, making decisions about university rankings, or 
setting priorities in funding. Thinking about the futures of the study of culture 
may well lead to a dead end as long as it overestimates such strategic calculations 
that point to a mere technocratic image of the future of scholarship.
The subject of these introductory remarks has been neither speculation nor 
prophecy on possible developments in cultural theory and research. The inten-
tion was rather to outline a way to future research by mapping out new practical 
methods of inquiry and point to “critical thinking tools” of the humanities (as 
Nicole Anderson claims in this volume) and shared, transdisciplinary points of ref-
erence that make cultural analyses translatable onto the field of action. But can an 
approach like this prevent futures from “draw[ing] near as a menace” – as one of 
the themes of this essay evokes? It can conceivably help us consider the openness of 
the future and the opportunities for an emergence of unplanned and new perspec-
tives, by admitting the limited manageability of future developments in the study of 
culture – and by suggesting instead the use of critical analytical, communicative, 
and ethical skills of the study of culture. Even with all these practical possibilities 
of knowledge in mind, the theoretical epicenter for orbiting the future resides in 
the present. In this sense, the words of Teresa de Laurentis could provide further 
food for thought: “The time of theory, as articulated thought, is always the present” 
(Laurentis 2004, 365).
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Postscript April 2020
We are confronted at this moment with a reality that is dominated by the global 
coronavirus disease (Covid-19) pandemic. How will the futures of the study of 
culture emerge from this crisis? At a time when bare survival is at stake, all 
projections into the future become more uncertain than ever. Even if it is still 
unknown today how enduring the repercussions of this catastrophe really will 
be – whether one can truly speak of an epochal ‘turn of an era’ – this situa-
tion is likely to have considerable consequences for the study of culture. It is 
to be feared that this worldwide unsettling of our survival conditions will con-
tinue to entail massive global challenges in the future. Alongside issues such as 
climate change, migration, war, terrorism, and human rights, the present crisis 
is bringing inherent dangers in the production and reproduction of human soci-
eties to the foreground. And with this new momentum, issues of ‘biopolitics’ 
come to the center of public attention: the increased urgency of public health 
and global health policy, coupled with the prominent role of scientific medical 
experts as the right arm of political  decision-makers. This situation could mas-
sively accelerate a development that has been emerging for some time now: The 
public importance of the humanities and cultural sciences could rescind even 
further.
If it is currently the virologists, biologists, physicians, pharmaceutical chem-
ists, biomedical technologists, and specialists in digital surveillance who set the 
tone and determine the agendas of research, and to whom the political decision- 
makers defer, they will also most likely collect the lion’s share of research funds 
in the future. But can virologists, biomedical pharmacists, technologically com-
petent physicians, and big data specialists solve social and cultural problems? 
Who will be dealing with the obvious social downsides of this global crisis? 
In all this, a new hour for the study of culture, for the humanities, and the social 
sciences could arrive. Future efforts to solve the problems caused by the pandemic 
will have to concern themselves with counteracting a hitherto one-sided orienta-
tion towards ‘economic globalization.’ The study of culture will have to consider the 
cultural, symbolic, experiential, affective, and discursive implications of the crisis. 
It could also furnish conceptual tools to handle the greater need for cross-border 
networking, solidarity, and collaborations on a global scale. But in all these devel-
opments, the cultural power asymmetries and economic inequalities will have to be 
assessed anew, leading to a critical analysis of the seemingly unavoidable reshaping 
of the global order. But there will be additional impulses to reposition the study of 
culture in the present turmoil of the world. They will arise from new concerns – the 
necessity to uncover, problematize, and counteract the massive restrictions of dem-
ocratic rights and liberties; the obligation to deal with the symptoms of  increasing 
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racism and populism; but also the need to question the forceful interventions of 
crisis measures into our ways of life and sociality. 
One thing seems certain: The futures of the study of culture will surely be 
“infected” by this pandemic crisis. They will be confronted with new fundamen-
tal problems and their consequences for our everyday lives. To name but a few 
important ones: the changing relationship between the generations, the new 
rules of physical and spatial distance, the intensified mediatization and digitali-
zation of our communication through ‘social distancing’ and its virtual tools, the 
transformation of our mobility in public spaces and of our concepts, practices, 
and relations of work. How are these new social conditions to be analyzed with a 
differentiating vocabulary?
There may be other and more encompassing components that demand new 
framings for the study of culture: How can we define ‘systemic relevance’ in our 
societies under the conditions produced by the crisis? Should the study of culture 
be further opened up to economics (see Tom Clucas in this volume)? How can we 
develop ethical and bioethical norms that are adequate to our needs and at the 
same time responsive to different cultural frameworks (see Silke Schicktanz in 
this volume)? Last, but not least: How can the distinctions between the spheres of 
the human and the non-human – in view of the present challenge from the viral 
world – be reconsidered and the necessary recognition of multispecies cultures 
be newly assessed (see Ursula Heise and Richard Grusin in this volume)?
In addition to the challenges posed by such newly pressing issues, coping 
with changed practices and forms of communication will be of fundamental 
importance. It is here that translation as a ‘methodological concept’ promises to 
gain further importance. When experts and politicians collaborate in an entan-
gled way, and scientific studies and findings more increasingly become the basis 
for political decision-making, then the refined and critical translational capaci-
ties of the study of culture are needed all the more. It is these translational capac-
ities that might help to steer and control booming practices of mediation manage-
ment and to develop communication strategies that include democratic public 
participation. In this way further ‘trading zones’ for the collaboration between 
different knowledge and decision-making systems could be implemented (see 
Peter Galison and Jens Kugele in this volume). Other cultural and social practices 
that make a study of culture approach indispensable will gain in importance: 
developing modes of resilience, coping with existential liminal situations, and 
the modes of cultivating global social solidarity and responsibility (see Ansgar 
Nünning in this volume). Giving increased attention to such novel forms of action 
could perhaps lend a practical dimension to the rather abstract concept of a 
“metamorphosis of the world,” which Ulrich Beck coined to describe a radical 
disruption of all familiar certainties, conditional frameworks, and analytical 
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competences in grasping possible futures. Focusing on a practical approach like 
this could help the study of culture break down such overarching concepts into 
the operative levels of our capacities to act. Moreover, it could also help to inflect 
our analytical research in directions that have not yet been illuminated, since 
they have been almost unthinkable so far.
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Collaborative Research in the Study 
of Culture
1 Thinking about Futures
On September 5, 2019, the “Futurium” opened its doors to the public in Germa-
ny’s capital, Berlin, and extended an invitation to reflect on the possible futures 
we imagine for our world. This new building illustrates several key characteris-
tics of our thinking about the future, futures, and futurity in this volume as well. 
First, in its spatial interplay of exhibition, forum, and lab, the Futurium demon-
strates that thinking about futures requires a variety of dynamic spaces. Second, 
as Stefan Brandt, director of the Futurium emphasizes, it invites us to think about 
the future in the plural (Checchin 2019). Third, located in the government quarter 
of the capital and sponsored by the German Federal Ministry for Education and 
Research as well as by several foundations and companies, this 60-million-Euro 
project reminds us of the role that infrastructure, politics, and economics play 
in our thinking about futures. Fourth, its architecture, a result of a 20-year plan-
ning and building process, presents a fundamental dilemma that all collective 
and institutional thinking about possible futures faces: Behind its concrete walls 
and its glass façade, this edifice, built with today’s materials and envisioned by 
yesterday’s architects, hosts visions of tomorrow. While limited by its conven-
tional materiality, it displays in its interior exhibitions on an envisaged future 
architecture that uses crab shells, bamboo, fungi cultures, brick clay, and recy-
cled materials (see Richter 2019). Fifth, inside the Futurium, visitors find a space 
Note: As mentioned above in the Preface and Acknowledgements to this volume, our texts 
were conceptualized, written, and edited well before there were any signs of the current global 
covid-19 pandemic that has rapidly brought death, fear, and unforeseen challenges to individual 
lives and cultural systems. In light of the current global pandemic, experts are expecting that the 
covid-19 crisis will change the future of our health systems, our political systems, and more gen-
erally, our culture. Although we are only at the very beginning of this pandemic, it can be predict-
ed, that, in many ways, these developments will also have unforeseeable consequences for the 
higher education system in general and the study of culture more specifically. Just as the crisis 
already has changed our perspectives on health, social interaction and distance, our notions of 
home, our organization of the private and public sphere, it will change the ways we organize our 
classrooms, our research, travels, meetings, and conferences, our interactions with colleagues, 
fellow researchers, and students. As leading economists at the I.M.F. expect the global economy 
to face the worst slump since the Great Depression, many higher education institutions and hu-
manities departments might have to deal with major budget cuts in the near future.
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of interaction and active participation that moves beyond mere representation 
and descriptive texts. Sixth, at its conceptual core, the Futurium features creative 
collaboration that reaches across institutional contexts and fields of expertise 
and engages in an exchange with citizens. The future “lab” inside the Futurium 
is thus not only an attraction for family excursions on rainy Sunday afternoons, 
but it enables the conceptual interaction between academic research, exhibition 
space, participating visitors, and the general public.
These elements are central in our thinking about futures of the ‘study of 
culture’ as well, which requires dynamic spaces that allow for creative reflection 
about the future in the plural, always with an awareness of and consideration for 
its political dimensions. Most centrally, exchange, in the form of collaborative 
research, lies at the heart of the scholarly study of culture, which imagines the 
possible futures of its field as well as possible futures of culture more generally.
2 Collaborative Research
At its core, an integral element of the interdisciplinary study of culture is such col-
laborative research across various borders. This is the case, at least, if we conceive 
of the study of culture not as resorting to one particular tradition such as the British 
Cultural Studies, the North American Cultural Studies, or German Kulturwissenschaft 
in the singular form (see also Ansgar Nünning’s contribution to this volume), but 
instead as an attempt to foster a non-ideological intellectual exchange among all 
scholarship on culture that employs theoretical and conceptual tools and takes into 
account its historical dimensions. In what follows, I will highlight five aspects of such 
collaborative research: first, developing knowledge through the work of thought col-
lectives in the Fleckian sense; second, exchange across various boundaries, includ-
ing training future generations of researchers for the study of culture; third, forms 
and formats that allow this collaboration including administrative imagination and 
structures; fourth, the academic status of collaborative work; and fifth, inextricably 
linked to the latter, the status of the study of culture as an academic field in the 
context of disciplinary formations and degree-awarding institutions.
3 Collective Knowledge Construction
Rumor often has it that academic work in the humanities and in the social sci-
ences is the solitary work of individual scholars. The prevailing myth of the indi-
vidual, independent, and solitary genius scholar goes hand in hand with the 
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fictions of individual talents and skill sets, independent decision-making and 
selection of research topics, solitary research and problem-solving, as well as 
single-authored publications. What this myth of the individual genius scholar 
does not account for is best captured in the notion of “thought collective” (“Denk-
kollektiv”), a term coined by Ludwik Fleck in the 1930s. As the title of his work 
Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1980 [1935]) indi-
cates, Fleck points us to his fundamental notion of a collective “development” 
and “formation” of scholarly facts. These scholarly facts, in Fleck’s view, are in 
their essence shaped and constructed by a collective of people, inherently linked 
to language, and instantiated primarily in different forms of scholarly texts. Thus, 
they bear witness to interrelations among individuals as well as across time and 
place. Any individualistic accounts of knowledge and of independent genius 
scholars must therefore be interpreted as mere fiction. While the thought collec-
tive in Fleck’s sense might often be silent in individual publications, collaborative 
research offers ways to make it explicit (see Wray 2002, 152). This is certainly not 
intended to debase individual work entirely, but to explore ways of combining 
solitary work with collaborative work, and to make the thought collective more 
explicit in the social-linguistic utterances that, in combination with academic 
practice, create the development of knowledge.
4 Crossing Boundaries
As Peter L. Galison suggests in this volume, “collaborating across boundaries 
requires a certain kind of attentive listening.” Such active engagement with the 
work, motivations, values, and goals of others may question established struc-
tures, hierarchies, and epistemic regimes; yet it also forms the foundation for 
collaboration across disciplinary, regional, national, institutional, and linguistic 
boundaries. Such boundary-crossing includes collaboration across status groups 
in academia. Integrating students and early-career researchers at a doctoral and 
postdoctoral level using this notion of collaboration creates opportunities to train 
future generations of researchers in the study of culture to enter the profession 
equipped with competences beyond their specific fields of expertise and beyond 
their individual thesis work. Lawrence Grossberg, in his preface to his Cultural 
Studies in the Future Tense, highlights the value of such collective work when 
he thanks his students “who have helped shape cultural studies at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, in my seminars […] and in the various working groups 
of the University Program in Cultural Studies,” as well as his graduate students, 
“past and present […] for their collaborative and collective labors” (Grossberg 
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2010, xi). Grossberg goes on to thank his translator, his audiences, those who 
extended speaker invitations to him as well as his junior faculty colleagues, i.e., 
multiple participants in the (academic) thought collective and the construction 
of knowledge behind Grossberg’s own single-authored publications. While it is 
encouraging to see esteemed scholars like Grossberg acknowledge the value of 
collaborative research across boundaries and status groups in their prefaces, 
such research needs to be acknowledged and fostered every step of the way. To 
use Peter Galison’s words from this volume again: “There are substantive things 
one can do to promote the visibility and recognition of rising PhDs, postdocs, and 
assistant professors: They can be promoted to give academic and public talks, 
they can take on recognized roles in working groups, they can report at collabo-
ration meetings, they can be leads on white papers. We ought to be thinking now 
about ways to do such things in the growing number of interdisciplinary collabo-
rations in the human sciences.”
5 Forms and Formats
Successful collaborative research requires appropriate forms and formats of col-
laboration. It requires administrative imagination, visionary institutional for-
mations, and innovative structures. Research centers such as the Center for 21st 
Century Studies (C21) at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee is a case in point 
(see Richard Grusin’s contribution to this volume). In light of developments in 
higher education over the past decades, including financial as well as technolog-
ical transformations and its increasing professionalization and institutionaliza-
tion, R. Eugene Rice and others have observed that their fellow faculty members 
increasingly turn their thoughts inward (see Rice 1996). Collaborative research, 
by contrast, requires a reflection on academic genres, on both well-tested and 
alternative formats for research events, on enabling spaces inside and outside of 
buildings, and on the accessibility of research results, open access publications, 
and open science more generally. Scholars in the study of culture will need to 
become adept at using multiple modalities to present their work beyond the con-
ventional genres and media as they expand their work into the realms of film, 
exhibitions, newspaper articles, community work, etc. Mary Frank Fox and Cath-
erine A. Faver (1984) point to the advantages of such collaborative work and high-
light its potential to foster efficiency, sustained motivation, and interpersonal 
commitment. At the same time, they also draw our attention to its costs and risks 
such as logistical efforts, travel costs, energy-consuming social conflicts, evalua-
tion of publications, and ethical standards.
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6 The Status of Collaborative Work
The risks and potential of collaborative research are inextricably linked to its aca-
demic status. To achieve sustained success for collaborative research in the study 
of culture, we ought to reevaluate our hiring practices and reconsider our idea of 
academic careers. Our perception of academic institutions would benefit from con-
tinued exchange amongst scholars about our conceptions of the study of culture 
as a research field; its relation to analyses of cultural systems, representations, 
historical dimensions, prognosis, and citizenship; its positionalities; and its rela-
tionship with artists and activists. One of the central questions for scholars in the 
study of culture will be how to situate their scholarship and thus the enterprise of 
the study of culture more broadly vis-à-vis the issues debated in a changing world. 
Topics such as climate change (see Ursula Heise’s contribution to this volume), big 
data and surveillance (see Richard Grusin’s contribution to this volume), artificial 
intelligence, public health and, most recently, global pandemics are major concerns 
in public as well as academic discourse. In light of the developments in the field of 
artificial intelligence and as far as the participants in our collaborative research are 
concerned, a new idea of “the machine” might even be needed (McCarty 2012, 7). 
A value- neutral version of the study of culture is unachievable, not only for episte-
mological reasons, but also in light of the increasing commercialization of higher 
education that forces the humanities to emphasize values other than those of the 
market, as Martha Nussbaum (2012) argues (see also Tom Clucas in this volume). 
Scholars in the study of culture will thus have to debate, for example, how to address 
political issues without resorting to the programmatic positions of British cultural 
studies, or how the “Heart of Cultural Studies” (Grossberg 2010) relates to the heart 
of the study of culture. If these discussions include a vision of collaborative research 
with participants from outside of academia, the study of culture might be able to 
realign the priorities of the professorate with democratic imperatives, thereby cre-
ating more public space in higher education (see Mathews 1998; Checkoway 2001).
In several influential articles, Clifford Geertz points to the important political 
role scholarly work on culture plays, particularly because of its emphasis on the 
constructedness of knowledge. At its core, Geertz’s essay “Blurred Genres” makes 
a statement on the epistemological independence of the humanities. By reviewing 
their proper area of inquiry as well as their substantial theoretical tools, Geertz 
emphasizes the prominent status of the humanities in the academic construction 
of knowledge. Geertz’s renunciation of “facticity” does not negate the possibil-
ity of substantial arguments. Rather, he invites us to ask different questions and 
to address emerging topics and concerns in academic and social discourse while 
reflecting on the methodological questions with which we are presented. Against 
attempts to mimic physics in order to reach higher predictability and therefore 
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seem more legitimately scientific, Geertz’s approach favors, for example, the inter-
pretation of dynamic variation over the quest for generalizing laws or definitions 
(Geertz 2000 [1980]). The latter runs the risk of violating the fundamental flexibil-
ity, nuance, and variability in the interrelations between the individual and the 
environment. In Geertz’s view, the social sciences, having just freed themselves 
from “dreams of social physics” (Geertz 2000 [1980], 23), can self- confidently 
claim a voice in the process of academic knowledge-construction, not least 
because they are well equipped and much needed in times of a general “muddling 
of vocational identities” (Geertz 2000 [1980], 23). Geertz stresses the historical, 
sociological, comparative, interpretive, and “catch-as-catch-can enterprise” of 
rendering matters understandable as well as the importance of context. Recog-
nizing the grande peur of relativism, Geertz emphasizes diversity not so much in 
an act of exaltation, but rather to argue that we need to take diversity seriously as 
an object of analysis. In regarding pluralism as an entity in and of itself, the par-
ticularities would risk being subsumed in the generalizations, which translates 
to a threatening of social cohesion (values, beliefs) and an endangering of the 
ability to understand each other. The interplay between flexibility and stability 
or, as Mikhail Bakhtin describes it, the tension between centripetal and centrifu-
gal forces, needs to be balanced. Thus, pluralism should be taken seriously, and 
intellectual and social work will need to be vigilant about the balance between 
these tensions as we follow Arjun Appadurai’s call to “collaboratively envisage 
and build a robust anthropology of the future” (Appadurai 2013, 4).
7 The Status of the Study of Culture
As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, imagining possible futures makes 
critical reference to the present and, at the same time, makes us more attuned to 
characteristics of the present (see Katharina Martin and  Christian Sieg 2016). This 
also applies to thinking about the future of the study of culture as an academic 
field in the context of disciplinary formations and degree- awarding institutions. 
It is clear that people and ideas are always on the move, and we might agree that 
there are no strict borders between previously separate disciplines and subdis-
ciplines: that, for example, string theory shares techniques with what used to 
be called condensed matter physics (Peter Galison in this volume). At the same 
time, it has been argued that the interdisciplinary research perspectives consti-
tuting the research field ‘study of culture’ should be transformed into an aca-
demic discipline of its own (see Böhme 2016). What is at stake in these discus-
sions about disciplinarity (see Assmann 2016, ch. 2 and 5), interdisciplinarity (see 
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Bachmann-Medick 2016; Nünning 2016), and transdisciplinary collaboration, is 
the very fabric of the study of culture, including questions of assessment, hiring 
practices, tenure review processes, translatability of research questions, degrees, 
standards, review and assessment cultures, publication cultures (see Endersby 
2016), and notions of best practice across national contexts: in short, the central 
institutional dimensions of the construction of academic knowledge and power.
Including work in the study of culture ranging from institutionalized forms of 
disciplinary formations to the work of (and with) independent scholars, artists, 
activists, and citizens, collaborative research in the study of culture offers us 
opportunities to rethink academic careers, reconceptualize our notions of excel-
lence, reconceptualize our notions of research, and rethink our visions for schol-
arship. We should aim to design administrative and departmental structures that 
recognize diverse forms of scholarship (Bringle, Games, and Malloy 1999) and 
diverse roles in departmental contexts in higher education; that integrate the dif-
ferent phases in academic careers; and that recognize scholars who feel a respon-
sibility towards communities, civic life, and democratic discourse more  generally. 
This might also lead to a rethinking of our curricular designs in the context of 
the study of culture: We should aim to create an interdisciplinary horizon for the 
research field ‘study of culture’ by addressing the very issues of translating schol-
arship across disciplinary, national, and linguistic boundaries, and by engaging 
in an exchange on them together. As Fox and Faver postulate, “[i]n the future, col-
laborations should be used systematically, rather than haphazardly, not only to 
fulfill the needs of individual researchers, but also to advance science and schol-
arship as a whole” (Fox and Faver 1984, 356).
As Arjun Appadurai reminds us in The Future as Cultural Fact, it is “vital to 
build a picture of the historical present that can help us to find the right balance 
between utopia and despair” (2013, 3). Grouped in four clusters, the contribu-
tions in our volume attempt to build this picture as they first point to the horizons 
for our future reflections; second, discuss the political dimensions of possible 
futures of the study of culture; third, rethink inter/disciplinary perspectives, heu-
ristics, and epistemologies; and, fourth, invite us to consider future connectivi-
ties, and emerging topics and concerns.
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Ansgar Nünning
Taking Responsibility for the Future: 
Ten Proposals for Shaping the Future of 
the Study of Culture into a Problem-Solving 
Paradigm
1  On the Need for Rethinking, Reframing, 
and Reinventing the Study of Culture  
for the  Twenty-first Century
There is a curious lack of alignment between the challenges and problems that 
we face in the twenty-first century and the established ways in which academic 
disciplines and institutions have been organized since the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. At an early meeting of the International Advisory Board of the 
International Graduate Centre for the Study of Culture, which is the institutional 
site of knowledge production that has both shaped the observations and propos-
als in this essay, the renowned literary and cultural theorist Ursula Heise from 
UCLA once remarked that there is an unfortunate disparity between many of the 
concerns and issues with which the study of culture tries to come to terms and 
the disciplinary matrix and institutional frameworks within which we operate. 
Note: For this essay I have drawn on and adapted some ideas and formulations that were first 
broached or developed in earlier articles (see especially Nünning 2010, 2012, 2014) and in pas-
sages that I contributed to introductions of co-edited volumes (see, e.g., Baumbach, Michaelis, 
and Nünning 2012; Nünning and Nünning 2010, 2018). Sections 7 and 10 are largely based on a 
reframed summary of Nünning (2014), from which several ideas and passages have been adapt-
ed and only slightly rephrased. Now that the extramural funding from the Excellence Initiative 
and the funding line called ‘Graduate Schools’ have unfortunately come to an end, I have also for 
the first time incorporated some of the ideas that were developed for the original proposal for the 
establishment of the “International Graduate Centre for the Study of Culture” submitted in 2006 
and the renewal proposal of the GCSC from 2012 into an article.
On behalf of all the colleagues who have worked together at the GCSC, the three editors of 
this volume would like to express our and their tremendous gratitude for the generous financial 
support and extramural funding that the GCSC has received through the German Excellence Ini-
tiative from 2006 until 2019. I am also very grateful to my two co-editors, both for doing the lion’s 
share of the editorial work and the fruitful collaboration over the last ten years or so. I would also 
like to thank my secretary Rose Lawson for her careful proof-reading, and Elizabeth Kovach for 
her copy-editing and for making valuable suggestions for improvement.
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Although Ursula Heise no doubt phrased her observations much more elegantly, 
the gist of it was that we are trying to solve twenty-first-century problems with 
theories, concepts, and methods developed in the twentieth century, while 
working within a disciplinary matrix and the constraints of institutions that 
largely emerged in the nineteenth century.
Quite a few scholars and commentators from diverse disciplinary and institu-
tional backgrounds have recently made similar remarks. The well-known German 
social scientist Harald Welzer, for instance, observed that both the programmatic 
political blueprints and the economic and industrial policies that were developed 
in the twentieth century are ill-suited for finding adequate answers to the chal-
lenges of the twenty-first century, especially to the question of how the current 
level of civilization could be maintained with a radically reduced use of resources 
(see Welzer 2013, 220, 288). In a somewhat similar vein, Cathy Davidson also attri-
butes current problems to the disparity between the challenges they pose and the 
outdated strategies we use in trying to cope with them: “If we’re frustrated at the 
information overload, at not being able to manage it all, it may well be that we 
have begun to see the problems around us in a twenty-first century multifaceted 
way, but we’re still acting with the individualistic, product- oriented, task-specific 
rules of the twentieth” (Davidson 2011, 7). In short, we seem to be facing a wide 
range of new challenges and twenty-first-century global (or postmodern) prob-
lems for which there are no ready-made, traditional, or modern solutions.
The disparity between the somewhat ill-suited concepts and methods as 
well as the equally outdated institutional and disciplinary arrangements and 
the most pressing challenges, concerns, and issues that the study of culture is 
faced with in the twenty-first century may be one of the reasons for a loss of 
faith in both the relevance of academic work and our ability to imagine or shape 
the future at large. This is exactly what Lawrence Grossberg, one of the most 
distinguished pioneers of cultural studies in the United States, suggested in his 
seminal book Cultural Studies in the Future Tense: “People seem to be losing their 
faith in their ability to shape the future. It is not that they do not care about 
the future, but that they no longer feel that their caring can shape the future. 
We take no responsibility for the future” (Grossberg 2010, 62, see 284). Although 
many activists and campaigns like ‘Fridays for Future’ serve to show that there 
are indeed people who still retain some faith in their ability to shape the future, 
I tend to agree with Grossberg that the latter have become the exceptions rather 
than the rule. While engaged activists from the younger generation have begun 
to hold politicians and established institutions accountable for the proliferation 
of ecological crises and natural disasters that threaten the future of our planet, 
attempts to respond to cultural issues that matter globally have largely been few 
and far between.
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Taking my cue from these observations, I would like to argue that we need to 
rethink, reframe, and even reinvent the study of culture in such a way as to ensure 
that there will be a better fit between current concerns of the twenty-first century 
(henceforth often abbreviated as C21 concerns or issues), on the one hand, and 
the conceptual, theoretical, and institutional frameworks with or within which 
we operate in the field of the study of culture, on the other hand. Moreover, as the 
title and subtitle of this essay (i.e., an essay in the original sense of the word, viz. 
an attempt) serve to emphasize, this essay argues that we should take responsi-
bility for the future of both the study of culture and the world we live in by actively 
shaping the study of culture into a problem-solving paradigm, thus substantially 
reframing and even reinventing the field, the concepts and frameworks, and the 
projects and practices with which we are engaged. The emphasis in what follows 
will be on making some proposals for how the study of culture can be developed 
in such a way that it will not only have a future but also become an important 
interdisciplinary paradigm for coming to terms with key C21 issues.
Although the emphasis in both this volume and my essay is on the study of 
culture rather than the Anglo-American kind(s) of cultural studies, a contribution 
to a volume entitled Futures of the Study of Culture should offer clear answers to 
the two questions raised in the title of one of Grossberg’s many important essays: 
“Does Cultural Studies Have Futures? Should It?” (2006). I am inclined to answer 
both questions in the affirmative, but I hasten to add that the study of culture will 
only have futures if we take full responsibility for them, i.e., if we are able and 
willing to develop relevant research agendas, reframe the concepts, theories, and 
methods we work with, and to state as clearly as possible why the study of culture 
matters in the twenty-first century more so than ever.
Since the title of this essay may sound grandiose and promise more than 
what I will be able to deliver, three brief provisos seem necessary. First, although 
it might go without saying, what follows is much more modest in scope than the 
comprehensive account that Grossberg delineates in his wide-ranging mono-
graph Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, to which some of the suggestions made 
below are much indebted. Second, what follows does not claim to be about ‘the’ 
challenges, concerns, and issues that both contemporary societies and the study 
of culture are currently facing, but will instead only be able to cover a fraction of 
the wide array of aspects, dimensions, and issues that the topic of this volume 
addresses, focussing on some of the challenges and concerns that have not 
received as much attention as they arguably merit. Third, despite its emphasis 
on the future, this essay is neither an exercise in the emerging field of futures 
studies (aka futurology), nor an attempt to follow in the footsteps of Jonathan 
Swift. Apart from the intertextual reference in the subtitle to Swift’s Juvenalian 
satirical essay, no irony or satire is intended.
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2  Figuring out what is Going on, or: Challenging 
the Hegemonic Master Narratives and Fictions 
that Capitalist Cultures Live by, and Reframing 
Concerns, Conjunctures, and Contexts for the 
Study of Culture in the Twenty-first Century
Although limitations of space preclude the possibility of comprehensively gauging 
what the most pressing challenges and concerns are at present or taking stock of 
the state of the art in the study of culture, taking responsibility for the future 
presupposes understanding “what’s going on in the worlds in which we live” 
(Grossberg 2010, 1) and the institutions in which we work. In his best-selling book 
21 Lessons for the 21st Century, the historian Yuval Noah Harari (2018) provides 
a wide-ranging overview of some of the most important technological and polit-
ical challenges that we are faced with in an age that has variously been dubbed 
the age of acceleration, the age of bewilderment, the age of climate change, the 
Anthropocene, and the digital age. One of the few things that most commentators 
still seem to agree on is that our contexts, technologies, forms of life and work, 
and the concerns that emerge in relation to them have changed so drastically and 
rapidly that most people no longer know what is going on: “it is hard to maintain 
a clear vision. Frequently, we don’t even notice that a debate is going on, or what 
the key questions are” (Harari 2018, ix).
If we accept this general diagnosis, it follows that such a lack of clarity and 
consensus poses a real challenge for the study of culture. It results in not only a 
radically altered context in which there is not even agreement about what the 
agenda or the priorities should be but also new concerns, issues, and research 
questions. As Cathy Davidson observes, “When suddenly, abruptly, our context 
changes, we are forced then to pay attention to all the things we didn’t see before” 
(Davidson 2011, 206). It is anything but clear, however, what we should really 
pay attention to as scholars of culture, because there is no consensus as to what 
the greatest challenges and concerns are in the twenty-first century (see Harari 
2018, 1–2). It is hardly controversial, however, that not only the contexts but also 
the ‘conjunctures’ (see Grossberg 2006, 4) of today’s societies have changed so 
much that it is anything but clear what the most important “Problem-Spaces of 
Cultural Studies” (Grossberg 2010, 43) actually are.
Since any attempt at defining these new conjunctures and problem-spaces 
in a single essay would be doomed to failure, my first two proposals are that we 
should challenge the hegemonic master narratives and fictions that capitalist 
cultures live by, and that we should then try to reframe the main concerns and 
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conjunctures for the study of culture in the twenty-first century accordingly. We 
are currently witnessing a crisis of many of the hegemonic master narratives 
and stories that we (or Americans) live by (see McAdams 2013), and a concomi-
tant emergence of alternative cultural, medial, and narrative ways of sense- and 
worldmaking. The study of culture (or narrative theory, for that matter) has hardly 
begun to address the loss of faith in the master narratives of growth and progress 
(see Hänggi 2015), the proliferation of crisis narratives, broken narratives, and 
new kinds of fictional storytelling like fragmented essay-novels. Being as much 
shaped by contemporary culture as shaping it in turn, this rise of new kinds of 
narratives in twenty-first-century storytelling presents a challenge to both the 
study of culture and the study of narratives, questioning some of their most cher-
ished premises and concepts. In the Appendix of his book Living to Tell About 
It, James Phelan observes that “the living of our lives affects the way we tell our 
stories, where the telling of our stories affects the way we go on living, and where 
part of our living is given over to talking about our telling” (Phelan 2005, 205). 
This observation not only suggests that the way we live and the way we tell our 
stories mutually shape each other; it also implies that wide-ranging changes in 
the way we live will have a profound impact on how we tell stories and what kinds 
of narratives we choose.
Taking my cue from Phelan’s emphasis on the mutual constitution of living 
and storytelling, I should like to venture the hypothesis that we are currently wit-
nessing a crisis of many of the hegemonic master narratives and stories that cap-
italist, or western, cultures live by and a concomitant emergence of alternative 
ways of knowing, sense-, and worldmaking. For worse rather than for better, we 
seem to live in an age in which disrupted lives (see Becker 1997) and broken narra-
tives have become the rule rather than the exception. I would even go so far as to 
maintain that the plethora of broken narratives across a broad range of domains, 
genres, and text-types may suggest that, in a digitally enhanced and fragmented 
age like ours, there may be a change of dominant between the hitherto prevailing 
forms of coherent and linear stories that have served as cultural templates and 
new kinds of broken narratives, fragmented novels, and other fragmentary and 
often multimodal hybrids that combine heterogeneous genres and text-types. In 
a stimulating online-essay, “Fragmentary: Writing in a Digital Age” (2012), Guy 
Patrick Cunningham suggests that “works that deal with fragmentation, that 
eschew not only a traditional narrative structure but the very idea of a work com-
prising a single, unified whole […] take on a special kind of relevance.”
Moreover, in an age of ongoing crises, it is probably no coincidence that 
broken narratives seem to have proliferated in various contexts beyond literature 
and the arts. Salient cases in point include the realms of the economy, banking 
and finance, as well as politics. As a result of the financial crises (see Lanchester 
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2010) and soaring national debts, more and more banks, companies, and even 
states have been confronted with the fact that their cherished corporate or col-
lective narratives no longer match recent developments. When financial dangers, 
debts, distress, and disorganization prevail, the collective narrative that tells the 
story of a firm or a nation may well be broken beyond repair. Moreover, we cur-
rently seem to be witnessing a crisis or even a breakdown of some of the master 
narratives that late capitalism has lived by, and it may well just be a question of 
time until the brokenness and obsolescence of master narratives such as those of 
economic growth, innovation, progress, and ever-growing prosperity will become 
impossible to ignore or overlook.
Being as much shaped by contemporary culture and altered forms of living as 
shaping them in turn, this rise of new kinds of narratives in twenty-first-century 
storytelling presents a challenge to both the study of culture and narrative theory, 
questioning some of their most cherished premises, concepts, and cultural tem-
plates. The phenomena that have been subsumed under the umbrella terms of 
‘broken narratives’ and ‘fragmented novels’ challenge and even undermine key 
assumptions, i.e., that there is such a thing as a logic of narrative and that stories 
are endowed with orderly structures, coherence, and causality. Although it is defi-
nitely much too early to venture any hypotheses about whether such emergent 
narrative forms constitute a change of dominant in contemporary storytelling, 
their emergence and recent proliferation testifies to the fact that narratives not 
only shape cultures and world-models but are also very much shaped by them. 
Broken narratives and fragmented novels foreground wide-ranging changes in 
prevalent forms of life in the twenty-first century (see Jaeggi 2014; Basseler et al. 
2015); they can be seen as articulations of significantly altered experiences in 
rapidly changing cultural contexts.
One of the most promising approaches to reframing concerns and contexts 
for the study of culture in the twenty-first century, therefore, seems to be to focus 
on the way in which cultures shape narratives and vice versa (see Nünning 2012). 
Renowned cultural psychologists go so far as to claim that “Storytelling becomes 
entwined with, even at times constitutive of, cultural life” (Bruner 2002, 31) and 
that, in our daily autobiographical practice of narrating our lives, “we draw some 
of our best material from master cultural narratives” (McAdams 2013, 84). Dan 
P. McAdams even goes so far as to maintain that we are still relatively ignorant 
about the key concepts and processes that shape cultures: “Beyond making 
vague references to things like ‘my religious heritage’ or ‘the American Dream,’ 
we tend to have remarkably little insight into the ways our lives are framed by 
cultural categories, values, and norms” (McAdams 2013, 271). His wide-ranging 
and brilliant account of the stories Americans live by could well serve as a model 
to be emulated in the study of other cultures:
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I would submit that life stories are more reflective of and shaped by culture than any other 
aspect of personality. Stories are at the centre of culture. More than favored goals and values, 
I believe, stories differentiate one culture from the next. I have argued throughout this book 
that the stories people live by say as much about culture as they do about the people who 
live and tell them. Our own life stories draw on the stories we learn as active participants 
in culture – stories about childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and aging. Stories capture 
and elaborate metaphors and images that are especially resonant in a given culture. Stories 
distinguish between what culture glorifies as good characters and vilifies as bad characters. 
 (McAdams 2013, 284)
Exploring the ways in which cultures shape narratives just as much as narra-
tives shape cultures could thus be an especially promising approach in order to 
reframe concerns and contexts for the study of culture in the twenty-first century. 
Since narratives can be conceptualized as “culturally mediated practices of 
(re)interpreting experience” (Meretoja 2018, 2), scholars engaged in both narra-
tive studies and the study of culture need to be more “sensitive to the ways in 
which narratives as practices of sense-making are embedded in social, cultural, 
and historical worlds” (2). In order to come to grips with the ways in which cul-
tures and narratives mutually constitute one another, we need to know much 
more about different communities’ “stored narrative resources” (Bruner 1990, 
67–68), what Bruner calls “culture’s narrative resources” (2002, 93) and the cul-
tural categories, values, and norms that frame and shape our lives.
3  Exploring Cultural Ways of Worldmaking 
as a Paradigm for the Study of Culture  
in the Twenty-first Century
If we accept the view delineated above that nobody can really tell what is hap-
pening right now due to an overload of information and a proliferation of compet-
ing accounts, narratives, and fictions (sensu Harari 2016, 2018), then challenging 
the hegemonic master narratives and reframing concerns and conjunctures for 
the study of culture in the twenty-first century needs to be supplemented with an 
exploration of how the worlds that we live in are fabricated or made. The news, 
for instance, purports merely to report what has happened but it really does much 
more than that. As Alain de Botton shrewdly observes in his book The News: “The 
news […] fails to disclose that it does not merely report on the world, but is instead 
constantly at work crafting a new planet in our minds in line with its own often 
highly distinctive priorities” (de Botton 2014, 11). Media and especially the news 
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thrive on catastrophes and crises, for instance, but what is often forgotten is that 
focussing on natural cataclysms and disaster and operating in a 24/7 crisis mode 
tell us more about the highly distinctive priorities of the media in question and their 
ways of worldmaking than about what is really going on in the world. As Susan 
Faludi has shown in her Pulitzer-Prize-winning and ground-breaking book Back-
lash (1991), the same holds true for the ways in which media campaigns often resort 
to dubious means such as skewed reporting with little or no evidence, wilfully fic-
titious news stories about alleged trends and the reinforcement of cultural myths 
and stereotypes that discredit feminist aspirations and obstruct women’s equality.
In order to figure out what the main concerns and issues are in our present 
contexts and conjunctures, we need to know much more about how specific 
media and narratives establish and disseminate agendas, priorities, and worlds. 
Two related research questions concern the extent to which ways of worldmaking 
are not only imbued with cultural and ethical values but also implicated in power 
relations. The study of culture should thus pay much more attention to the ways 
in which media, metaphors, and narratives shape the cultural life of catastrophes 
and crises (see Meiner and Veel 2012; Nünning 2012), making highly biased media-
worlds that strongly distort people’s prevailing views. The main point here is not 
just that the degree of what the late Hans Rosling (2018) has felicitously called 
“factfulness” is often dubious or questionable in the crisis-prone worldview that 
the media tend to project but that we tend to lose sight of both the ways in which 
“mediashock” (Grusin 2015) and the worlds of news and popular culture are 
made, as well as long-term developments that are arguably much more important.
Although there is broad consensus by now that narratives are of great impor-
tance for the ways in which we make sense of our experiences and the world, 
neither narrative theory nor the study of culture have been much concerned with 
the ways in which events, stories, and fictional or real worlds are made, or with 
the functions that various forms of cultural worldmaking can fulfil (see Nünning 
2010). Narratives are at work in processes such as identity formation, the forging 
of communities and nations, the negotiation and dissemination of norms and 
values, and the fabrication of storied versions of ‘the world.’ As Jerome Bruner 
aptly observed, “narrative, including fictional narrative, gives shape to things in 
the real world and often bestows on them a title to reality” (2002, 8).
The constructivist notions that provide the epistemological underpinnings 
of Nelson Goodman’s approach pertain to a wide range of different domains 
of worldmaking and to many cultural ways of worldmaking that we find in the 
media. They range all the way from Making Selves, to borrow the subtitle of a 
seminal book by Paul John Eakin (1999), to worldmaking in such domains as pol-
itics, law, and economics. The question of ways of worldmaking is particularly 
important in the case of narratives (both factual and fictional), as well as other 
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literary genres and artistic media, in that stories are endowed with performa-
tive power, functioning as world-building media that project alternatives to the 
world-models that we generally regard as ‘reality.’ In addition, narratives often 
self-reflexively foreground and explore many of the epistemological and onto-
logical questions involved in worldmaking. It thus does not come as a surprise 
that Jerome Bruner observed that “Nelson Goodman’s constructivism arms one 
well to appreciate the complexities of self- and life-making” (Bruner 1991, 17), 
although it is equally clear that his analytical toolbox needs to be supplemented 
by other concepts. W. J. T. Mitchell was the first to explicitly address the question 
of “exactly what Goodman is excluding under the rubric of value” (Mitchell 1991, 
23), exploring “the scope of Goodman’s project, what lies inside and outside the 
domain of his inquiry” (Mitchell 1991, 24). According to Mitchell, “there are three 
basic subject areas that Goodman routinely excludes from his system: values, 
knowledge, and history” (24), but there are also other domains, forms, and func-
tions of worldmaking that did not fall within Goodman’s philosophical purview 
(see Nünning and Nünning 2010, 12–16).
While there is quite a lot of research and debate on the ways in which narra-
tives serve as one of the most important means of self-making, neither narrative 
theory nor the study of culture have been much concerned with the performa-
tive power that storytelling exerts in many domains beyond narrative fiction and 
autobiography. Narratives, for instance, also contribute to what may be called 
‘community-making,’ with genres and culturally available plots serving as the 
main interfaces between the making of selves and the making of communities. 
Narratives can be endowed with performative power, actively moulding, con-
structing, or even creating the cultural and ideological conflicts that they purport 
to merely reflect or represent. The stories disseminated by George W. Bush and 
his administration are a case in point. As an examination of former President 
Bush’s speeches shows, his narratives of crisis not only offer paradigm exam-
ples of how storytelling can serve to make worlds and generate conflicts, but they 
also serve to illustrate that even wilfully fictitious stories can become ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ (see Nünning and Nünning 2017). Several notable excep-
tions notwithstanding, narrative theory has yet to fully grasp such influential and 
ubiquitous narrative ways of worldmaking as “The News” (see de Botton 2014), 
the so-called ‘social’ networking services like Facebook, and the forms and func-
tions of storytelling in organizations, politics, law, economics, and many other 
fields. The study of culture would certainly stand to gain if it paid more atten-
tion to the multiple functions that narratives perform (see the articles in Erll and 
Sommer 2019).
As I have argued elsewhere (Nünning and Nünning 2010), the complex pro-
cesses involved in cultural and, particularly, narrative ways of worldmaking 
38   Ansgar Nünning
could well serve as a paradigm for the study of culture in the twenty-first century. 
Since “no one area of study can come to terms with the multidimensional com-
plexity of narrative worldmaking” (Herman 2011, ix), Goodman’s constructivist 
premises and his general approach tally well with the interdisciplinary nature of 
research in the study of culture. Although Goodman’s analytical theory of world-
making provides a highly flexible framework for comparative inquiry, it needs 
to be further developed and supplemented so that it becomes applicable to a 
broad range of cultural activities and processes, including journalism, literature, 
film, music, computer games, and other media. An alliance between theories of 
symbol systems (as delineated by Ernst Cassirer and Goodman), which pertain 
equally well to verbal, non-verbal, and performative ways of worldmaking (see 
Mitchell 1991, 25), and approaches developed by cultural studies could be an 
important force in the current reconceptualization of the study of culture: Such 
an alliance can open productive possibilities for the analysis of both the relation-
ship between cultural ways of worldmaking and their changing contexts, and the 
epistemological, historical, and cultural implications of symbolic systems and 
signifying practices involved in worldmaking. In addition, such a move could 
throw new light on both the diachronic development of cultural ways of world-
making and their changing functions. Another reason why the approach dubbed 
‘cultural ways of worldmaking’ could serve as a model for the study of culture 
in the twenty-first century is thus its broad scope, which opens up a wide range 
of possible applications to diverse disciplines and fields of inquiry. The latter 
include the ways in which not just the news, media and politics but also the arts, 
humanities, and sciences and their academic ways of worldmaking constitute our 
everyday worlds.
The main reason why the issues involved in cultural ways of worldmaking 
could serve as a paradigm for the study of culture in the twenty-first century is 
that “it shifts attention from ‘culture’ or ‘cultural objects,’ assumed to exist, ready 
to be examined, to the level of the concepts that we deploy to construct the objects 
of inquiry in the first place” (Nünning and Nünning 2010, 19). If we do not have 
access to the real world as such, and if the fictions, metaphors, and narratives 
we live by shape our mental worlds, then the most crucial issue is the question 
of how such worlds or world models are constructed and conceptualized in the 
first place. This question pertains to all the different actors, institutions, levels, 
and media involved in worldmaking, ranging all the way from first-order observa-
tions by participants in the cultural field to various second-order or even higher- 
level observations by which old and new media make their worlds. The para-
digm of cultural ways of worldmaking could thus be productively aligned with 
other approaches in cultural, media, and social theory, such as Bruno Latour’s 
actor-network theory.
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4  Re-Aligning the Study of Culture with Emerging 
Challenges, Concerns, and Problematics  
of the Twenty-first Century: New Conjunctures 
and Directions for the Study of Culture
The suggestions made in the previous section were not meant to imply that the 
topic of cultural ways of worldmaking should be regarded as the paradigm of 
the study of culture, although it would arguably merit much greater attention 
than it has hitherto been granted. It was rather meant to serve as a paradigm 
example of how the research questions, concepts, and theoretical frameworks 
of the study of culture could be reframed to better re-align them with emerging 
challenges and current concerns. Although the notion of conjunctures (see Gross-
berg 2010, 40–53, 57–101) as one of the key concepts of cultural studies has not 
gained much traction in European versions of the study of culture, I completely 
agree with Grossberg’s claims that exploring cultural phenomena and processes 
should be conceptualized as an inherently dynamic, flexible, and open-ended 
project rather than as a fixed and static discipline, and that it should also strive 
to construct the most relevant conjunctures. What Grossberg dubs “conjunctural 
analysis” or simply “conjuncturalism” “is a description of change, articulation, 
and contradiction; it describes a mobile multiplicity, the unity of which is always 
temporary and fractured” (Grossberg 2010, 41). Rather than examining a clearly 
delimited set of events or objects, the study of culture should thus respond to 
the ever-changing concerns, contexts, and problems that emerge in particular 
social formations and their ongoing debates about cultural issues. What Gross-
berg claims about cultural studies arguably pertains just as well to the study of 
culture: “Too many have forgotten that cultural studies is about conjunctures, 
and that to do it successfully, it has to reinvent itself – its theories, politics, and 
questions – in response to conjunctural conditions and demands” (65).
With a view to the future of the study of culture, it seems of paramount 
importance to take the inherently dynamic nature of the cultural phenomena and 
processes that constitute the objects of inquiry into account, defining research 
priorities in response to changing challenges and contexts and constructing con-
junctures accordingly. Rather than think in terms of a limited number of fixed 
research areas, it seems much more productive to attempt to identify emerging 
concerns, issues, and topics that cut across disciplines and research fields. Such 
key recent issues include, for instance, the proliferation of crises in finance and 
the economy, the challenges involved in climate change, global warming, and 
demographic change, and the far-reaching consequences of such wide-ranging 
40   Ansgar Nünning
transformations as digitalization, globalization, and global migration. Cutting 
across the dividing lines between culture, technology, science, and society, these 
and other processes all constitute transdisciplinary challenges that should change 
the research priorities of the study of culture. The study of culture has yet to come 
to terms with such challenges as those posed by ethics in digital cultures (Spieker-
mann 2019; see also Erll et al. 2008) and the equally challenging questions sur-
rounding the impact of digital media on how we think (see Hayles 2012; S. Green-
field 2014), or How to be Human in the Age of the Machine, to quote the subtitle of 
Hannah Fry’s (2018) recent book about the benefits and dangers of an increasingly 
algorithm- and data-driven world.
I would now like to single out at least some of the most important issues and 
trends to which the study of culture could devote much more attention. These 
include, for instance, the unprecedented degree of commercialization of culture 
(both high-brow and popular), the radically altered media ecology that consti-
tutes the cultural environment, and the unprecedented rise of digital information 
technologies and networks (see e.g. Morozov 2013; A. Greenfield 2017). Among 
the catalysts that have recently enhanced changes in the cultural field are the 
acceleration of digital innovations, the unprecedented growth of digital monopo-
lies (see Taplin 2016), and the pervasive “colonization” of both everyday life and 
the domestic sphere by networked devices, products, and services provided by 
digital information technologies (see A. Greenfield 2017, 36, 286 and passim). 
Although the ongoing boom of the radical technologies that Adam Greenfield has 
analyzed and critiqued in his seminal monograph Radical Technologies (2017) is 
such a complex topic that it cannot be delineated here, it is important for anyone 
who is trying to understand the ways in which contemporary cultures are evolving 
to remember just how comprehensively the digital information technologies and 
networks that so many people nowadays take for granted have changed every-
day experience, completely reshaping prevalent forms of life in the twenty-first 
century:
Networked digital information technology looms ever larger in all of our lives. It shapes our 
perceptions, conditions the choices available to us, and remakes our experiences of space 
and time. […] It even inhibits our ability to think meaningfully about the future, tending to 
reframe any conversation about the reality we want to live in as a choice between varying 
shades of technical development.  (A. Greenfield 2017, 8)
The dominant forms of life and everyday experience in what Roberto Simanowski 
has christened Facebook-Gesellschaft (2016), i.e., Facebook society, and, even more 
so, in the more recent worlds dominated by Instagram, Snapchat, and Twitter, are 
largely shaped by digital information technologies (see A. Greenfield 2017) and 
their relentless rhythms of round-the-clock communication and consumption that 
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the art historian Jonathan Crary (2014) has exposed and critiqued in his brilliant 
but somber exploration of nonstop neoliberal capitalism, 24/7. Crary’s analyses 
tally well with the observations that the late sociologist Zygmunt Bauman made 
in his book Consuming Life (2007). Bauman uses the brilliantly polyvalent term 
‘consuming life’ to describe the large degree to which contemporary forms of life 
are centered around the paradigm of consumption, transforming a society of pro-
ducers into a society of consumers who end up consuming their lives. Contrib-
uting to a transformation of the consumer into a commodity, digital and social 
media (see Lanier 2018) arguably play a central role in the process of reconfiguring 
cultures and forms of life, affecting the very basics of life. As Crary (2014) shows, 
we are beginning to sacrifice sleep to a marketplace that operates 24/7, resulting 
in a collective fatigue that increasingly characterizes our dominant forms of life. 
The rapid acceleration of all walks of life in late capitalism has generated a 24/7 
lifestyle that provides hardly any space to breathe. We are supposed to consume 
and communicate electronically round the clock, being monitored with digital 
surveillance techniques that would have made George Orwell’s Big Brother blush 
with envy. According to Crary, this process will eventually lead to the end of sleep 
(see Crary 2014) and, in his brilliant analysis of the contemporary cultural imagi-
nary, he illustrates perceptively how the widely used expression ‘digital age’ can 
be regarded as a questionable act of historiographic construction. It does not con-
stitute a neutral representation of contemporary culture at all but rather blocks 
out a large number of aspects and experiences that are just as constitutive for the 
culture(s) of today but incommensurable with the culture’s fixation on technical 
progress and growth: “This pseudo-historical formulation of the present age as a 
digital age, supposedly homologous with a ‘bronze age’ or ‘steam age,’ perpetu-
ates the illusion of a unifying and durable coherence to the many incommensura-
ble constituents of contemporary experience” (Crary 2014, 36).
Therefore, the disruptions brought about by the rise of digital information 
technologies and the concomitant changes in dominant forms of life, as far- 
reaching as they have been, are by no means the only relevant contexts against 
which recent developments and trajectories of contemporary cultures should be 
gauged. On the contrary, it would be equally (in)accurate to claim that we are 
living in an age of crises (e.g., the debt crisis, other financial crises, or the refugee 
crisis), an age of terrorism and the so-called ‘war on terror’ (see Hodges 2011), an 
age of surveillance, an age of climate change, and the Anthropocene (see Harari 
2016, ch. 2), or an age of world-wide migration and refugee crises.
Moreover, any attempt to construct the most relevant conjunctures of today’s 
cultures has to acknowledge that these diverse contextual developments are not 
isolated but rather interlinked in various ways. The banking and debt crises, 
for instance, were not just cataclysmic events in the systems of finance and the 
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economy but rather had devastating consequences for society as a whole, chang-
ing cultures, the mental climate, and the dominant hierarchy of values in signif-
icant ways. As the prolific journalist and novelist John Lanchester has shown in 
his highly readable account of the financial crisis entitled Whoops! Why Every-
one Owes Everyone and No One Can Pay, the “hegemony of economic, or quasi- 
economic, thinking” (Lanchester 2010, 187) has been so damaging for Britain and 
the Western world at large because the “economic metaphor came to be applied 
to every aspect of modern life, especially the areas where it simply didn’t belong” 
(187–188). He goes on to argue that instead of having discussions about values 
and principles, the emphasis has almost exclusively been on costs:
In Britain in the last twenty to thirty years that has all been the wrong way round. There was 
a kind of reverse takeover, in which City values came to dominate the whole of British life. 
There needs to be a general acceptance that the model has failed. […] the model which spread 
from the City to government and from there through the whole culture, in which the idea of 
value has gradually faded to be replaced by the idea of price.  (Lanchester 2010, 188)
These examples may suffice to illustrate what should be taken into consideration 
in attempts at constructing conjunctures that would re-align the study of culture 
with key C21 concerns. Even the apparently arcane world of finance or the bank 
and debt crises of the economy, just like ubiquitous digital information technolo-
gies, have had, and continue to have, far-reaching consequences for culture and 
society at large, shaping not just the dominant hierarchy of values and ideologies, 
but also the design of everyday life and prevailing notions about living together in 
a multicultural world. Although the major difficulties in constructing a research 
agenda and defining priorities derive from the fact that there are so many different 
cultural, economic, political, social, and technological contexts that could, and 
should, be taken into consideration, it is of great importance that we begin to con-
struct new conjunctures by describing and explaining the concomitant changes 
in the cultural spheres and relating them to one or several of these contexts. Many 
cultural practitioners have responded to the various crises that have occurred in 
the aftermath of 9/11 and the so-called ‘war on terror,’ the banking and debt crises 
since 2008, as well as many further cultural and social issues that have shaped 
the new millennium. These include, for instance, the ‘costs’ of modernization, 
acceleration and globalization, which manifest themselves in, e.g., performance 
indicators, evaluations, and ‘burnout’ in the brave new worlds of ‘new public 
management’ (see Bartmann 2012) and disruptions in the job market in many 
branches and industries. Other questions about contemporary cultures revolve 
around the fact that we are living in multicultural societies that are increasingly 
marked by worldwide migration, competing forms of life and values, and conflicts 
of integration and identity that result from these developments.
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Moreover, processes of slow change and gradual transformation such as 
climate change and global warming, “mind change” (S. Greenfield 2014) and 
the disruptions caused by digital technologies (see A. Greenfield 2017) in a wide 
range of cultural forms of production, from journalism and music (see Taplin 
2017) to the literary field, certainly deserve much more sustained attention within 
the study of culture. The same holds true for the wide-ranging and devastat-
ing effects that economic competition and the doctrine of growth has had, and 
continues to have, on the ecology and environment: “Even as economic dispar-
ity is increasing, competition is urged with fundamentalist fervor as the single 
solution to all problems. Ecological health continues to elude us – and perhaps 
indeed depends upon the reconstruction of patterns of thought” (Mary Catherine 
Bateson 2000, xii; in: Bateson 1972/2000).
In order to ensure that the study of culture will have a sustainable future, it 
is not enough to merely address and respond to such changing concerns, con-
texts, and their respective problematics. Rather, we must attempt to develop such 
emergent problematics into fully-fledged research fields. The French literary his-
torian Yves Citton has done just that with regard to what he has felicitously called 
the recent shift “From Attention Economy to Attention Ecology” (Citton 2018, 1), 
serving as a model well worth emulating. Although he concedes that “hyper- 
attention fed by digital acceleration is not inevitably going to undermine the foun-
dations of our capacity for deep concentration,” he hastens to add that “some-
thing major is being reconfigured, in which the distribution of attention already 
plays a major role. […] Attention is the crucial resource of our epoch” (Citton 2018, 
10). Citton not only outlines a highly fruitful approach to the new research field of 
what the title of his book names “the ecology of attention,” but he also develops 
a coherent conceptual and theoretical framework for exploring the wide-ranging 
changes that we have witnessed in the spheres of “Attention Regimes” (27), “Atten-
tional Capitalism” (44) and “The Digitalization of Attention” (63), to quote some of 
the key concepts used as chapter titles in Part I one of his book, in which he also 
includes some words of advice and warning that we would ignore at our own peril:
Knowing how to choose our alienations and our enthralments, knowing how to estab-
lish vacuoles of silence capable of protecting us from the incessant communication that 
overloads us with crushing information, knowing how to inhabit the switches between 
hyper-focusing and hypo-focusing – this is what aesthetic experiences (musical, cine-
matic, theatrical, literary or video-gaming) can help us do with our attention, since atten-
tion is always just as much something that we do (by ourselves) as something that we pay 
(to another).  (Citton 2018, 19)
At the risk of repetition, I would like to reiterate what I said at the beginning of 
this section: The discussion of these new contexts and concerns is not meant to 
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suggest that these developments should be regarded as the new objects or the 
most important topics of the study of culture. They are rather meant to serve as 
paradigm examples that could illustrate how the research profile and priorities of 
the study of culture could be better aligned with major concerns, challenges, and 
pressing problems of the twenty-first century.
5  Recalibrating Key Concepts for the Study 
of Culture in the Twenty-first Century:  
Stock-taking and Enriching our Conceptual 
and Theoretical Frameworks 
The next proposal follows directly from the previous one in that the suggestion to 
re-align the study of culture with emerging challenges, concerns, and problemat-
ics of the twenty-first century necessitates taking stock of the concepts we have 
been working with, recalibrating them and enriching the extant conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks by developing additional concepts in order to account for 
new contexts, conjunctures, and problematics. The notion of ‘travelling concepts’ 
as developed by the Dutch cultural theorist Mieke Bal (2002) has had a remark-
able impact on recent approaches in cultural analysis and the study of culture at 
large, opening up new avenues for interdisciplinary exchange, while also intro-
ducing an important self-reflexive dimension to the field. Bal’s fruitful project 
proceeds from the assumption that concepts are indispensable for the study of 
culture because they are “the tools of intersubjectivity” and “key to intersubjec-
tive understanding” in that “they facilitate discussion on the basis of a common 
language” (Bal 2002, 22). Bal also observes that concepts “offer miniature theo-
ries” (22), also referred to as “shorthand theories” (23), a claim based on the influ-
ential concepts that metonymically represent, or evoke, more complex  theories – 
such as, for example, cultural memory (see Erll and Nünning 2008).
Following in Bal’s footsteps, several recent volumes have not only traced the 
dynamic travelling of concepts between academic disciplines and across research 
cultures (see, e.g., Baumbach et al. 2012), but they have also provided an over-
view of main concepts and cutting-edge research fields in the study of culture (see 
Neumann and Nünning 2012). The chapters in these volumes also show that the 
“meaning, reach, and operational value” (Bal 2002, 24) of concepts differ between 
disciplines, academic cultures, and historical periods. Concepts in the study of 
culture are usually not univocal, fixed, or firmly established. Rather they are 
dynamic and flexible, undergoing semantic changes as they travel back and forth 
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“between disciplines, between individual scholars, between historical periods, 
and between geographically dispersed academic communities” (Bal 2002, 24), 
which are often shaped by different national research cultures and  traditions.
Taking stock of the travelling concepts we have been working with in the 
study of culture and their respective journeys, however, is arguably not enough 
if we want to realign our conceptual and theoretical frameworks with current 
concerns and emerging fields. This involves much more than simply making an 
inventory of key concepts. Rather, it entails a sober exploration of the unspoken 
assumptions, implications, and ideological baggage that concepts in the field of 
cultural analysis typically entail. To a much greater extent than in the sciences, 
we do not deal with clearly defined concepts but rather conceptual metaphors 
and metaphorical concepts. Travelling across various axes, key concepts in the 
study of culture tend to gravitate into the force fields of metaphors and narratives 
(see Baumbach et al. 2012). Imbued with, and shaped by, their respective histor-
ical and national traditions, concepts typically come with an array of semantic 
implications, often including ideological freight, unconscious biases, and nor-
mative implications.
In order to decide whether established concepts are still adequate in address-
ing current concerns and research questions, an especially promising approach 
may well be to carefully examine their semantic implications and their respective 
affordances and constraints. While the notion of constraints refers to both the 
limitations of a concept, pattern or shape and its unacknowledged ideological 
implications or presuppositions, the term ‘affordance’ foregrounds the range of 
possibilities or potentialities a concept entails or opens. In her convincing and 
powerful proposal for a new formalism that serves to connect aesthetic, literary, 
and symbolic forms to historical, political, and social contexts, Caroline Levine 
introduces the concepts of affordances and constraints as follows:
To capture the complex operations of social and literary forms, I borrow the concept of 
affordance from design theory. Affordance is a term used to describe the potential uses of 
actions latent in materials and designs. […] Let’s now use affordances to think about form. 
The advantage of this perspective is that it allows us to grasp both the specificity and the 
generality of forms – both the particular constraints and possibilities that different forms 
afford, and the fact that those patterns and arrangements carry their affordances with them 
as they move across time and space.  (Levine 2015, 6)
This perspective can be applied to the key concepts we work with in the study 
of culture. We can interrogate the respective affordances and constraints of dif-
ferent concepts. In his analysis of the concept of globalization, Grossberg has, 
for instance, convincingly demonstrated that discourses of globalization tend 
to have very particular affordances and constraints in that the presuppositions 
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of this concept inevitably “set up a particular structural logic – an inescapable 
binary logic of the global vs. the local, which is applied across every possible 
dimension” (Grossberg 2010, 60). The same arguably holds true for many of 
the key concepts of postcolonial theory and postcolonial discourse analysis, to 
mention just two additional cases in point. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown in 
his influential book Provincializing Europe, every case of transferring a cultural, 
economic or political concept, model or theory from one context to another is “a 
problem of translation” (Chakrabarty 2000/2008, 17) – a translation of existing 
worlds, their “conceptual horizons” and their thought-categories into the context, 
concepts and horizons of another life-world (see Chakrabarty 2000/2008, 71). He 
also draws attention to the important but often unacknowledged facts that any 
seemingly “abstract and universal idea” can “look utterly different in different 
historical contexts,” no country is “a model to another country,” “historical dif-
ferences actually make a difference,” and “no human society is a tabula rasa” 
(Chakrabarty 2000/2008, xii). What Chakrabarty observes about the “universal 
concepts of political modernity” also holds true for every approach and concept 
in the study of culture that is transferred from one academic context or discipline 
to another: such travelling concepts “encounter pre-existing concepts, catego-
ries, institutions, and practices through which they get translated and configured 
differently” (xii). This should be kept in mind when trying to gauge the challenges 
and possibilities offered by the notion of travelling concepts in general and when 
assessing the usefulness and limitations of particular key concepts for coming to 
terms with C21 concerns.
The need to recalibrate and update key concepts in the study of culture is not 
only a result of constantly changing contexts. It also arises from the fact that con-
cepts are ‘operative terms’ (see Welsch 1997); they are never merely descriptive 
but “also programmatic and normative” (Bal 2002, 28). Concepts construct and 
change the very objects to which they are applied (see Welsch 1997, 20), “entailing 
new emphases and a new ordering of the phenomena within the complex objects 
constituting the cultural field” (Bal 2002, 33). It is thus vital for the development 
of the study of culture in an interdisciplinary and transnational framework that 
we maintain awareness of these epistemological implications and continue to 
develop new and more nuanced concepts for addressing the constantly changing 
cultural fields of the twenty-first century.
Relatively recent additions to our conceptual repertoire have been the con-
cepts of affect, media events and “mediashock” (Grusin 2015), ‘ritual dynamics’ 
as developed by the science of ritual (see Michaels 2010–2011), transculturality, 
resilience, and the notion of cultural resources. The latter is the key concept 
around which the projects in the collaborative research centre “RessourceCul-
tures” at the University of Tübingen revolve, which focuses on the socio-cultural 
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dynamics of using resources. In order to gain a better understanding of how 
cultures and societies manage to cope with the kinds of crises that Europe has 
been faced with for more than a decade, the study of culture should, for instance, 
explore the cultural resources of resilience.
Recalibrating key concepts for the study of culture involves not only develop-
ing new categories and enriching extant theoretical frameworks but also refram-
ing and retheorizing concepts that have been around for a while but were never 
fully explicated (see Berning et al. 2014). An obvious case in point is Raymond 
Williams’ rich notion of “structure of feeling,” which has only recently (re)gained 
the attention it deserves in a volume that explores the importance of affectiv-
ity in various research areas of the study of culture (see Sharma and Tygstrup 
2015). Similarly, the essays in a volume edited by Doris Bachmann-Medick and 
Jens Kugele (2018) revisit established analytical tools in the study of migration, 
showing that we need to reframe migration if we approach it from a conceptual 
perspective and confront established terminologies with recent cultural and dis-
cursive frameworks as well as historical and political realities that are all too 
often referred to as ‘the refugee crisis,’ a biased and loaded term that already 
frames the events in an ideologically and politically charged manner. Chang-
ing concepts in this field involves, for instance, taking practices of visibility and 
visualization (including invisibility and making unwelcome people invisible) 
into account, reframing mobility and the structure of the collective unconscious, 
taking a fresh look at border regimes and borders as conflict zones, and recon-
ceptualizing migration as translation (for detailed explorations, see the essays in 
Bachmann-Medick and Kugele 2018).
In order to avoid possible or even obvious misunderstandings, I would like to 
emphasize, however, that the plea to re-align the study of culture with emerging 
challenges, concerns, and C21 problematics is by no means meant to suggest that 
the concepts and issues surrounding, e.g., identity politics have lost any of their 
former relevance. On the contrary, both the categories of race, class, and gender, 
and ongoing debates about structural racism, blatant or latent misogyny, and 
other ingrained forms of inequality continue to be as relevant as they were in the 
twentieth century. One could even go so far as to say that there is a dire need for 
more research on the subtle forms that racism, misogyny, and anti-feminism have 
taken in the twenty-first century and that there has been a backlash against both 
anti-racism and feminism. As Reni Eddo-Lodge (2018, 99–100) has persuasively 
shown, in Britain there has been “a backlash against conversations about white 
privilege” (Eddo-Lodge 2018, 99) and “a backlash against any and all anti-racist 
organising” (100). Similarly, in the preface to the 15th anniversary edition of Back-
lash, originally published in 1991, Faludi shows that we have witnessed several 
developments in the twenty-first century that are arguably “worse than backlash” 
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(2006, xiii) in that “the very fundaments of feminism have been recast in com-
mercial terms” (xiv): “The feminist ethic of economic independence has become 
the golden apple of buying power”, the “feminist ethic of self-determination has 
turned into the golden apple of ‘self-improvement’” (xv), and “the feminist ethic 
of public agency has shape-shifted into the golden apple of publicity” (xv).
The recent boom of so-called ‘social media’ and the concomitant emergence of 
a “Facebook society” (Simanowski 2015), a Twitter-filter bubble, Instagram, Snap-
chat, and YouTube cultures revolving almost entirely around people’s physical 
appearance not only amply substantiate these prophetic statements, but they also 
underscore the need to rethink feminism and identity politics in new conceptual, 
contextual, and theoretical frameworks. Moreover, as recent research in intersec-
tionality has demonstrated, we should redirect our attention from a focus on just 
one of the categories of difference that define identities to the various ways in which 
age, class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, nationality, and others are entangled and 
interlinked with radically altered media environments, networked digital informa-
tion technologies, and an equally changed economy and ecology of attention (see 
Citton 2018). In addition, such recent media phenomena as the worlds generated 
by Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube, or “WeTube” (see Greif 2016, 200–210), and 
the peculiar “Reality of Reality Television” (177–199) have yet to receive the degree 
of attention that they arguably deserve as new cultural ways of worldmaking.
6  Responding to the Epistemological Crisis and 
Proliferation of Fictions: Reclaiming Authority, 
Credibility, and Truth for the Study of Culture
The next proposal is a direct follow-up to the previous one in that the key con-
cepts of objectivity and truth upon which research in the humanities and the 
sciences are based, just like the notion of scientific knowledge, have recently 
been challenged. Although the challenging of scientific truth is not a recent phe-
nomenon but something that has quite a long and sorry history, it has gained 
new urgency in an age in which the distinctions between fact and fiction have 
become increasingly blurred and in which oxymora like ‘alternative facts’ or 
dubious notions like ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are gaining currency. As the his-
torians of science Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway have demonstrated in their 
seminal book Merchants of Doubt (2012), not only journalists and politicians but 
also groups of scientists have been involved in disseminating doubt about “the 
Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming,” as the subtitle of their 
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book succinctly states. In recent years, debates about what is really going on, 
about whether the consensus that science has established about global threats 
such as climate change and global warming can be trusted, has become even 
more ferocious, often revealing a blatant lack of respect for research and the very 
notion of scientific knowledge. If counter-narratives without a shred of scientific 
evidence can be constructed and disseminated by popular and so-called social 
media, gaining wide acceptance and even credibility, then genuine research will 
sooner or later be in dire straits.
One of the most pernicious effects of these alarming tendencies, which 
pertain to every academic discipline, is the proliferation of “ideological fictions” 
(Harari 2016, 151). Such fictions not only have the power to sow seeds of doubt 
(see Oreskes and Conway 2012, 66) and call scientific consensus into question, 
but they can even undermine the notions of objective reality and scientific truth: 
“As human fictions are translated into genetic and electronic codes, the inter-
subjective reality will swallow up the objective reality and biology will merge 
with history” (Harari 2016, 151). Although Harari has quipped that “humans 
have always lived in the age of post-truth” and that homo sapiens could even be 
defined as “a post-truth species, whose power depends on creating and believing 
fictions” (2018, 233), the proliferation of ‘alternative facts,’ fake news, and ideo-
logical fictions constitutes a real challenge to academic work, scholarly research, 
and the notion of scientific knowledge, threatening the very existence of univer-
sities as institutions in their own right.
On the other hand, the proliferation of various kinds of fictions is also a great 
challenge and opportunity for the study of culture in that it opens up an import-
ant new field of research. As experts in both literary fiction and cultural ways of 
self-, community-, and worldmaking (see section 2 above), scholars engaged in the 
study of culture should apply their conceptual expertise, methodological know-
how, and analytical research techniques to understand how such ideological fic-
tions are constructed and disseminated as well as the functions they fulfill. Simply 
dismissing ideological fictions as bullshit (sensu Harry Frankfurt 2005), fake news, 
or lies is arguably a serious sin of omission in that it would fail to acknowledge 
both the fact that “some fake news lasts forever” (Harari 2018, 231) and that such 
fictions often have pernicious effects. We might therefore be much better advised 
to heed Harari’s clarion call and put the examination of fictions onto our research 
agenda, because fictions serve as important ways of meaning- and sense-making:
In the twenty-first century fiction might therefore become the most potent force on earth, 
surpassing even wayward asteroids and natural selection. Hence, if we want to understand 
our future, cracking genomes and crunching numbers is hardly enough. We must also deci-
pher the fictions that give meaning to the world.  (Harari 2016, 151)
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I would even go so far as to claim that the alarming proliferation of bullshit, 
 fake-news and fictions not only tends to undermine the authority, credibility, and 
reliability of scholarly research and of scientific knowledge, but that these ten-
dencies have also become so widespread that they arguably constitute nothing 
less than an epistemological crisis. A brief look at how the renowned philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains the connection between culture and narrative sche-
mata will hopefully clarify this claim. According to MacIntyre, cultures can be 
understood as communities that share foundational schemata: “Consider what 
it is to share a culture. It is to share schemata which are at one and the same 
time constitutive of and normative for intelligible action by myself and are also 
means for my interpretations of the actions of others” (MacIntyre 1977, 453). When 
global processes become more complicated, and when it becomes more difficult 
to know the truth about the world because of competing accounts, then such a 
co-existence of incompatible schemata and irreconcilable world models can lead 
to an epistemological crisis: “it is also the case that the individual may come to 
recognise the possibility of systematically different possibilities of interpretation, 
of the existence of alternative and rival schemata which yield mutually incom-
patible accounts of what is going on around him. Just this is the form of episte-
mological crisis encountered by ordinary agents and it is striking that there is not 
a single account of it anywhere in the literature of academic philosophy” (Mac-
Intyre 1977, 454). Although the publication of MacIntyre’s pioneering essay on the 
subject dates back more than forty years, no publication that I have come across 
has managed to offer a better account of how such an epistemological crisis can 
be resolved:
When an epistemological crisis is resolved, it is by the construction of a new narrative which 
enables the agent to understand both how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her 
original beliefs and how he or she could have been so drastically misled by them. The nar-
rative in terms of which he or she at first understood and ordered experiences is itself made 
into the subject of an enlarged narrative. The agent has come to understand how the crite-
ria of truth and understanding must be reformulated. He has to become epistemologically 
self-conscious.  (MacIntyre 1977, 455)
Three of the most challenging and important tasks for the study of culture, at 
least from my point of view, would thus be to devote much more attention to the 
proliferation of ideological fictions and to an exploration of the resulting episte-
mological crisis, to reclaim authority, credibility, and truth for the study of culture 
as well as scientific knowledge in general, and to attempt to tell better narratives 
and stories than those that currently occupy the headlines and shape the agendas 
of universities (see section 10 below). Even though the majority of people may 
well continue to prefer fictions to the truth, it is up to us to remind the public that 
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“the scientific community has been our most reliable source of knowledge for 
centuries” (Harari 2018, 244).
Movements such as the series of international demonstrations and rallies 
held under the banner of ‘March for Science’ serve to show that an increasing 
number of scholars and scientists from around the world are beginning to under-
stand how urgent it has become to stand up for academic freedom, the indispens-
able value of research, and scientific knowledge. It is high time that the study of 
culture not only joined forces with movements such as ‘March for Science’ and 
‘Fridays for Future’ but also started to employ its expertise and research method-
ologies in an exploration of the proliferation of fictions, the concomitant episte-
mological crisis, and their far-reaching detrimental effects.
7  Fostering Internationalization and Pluralism: 
Transnationalizing Approaches for the Study 
of Culture in the Twenty-first Century
Although the next proposal might amount to forcing an open door in an age of 
globalization and worldwide mobility, I would still like to suggest that we should 
continue to foster more sustained international collaboration and transnational 
approaches to the study of culture. The study of culture is, after all, itself very 
much a cultural practice characterized by local traditions and national specific-
ity. As I have discussed elsewhere (see Nünning 2014), approaches to the study 
of culture as practised in different countries still display considerable differences 
due to factors such as language, intellectual style, respective cultural contexts, 
historical developments of disciplines and approaches, and institutional differ-
ences between national research cultures and traditions. German Kulturwissen-
schaften and British cultural studies, for instance, are two national traditions 
with significant differences. The development of genuinely transnational, or 
even trans-European, approaches to the study of culture is still a desideratum for 
future research.
Some recent contributions to research have, however, begun to fill the void. 
These include approaches that either cut across national traditions or have suc-
cessfully travelled from one research culture to others. A number of influential 
‘cultural turns’ (Bachmann-Medick 2016) in the humanities or ‘cultural sciences’ 
(Kulturwissenschaften) as well as the notions of ‘travelling concepts’ (Bal 2002) and 
‘translation’ offer promising ways of overcoming boundaries between  research 
cultures and national traditions. During the last two decades, there have been 
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sustained attempts at Internationalizing Cultural Studies, to borrow the title of an 
anthology edited by Ackbar Abbas and John Nguyet Erni (2005), as the study of 
culture has been one of the most rapidly developing fields in European and Amer-
ican universities and has also emerged in Asian and Australian scholarship (see 
Bachmann-Medick 2014, 1–22).
We deliberately chose the more neutral and open term ‘study of culture’ over 
the Anglo-American term cultural studies or the German notion of Kulturwissen-
schaften for this volume and the entire book series. It signals that our project of 
developing transnational approaches to the study of culture does not refer to any 
narrow understanding of the object of study, a particular theoretical approach, 
national research tradition or school of thought, as is the case with, for example, 
‘cultural studies,’ ‘cultural analysis’ (Bal 2002, 6–8), ‘cultural materialism,’ and 
‘cultural criticism’ (Belsey 2003). The goal is, rather, to enhance the dialogue 
among these and other approaches, disciplines, and cultures of research to foster 
self-reflexive, interdisciplinary, international, and potentially even transnational 
approaches.
The development of transnational approaches to the study of culture does 
not privilege any one approach but should rather display a commitment to theo-
retical and methodological pluralism. An approach resulting from an anthropo-
logical, semiotic, and constructivist understanding of culture that characterizes 
many recent approaches is a prerequisite for the rich exchange that takes place in 
transdisciplinary and international research undertakings. Approaches that have 
cut across disciplinary and national research traditions include, e.g., cultural 
semiotics, cultural anthropology, historical anthropology, literary anthropology, 
the new cultural history, cultural ecology, and area studies (for an overview, see 
Nünning and Nünning 2008). Although the traditions, research foci, and meth-
odologies of these different ways of studying culture differ substantially, these 
approaches all embrace inter- or transdisciplinary collaboration and an interna-
tional, or even global, orientation.
In an article entitled “Cultural Studies and the Transnational,” the Canadian 
cultural theorist Imre Szeman has demonstrated that the notion of the trans-
national (referred to as a “concept-metaphor”; Szeman 2007, 200) “forces us to 
consider seriously that the very object of cultural studies – culture – has been 
radically changed in ways that require the activity of the field to shift from what 
has remained its basic orientation: the study of cultural objects and practices of 
everyday life in relation to power” (202). Szeman also carefully delineates three 
levels on which the transnational functions within cultural studies: cultural 
studies as a transnational discipline; the field’s examination of transnational 
contexts, issues, and sites; and the political and epistemological challenges 
involved in the transfer of British and American cultural studies to other contexts. 
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While it may well be “apparent that cultural studies as a professional practice 
is now truly transnational” (203), what is much less clear is whether there have 
been any sustained attempts at inter- or transnationalizing research traditions 
and practices themselves.
In addition, the notion of transnationalization challenges established Euro-
centric and American concepts used to denote modern cultures and collectives 
such as the nation-state and the polity. It draws attention to the interconnections 
between polity, nation, and culture in their various manifestations within lan-
guage, media, memory, and identity. Itself a major mode of the diffusion, trans-
fer, and problematization of key concepts, a transnational perspective epitomizes 
the emergent character of concepts and the necessity for greater self-reflexivity. 
It also illuminates transnational cultural phenomena (e.g., Hollywood and Bolly-
wood movies, popular music and MTV, a new understanding of world literature) 
that have proliferated in the age of globalization and the historical and heuristic 
reconfigurations of culture, society, and the polity that these phenomena have 
demanded.
Szeman states that “an interrogation of the potential cultural parochialisms 
and conceptual blind spots of cultural studies constitutes [...] one of the most 
important and compelling ‘theoretical’ projects in the field today” (2007, 206). 
Transnational approaches to the study of culture could serve as important con-
tributors to such a project. The same holds true for my plea to recalibrate key con-
cepts and explore the processes of appropriation, reframing (see Berning et al. 
2014), and translation that are involved in the travelling of concepts. To the extent 
that the meaning of such concepts must be constantly renegotiated, a sustained 
enquiry into the dynamics of such travelling, including the “‘translational’ pro-
cesses” (Chakrabarty 2000/2008, 19) and politics involved and the genealogies of 
the concepts in question (see section 5 above), is a prerequisite for the develop-
ment of transnational approaches to C21 challenges in the study of culture.
8  Reinventing the Practices and Institutional 
Frameworks of Knowledge Production: The 
Study of Culture as a Collaborative, Evidence-
Based, and Interdisciplinary Practice
Another daunting but important task for anyone interested in securing viable 
futures for the study of culture is to get involved in the attempt to shape and 
remake the institutional sites and practices of knowledge production. Since the 
54   Ansgar Nünning
study of culture is an interdisciplinary project, we need institutional frameworks 
that foster and support collaborative work and interdisciplinary conversation 
across different cultures of research. It is certainly not a coincidence that cultural 
studies only began to rise to prominence after the Centre for Contemporary Cul-
tural Studies had been established at the University of Birmingham in 1964 and 
that, even decades later, international luminaries such as Lawrence Grossberg 
continue to sing their praises for the stimulating research environment that the 
CCCS generated (see Grossberg 2010).
Moreover, research cultures are themselves subject to historical change, 
and both cultural studies and German Kulturwissenschaften have undergone 
far-reaching developments and important innovations in recent years. In com-
parison to the programmatic mission encapsulated in the name of the Birming-
ham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, which suggests that cultural 
studies “is a field devoted entirely to the immediate present” (Felski 2003, 
501), for instance, from today’s point of view the “rationale for isolating the 
study of popular, contemporary culture from high culture and the culture of 
the past now seems purely historical” (Belsey 2003, 91). In an article entitled 
“Beyond Literature and Cultural Studies,” Catherine Belsey made a program-
matic proposal that calls for “a new discipline […], beyond literature and Cul-
tural Studies, that would explicitly treat all culture as its province, and would 
take full advantage of the attention French theory pays to the signifier” (Belsey 
2003, 99).
Taking my cue from Cathy Davidson’s call for what she called “a Project Work-
place Makeover” (2011, 167), I would even go so far as to make a similar plea for ‘a 
Project Institution Makeover’ for the study of culture. Davidson is certainly right 
when she observes that it is high time that we began to rethink and reinvent our 
institutions for research and teaching: “What we haven’t done yet is rethink how 
we need to be organizing our institutions – our schools, our offices – to maxi-
mize the opportunities of our digital era” (Davidson 2011, 12). There has also been 
relatively little debate about how we should organize our universities, faculties, 
and departments to make the best of both the scholarly expertise that we find in 
different departments and faculties that pertain to the study of culture. We also 
need to overcome the disparity between disciplinary specialization dating back 
to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the concerns and challenges we 
are facing in the new millennium, almost all of which demand interdisciplinary 
collaboration. The standardized ways in which our institutions have tradition-
ally been organized “may have worked for the twentieth century, but do they 
always and necessarily make sense for the twenty-first” (Davidson 2011, 220–
221)? Moreover, the limits imposed by disciplinary boundaries and bureaucracy 
are often “hostile to creative thinking” (Graeber 2016, 146), posing unnecessary 
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 administrative obstacles rather than fostering collaboration across disciplines 
and  impending conceptual breakthroughs. Such an institutional makeover would 
also have to address, and critique, such detrimental developments as the ongoing 
bureaucratization and corporatization of many universities, the increasing reli-
ance on extramural funding, research assessment exercises, and grant agencies. 
This has involved an “extraordinary squandering of human creativity” (Graeber 
2019, 188), not least due to the concomitant proliferation of administrative tasks, 
paperwork, and increase in what the anthropologist David Graeber, who is fortu-
nately never one to mince words, has designated “bullshit jobs” (2019).
Since the predominant division of labor between faculties, departments, and 
disciplines is anything but conducive to fostering interdisciplinary projects, we 
arguably need institutions and research centres that are specifically designed for 
the study of culture. Re-aligning the study of culture with emerging concerns pre-
supposes that we continue to challenge disciplinary boundaries and develop the 
study of culture as an interdisciplinary practice. None of the daunting develop-
ments that threaten us most in the twenty-first century seem to do us the favor of 
falling into the scope of just one academic discipline. No matter whether we are 
dealing with phenomena or processes such as climate change, “mind change” 
(Greenfield 2014) and other effects of digitalization, or ways of worldmaking, 
for that matter, coming to terms with any of these or other current challenges 
involves interdisciplinary collaboration.
As the exemplary discussion of some of the emerging concerns in section 4 
above has already indicated, an institutional makeover of the humanities and 
social sciences is arguably not enough. Coming to terms with such transdis-
ciplinary challenges necessitates forging new collaborative interfaces between 
the study of culture and disciplines such as economics, law, medicine, psy-
chology, and theology, to name but a few in which cultural aspects are par-
ticularly prominent. Initiating dialogues across disciplinary borders between 
the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences is an important first step, but 
in order to explore new cross-disciplinary research fields like those briefly dis-
cussed above, we need to establish new institutions for important emerging 
fields like environmental humanities, medical humanities, and the cultures of 
the economy and law.
Recent international developments have considerably broadened the aims 
and scope of what falls under the purview of cultural studies or the study of 
culture, both historically and as far as the synchronic range of forms of art and 
culture are concerned. Cases in point include the Amsterdam School for Cultural 
Analysis (ASCA), the European Summer School in Cultural Studies (ESSCS), the 
Lisbon Summer School for the Study of Culture, and the International Graduate 
Centre for the Study of Culture (GCSC). These international research networks 
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and institutions have managed to foster new models of collaboration and bring 
the modes of reasoning and research methodologies from a broad range of dis-
ciplines (ranging from history, sociology, and political science to literary and 
theatre studies) into the study of culture. They have also firmly established 
and institutionalized the study of culture as a collaborative, evidence-based, 
and interdisciplinary practice, thus making important contributions to a better 
understanding of current issues that no discipline can get to grips with on its 
own: “Collaboration by difference is an antidote to attention blindness. It signi-
fies that the complex and interconnected problems of our time cannot be solved 
by anyone alone” (Davidson 2011, 100). Such a method is extremely well suited 
for the kinds of inter- and transdisciplinary projects needed in the study of 
culture for the twenty-first century, as Davidson’s comments illustrate: “Collab-
oration by difference respects and rewards different forms and levels of exper-
tise, perspective, culture, age, ability, and insight, treating difference not as a 
deficit but as a point of distinction” (100). Seen in this light, collaboration by 
difference might be one of the keys for updating dominant methods in such a 
way as to re-align them for the cross-disciplinary challenges we face in the new 
millennium:
If the twentieth century was all about training experts and then not paying attention 
to certain things because the experts would take care of the matter for you, the twenty- 
first is about crowdsourcing that expertise, contributing to one another’s fund of 
knowledge, and learning how to work together towards solutions to problems.   
 (Davidson 2011, 258)
Such international research networks and institutions as those mentioned above 
could well serve as models to be emulated if we want to ensure that the study of 
culture will be able to make important contributions towards solving problems 
and thus really have a sustainable future for the simple reason that people will 
begin to understand that such a problem-solving paradigm is indispensable for 
society. These models have not only demonstrated how the transfer of approaches, 
concepts, and methodologies between diverse disciplines and academic cultures 
can be organized and advanced, but they have also managed to create sustained 
structures for research organization and research training in the field of the study 
of culture. Since such structures provide the necessary institutional basis for ini-
tiating research in innovative, interdisciplinary research areas, investing creative 
energy, resources, and time in the development and building of such institutions 
and initiating new projects might be one of the most promising ways of ensuring 
sustainable futures for the study of culture.
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9  Moving beyond Critique, or: A Vision for the 
Study of Culture as a Problem-Solving Practice 
for the Twenty-first Century
The second but last proposal can be very brief, because it refers to an import-
ant plea that Rita Felski developed in great detail concerning literary studies 
(see Felski 2015). My point here is simply that her observations about the pre-
ponderance of critique over other approaches and ways of knowledge production 
pertain just as much to the study of culture, and arguably even more so to cultural 
studies, as to literary criticism and literary studies. Anglo-American forms of cul-
tural studies have traditionally been conceived of as politically engaged projects 
that put a heavy emphasis on critique. British cultural studies were developed as 
a response to concrete social and political challenges of the British class system 
and as a politically motivated project aimed at producing changes in society and 
strategies of resistance. While culture and politics have always been inextrica-
bly intertwined in this research tradition, the German tradition of Kulturwissen-
schaften, which can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, has quite a different genealogy, lineage, and non-political agenda, is 
largely an academic enterprise that explores cultural phenomena as objects of 
academic research without an eye towards engendering political change.
Notwithstanding such differences, however, Felski’s observations about 
what she calls “the malaise of critique” (Felski 2015, 119) and her plea for the need 
to move beyond the dominant model of critique applies equally well to cultural 
studies: “Yet the malaise of critique could also free us up to reassess our current 
ways of reading and reasoning: to experiment with modes of argument less 
tightly bound to exposure, demystification, and the lure of the negative” (Felski 
2015, 119–120). Similarly, the range of theoretical and methodological approaches 
she suggests as fruitful alternatives to critique could also open up new horizons 
for research in the study of culture, in which, e.g., phenomenology and other 
non-political forms of reading (e.g. “actor-network theory, post-historicist criti-
cism, affective hermeneutics”; Felski 2015, 182) have enjoyed greater prominence 
than in American or British cultural studies.
I would like to go even further, however, in that I conceive of the study of 
culture not as a dominantly critical project geared at debunking, demystifying 
or exposing forms of discrimination or ideologies, but as a paradigm actively 
engaged in problem-solving. Putting the emphasis on problem-solving would 
not only involve challenging ingrained assumptions and practices, but it would 
also arguably be very productive in initiating conversations across disciplinary 
borders between the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences (see section 
58   Ansgar Nünning
8 above). It is in such cross- or trans-disciplinary research fields like environmen-
tal humanities, medical humanities, and the cultures of the economy and law 
that scholars involved in the study of culture could really make worthwhile con-
tributions to solving, rather than merely critiquing, real problems – even though 
critique has and always will also have an important role to play. The questions of 
whether the study of culture should be about critique or problem-solving is not 
an either/or but rather a both/and issue, but we would arguably be well advised 
if we moved beyond critique and managed to develop better stories, both for the 
study of culture and the future(s) of the world at large.
10  Developing Positive Visions for the Future(s) 
of the Study of Culture: Imagining Alternative 
Positive Futures and Telling Better Future 
Narratives
Taken together, the previous proposals could be summed up in the overall sug-
gestion to develop positive visions for the future(s) of the study of culture by 
telling better narratives of the futures of both the world we live in and the inter-
disciplinary field in which we work. We could thus turn recent insights into the 
reality-constituting function of narratives to our own advantage and bear in mind 
that “narratives both expand and diminish our sense of the possible” (Meretoja 
2018, 2). Instead of accepting the stories disseminated either in the realms of pol-
itics and the media or the largely apocalyptic and dystopian visions of the future 
in popular culture, we should bear in mind Grossberg’s wise and witty reminder 
that “Bad Stories Make Bad Politics!” (Grossberg 2010, 64). My final and overarch-
ing proposal is thus that we should scrutinize hegemonic master narratives that 
no longer make sense of the world as it is and try to invent much better stories.
To propose narrative constructions for the future of the study of culture, we 
could follow the constructivist advice of Brian McHale:
it is important to distinguish among better and less good stories – “better” not in the sense 
of objectively truer (a criterion discredited by the constructivist approach), but in terms of 
such criteria as rightness of fit, validity of inference, internal consistency, appropriateness 
of scope, and above all productivity.  (McHale 1992, 9)
If we look at the dominant master narratives of modernity and capitalism in 
terms of McHale’s criteria, we find that they no longer display rightness of fit, 
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have ceased to be appropriate in today’s world and are no longer sustainable. 
Much more work needs to be done to gauge the complex challenges and concerns 
with which we are faced, and to conceive and develop fully-fledged transnational 
approaches and concepts for the study of culture that meet such criteria.
It therefore seems apt to conclude by once again stressing the need for devel-
oping and debating the trans/national dimension of the study of culture. Anyone 
interested in transnational approaches to the study of culture that are re-aligned 
with C21 problematics can profit considerably from comparing different national 
approaches and considering the ways in which such influential traditions are 
discursively constructed and institutionally implemented. What is needed for 
the development of such approaches is an enhanced degree of self-reflection 
about different national traditions in ‘doing’ the study of culture, the promotion 
of greater “transnational literacy” (Bal 2002, 291), an openness to interdisciplin-
arity, and a questioning of one’s own academic routines. Several promising new 
departures have served to internationalize and even transnationalize approaches 
to the study of culture, such as the volumes and anthologies Internationalizing 
Cultural Studies: An Anthology (Abbas and Erni 2005), The Worlding Project: 
Doing Cultural Studies in the Era of Globalization (Connery and Wilson 2007), New 
Cultural Studies: Adventures in Theory (Hall and Birchall 2007), and The Trans/
National Study of Culture: A Translational Perspective (Bachmann-Medick 2014), 
all of which delineate promising trajectories for developing a transnational study 
of culture.
We have also witnessed sustained attempts to develop new forms of ‘global’ 
cultural studies. Although an Institute for Global Cultural Studies (IGCS) was 
founded as early as 1991 at Binghampton University, with other universities offer-
ing programmes on global cultural studies following suit (e.g., Point Park Uni-
versity and most recently Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3), there have also been 
critical voices expressing scepticism against the very notion of ‘a global cultural 
studies.’ Jon Stratton and Ien Ang’s warning that the “‘internationalization’ of cul-
tural studies cannot mean the formation of a global, universally generalisable set 
of theories and objects of study” (1996, 363) may still serve as a timely reminder 
that the field of the study of culture may not lend itself particularly well to uni-
versalizing or transnationalizing gestures, and even less to attempts to develop 
universal theories of any cultural object, phenomenon, or process. In a particu-
larly stimulating and thought-provoking review essay, Imre Szeman assesses the 
notion of “Global Cultural Studies” (Szeman 2011), carefully gauging both the risks 
and promises of such an ambitious project, and the political and epistemological 
problems that it entails. We face both “national-cultural situations, events, and 
circumstances” and a more or less “shared global critico-theoretical discourse” 
(Szeman 2011, 148), though the latter indeed tends to be “heavily weighted towards 
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ideas emerging from Anglo-American and European traditions” (148). I not only 
agree but would add that we should redress the balance by provincializing (sensu 
Chakrabarty 2000) hitherto dominant approaches and following up on the ten 
proposals made here.
While cultural studies may well have gone international or even transna-
tional in some instances, there is still a great need to further develop innovative 
and truly transnational approaches to the study of culture that are equipped to 
come to terms with such global challenges and transnational questions of the 
twenty-first century as highlighted by Harari:
What will happen to the job market once artificial intelligence outperforms humans in 
most cognitive tasks? What will be the political impact of a massive new class of economi-
cally useless people? What will happen to relationships, families and pension funds when 
 nanotechnology and regenerative medicine turn eighty into the new fifty? What will happen 
to human society when biotechnology enables us to have designer babies, and to open 
unprecedented gaps between rich and poor?  (Harari 2016, 269)
Although it may be a tall order to try to change disciplinary traditions, institu-
tional contexts, and theoretical frameworks dating back to the twentieth century 
(if not before) in such a way as to align them with the concerns and challenges of 
the twenty-first century, there is definitely a real need for the kind of conceptual 
and institutional project makeover outlined above (see section 8).
Moreover, we should neither give up hope nor forget that everything could 
be different, to translate the title of Harald Welzer’s (2019) recent book. Even 
ingrained disciplinary traditions and institutional arrangements can be changed 
if there are enough dedicated and enthusiastic people willing to collaborate in 
order to challenge and change them: “Donʼt give up hope. Departmental cultures 
can change. And there can be subcultures of support within departments creating 
pockets of resistance to the effects of the corporate university” (Berg and Seeber 
2016, 84). The study of culture will only have a future if the scholars working in 
the field are prepared to take full responsibility for it and take Max Tegmark’s 
wise words that “we need more mindful optimists” to heart (Tegmark 2017, 334). 
It is certainly high time that we “re-orientate ourselves from an exclusive pre- 
occupation with retrospectively making meaning(s) to the creative activity 
of making future(s), prospectively” (Bode and Dietrich 2013, 107; bold-print 
emphasis in the original).
The ten proposals made above are an attempt to sketch some of the tasks that 
are involved in such an endeavor, outlining what the most promising trajectories 
may be. I am perfectly aware, however, that these proposals are relatively general 
and that they need to be fleshed out in a much more detailed fashion. Therefore 
I would like to leave the last words to the late psychologist Christopher Peterson, 
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whose ambivalent self-assessment of his own vision for the future of psychology 
also expresses my own sense of striving to strike the right balance between aiming 
high while being perfectly aware of the limitations of what we can achieve:
As a research psychologist, my goal is to do studies that are important and interesting, that 
answer questions about weighty matters, and that suggest ways to enhance the psycholog-
ical good life. This is a vision with which I am quite happy, although it is of course vague. 
When I start to flesh out the vision, the process too often gets mired down by my worries 
about the means.  (Peterson 2013, 321–322)
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Andreas Langenohl
The “Future Sense” and the Future  
of the Study of Culture
1 Introduction: The Future Unravelling the Present
The title of this collection of essays might, at first glance, sound rather specula-
tive. How are we to know what future awaits the study of culture? After all, the 
future seems to be, by modern definition, that which cannot be known and is not 
accessible in the present, following such diverse scholars as Frank Knight, Rein-
hart Koselleck, or Niklas Luhmann. What is more, this fundamental ‘uncertainty’ 
regarding the future may be celebrated as indicating the potentially open horizon 
of contemporary societies – an openness that has to be defended against attempts 
to foreclose and to predefine it, as seems to be happening in such diverse arenas 
of permanent crisis as accelerating global climate change, the mushrooming of 
security apparatuses, or out-of-bounds financial speculation. Should the study of 
culture not join the struggle for openness, and against predefinition?
However, one might interpret the title of this collection also in a grammatically 
different sense, such that the study of culture might ‘have’ an own mode of future, 
or futurity. A brief look at language, still one of the most important and paradig-
matic areas of research in the study of culture, already shows that different lan-
guages have different modalities of referencing the future. For instance, in English 
we can differentiate between something that ‘will’ happen, something that ‘will 
have’ happened, and something that is imminent, something that ‘is going to’ 
happen. Seen from this angle, ‘the future of the study of culture’ might refer less to 
a prediction or anticipation, and instead might carve out a research field in its own 
right. Its question is: How are we to understand things and events with an index of 
futurity, and what might differentiations in that understanding be?
Recently, two prominent scholars in the study of culture have been attempt-
ing to formulate an understanding of futurity that critically reflects on concepts 
of the future that derive future openness from its supposed unknowability and 
uncertainty. Literary studies scholar Leslie A. Adelson and cultural anthropolo-
gist Arjun Appadurai have both argued that the future might be understood as a 
function of the present – not in the sense that the future depends on and follows 
from present events and decisions, but in the sense that it informs, or may inform, 
the present precisely inasmuch as the present seems to be caught in a violent and 
hopeless synchronicity. This “future sense,” as Adelson calls it (2017, 29), is thus 
invoked in a bid to wrest the present away from its seemingly total  interlocking in 
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a horizon of, in Theodor W. Adorno’s terms, “permanent catastrophe” (Adelson 
2017, 78). For Adelson, the recent work of Alexander Kluge provides a vista for 
identifying a futurity in present conditions that is bound to unravel these con-
ditions as they unfold in catastrophe, where “world-making […] is constantly 
undone” (Adelson 2017, 5). For Appadurai, it is the solidarity practices of margin-
alized social groups all over the world that form globe-girdling alliances whose 
cooperative ethos is informed by experiences that become salient in the present, 
but transgress and break open its violent synchronicity and fatedness for disas-
ter. Insisting on a mode of futurity that becomes activated in the present but 
denies its synchronicity, both Appadurai (2013, 1) and Adelson (2017, 64) speak 
of the future as a “fact,” or more precisely, of a “cultural” and a “social fact,” 
respectively.
In this article, I will discuss these suggestions of a ‘future sense’ that take 
issue with notions of futurity that reduce the future’s openness to its intangibility 
in the present. As one shared concern in both suggestions is social cooperation, I 
will then contextualize them with a precursor in the political history of the twen-
tieth century, namely, ‘prefigurative politics’ at whose core, I suspect, one can 
find a similar concern with the problem that a future that is radically shut off from 
the present loses its transformative impulse for present cooperation. Prefigurative 
politics has been experimented with since the 1960s, when it emerged out of frus-
tration both with the violent synchronicity of instrumental mainstream politics 
and with instrumentalist understandings of revolutionary action. Today, prefigu-
rative politics is related back to particular strands of anarchist thought (see Day 
2005, 91–128; see also Graeber 2013, 89, 186–195 et passim) that sought to carve out 
social and political spaces within the existing society that would envision future 
modes of cooperation without waiting for a revolution to happen. Without claim-
ing the existence of a genealogy between Adelson’s and Appadurai’s understand-
ing of futurity with prefigurative politics or anarchist thought, I will concentrate 
on shared contextual features that, to my mind, interrelate these approaches: an 
urge to decipher the future as impacting the present; a characterization of that 
present that insists on its own normality while being caught in functional imper-
atives that constantly engender disaster and steer toward greater disaster; and a 
focus on a field of social cooperation that emerges against the odds.
In the last section, I will conclude on some points that I regard as signifi-
cant for this volume’s dedication, specifically on the question of what the ‘future 
sense’ might harbor for the future of the study of culture. Emerging at different 
sites and settings, it seems that the ‘future sense’ is historically circumscribed by 
a double dismay at modernity’s catastrophism and its tendency to turn the future 
into a mere externality of the present. In this context, the question arises what 
‘utopia’ can mean for a present that learns to adapt its sensorium to futurity.
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2 Futurity in Reading and Interrelating
Adelson’s current book on Alexander Kluge’s “cosmic miniatures” (Adelson 
2017, 1) can be read as the continuation of an interest in the literary articulation 
of discontinuities. In an earlier phase of her work, Adelson analyzed Turkish- 
German literature with a view to how this literary production in the German lan-
guage might be understood not as a mingling of different ‘cultures’ – that of the 
‘classical’ German canon and that of the Turkish ‘origin’ of writers such as Zafer 
Şenocak and Feridun Zaimoğlu – but as a site of literary representations whose 
gist cannot be reduced to a cultural genealogy (see Adelson 2005). Her manifesto 
“Against Between” (Adelson 2001) challenged the view that these writers and 
their works cover a space ‘between’ cultures, instead arguing that this production 
has to be understood as German literature on its way of shedding off not only clas-
sical canonical references but the very idea of cultural and literary tradition in 
terms of continuity. This approach had a methodological side as well. Adelson’s 
analyses do not so much refer to the plot level or the use of metaphors and tropes, 
which all too easily lend themselves for the ‘representation’ of ‘cultures,’ but 
rather to the textual creation of polyvalent narrative positionalities and spatial 
markers that shuttle opaquely between geographical referentiality and spatial-
ized phantasm. These narrative devices make culturalist and genealogical inter-
pretations of those texts more and more implausible. Developing this research 
strategy further, Adelson compared Turkish-German literature with writings of 
Alexander Kluge. In “Experiment Mars” (Adelson 2008), she argues that, in these 
writers, the invocation of memories of the past as informing the present gives way 
to the invocation of the future. These analyses do not only diagnose particular 
uses of the referential category of future in literary writing. More importantly, they 
converge on a shared insistence on making the future perceptible in narration, 
thus opening a vista on what Adelson terms the “protean abstraction” of futurity.1
In Cosmic Miniatures and the Future Sense, Adelson focuses on Alexander 
Kluge against the background of the engagement of his writings with critical 
theory. While the memory boom in the study of culture has led many scholars 
to depict the main contributions of Walter Benjamin or Theodor W. Adorno in 
their invoking the past as a potential horizon for thinking redemption amidst 
a ruinous world, Adelson argues that another reading is possible, and more 
accurate, that dissects the potentially enabling and emancipating presence of 
a sense of the future in the catastrophic present. Kluge’s work, according to 
1 See Adelson 2013, 215. See also the literary analyses in the special issue of The Germanic 
 Review to which this text by Adelson is the introduction.
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Adelson, vouches for such reading and develops it further; his current miniature 
writing represents a critical-interpretative elaboration on critical theory, which, 
as Adorno’s Minima moralia demonstrates, at significant points took the form of 
the miniature itself. Again, the main methodological device in the reconstruc-
tion of this argument is a formal-narratological one, as Adelson is interested 
in the production of complications concerning the narrative positionality that 
create “experiential portals in time” (Adelson 2017, 44, 69, 127) for the future to 
enter the present.
Here I can refer only to a few examples of Adelson’s narratological readings. 
Analyzing Adorno’s miniature “Heliotrope” in a preparatory step in laying out 
the notion of ‘future sense’ (Adelson 2017, 95–110), Adelson demonstrates that 
the narrator in this miniature shifts from a voice that would be possible to iden-
tify with the little boy anticipating a house guest as a person who for him rep-
resents a “radiant other life” (Adelson 2017, 108), to a voice that actualizes that 
radiant future not as a possibility but as a certainty, speaking, as it were, from 
the position of the fulfilled dreams and hopes of the boy. The mode of futurity 
crystallizing around this shifting narratorial voice is thus not one of anticipation 
and hope under the proviso of uncertainty, but one that installs that future as a 
referential certainty in the present. The point of Adelson’s interpretation of nar-
rative futurity thus relates both to “longing” (Adelson 2017, 107), as a vision of 
a radiant future life represented by the house guest, and to a “sense,” that is, 
an imaginary and sensual capacity – “a long-distance sense organ of temporal 
perception” (Adelson 2017, 200) – that is conveyed in the practice of reading as 
it follows the shifts and turns in narrative perspective. Through these turns, the 
reference object of that longing acquires a “utopian dimension” (Adelson 2017, 
106) that has a locale in the present. The ‘future sense’ is a mode of perception 
“that becomes, however incrementally, phenomenologically accessible to social 
experience through reading” (Adelson 2017, 196).
Thereby, it has to be borne in mind that the ‘future sense’ manifests itself 
against the background of experiences of macro-violence in the twentieth century 
that instill a sense of ‘permanent catastrophe,’ and are bound to leave hope only 
in the quality as “counterfactual hope” (Adelson 2017, 218). Comparing Adorno’s 
miniatures with those of Kluge, Adelson finds that, in Adorno, the ‘future sense’ 
as conveyed in the narrative structure of “Heliotrope” still bears the mark of antic-
ipation, even if one that somehow stubbornly and against the odds of a crushed 
world embraces certainty. In contrast to this, according to Adelson, Kluge’s ‘future 
sense’ is “more robust” (Adelson 2017, 77), as it assembles the future on par with 
the present, thus challenging the latter’s catastrophic reality directly. Her reading 
of one of Kluge’s miniatures on Fritz Bauer, the legal and political architect of the 
1960s Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt, shows how this is achieved: The miniature 
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posits a first-person narrator witnessing Bauer’s funeral and at the same time 
seeing the dead Bauer addressing inmates at a prison as ‘comrades’ (an episode 
verified in Bauer’s biography). For Adelson, this represents “a perlocutionary 
speech act in the sense that Bauer is not addressing an existing collective but a 
future collective he would like to call into being” (Adelson 2017, 244–245). More-
over, all collectives alluded to in the text are almost never circumscribed through 
a first-person plural pronoun but through its conspicuous absence: “The histor-
ical voices of Kluge’s conjunctive cultivation of differential temporalities in nar-
rative perspective are not simply plural, collective, or even collaborative, but co- 
operative instead” (Adelson 2017, 245). Adelson’s interpretation thus stipulates 
the ‘future sense’ as a mode of building collectivity not through the invocation 
of a ‘we’ that always threatens with essentialization, but through envisioning a 
cooperation between different human beings that is vouched for in the narra-
tive experience enabled by the text’s formal narrative structure. That structure 
becomes the point of entry for a modality of hope that, while unavoidably being 
‘counterfactual’ in the face of the mass atrocities of the twentieth century, is nev-
ertheless a “real counterfactual force” (Adelson 2017, 246).
While Leslie A. Adelson reconstructs political sociality, as based on future 
cooperation that is operative in the form of narrative address already in the 
present, through the practice of narratological reading, Arjun Appadurai grounds 
his understanding of the future as a “cultural fact” (2013, 1) on his fieldwork 
among marginalized, oppressed, and exploited groups in Mumbai. According to 
his analysis, the forms of sociality and cooperation found among the members 
of these groups can be regarded a counter-project to contemporary capitalism, 
which he characterizes, with Naomi Klein, as “disaster capitalism” (Appadurai 
2013, 295–296). The reference to futurity is established by Appadurai, in a way that 
is comparable to Adelson’s pronouncement of the ‘future sense’ as an antidote 
to ‘permanent catastrophe,’ through a juxtaposition with the temporal coloniza-
tion of the present and the future through out-of-bounds financial markets. The 
diagnosis that financial capitalism imposes its extractive and exploitative imper-
atives on societies through a particular commodification of the anticipated future 
refers back to Klein’s notion of “disaster capitalism,” as evident from financial 
instruments that bet on the probability of future natural and political disasters 
to happen; but it has also been observed by other scholars (see Lee and LiPuma 
2002, 203–207). As financial capitalism draws out a certain scenario of the future 
as punctuated by more or less probable and more or less profitable catastrophes, 
Appadurai finds in the mundane practices of subaltern populations and in their 
efforts to create networks of solidarity a different register of futurity, that would 
be circumscribed by concepts like ‘hope’ or ‘ethics of possibility.’ This mode of 
futurity can be regarded a ‘cultural fact’ inasmuch as it emerges from everyday 
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capacities and at the same time creates another capacity, which Appadurai terms 
the “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2013, 179).
Here, I will take a closer look at Appadurai’s (2013, 197) interpretation of “cos-
mopolitanism from below” on the side of the urban poor that, according to this 
analysis, is both the result of forced adaptive strategies to survive and a platform 
from which to embark on cooperation in the direction of emancipation. In this 
analysis, the author refers in particular to female sex workers in Mumbai who 
were urged to acquire language competencies demanded by their interactions 
with their male clients, who come from different cultural and linguistic back-
grounds in India (Appadurai 2013, 206–208). Their multilingual and multicul-
tural proficiency has thus formed not by dint of an intellectual decision in the 
horizon of a philanthropic ethics, but as the consequence of highly exploitative 
and commodified social relationships. Appadurai writes: “Such cosmopolitanism 
is hard won, unsupported as it is by the apparatus of literacy and cultural priv-
ilege or by the practices of leisure and self-cultivation” (Appadurai 2013, 208). 
Yet at the same time, as a side effect this has led women to greater ability and 
social resourcefulness with respect to the forging of social links not preordained 
by exploitation, as they use their communicative proficiencies to transform their 
neighborhoods2 and to link up with other marginalized groups and communities 
in India and elsewhere.
This is an example of how Appadurai conceptualizes cosmopolitanism as 
having, despite its highly problematic genesis, the potential to open up hori-
zons of change, which he terms the “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2013, 179). 
The capacity to aspire can be regarded as a “navigational capacity” (Appadurai 
2013, 188) that – where it is situated within social structures, as it is an unevenly 
distributed resource – encourages, and rests on, cooperation with others, and 
hence is more than the sheer aspiration toward individual social upward mobil-
ity. Rather, the capacity to aspire forms connections and enables cooperation in 
the present by dint of a future as part of a web of sociality whose present saliency 
resides in that very cooperation.
To conclude this section, I want to focus on conceptual commonalities 
between the two ways that the future as a ‘fact’ is introduced by the two bodies 
of scholarly work discussed here. The concept of the future as a social or cultural 
fact is invoked in a refusal of a catastrophic present, which threatens to prolong 
itself into the future. Futurity is thus outspokenly anti-utopian, as it claims its 
2 The term ‘neighborhood’ has been used by Appadurai 1996, 181–183, in terminological func-
tion in order to characterize a given form of social organizations that forms in interaction with its 
context (for instance, its natural environment).
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topos in the present; we might say that it is only through the present that futurity 
can actually turn into a future that would be different from a mere prolongation of 
the disastrous present. This conceptualization thus necessarily entails a radical 
deconstruction of the modernist conception of the future as principally ‘open,’ 
as that future is preordained by the self-reproductive proneness to disaster of the 
present. That modernist conception of the future as that which is open and thus 
cannot be known gives way to a much darker vision of the future as that which 
will happen in an undeniably catastrophic way if the present continues as it does. 
In Adelson, this gloomy picture of the future is rendered in critical-theoretical 
terms such as ‘counterfactual hope’ and ‘permanent catastrophe,’ developed in 
the wake of the Holocaust as a macro-crime that put an end to any indolent trust 
in the future as necessarily better than the present. In Appadurai, we find a com-
parable diagnosis that focuses on financial capitalism’s push to commodify the 
future, a commodification that rides on a drive toward inescapable, if unpredict-
able and thus potentially profitable, catastrophe.
In the horizon of these circumstances, the notion of the future as a ‘fact’ sug-
gests an activation of futurity beyond ‘mere’ hope, that is, of a future that has a 
greater robustness than an expectation or an anticipation as it plays itself out 
already in the present – as a “bridge in time to the utopian dimension of a ‘future 
without life’s miseries,’ as Adorno put it” (Adelson 2017, 245). While the notion 
that hope cannot be but counterfactual remains salient as a necessary reminder 
of the seemingly insurmountable misery of the present ‘damaged life,’ both the 
‘future sense’ and the ‘capacity to aspire’ refer to practices – practices of reading 
and practices of interrelating – that challenge the threatening facticity of a bad 
future by the facticity of a present futurity that is capable of tearing the present 
out of its violent and catastrophic synchronism.
Finally, we find in both bodies of work a focus on cooperation as a site where 
futurity can manifest as an imagination-orienting practice. The stunning improb-
ability of this invocation of cooperation becomes graspable if one contemplates 
the circumstance that modernity has itself compromised the notion of cooper-
ation to ethical incomprehensibility. Adelson (2017, 239) alludes in her work to 
the fact that the Holocaust was brought about by the expansion of the principles 
of the industrial and bureaucratic division of labor into the organization of the 
extermination of the Jewish population. Appadurai (2013, 244–245) builds his 
critique of present-day capitalism on insights that emphasize the perversion of 
the means-ends relationship in finance, as when instruments designed to insure 
against financial risks become the object of financial bets, which comes along 
with a reduction of any understanding of cooperation to ‘corporate ethics.’ And 
yet, cooperation figures in both theorists as a futurist challenge to these advanced 
stages of decline of modernist and capitalist modes of reproduction. For Adelson, 
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envisioning cooperation posits an alternative to the invocation of a collective 
identity (Adelson 2017, 244–246), which historically served as an ideological anti-
dote to radical functional differentiation and division of labor. For Appadurai, 
cooperation is the unforeseen consequence of a radical commodification and 
exploitation of human beings who, in order to make their living, must adapt to 
their circumstances and thereby acquire the capacity to transform these circum-
stances. This kind of cooperation, however socially marginal or narratologically 
presuppositional, signifies not so much an alternative future but an alternative 
present: It does not anticipate future cooperation, but instills cooperation in the 
present so as to decouple the present from its functional entanglement with an 
imminent catastrophic future that prolongs the present.
To envisage the future as a social or cultural ‘fact,’ thus, has implications first 
and foremost for the way that the relationship between present and future is con-
ceptualized. This conceptualization is necessarily historical inasmuch it gains its 
momentum from the contemporary diagnosis of a present that threatens to ‘roll 
over’ into the future. The ‘fact’ of the future, by way of contrast, intervenes into 
the synchronist functionality of the future for the present’s cataclysms. In the 
next section, I will turn to what I believe is a similar conceptualization of futurity 
as informing the present that might help to even better understand the interven-
ing effect of futurity in the present so as to break open the hold of the present on 
the future, and the role that cooperation might play in this.
3 Prefigurative Politics
The term ‘prefigurative politics’ is currently used in social movements that form 
against the societal, political, economic, and environmental consequences of a 
contemporary drive in capitalism that is often termed ‘neoliberal.’ In the wake of 
Michel Foucault’s (2008) studies on governmentality, which introduced the term 
‘neoliberal’ in order to characterize a post-classical discursive order of capital-
ism, scholars have distinguished neoliberalism from classical nineteenth-century 
industrial capitalism along the following features. Rather than being a form of 
deregulated and market-centered economic activity that has historically been 
characterized as ‘laissez-faire,’ neoliberalism envisions a societal order that aims 
at installing competitive markets, which are held to be the superior mechanism 
of social coordination, as the core principle of the whole social order (Harvey 
2005; Gertenbach 2007). The point is thus not only to ‘deregulate’ markets from 
all norms and regulations alien to the principle of competition, but to create and 
expand competitive markets and legal institutions to safeguard the principle of 
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 competition in them. Unlike Foucault, who referred mainly to German postwar 
ordoliberalism as the site where neoliberalism became articulated, newer studies 
depict the takeoff of neoliberalism in the expansion and the deepening of the 
financial system after the end of the Bretton Woods agreement. Recent social move-
ments like Occupy Wall Street, which oppose the consequences of this globalizing 
mode of societal rearrangement, address the complicity of state institutions in the 
setup, maintenance, and deepening of neoliberalism. ‘Prefigurative politics,’ for 
them, heralds a practice of the political that creates a maximum distance between 
those institutions and the organization of protest and resistance against them: the 
point is not to buy into the legitimacy of state institutions through, for instance, 
addressing them with demands that would provide legitimacy to those institu-
tions’ claims to ‘represent’ the political forces of society (Graeber 2013, 87–99). In 
this respect, prefigurative politics breaks with the reduction of the political to ‘rep-
resentation’ in the sense of representative democracy (Sitrin and Azzelini 2014). 
The political system is denied the function of being a point of crystallization for 
political action and empowerment. Therefore, prefigurative politics also takes 
issue with the politics of recognition as it implies that demands made by social 
forces be ‘recognized’ by the political system, thus again installing that system as 
the major hinge of the political (see Day 2005, 66–90; Nail 2013).
While prefigurative politics is invoked in a bid to articulate alternative polit-
ical projects that bypass the political system as an addressee, it also has a par-
ticular index of futurity. The term was first used in order to describe practices of 
radical political dissent in the historical context of the civil rights movements 
in the US, and more precisely, of the protests of student and staff at campuses 
such as Berkeley in the 1960s. According to Wini Breines’s (1989) historical recon-
struction, what was particular about these protests were the ways that alternative 
political goals and agendas were articulated in tandem with community-building 
practices that envisioned modes of sociality directly corresponding to the politi-
cal aims of those groups and networks. These practices were ‘prefigurative’ in the 
sense that they heralded modes of social encounter that would also characterize 
an alternative social and political commons of the future (see Day 2005, 19–45).
The first focus of those protests’ critiques was, thus, an instrumental under-
standing of the political that relied on a distinction between political means and 
political ends. Prefigurative politics, in contrast, targeted a correspondence and 
non-instrumental coherence between political means and ends. This privileged 
community-building over the formation of political organizations, as the latter – 
like many communist-leaning student organizations – were often seen as embody-
ing and prolonging the dictate of political instrumentalism even if their aims were 
to overthrow the present political system (Breines 1989, 18–66). In this respect, 
prefigurative politics was envisaged as a “questioning of instrumental rationality” 
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(Breines 1989, 50). Community-building, in contrast, was embraced as a politi-
cal strategy that built possible future communal structures into present ones, 
thereby redeeming the political viability of the former while probing and develop-
ing alternative ways of decision-making in the latter. Crucially, this establishment 
of a continuity between present community and future commune challenged the 
main instrument of democratic decision-making, which is the majority vote, as it 
appeared to be itself complicit in the instrumentalist narrowing of the political in 
established democratic political systems, relying on a distinction between those 
represented and those representing them (see Poletta 2002; Nail 2013). Up to the 
present day, a critique of the majority vote, as the key embodiment of representa-
tive politics, is therefore at the heart of prefigurative politics, which keeps exper-
imenting with different practices of consensus-based decision making (see Sitrin 
2006; Sitrin and Azzelini 2014; Graeber 2013, 196–207, 210–227). 
Critiques have been launched against prefigurative politics as a mode of prac-
ticing the political that is highly vulnerable to irritations (see Breines 1989, 48–49). 
Compared to political organizations with a strict means-ends instrumentalism, 
prefigurative politics might seem to be somewhat ineffective and always threat-
ened by a relapse into communal romanticism (see Breines 1989, 67–95). Its princi-
ple of consensus-based decision-making has been confronted with critiques since 
antiquity, as Egon Flaig, a political anthropologist focusing on collective decision 
rules, has demonstrated (Flaig 2013). However, the instrumental success of pre-
figurative politics is not the concern of this article, as neither Adelson’s “future 
sense” nor Appadurai’s “future as a cultural fact” is concerned with how these 
two modes of futurity ‘deliver.’ Instead, prefigurative politics, I would argue, is 
another instantiation of a ‘future sense,’ this time decidedly applied to rearticulat-
ing notions of the political as such. At the same time, it shares with Adelson’s and 
Appadurai’s suggestions a concern with a present that is seen as catastrophic, and 
with a future that threatens to be reduced to a mere continuation, and ultimately 
verification, of the present’s proneness to catastrophe. In other words, prefigura-
tive politics is historically circumscribed and motivated by a present that seems to 
have always already captured the future within an ideological horizon of a future 
that is allegedly unknown, unknowable, and hence irrelevant for the present.
Richard Day (2005, 91–128) has genealogically connected prefigurative poli-
tics with off-mainstream traditions of anarchist political thought. His conceptual 
concern is the rejection of the critique that anarchism is utopian, which was put 
forth often by Marxist thinkers. Focusing on the works of Gustav Landauer, Day dis-
sects a peculiar motif in anarchist thought to conceptualize revolutionary political 
agency without recourse to a revolutionary political collectivity – typically, class 
– and to the instrumental character that present political action must maintain 
to such future collectivity. Instead, Day argues, Landauer proposed the concept 
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of ‘structural renewal’ that anticipated some key components of the later prefigu-
rative politics. Its main idea was that, in order to transform the present capitalist 
and oppressive system, one has to start out with collaborative potentials already 
partially established in everyday interactions and affinities. ‘Structural renewal’ 
therefore did not have to wait for the advent of a revolutionary subject, constructed 
by the instrumental action of political organizations, but could proceed from these 
mundane alternatives to an oppressive system in order to corrode it from within. 
The temporality articulated in the concept of ‘structural renewal’ anticipated that of 
‘prefigurative politics’ in the sense that existing communal structures were deemed 
to bear the kernel of an imminent end of the oppressive societal system, and at the 
same time foreshadowed such communal structures on a much larger scale.
4  Conclusion: What the ‘Future Sense’ Might 
Harbor for the Future of the Study of Culture
If the notion of “future sense” as proposed by Adelson has been chosen to start 
and to end this article, it is because that notion is fundamental for the issues 
raised here. For the transdisciplinary field of the study of culture, it seems to me 
that Adelson’s conception of the “future sense” is both cautious and foundational 
at the same time. It is cautious because it circumscribes the future sense not as 
heralding any radically new political or societal project (Adelson 2017, 62), but 
rather as an entry point – a “portal,” as Adelson says – for reconsidering the 
ways that present and future may relate to each other. As a new way of perception 
that can be added to our senses, it requires “cultivation” (Adelson 2017, 196, 246) 
through the practice of “reading” (Adelson 2017, 196) that does not necessarily 
re-constellate fields of social practice, but first of all the ways that we relate to the 
world as one that is always already interpreted (see Weber 1904). Yet the concept 
of the ‘future sense’ is foundational too, referring to the capacity of localizing the 
future in the present, with the effect that the future turns from a utopian into a 
‘topian’ point of reference, that is, to something “that is not consistently deferred” 
(Adelson 2017, 78), but there to be perceived.
The contributions discussed in this article do not share all aspects with 
respect to how they attempt to recalibrate understandings of how future and 
present relate to one another. However, for the question organizing the present 
volume – what are the futures of the study of culture? – they together bear import-
ant inspirations as well as questions.
First, they urge us to rethink the inherited modernist juxtaposition of the 
‘present future’ and ‘future present,’ in Niklas Luhmann’s terms (Luhmann 1976; 
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see also Luhmann 1998). The gist of Luhmann’s distinction is that the future can 
be present only ever as an expectation formed in and by the present, which has 
conceptually nothing to do with how the present will present itself at any point 
in the future. In other words, the future ‘as such’ is an externality of the present. 
This distinction writes forth a tradition to conceive of modernity as an episteme 
and a phenomenology that radically cuts the bond between ‘experience’ and 
‘expectation,’ as in Reinhart Koselleck’s distinction between ‘Erfahrungsraum’ 
and ‘Erwartungshorizont’ (Koselleck 2004; see also Adelson 2017, 126). While both 
experiences and expectations undoubtedly inform present social action, expec-
tations are often associated with a quality of ‘ficticiousness’ regarding their ref-
erence objects, as those objects are held to belong to the future as being ‘open’ 
or ‘contingent.’3 Yet, modernity’s conceptual decoupling of the present from the 
‘open’ or ‘contingent’ future might, only seemingly paradoxically, be complicit in 
‘rolling over’ the present’s tendencies into the future, because many present prob-
lematic or even catastrophic social, political, and economic tendencies operate 
on such notions as future contingency. This celebration of contingency can be 
most clearly seen in financial market practices, whose condition of possibility 
is the claim that the future is open and therefore a projection screen for expecta-
tions, manifested as bets.
Second, we need to account for the fact that the “future sense” is a “sense 
organ” (in Adelson’s terms) whose “cultivation” is historically embedded and 
circumscribed. This historical circumscription, as can be seen from the above 
discussion, is informed by a sense of present, ongoing, and imminent catastro-
phe as a paradigmatic experience since the twentieth century at least. Adelson’s 
reflections take up the critical theoretical thread to contemplate modernity as a 
“permanent catastrophe.” Appadurai posits the “future as a cultural fact” against 
disaster capitalism and systematic exploitation on a mass scale. The radically 
democratic project of ‘prefigurative politics’ seems to be returned to whenever the 
suspicion arises that the institutions of representative democracy might either 
not be able to cope with ongoing disaster or, worse, be complicit with it.
Third, these studies invite scholars of culture to turn their attention to social 
cooperation and collective decision-making as phenomena that might have a 
presence apart from modernity’s ‘division of labor’ and apart from invocations 
of collective identity. In other words, conceptualizing cooperation must resist 
the temptation of sociological functionalism as well as that of culturalist iden-
titarianism. Instead, cooperation might be envisioned as a lateral – or, in an 
3 For instance, see Beckert 2013 who diagnoses “fictional expectations” as core components of 
financial capitalism.
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activist idiom, “horizontal” (Sitrin 2006; Nail 2013) – activity that actualizes 
forms of address in the present that not only anticipate their broadening in the 
future but make the potentiality of such broadening the basis of their present 
 experiencing.
Fourth, the following question arises: What becomes of utopia when an alter-
native, more ‘topian’ sense of futurity is in the present’s reach? Is the revolution-
ary political inclination of utopia lost for the ‘future sense’? While all the contri-
butions discussed in this article insist on a ‘future sense’ that rejects the severing 
of present from future that, in the modernist account, is often associated with the 
genre of utopia, it might still be possible to engage, as Adelson (2017, 126) argues 
that Kluge does, in an approximation of utopia as a “paradigm for imagining 
social perfection” whose futurity is not an index of inaccessibility but a “social 
fact” (Adelson 2017, 87) that structures the present. ‘Utopia’ might be revisited as 
a potential conceptual kernel of a future temporality whose significance resides 
in its quality of being, as Adelson defines the ‘future sense,’ “an anti-realist and 
non-empirical but nonetheless real dimensional phenomenon in time” (Adelson 
2017, 29). The conceptual labor that such revisiting requires might start with a 
deconstruction of an array of understandings that have been instrumental in 
rejecting utopia as a modality of social and political perception. This concerns 
not only the notion of the ‘empirical’ but also its permutations like probability 
and risk that, as Appadurai reminds us, foster a belief in the empirical precisely as 
they play with, and bet on, the possibility of its unreality. It also concerns notions 
of political ‘effectiveness’ that dismiss the significance as social and cultural facts 
of however fleeting and ephemeral experiments with prefigurative politics, at the 
double cost of taking political instrumentalism for granted without interrogating 
the latter’s ‘effectiveness.’ For the study of culture, the ‘future sense’ might thus 
be a call not only to robustly withstand the pressure to collapse the real into the 
empirical, but also to dissect the permutations of the empirical as they reach out 
into the unreal.
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She walks through her sunken dream
To the seat with the clearest view
And she’s hooked to the silver screen
But the film is a saddening bore!
For she’s lived it ten times or more
She could spit in the eyes of fools 
As they ask her to focus on
Sailor’s fighting in the dance hall
Oh man! Look at those cavemen go
It’s the freakiest show,
Take a look at the law-man
Beating up the wrong guy
Oh man! Wonder if he’ll ever know
He’s in the best-selling show,
Is there life on Mars?
These words are from David Bowie’s popular song (Is there) Life on Mars?, which 
was released in 1971. I want to suggest that the reason why the song has, and 
continues, to be so popular is because it speaks strongly to our cultural imagi-
nations, that is, it speaks to where we are going as societies, cultures, and as a 
species (or not), and it projects, and therefore anticipates, a future time and place 
that, like all good sci-fi, captures our imaginations, and projects our hopes, fears, 
horrors, dreams, and our wonder onto something somewhere else, if not better. 
Apart from being a cultural phenomenon in and of itself that has consequently, to 
some extent, had a huge influence on the way people feel about space, time, and 
the future, Bowie’s song, while making reference to great musicians, filmmakers, 
and philosophers, is also a political commentary on our times. The song therefore 
serves as a good sci-fi trope, to which I will keep referring throughout this paper, 
for thinking about the “futures” of studying culture in the political climate of 
today and tomorrow.
Let me start by giving you Bowie’s description of the meaning of his song: “A 
sensitive young girl’s reaction to the media [or to the film she is watching on the 
silver screen] […] she finds herself disappointed with reality […] that although 
she’s living in the doldrums of reality, she’s being told there’s a far greater life 
somewhere, and she’s bitterly disappointed that she doesn’t have access to it” 
(Pegg 2011, 144). The question “Is there life on Mars?” then could be interpreted 
as a plea, a call, to that something “other” as Jacques Derrida would say; to a 
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future, to another world that may perhaps come or save us, as the girl in the song 
seems to crave, from our “caveman”-like behaviors that we paradoxically exhibit 
in our modern times. We could argue the question of the song’s title is a call to 
and for a new Enlightenment, not one solely determined by privileging reason 
and autonomy or individual monadism (in the Kantian sense), but rather one that 
also includes a more contextual connection between people, and the environ-
ments (both local and global) in which we live.
However, while Bowie’s song has shaped the public imagination about space 
and the future, I would also argue that he does not necessarily present a utopic 
vision. This is because the question: “Is there life on Mars?” is also dystopic pre-
cisely because the question remains only a question. It is therefore perhaps a 
cynical political and cultural commentary on the times (the 1970s), but one just 
as relevant and pertinent today. In other words, the question becomes a commen-
tary on the way we culturally represent ourselves to each other. For example, the 
girl watching a film about “sailor’s fighting” and a “law-man beating up the wrong 
guy” that she has experienced in reality “ten times or more”, suggests a repetitive 
and circular representation of ourselves, one that endorses and perpetuates the 
simplistic “caveman”-like behavior in the media and on the silver screens, of our 
politicians, lawyers, and war-machines: “Oh man! Look at those cavemen go.” 
At the very end of the song there is a drumbeat that is an intertextual musical 
reference to Stanley Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey (which was released 
in 1968, 3 years before Bowie’s song). The drumbeat in the movie’s theme song, 
referenced by Bowie, is taken from German composer Richard Strauss’s composi-
tion, Also sprach Zarathustra (1896). One of the scenes in the movie accompany-
ing Strauss’s music is the ape (or early “caveman”) throwing a bone into the sky. 
The bone, a symbol of the tools and weapons humans learn to use, brings us right 
back – and thus repeats the circularity of human behavior – to the line in Bowie’s 
song: “Oh man! Look at those cavemen go.” But the title of Strauss’s music, is in 
turn, as we know, a reference to Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous book, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (1883–1891), in which Nietzsche opposes Immanuel Kant’s form of 
Enlightenment (or ascetic ideal). Rather, as Paul Patton argues, Nietzsche believes 
in the “possibility of a different type of human being, the ‘overman’ represented 
by the coming of a child without ressentiment at the natural conditions of life, 
including death, and with no need of a belief in super-sensible worlds,” that is, 
belief in worlds we cannot experience with our senses and are therefore transcen-
dent (including alien worlds) (Patton 2012, 139, 142–143). The child in Bowie’s 
song that references Strauss’s Also sprach Zarathustra and in turn 2001: A Space 
Odyssey (1968) could be reminiscent of the coming of the child that represents 
Nietzsche’s overman. And while Space Odyssey also projected a “future human,” 
perhaps an Nietzschean “overman” in space, on the ground, on earth, in 1968, 
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we saw various anti-authoritarian revolutions of varying intensity throughout 
Europe: in Poland, Prague, Germany, and arguably most famously in Paris with 
the student riots that brought the nation to a standstill in just over a couple of 
weeks. Much of the revolts at this time, as Angela Merkel put it, was a response 
to the political repressive socialism of the day on the one hand, and the free- 
market economy that in turn was blamed for appalling conditions for workers 
and increased fees for students on the other (Dülffer 2008).
In summing up the ‘68 movement on its fortieth anniversary in 2008, Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit claimed that “1968 was a European movement,” one that “gave rise 
to a new form of society all over Europe. Today we are on the path to a common 
identity” (Cohn-Bendit 2008). Compare that to what is happening in Europe 
now, and reflect on the fact that only nine years after Cohn-Bendit’s claim, on 23 
June, 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU (what has been termed “Brexit”). In the 
immediate aftermath of the vote to leave the EU, there were threats from Ireland 
and Scotland for a new referendum to leave the UK, and talk of Nexit (the “next” 
country touted to leave was the Netherlands). If there was a common identity or 
a potential for one, it was shattered on 23 June, 2016. The line in Bowie’s song 
in which he sings “Rule Britannia is out of bounds” is uncannily prophetic, evi-
denced by a display of sovereignty when Boris Johnson made clear in his speech 
on the morning of the outcome of the vote that “we can now take back democratic 
[meaning sovereign] control … we can control our own borders” (Johnson 2016). 
And as Philip Stephens in his column in the UK Financial Times on 23 June argued: 
“The 2008 financial crash, austerity and the grossly uneven distribution of the 
rewards of globalisation have all taken a toll” (Stephens 2016). This is indeed a 
far cry from a united EU on a path to a “common identity,” as Stephens goes on: 
“Not so long ago British politicians of almost all shades were proud of Europe’s 
role as a catalyst for the spread of freedom and democracy beyond its borders. 
Governments of right and left championed the EU accession of formerly commu-
nist states” (Stephens 2016). But now, and quoting this time politician and Brexit 
supporter Michael Gove, “people in this country have had enough of experts” 
(Gove 2016). Indeed, those experts are not just “organisations” initially suggested 
by Gove, but one could argue they also include academics and academic institu-
tions. I’ll come back to this disillusionment with academic experts shortly, but for 
the moment while it is possible to see the Brexit revolt as a repetition of political 
uprisings of the 1960s, as Karl Marx argues such repetitions are often in form only 
because history repeats itself “once as tragedy and again as farce” (Marx 2013 
[1852], 9), or as Bowie sings: It’s an old story, seen “ten times or more.”
This discussion of Brexit is an example, a case study, or a way to think about 
the statement, “the futures of studying culture,” because the vote to Leave was 
much more than just about economics, politics, fear of terrorism, and dislike of 
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immigration. It is, I would argue, also about culture and ‘identity.’ Indeed for 
some, such as David Morris, it represents the new culture wars between classes 
and between the left and right: “The most overwhelming Leave constituencies are 
a social milieu that is remote, both literally and figuratively, from higher educa-
tion […] Class, education and geography dominate above all else, far more so than 
the policy debates about the economy and immigration” (Morris 2016). Moreover, 
no longer wanting a cosmopolitan identity, Britons have been lamenting a long-
passed idea of “Britishness” (and thus culture), which they believe immigration 
has diluted (McQuillan 2016a). My aim here is not to side or comment on whether 
or not Britain was right or wrong to decide to leave the EU. Rather what is more 
interesting is that Brexit not only exposed the fault lines in class relations, but 
that in the lead-up to and fall-out from the vote, while there were many academ-
ics commenting about the economic and political implications of Brexit, there 
were very few academic voices linking the debate to ethics, responsibility, and 
social justice.
Jacques Derrida would definitely have had something to say, and in fact, 
still does, when we consider how and why his work has ongoing relevance. For 
instance, writing on the mass demonstration in Paris in 1996 over the issue of 
refugees and immigration, in his article “On Cosmopolitanism” (2001), which is 
relevant to the Brexit issue today, Derrida rigorously unpacks the issues by focus-
ing on the word “cosmopolitanism.” Derrida argues that “[s]ince the Revolution,” 
France has portrayed its cosmopolitan identity by “being more open to political 
refugees in contradistinction to other European countries” (Derrida 2001, 10). 
And yet, despite this, Derrida locates a double bind or contradictory imperative 
within the concept of cosmopolitanism. As summarized by Simon Critchley and 
Richard Kearney in the preface to Derrida’s article:
[O]n the one hand, there is an unconditional hospitality which should offer the right of 
refuge to all immigrants and newcomers. But on the other hand, hospitality has to be con-
ditional: there has to be some limitation on rights of residence. All the political difficulty of 
immigration consists in negotiating between these two imperatives. (Derrida 2001, x)
I would argue that any negotiation of this nature involves ethics because it has 
to account for the needs of both hosts and refugees. Of course Derrida has a 
lot more to say about this negotiation and the nature of hospitality, and while 
Derrida wrote “On Cosmopolitanism” in 1997, twenty years later we could say that 
the Brexit vote to Leave was perhaps a failure by our politicians to take on this 
negotiation and a further failure of both academics and politicians to even com-
municate the issues involved to the general population. Still I can’t help wonder-
ing what Derrida would have to say about this situation. I recall a conversation 
Pre-Post-Apocalyptic Culture: The Future(s) of the Humanities   87
Derrida and I were having about 1968, in which he was telling me that intellec-
tuals (the  professors) en masse were supporting, and were often found on the 
front line with, the students and workers. Foucault was one of them, and Derrida 
harbored in his home some of the student rioters wanted by authorities. And 
while the situation is different today, and while there are many academic com-
mentators on Brexit, the questions remain: where are the professors, the intellec-
tuals, the academics today, not just as commentators on an event like Brexit, but 
shapers of the future of culture and politics and our responsibilities and ethics 
towards others, to all communities and classes in our societies? Or, to put the 
question another way: What should be the role of higher education in a situation 
like Brexit? To some British academic commentators there is an argument that 
the lack of an active role in Brexit by higher education institutions has created a 
legitimation crisis. Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas broadly define a legitima-
tion crisis as a situation in which the citizens of a political regime lose belief in 
the system, such as, public institutions (Weber 2012, 382; Habermas 1987, 140; 
see also Habermas 1975). Now some British academic commentators have been 
arguing that a legitimation crisis was played out in and through Brexit, with the 
vote to Leave as much about an economic as it was an anti-intellectual or a higher 
education legitimation crisis. The crisis can be summed up by Martin McQuillan 
when he argues:
The widening of the graduate population and the expansion of immigration to the United 
Kingdom are perhaps the two most significant factors that have changed the cultural com-
position of Britain in the last two decades. The EU vote is a direct challenge to the latter; 
it also feels like a warning shot to the former. As the so-called “post-truth” politics of the 
campaign demonstrated, it is not an exaggeration to say that the referendum was an anti- 
intellectual experience and that the outcome is a rejection of the values espoused by those 
in universities who argued for Remain.  (McQuillan 2016b)
Indeed, 103 universities in the UK wrote an open letter to the British voters appeal-
ing to them to vote Remain. But admirable as this was, and while it was absolutely 
needed, in some ways the letter missed its mark and failed to take account of this 
culture war and this anti-intellectualism that McQuillan comments on. Beginning 
the open letter with this line, “we are gravely concerned about the impact of a UK 
exit from the EU on our universities and students” (Independent 2016), we can 
perhaps see why it missed its mark. The letter did not address at all what univer-
sities could do for those working classes who do not share the same values, who 
are simply struggling to survive, and often have no chance or opportunity of ever 
getting to university. After all, to use Bowie’s interpretation of his song: “the girl 
is being told there’s a far greater life somewhere, and she’s bitterly disappointed 
that she doesn’t have access to it” (Pegg 2011, 144).
88   Nicole Anderson
Of course in this climate of legitimation crisis the university and research 
communities are easy targets. Because while universities argued that leaving 
the EU would be a mistake, could not be supported by any reasonable evidence, 
and would be bad for national institutions such as universities, as David Morris 
argues, “[t]he sceptical listener only hears self-interest and a wish to preserve 
the status quo above all else,” and they hear this precisely because “[t]he highly 
educated and their educators have done relatively well in Britain since the reces-
sion and austerity, even with the diversity of experience within these groups” 
(Morris 2016). In other words, within some western societies, large portions of 
the population, not just Britain, are tilting in terms of their cultural values to the 
extreme right, and what this means, as Philip Stephens puts it, is that increas-
ingly “[f]ear counts above reason, anger above evidence, lies and prejudice claim 
equal status with facts, and political popularism wins the day, and this is a con-
sequence of trust in democratic and educational institutions being at a very low 
point in the history of Western democracy” (Stephens 2016). But when academics 
start to associate political popularism with the ignorance of the masses, this iron-
ically just widens the cultural and class divide and further perpetuates mistrust 
in academic institutions. One could just as easily argue that, like the working 
class response, the educated position of being for “Remain” is equally ideological 
and/or a knee-jerk reaction because, as I mentioned earlier, it is perhaps based 
on thinking of the working class as uneducated bigots, and thus not really paying 
attention to the desperation coming from austerity measures and the failure of 
neoliberalism to distribute wealth fairly. But perhaps this situation may have been 
averted if the role of higher education, and here I particularly include the human-
ities and cultural studies, had contributed (say through more effective public dis-
course and through extensive and consistent influence on the secondary school 
system) to developing a citizenry that would be capable of making informed deci-
sions: that is, decisions based on being able to critically choose among various 
options articulated in one form or another between the left and right and neces-
sary for understanding not only the complexity but the ethical implications of 
a given situation or event like Brexit. Therefore, perhaps it is ethical education 
and  decision-making that will enable us to go beyond the ideologies of both left 
and right so that we can negotiate and make informed decisions with the others’ 
interests in mind. That is, ethical education enables us to focus on the interests 
and needs of the other, no matter how different they may be to “us.”
Meanwhile, if Brexit has revealed a legitimation crisis in Higher Education, 
then we can conclude that academics are seen as part of an elite, as experts in 
control (economically and intellectually) who have let the people down. In this 
Brexit climate that will effect Europe, as well as in the larger world context of 
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potential ecological and hence political crisis with increasing refugees and immi-
gration born out of war, fundamentalism and climate change (Syrian refugees are 
partly a result of climate forces as well), with the forthcoming struggle for raw 
materials, such as food and water, and with the closing or policing of borders, 
the explosions of social divisions and exclusions, that is, increased tribalism 
and forms of apartheid (Žižek 2016), it is no wonder that a discourse of post- 
apocalyptic culture is on everyone’s lips, and why Slavoj Žižek’s (2016) claim that 
we are “living in end times” and approaching an apocalyptic state taps into the 
current Zeitgeist. In fact, as Claire Colebrook puts it, this explains why “Fredric 
Jameson suggested that it was easier to imagine the end of the world than the end 
of capitalism” (Colebrook 2016, 21; see Jameson 2003, 76). In fact, this could be 
called a pre-post-apocalyptic culture precisely because it is, and it will be climate 
change and fundamentalism, coupled with the rise of the Internet and the sup-
posed democratization of knowledge, that differentiates us now from 1968 and 
other political upheavals of the past.
Given all of this, given the talk of living on the verge, or in a pre-post-apocalyptic 
culture, given the alleged demise in trust in academic institutions, there seems to 
be an increasing dominant way of thinking about the future of studying culture and 
the humanities, and that is, that the humanities will either slide into non-existence, 
in other words, there is no future at all, because, with the mistrust in ‘experts’ such 
as academics, universities and particularly the study of the humanities, including 
culture, will be seen as increasingly indulgent by the general populace, or we will 
nonetheless muddle along catering only to a small elite cut off from the mainstream 
and increasingly less relevant and a tiny voice that makes no difference among the 
dominant political issues of the day. Unless academics have given up entirely, this 
view looks bleak.
But why care? Should we care? When Žižek and other philosophers tell us 
we are living in the “end times,” like good cultural theoreticians, the question 
we need to be raising here, as Claire Colebrook argues, is “whose ‘end times’ 
and whose ‘world’ [is] deemed to be ending?” (Colebrook 2016, 21). Put more 
concretely: The “end of the world” that is being pre-emptively mourned in post- 
apocalyptic culture is a highly specific world of hyper-consuming, personalized, 
neoliberal, and narrowly post-human “man.” It is only possible to say that “we” 
are easily imagining the end of the world when what is presented as “the end” 
in films, pop-songs, and philosophy “is the end of Western affluence and white 
privilege” (Colebrook 2016, 22). We could put the question to higher education 
institutions as well. It could well be argued and indeed has been that implicit in 
statements like “the futures of studying culture” or the “value of the humanities” 
(and you could replace humanities with universities here), is a mournful narcis-
sism of our own values, beliefs, ideologies, and privileged positions.
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Having said this, whether or not we are on the verge of a post-apocalyptic 
culture is actually not the issue. If there is some kind of apocalypse (whether it 
is nuclear, viral, terrorist, etc.), when and if it happens, everything, let alone the 
question of the future of studying culture will be redundant. As Derrida argues, 
the absolute future is unpredictable, incalculable, absolutely unknowable, and 
therefore unpreventable, and this is what Derrida calls the “future to come” 
(Derrida 1994, xix). However, there is also another future, what Derrida calls the 
“future-present” (Derrida 1976, 67). This is a near future, one that can be calcu-
lated and anticipated based on the present and the past, and through reason and 
imagination this future can be shaped (shaped enough to perhaps prevent our 
own man-made apocalypse). Therefore, this for me is the future of which we can 
take hold. A future in which we can assert the value of the humanities, or the 
futures of studying culture, as I do, as a more positive and hopeful attempt to step 
out of this narcissism and make ourselves relevant to the people that need us. 
After all, helping politicians, journalists, and the general public understand and 
solve the social and ethical issues of our age is the university’s, and especially 
the humanities’, most pressing mission. For Morris, the “challenge is to make the 
complexities and caveats of research resonate with the everyday experience of cit-
izens” (Morris 2016). The alternative is to waste away in crumbling ivory towers, 
relics, or ruins of an age past.
The study of culture, and the humanities more broadly, offers the perfect 
position to help others understand our social and cultural problems and provide 
answers to them; with the theoretical and empirical tools in our toolbox we have 
the ability to respond to the most important issues of our times with flexibility 
and with speed. The study of culture, and the humanities, provides not only 
knowledge and understandings of human behavior, society, and culture, but also 
what it means to be human. Moreover, the study of culture and the humanities 
knows how to tell a story about who we are and where we are going, much like 
Bowie’s song; the humanities need to tell that story more strongly, and through 
that story start shaping the cultural, social, political, and ethical imagination in 
positive and socially just ways.
Furthermore, unlike the current break-up of the EU, what is needed now 
more than ever is that cultural studies and the humanities collaborate with 
the sciences (in research and in teaching), which will involve translating the 
ways in which various disciplines see the world, and use various theoretical 
and empirical frameworks to provide a new vision of the world, as well as new 
 innovative  implementations of those visions. Unlike the EU breakup, we need 
to come together in unity (not cynically for our own economic survivals as C.P. 
Snow (1959) writing in the 1950s analyzed the reason for the divide between the 
humanities and sciences); we need to come together around a bigger picture so 
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that we can start shaping or at least influencing the way others will ethically see 
the future history of the world. The more relevance we have the more we will be in 
a position to grow the humanities (which has been on the decline since the 1970s) 
by influencing public perception. As Leonard Cassuto, professor of English and 
American Studies at Fordham University, stating the obvious, argues:
Administrators are looking outside the liberal arts because they feel financial pressure. The 
numbers show that liberal arts graduates actually do very well after graduation, but there 
is no denying that prospective college students – and their tuition-paying parents – do not 
believe that. The percentage of liberal arts majors is trending downward, and shrinking 
enrolments result in college teaching jobs that don’t get replaced.  (Cassuto 2016)
If we care about studying culture and the humanities, if we care about the future 
of these things, then we should probably be asking ourselves the hard ques-
tions, if we aren’t already. And I will pose some of those questions in a moment. 
I do believe there will be the humanities and the study of culture in the future, 
although it might not look like what it does today. So leaving aside the current dis-
course about the end of times (which we may very well be in), if we assume we are 
going to be around as a species, then the question is: When we think about the 
future/s of the humanities and the study of culture, how far into those future/s 
should our projections go? Should we think only of the next 10 years? In fact let’s 
project into the far distant future, and let’s assume that the answer to the ques-
tion “Is there life on Mars?” in Bowie’s song, is us: the human species.
When we teach culture and the humanities on Mars, what will it look like? 
On Mars the environment will obviously be different, and our responses to the 
“world” or planet around us will be different, therefore the students, teachers, 
and researchers will be different, and so too what we learn, teach, and research. 
In this Martian environment, which we might be able to populate thanks to our 
scientists and economists, what contribution will the humanities and cultural 
studies have made? What will the humanities and cultural studies equip us with 
to not only survive, but also live and become, in that environment? What do the 
humanities give us today to enable the potential for that possible future? How 
do we prepare our students today for the many possible futures that we can only 
imagine? How do we make ourselves relevant today to enable possible futures?
Here are a few ideas or answers to these questions (obviously they are not the 
only ones): The humanities and cultural studies are what help us to communicate 
our understanding of the world around us (whether it be on Mars or Earth). Or to 
put it another way, the humanities and cultural studies are the study of how we 
represent ourselves to each other (currently through philosophy or art; literature 
or film; sociology, languages, cultures, history, anthropology or social media, and 
so on). The humanities, then, give us the critical thinking and communication 
92   Nicole Anderson
skills as well as the problem-solving tools in which to think laterally about, and 
respond flexibly and with speed to a fast-evolving world and the challenges of the 
times (now and in the future). Most importantly, the humanities teach us not only 
to communicate our understanding of the world around us to others, but enables 
us to transform, shape, or create the worlds we live in, as it provides us with the 
ability and the tools to describe visions for a better (ethical, moral, and socially 
just) future for all. It is through these critical thinking tools that we (not only stu-
dents but also teachers and researchers) acquire the skills to learn and critically 
reflect. After all, if we as educators don’t learn, and don’t adapt by envisioning 
the future, then how can we teach and research? The future of the humanities 
in large part, then, comes down to what happens in the classroom and how we 
collaborate with each other as well as the sciences and industry here, now, today, 
and also the way we connect for, and convey or communicate to students and the 
general public, the relevance of the details and particularity of what is learnt in 
the classroom and in our research to the larger world in general.
Acknowledgement: This paper is based on my lecture at GCSC/GGK Anniversary 
Symposium “Futures of the Study of Culture”, July 7–8, 2016, Alte Gießerei (Justus 
Liebig University, Giessen, Germany). I thank Jens Kugele, Doris Bachmann-Medick, 
and Michael Basseler, and the GCSC board members, for inviting me to speak at 
this important symposium.
References
Cassuto, Leonard. “This Picture Tells a Story.” Inside Higher Ed (6 June 2016). <https://www.
insidehighered.com/views/2016/06/06/responding-state-humanities-today-essay> 
[accessed: 28 February 2018].
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel. “Stop the Comparisons with 1968.” Café Babel (23 January 
2008). <http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/society/article/daniel-cohn-bendit-stop-the-
comparisons-with-1968.html> [accessed: 28 February 2018].
Colebrook, Claire. “The Play of the World: The End, the Great Outdoors, the Outside, Alterity, 
and the Real.” Derrida Today 9.1 (2016): 21–35.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Transl. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976.
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx. Transl. Peggy Kamuf. New York/London: Routledge, 1994.
Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Transl. Mark Dooley and Michael 
Hughes. London/New York: Routledge, 2001.




Pre-Post-Apocalyptic Culture: The Future(s) of the Humanities   93
“EU Referendum: An Open Letter to UK Voters from Leaders of 103 British Universities.” 
Independent (20 June 2016). <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu- 
referendum-an-open-letter-to-uk-voters-from-leaders-of-96-british-universities-a7092511.
html> [accessed: 28 February 2018].
Gove, Michael. “Interview with Faisal Islam.” Sky News (3 June 2016). <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA> [accessed: 29 November 2019].
Habermas, Jürgen. Legitimation Crisis. Transl. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.
Jameson, Fredric. “Future City.” New Left Review 21 (2003): 65–79.
Johnson, Boris. “Boris Johnson Hails Brexit Victory – Full Statement.” The Telegraph (24 June 
2016). <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/boris-johnson-hails-brexit-
victory---full-statement/> [accessed: 28 February 2018].
Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. Transl. Daniel De Leon. Belmont, 
NC: Wiseblood Classics, 2013 [1852].
McQuillan, Martin. “Taking a Leave of our Senses in the EU Referendum.” Wonkhe Report 
(23 June 2016a). <http://wonkhe.com/blogs/comment-taking-a-leave-of-our-senses/> 
[accessed: 29 November 2019].
McQuillan, Martin. “The Morning After the Referendum the Night Before.” Wonkhe Report 
(24 June 2016b). <http://wonkhe.com/blogs/comment-the-morning-after-the-referendum-
the-night-before/> [accessed: 29 November 2019].
Morris, David. “What Next for Universities in Our Disunited Kingdom?” Wonkhe Report (23 June 
2016). <http://wonkhe.com/blogs/comment-universities-dis-united-kingdom/> [accessed: 
29 November 2019].
Patton, Paul. “McCarthy’s Fire.” Styles of Extinction: Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. Eds. Julian 
Murphet and Mark Steven. London/New York: Continuum, 2012. 131–144.
Pegg, Nicholas. The Complete David Bowie. London: Titan Books, 2011.
Snow, Charles P. The Two Cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.
Stephens, Phillip. “The Perils of a Populist Paean to Ignorance.” Financial Times (23 June 2016). 
<https://www.ft.com/content/bfb5f3d4-379d-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f> [accessed: 
1 March 2018].
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books, 
2012.
Žižek, Slavoj. Living in the End Times. London/New York: Verso, 2016.
 Open Access. © 2020 Isabel Capeloa Gil, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110669398-006
Isabel Capeloa Gil
The Global Eye or Foucault Rewired: 
Security, Control, and Scholarship 
in the Twenty-first Century
The great antagonist in J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, Sauron, is metonymi-
cally described in the novel and visualized in Peter Jackson’s cinematic trilogy as 
the ‘great eye.’ The ‘Eye of Sauron,’ the ‘red eye,’ and the ‘great eye’ are epithets 
that arguably connote an embodied feeling to the penultimate villain in Tolkien’s 
trilogy. This is reported in a letter sent by Tolkien to his friend Mrs. Eileen Elgar 
on October 3, 1963: “[…] in a tale which allows the incarnation of great spirits in 
a physical and destructible form their power must be far greater when actually 
physically present. […] Sauron should be thought of as very terrible” (Carpenter 
1981, 246). Throughout the saga, the thought of Sauron trumps the character’s 
materiality. Sauron is less an active driver of antagonistic action than he is a sensa-
tion of danger and fear. He is less a character than an ambiance conveyed through 
the terror of pervasive, continuous, absolute, and totalitarian  observation.
The Lord of the Rings trilogy, written roughly between 1937 and 1949, sub-
stantiates, in Sauron’s eye, a particular twentieth-century panopticophobia: the 
fear of universal control via sight, at a time when the tools to expand the capacity 
for control over populations were starting to grow exponentially. As the century 
unfurled, visual control widened and became pervasive, from the improvement 
of weapon target accuracy via optics, to the introduction of visual technologies 
in the public sphere.1 In fact, the very project of modernity in its dual dimension 
of progress on the one side, and violent exploitation on the other, is a by- product 
of the Enlightenment project equating the progress of reason to the widening of 
a politically controlled system of images. If anything is common to the projects 
of late and early modernity, it is the organization around plans of total visuality. 
They encompass simultaneously utter control and utter sight, defined by Nicolas 
Mirzoeff as the mandate to see and control everything, everywhere, all the time 
(Mirzoeff 2015, 20). This plan of total visuality hence becomes a strategic driver 
in the organization of the social and in the partition of the sensible, as well as 
an overhaul in the wider production of meaning. As such, a twenty-first-century 
agenda for the study of culture will unavoidably deal with visuality beyond modes 
of mediation and representation to ask how and under which conditions the pro-
1 On modernity and vision, see Paul Virilio 2009 as well as Jonathan Crary 1999.
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duction of meaning is shaped by technologically induced visual surveillance. The 
gathering of visual data, the visual control, taps into what Yuval Noah Harari has 
termed the algorithmic hacking of humanity (Harari 2018, 308). It changes the 
way in which cultural subjects look at the world and make sense of it, going all 
the way deep into the very sense of social and political subjectivity, and reboot-
ing the wider understanding of culture as the practices, discourses, and products 
that aggregate the way in which humans interact with each other and the world 
around them.
And yet, Sauron and even Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ speak to a different world, a 
world of centralized and unified surveillance, of vertical linear power structures, 
a pre-modern panoptical world in fact, clearly identified by Michel Foucault in 
his reading of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. Under twenty-first century condi-
tions, the control system of technical vision is multipolar, diffuse, overarching, 
and overwhelming, cutting across all human action from biometric identification 
to smart phones, personal computers to CCCR cameras at airports, playgrounds, 
schools, churches, restaurants, and in the public space. From the practice of 
facial recognition effective now in China (Fig. 1) to body scanners at airports, the 
project of visual domination acts to produce a transparent body, stripped of its 
opaque singularity.2
Despite a semblance of democratic empowerment, because all that are 
seen are apparently also agents of seeing, the system of images that structures 
late modernity, and the resulting explosion of control centers across multiple, 
diffuse, and diverse sight points, is consistently built upon a few centers of dom-
inance. These range from national security agencies to private surveillance pro-
viders, from media conglomerates to the entertainment industry, and even from 
the influencer’s Instagram page to the structured streaming of images by social 
media platforms, from Facebook to Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. Beyond the 
containment of the dangerous in the correction institutions (prisons, reformato-
ries, hospitals, and asylums), the control of the stream of produced images has 
become a privileged tool: to manage those who see, but also limiting access and 
thereby influence; regulating, monitoring, and restraining. The control of visual 
regimes, whether made visible or invisible, has shaped modernity’s “structure of 
feeling” (Williams 1961).
As such, it has unavoidably impacted the production of scholarly research 
particularly in the humanities, as it articulates questions of democratic access 
and inclusion (Appadurai 2006), and of citizenship (Azoulay 2008) crafted by an 
2 See on body scanners, the forthcoming work by Ilios Willemars. The Body as Placeholder: 
 Incorporated Subjects in Digital Art.
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understanding that the right to see is melded with the right to be seen and heard 
by the State. But it also connotes the anxiety over technological transformation 
(Turkle 2009), over the future of the human subject, and the right to privacy and 
embodiment (Scott 1998; Chamayou 2011). The transparent body under surveil-
lance equates to the subsumption of flesh to numerical abstraction. The utopia 
of vision as empowered access to knowledge that inspired the metaphor of sight 
for the European Enlightenment oozes into A.I.-powered smartglasses for facial 
recognition (Fig. 2) materializing the dystopia of global snooping and algorithmic 
control via visualization in countries like China (Mozur 2018).
While surveillance, following the rising interest in security and terrorism, has 
given vent to prolific scholarly production, not least following the studies inaugu-
rated by David Lyon (Lyon 1994) and William Staples (Staples 1997), the herme-
neutical toolbox of cultural studies reveals ample possibilities in the exploration 
of the crossover between the regimes of the visual and technologies that structure 
them, among them the visual arts, film, and literature. And then, as Lawrence 
Grossberg argues, it is our task to question the context (Grossberg 2010), widen-
ing the field to explore the (in)visible conditions that structure the project of total 
visibility and its impact in shaping late modernity’s forms of subjectivity, ways of 
belonging, communicating, and living.
1 The Terror of Sight
In Western iconology, the sense of sight3 has traditionally symbolized knowledge 
and/as control, be it over the body (as in Aristotle),4 the city (the sovereign eye), 
or the world (the eye of God). Pre-modern approaches to sight connote both a cre-
ative dimension – as in Nicholas of Cusa, De Visione Dei – and a phobic, terrifying 
side, epitomized in the frightening stare depicted, for instance, in Caravaggio’s 
famous rendering of the Gorgo or Medusa (1597).
3 Sight is understood as a multimodal category in the arguments presented by Jonathan Crary 
in Suspensions of Perception, which define it as a historically situated and culturally construct-
ed category that is irreducibly a mixed multisensorial modality, encompassing touch, hearing, 
taste, and smell, Crary 1999, 3.
4 In Metaphysics, Aristotle writes: “All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the 
delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; 
and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are 
not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that 
this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things” 
(Aristotle 1999, I, 1, 980a 21–26).
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In 1453, Nicholas of Cusa anthropocized the idea of God’s vision and repre-
sented divine sight as embodied and culturally situated perception. In chapter 
two of his De Visione Dei, titled “Absolute Sight encompasses all modes of seeing,” 
he wrote that:
Notice that in those who have sight, sight varies as a result of the variety of its contracted-
ness. For our sight is conditioned by the affections of the organ and of the mind. […] But 
sight that is free from all contractedness […] encompasses at one and the same time each 
and every mode of seeing. For without Absolute Sight there cannot be contracted sight. But 
Absolute Sight encompasses all forms of seeing – encompasses all modes in such a way that 
it encompasses each mode. And it remains all together free from all variation. For in Abso-
lute Sight every contracted mode of seeing is present uncontractedly.  (Cusa 1999, 683)
For Nicholas of Cusa, seeing is not a natural given, but a situated multisensory 
endeavor. He distinguishes between individual sight that is both varied and 
limited, and the Absolute Sight that overcomes “contractedness” as it encom-
passes all forms of seeing. The above excerpt suggests the difference between 
finite vision and the infinite spherical vision of God, which is nonetheless 
modeled after human experience. Written to accompany a visual experiment, 
the text instructs the monks of Tegernsee to circumambulate an all-seeing icon 
of God. Developing the concept of infinite space that had found a geometrical 
representation in the vanishing point,5 Cusa places it within God’s eye, which 
retains its medieval and religious function by gazing out of the painting at the 
monk according to inverse perspective. As Arianne Conty writes, Cusa constructs 
a veritable sociology of belief, in which believing the word of the other, of the 
community, is necessary for each individual’s understanding of God (Conty 2012, 
480–481). In this sense, there can be no unmediated experience of the divine, for 
God, as infinite and absolute, cannot be reduced to a single perspective. Cusa’s 
experiment suggests that individual seeing is an unreliable source for communal 
belonging, because what we see cannot be shared. However, one can share the 
trust in the vision of God conveyed by the Scripture, which thus overcomes singu-
larity and beacons to universal meaning.
God’s vision, hence, organizes a system of dependence of the diverse and 
limited upon the unlimited central and omnipresent Eye of God as it presents 
a system of power that though unseen is clearly located at the idealized heart/
center of the universe. The Eye of God is the vanishing point of a universe contin-
uously observed and controlled by the transcendent.
A different strand is invoked by the trope of the Gorgo. The Medusa, here 
depicted in Caravaggio’s famous painting, the Gorgon slain by Perseus, is the 
5 The geometrical perspective was developed by Filippo Brunelleschi in Florence in 1413.
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epitome of seeing as trauma and panic (Fig. 3). Let us consider for a moment 
the story of the Gorgon.6 Medusa shares with her sisters Stheno and Euryale a 
terrifying appearance. These monsters with snake hair were said to possess huge 
teeth and a beard, in addition to a powerful shrieking voice, and a gaze that 
turned all those who beheld them into stone. Medusa (also Médusa, the ‘Lady,’ 
Gil 2007, 329), unlike her kin, was mortal. That is why Perseus, in order to save 
the young Andromeda, and aided by the goddess Athena, could resort to trickery 
to approach the beast and capture her head. Cloaked in a cape that rendered him 
invisible and armed with a mirror, Perseus approached the monster in arrears, 
guiding his moves with the aid of the mirrored reflection. When the Gorgo’s 
gaze hit the mirror, she saw her own reflection, hence turning herself to stone. 
The Medusa presents the phobia of the gaze, the horror of perception in a world 
marked by catastrophe and frozen to stone by the panic of seeing. As a metaphor 
of the observer, the monstrous body of the Medusa presents the dislocation of the 
spectator from the order of things. Medusa’s glaring eyes and guttural cry present 
in Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero’s words the “human appalled by his very 
being and contemplating the unspeakable act of his own annihilation” (Cavarero 
2005, 25).
The double logic of creation and terror, of producing a subjectivity within 
a logic of terrifying control, precisely to limit the possibilities of the controlled 
subject to unleash that very same terror (be it the plague or crime), is what lies at 
the node of the Foucauldian surveillance model, inspired by Jeremy Bentham’s 
model of the panopticon. Foucault’s work has inspired social theory along the 
past 40 years, interested as it was in understanding the complex modulations of 
power in its articulation with disciplinary technologies and the very institutions 
of modernity (the prison, the factory, the hospital, the school, the church, the 
court) and how they impacted the production of subjectivity. Bentham’s panopti-
con is an enlightening trope in this strategy of control that brings about a radical 
paradigmatic shift in the production of modern subjectivity.
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange 
things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its 
action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; 
that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power 
relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be 
caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. To achieve this, 
it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an 
inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much, 
6 On the duplicity of the Medusa, see Vernant 1985; Gil 2007.
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because he has no need in fact of being so. In view of this, Bentham laid down the princi-
ple that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly 
have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. 
Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one 
moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. […]
The Panopticon is a / machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric 
ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything 
without ever being seen.  (Foucault 1975, 201–202; my emphasis)
The importance of the panopticon is to produce a permanent visibility-inducing 
machine that becomes the hallmark of modern power, structured upon the ability 
to dissociate this ever present and all-seeing entity from the seen. That is, hiding 
agency, the voyeuristic machine of vision produces subjectivities structured on 
utter control and transparency, because in the Foucauldian conditions of high 
modernity, though power is unverifiable, it is utterly visible. Foucault’s reading 
of Bentham’s pedagogical panopticon has effectively not only given vent to a 
wide array of studies on the trials and mechanisms of what David Lyon in 1994 
named “surveillance society” (Lyon 1994), but arguably has fielded a new culture 
as well, a culture of surveillance, creatively producing surveyed subjectivities 
(Staples 1997). This culture has impacted scholarship and created a new sub-field 
of surveillance studies, situated on the cusp of politics and interpretation, philos-
ophy and sociology, technology and the humanities.
2  The Culture of Visual Surveillance 
and Scholarship in the Humanities
The conditions under which the technologies of surveillance operate in the post 
9/11 world have changed. Not only does the center no longer hold, but the direc-
tions, the flows, and the locations from which the panoptic control is exercised 
have multiplied and changed. Whereas the panopticon, in Bentham’s assertion 
and Foucault’s reading of Bentham, rests on the potential visibility of the observer 
and on the sheer and radical stability of the position from which power is exer-
cised, in the post 9/11 world, power is still unverifiable and permanent, but it 
is utterly invisible, exercised from a multiplicity of even contradictory positions. 
The post 9/11 culture of surveillance is best epitomized in a global eye, made up of 
multiple smaller eyes, that exert power in what Arjun Appadurai calls a “volatile 
morphing” (Appadurai 2006, 83), of reciprocal and contradictory observation, 
a control spreading rapidly over the globally networked 4.0 industry. The vola-
tility, and the multiple and multidirectional seeing positions, conflate a social 
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 technological drive that radical critics, such as William Staples in The Culture of 
Surveillance, have called the visual “pornography” of total self-display (Staples 
1997). Display and technologically mediated self-presentation become extraordi-
narily effective modes of self-surveillance.
James C. Scott’s remarkable Seeing Like a State (1998) insightfully places 
the operation of the state at the center of the transformations in the conflation 
of knowledge, vision, and control. Scott’s research shows how state power and 
the modern project is not simply a project of absolute visibility, but of restricting 
access to vision and of constraining the right to look, exerted through forms of 
rationalization and simplification.
Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision. The great advantage 
of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an other-
wise far more complex and unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the 
phenomenon at the center of the field of vision more legible and hence more susceptible 
to careful measurement and calculation. Combined with similar observations, an overall, 
aggregate, synoptic view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree of 
schematic knowledge, control, and manipulation.  (Scott 1998, 11)
As the new vanishing point of secular modernity, the state thus enacts a model 
of control that rests on the expansion of technological capacity – to see every-
thing, everywhere, everytime – but also on the concomitant narrow selection of 
visual data, that leads in turn to a simplification ultimately aimed at making the 
phenomenon more legible, but also more schematic and prone to manipulation. 
Suggestively, Scott’s diagnosis of simplified legibility opens up the field for a 
scholarly questioning of the project from the perspective of a counter-legibility, 
enacted on the intersection of the visible and the visual with the textual and the 
speakable, inviting complexity, where simplification is becoming the rule.
In liquid modernity, the panopticon that organized the populations with the 
ultimate end of keeping in, in gated areas, the undesirable, damaged, sick and 
dysfunctional parts of society, has given way to a different logic. As Zygmunt 
Bauman argued, in the new post-panoptic society, the surveillance dispositif is 
creative of subjectivities that are not simply produced from the standpoint of a 
general dominating entity, but it is fragmented and heterogeneous.7 It operates 
through state and corporate entities and it reflects 
7 Post-panoptic developments have been studied by scholars such as David Lyon, proposing the 
synopticon as a technology mediated device of permanent observation, Lyon 2006, 35, or Didier 
Bigo 2011, proposing the term ban-opticon to define the way in which profiling technologies are 
used to create surveilled and excluded identities; see Bauman and Lyon 2013. 
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[…] a more general phenomenon of surveillance philosophy and surveilling equipment 
wrapped around the task of ‘keeping away’ instead of ‘keeping in’, as the panopticon did, 
and drawing its life juices and developmental energy from the currently unstoppable rise of 
securitarian preoccupations, not from the disciplining urge as in the case of the panopticon. 
 (Bauman and Lyon 2013, 58)
If the age of the (post) panopticon in its steady and heavy institutional sense is 
over, as Jean Baudrillard (1994) announced in Simulacra and Simulation, and has 
been substituted by pure representation, a world of simulacra meaning nothing 
but themselves, what societies have experienced is the effective tightening of 
social control through volatile abstraction (refugees as swarms, the migrant 
caravans, etc.), eliciting a radical transformation in surveillance modes. They 
have changed to become more pervasive, permanent, lighter, faster, and increas-
ingly supporting preemptive action. Having dissociated, in Foucault’s terms, the 
seeing from the seen, the global surveillance eye enacts a seeing ex-ante, even 
before there is anything to be seen. One of the most remarkable examples of this 
evolution is the drone, be it the civilian gadget form that hovers over malls and 
parks, and that is consistently pushed as the new trendy object of consumption 
in airport tax-free shops all over the globe, or in its military form as the UAV or 
UCAV,8 potentiating the pervasiveness of an unseen repressive and murderous 
power machine.
In its military form, the drone captures the imagination, just as it is a product 
of a heritage of cultural representations of phobia. Naming is an act of power. 
Named the Reaper, the Predator, or the Gorgo, the UCAVs capture the imagination 
of fear and project the drone controller’s imagination of power and control over 
a vision of society and culture. The wrong attire in the wrong place, a children’s 
game that falls outside the scope of the cultural understanding of the observer, 
a gesture out of hand, a social gathering outside the pattern of Western sociality, 
may trigger a click with deadly impact. What goes on in the command room at 
Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, where the US Air Force’s drone squadron operat-
ing in Afghanistan is located, and in other military sites engaged in the ‘war from 
a distance’ and in cyberwar, is not simply a matter for politics, military sciences, 
and social studies. This is a matter of culture, a second wave of surveillance 
studies in which we who partake in meaning-making activities must engage.
One of the most remarkable studies of the cultural implications of the age 
of the drone, Grégoire Chamayou’s Drone Theory (2011), argues that in the new 
stage of the war on terror, precisely the business of detection and preemptive 
annihilation trains military personnel as cultural analysts. The stakes are about 
8 UAV – Unmanned aerial vehicle; UCAV – Unmanned combat aerial vehicle.
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schematizing patterns of life, detecting narratives as they appear in visual form 
and the deviations from those patterns. As one analyst, quoted by Chamayou 
says, “You’re now getting into a culture study. […] You’re looking at people’s lives. 
[…] Essentially, the task consists in distinguishing between ‘normal’ and ‘abnor-
mal’ activity in a kind of militarized rhythm-analysis, that takes on increasingly 
automatized forms” (Chamayou 2011, 43). According to Chamayou, the world has 
entered into a new stage where surveillance is now a tool not simply for strate-
gic but also for effective annihilation, a process that folds the cultural with the 
technological, creating an assemblage that radically shifts the cultural organiza-
tion of the social. The combat-ready drone epitomizes a global eye that has now 
become a tool to advance preemptive mechanisms of branding, excluding, and 
annihilating unlivable life. Chamayou considers six major trends in the new sur-
veillance and annihilation culture:
1. The principle or permanent surveillance or permanent watch: freed from the 
constraints of a human body (that of the pilot) the drone is a resilient and 
resistant body of iron that enlarges the possibilities of constant ‘geo-spatial’ 
overwatch, continuously sending back data to supercomputers, that work to 
analyze, simplify, and read patterns into it;
2. The principle of the totalization of perspective or synoptic viewing: to see 
everything, everywhere all the time;
3. The principle of creating an archive of everyone’s life: the drone feed is 
marked by ‘archive fever,’ as optical surveillance is not limited to present 
time, but its strength lies precisely in the ability of recording and archiving a 
myriad of sights that are later built into stories of people’s lives. In the drone 
archive life stories are continuously created and recreated;9
4. The principle of data fusion: the feed is multisensory, drones also capture voice 
communication and data from various devices (computers, mobile phones, 
etc.). The archival intent is to fuse all of these elements in a common story;
5. The principle of the schematization of forms of life: the data feed provides 
for a ‘cartography of lives,’ which has become the epistemic basis of armed 
surveillance. It is no longer simply about identifying individuals, but of sche-
matically co-creating them;
6. The principle of the detection of anomalies and preemptive anticipation: this 
is a principle that draws on the cultural competences, on the visual literacy 
of the analyst and allows for a reading of the present to become a prediction 
of the future.
9 This happens when the system is perfect: that is, because there is no ability to store, retrieve, 
and analyze all the data fed by these unmanned vehicles.
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Conflating the post-panopticon’s dispersive power, and its total presentness and 
subsumption into total representation, drone theory speaks to the metamorphic 
transformations of contemporary surveillance culture. To question the doctrine 
is, I contend, to question the nature of representation itself. But although the 
case has been made as to the urgency of understanding how post-panopticon 
surveillance appropriates cultural literacy for counterinsurgency, the question 
must be asked: is it simply in diagnosis that the task of the study of culture rests? 
Arguably, we are not problem-solvers, but no less important or impactful is the 
task of critique, of understanding, and questioning the perturbations in the nor-
mative. Under the spectacularly spectacled conditions of our late modernity, 
the counter-visuality of sorts we may be able to induce, may come from areas of 
activity that are not necessarily scholarly, but are certainly objects of scholarly 
inquiry. Art forms materialize a type of criticality that is increasingly intervening 
in the public debate, bringing to bear new languages that speak to supplemen-
tary modes of knowledge production. Speaking to visually trained audiences, 
they suggest a mode of representation situated beyond the textual abstraction, 
on the one hand conveying a new materialism but on the other requiring a sen-
sitive awareness to modes of representation that collapse the traditional device 
between fact and fiction, authenticity and simulacrum. My final example resorts 
to art to ask for fault lines in the representation of the drone narrative in what is 
a widening opportunity to discuss the new and intricate entanglements between 
real politics, facts, and the imaginary work of artistic creation.
Journalist and director Laura Poitras took surveillance as the node of concern 
of her exhibition, Astro Noise, which opened at the Whitney Museum in New York 
City in February 2016. Astro Noise is an installation of the affective assemblages 
that rule the communal in the post 9/11 world. The visitor is guided through a 
transformed curatorial space that organizes the experience of living under sur-
veillance around representational modes. In doing so, the viewer is plunged into 
the landscape of permanent war we live in, and is strategically transformed from 
detached observer into participant, from being an object of surveillance into an 
artistic subject.
In the first room of the exhibition space, located on the top floor of the 
Whitney, two large double screens hang in the middle of the space with video 
projections to each side of the screen. On the one side, Poitras’ short film O’Say 
Can you See (2001/2011) is projected, featuring onlookers viewing the wreckage 
of the World Trade Center. Made up of slow-motion reaction shots of by- standers, 
unwilling observers to the spectacle of destruction, the film creates a sense of 
separation from reality. As Poitras claims, reaction shots reveal the limits of rep-
resentation (2016, 36); they question the frame and dislocate the hegemony of 
the seen vis-a-vis the indeterminacy of the seeing. Then, in the background of 
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that same screen, the viewer is confronted with footage released by the Ameri-
can military under the Freedom of Information Act, depicting an interrogation of 
would-be Taliban suspects in Afghanistan in February 2002. American pain and 
awe are glued to the torture of others, a mutual implication whereby the viewer 
is instructed to read the visual embedding of what Achille Mbembe calls a necro-
politics, a definition of life based on the exercise of control over mortality and as 
simple deployment and manifestation of power (Mbembe 2003). This is also an 
invitation to read the impossible representation of the torture of others. Just as the 
reality of the fallen towers remains outside the frame of the awe-stricken observ-
ers, so too does the reality of torture, lie outside the scope of re-presentation.
The visitor then moves to Room 2 and the installation Bed Down Location, 
where she is invited to lie down in a huge bed looking up at the skies of multiple 
Middle Eastern cities and New York, just as drone activity is perceived overhead. 
The skies of Baghdad or Mosul, New York or Kabul appear strikingly alike and yet 
radically different, pervaded by the fleeting overhead sound of a buzzing engine, 
a drone, almost imperceptible to viewers. Lying in bed, the visitors are unaware 
of being recorded by an infrared camera, the feed of which is being streamed 
live in Room 4. In fact, the whole space of the exhibition is a space of permanent 
observation, by Poitras’ camera, by the military recording, the infrared, and the 
museum.
Next, the visitor is then guided through a dark corridor with small openings 
inviting the voyeuristic gaze. Beyond the opening, there are cases with surveil-
lance records, redacted data, pictures, video logs of past Guantánamo prisoners, 
and writing material. The viewer takes up the position of the gatekeeper in the sur-
veillance system. The objects inside the illuminated cases are visible all together 
and all the time to the intrusive viewer who remains protected in the dark hall, 
confronted with the real pain of others. The hall is a transition space, a liminal 
area that leads up to the transformation of the viewer into object, or rather to the 
conflation of the viewer-as-object, which takes place in Room 3, as the display of 
the infrared camera in Room 2 is presented on screen. In the hallway leading out 
of the installation, this data is equated with a different surveillance product, as 
viewers visualize the data garnered by UK military satellite surveillance over the 
Gaza strip. This material is transformed by dint of the aesthetic gesture, blurring 
the boundaries between art and life, that also speaks to the musealization of sur-
veillance culture.
 Poitras’ project is about reciprocity, about mutual implication in the project 
of total war, but it is also a project about the language of the visible and the ways 
in which citizens, exhibition visitors, artists, scholars, and activists are led to 
operate within this “surveillant assemblage” (Weizman 2017). Ultimately it is also 
a project about storytelling, about creating narratives that model social and polit-
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ical constellations. In the age of the post-panopticon, Poitras invites the surveyed 
to understand emotionally, disbanding the categories between viewer and the 
viewed and stressing the mutual vulnerability that is the trademark of this new 
stage of the social.
In an interview, Poitras claims this is an exhibition that turns the museum 
viewer into the protagonist and forces her to make choices. Insomuch as it repro-
duces the conditions that place individuals under the global eye of surveillance, 
art acts out a paradoxical role that replicates the circumstances of control just as 
it produces critique, or an artistic criticality in Irit Rogoff’s sense (Rogoff 2003),10 
that is, a critique embedded in the position of the artist as a situated body in a 
constellation of mutually engaged relations. Poitras states: “I am interested not 
just in the experience of the viewer as protagonist moving through a narrative 
journey but in how other bodies create that narrative experience” (Poitras 2016, 
33). This is a project for a new communality, a call for recognition and engage-
ment enacted through art. It is a project conflating the educated position of cri-
tique with the artistic edge of creation, a model of collaboration in knowledge, 
and a critical act to traverse the complexity of our present.
3 Coda
While the metaphor of sight as a model of cultural engagement has prevailed in 
Western aesthetics from Aristotle to Nicolas of Cusa, and from myth to science and 
art, the liquid condition of the twenty-first century has brought on radical changes. 
A top-down hierarchical dispositif structured upon the exercise of discipline over 
docile bodies, the panoptical model devised by Jeremy Bentham and revised by 
Michel Foucault turned vision into a strategy of domination and power, a simul-
taneously creative and repressive mechanism producing docile  subjectivities 
held together by the institutional power of the disciplinary  apparatus. In the 
post-panoptical world of pervasive seeing-inducing technology, where everyone 
is watching and being watched, the visible has become the locus of a new cul-
tural model that is no longer set on discipline but on surveillance; on organizing 
10 Rogoff defines the move from critique to criticality as a motion of productive engagement, 
moving from blame to power, that is: “[…]from finding fault, to examining the underlying as-
sumptions that might allow something to appear as a convincing logic, to operating from an 
uncertain ground which while building on critique wants nevertheless to inhabit culture in a re-
lation other than one of critical analysis; other than one of illuminating flaws, locating elisions, 
allocating blames,“ Rogoff 2003, xx.
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areas of observed participation, of shaping questions and monitoring answers; 
and on devising the problems, the bodies, and the institutions that organize the 
social. A metadiscipline that works across contextual deployment by analyzing 
phenomena and, as Siegfried Kracauer put it, its “surface-level expressions” 
(Kracauer 1988, 75), the study of culture has consistently addressed the multiple 
ways in which the changes of the post-panoptical world infiltrate and shape cul-
tural experience, as well as how art and culture can work to resist these oblique 
powers and produce new modes of seeing the world. Surveillance studies and the 
meaning-inducing strategies that are at work in the world of total visuality shape 
a field of inquiry that requires a transdisciplinary approach, an understanding 
of contextual hermeneutics and mediation as well as the narratological tools to 
unpack the identitarian storytelling secretly conducted in and through surveil-
lance. Questions most likely to inform the wider undertaking ask: what does the 
new surveillance do to the understanding of the human? How does it affect sub-
jectivity and artistic creation? What are the tools used to infiltrate the organization 
of the sensible? In the world of total visuality, can there be an outside to cultural 
models produced and enacted within the limits of surveillance? And what are the 
new languages that produce this outside? Because, as always, the work of culture 
will likely be the strategic opening at the beginning of resistance.
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ANNEX
Fig. 1: A video showing facial recognition at Megvii intelligence company in Beijing. Credits: 
Gilles Sabrie New York Times (published July 8, 2018).
Fig. 2: Chinese Police wearing A.I.-powered smartglasses. Credits: Reuters.
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Fig. 3: Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio, Medusa (1597). Le Gallerie degli Uffizi, Florence.
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Richard Grusin
No Future: The Study of Culture  
in the Twenty-first Century
Preface
This lecture was written for the occasion of a celebration in July 2016, marking 
the 10th and 15th anniversaries respectively of the University of Giessen’s GCSC 
and GGK. It was, in retrospect, a more innocent time, when my colleagues from 
outside the US were asking curiously if Donald Trump could really be elected 
president of the United States, which I assured them was extremely unlikely to 
happen. If I were asked to write a similar lecture today my premediation of “no 
future” for the study of culture in the twenty-first century would seem even more 
on point than it might have then.
My own involvement with these two graduate programs began in March 
2010 when I delivered the opening plenary address at “The Arts of Mediation,” 
a summer conference at the Catholic University of Lisbon, organized as part of 
the PhDnet, of which the University of Giessen is a founding member. At that 
time I was in the process of finalizing the details of an offer to direct the Center 
for 21st Century Studies (C21) at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Initial 
discussions with Ansgar Nünning about the GCSC persuaded us both that it 
would be good to work together. Within a year, we had written and signed off on 
a memorandum of agreement between the two centers that we would collaborate 
in the future. Beginning with master classes, lectures, and meetings in Giessen, 
we developed plans for collaboration. Working primarily with Martin Zierold 
and Beatrice Michaelis, I helped to organize the May 2013 GCSC conference on 
“The Re/turn of the Nonhuman in the Study of Culture,” which was co-sponsored 
by C21. Our most substantial collaboration was a $1.5 million Andrew Mellon 
Foundation-funded program in Interdisciplinary Graduate Humanities Educa-
tion Research and Training (IGHERT), a program that also involved humanities 
centers at University of California-Santa Cruz and Australian National University, 
Canberra.
In 2011 while working out the details of our letters of intent to collaborate, 
I sent Ansgar Nünning a copy of the inaugural lecture I had delivered at Univer-
sity of  Wisconsin-Milwaukee in October 2010, entitled “The Future of 21st Century 
Studies.” I like to think that the Anniversary Symposium on “Futures of the Study 
of Culture” was at least partly indebted to that inaugural lecture, which argued 
that the future of the study of culture lay in the interdisciplinary academic field 
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called twenty-first-century studies. I know that my argument in this lecture shares 
some points of contact with that earlier piece, which addressed the future of 
 twenty-first-century studies, particularly as it manifests itself in the arts, human-
ities, and social sciences, the traditional areas of focus among centers like C21 and 
GCSC.
1  Framework for the Study of Culture  
in the Twenty-first Century
What do I mean by claiming that there is no future to the study of culture in the 
twenty-first century? My thesis is that we are (or should be) nearing the end of the 
study of culture, and that if we as academics continue to study it as we have since 
at least Kant and Herder we will run the risk of irrelevance, or worse. In this chapter 
I maintain that there is no future for the study of culture if it does not include the 
study of key concerns of the twenty-first century, including especially those ecolog-
ical, geopolitical, and economic issues that threaten the existence of culture as we 
know it, but which have historically been defined in opposition to cultural issues.
I intend by the phrase “no future” to make two allusions. The first is to the 
powerful refrain to the Sex Pistols’ 1977 anthem, “God Save the Queen,” whose 
sympathy for the working class and resentment of the monarchy have recently 
refigured themselves very differently in the wake of the 2016 Brexit referendum 
(Sex Pistols 1977). In alluding to the Sex Pistols song I mean to call attention to the 
way in which the study of culture in the academy is currently threatened by the 
politics of austerity and securitization that have emerged in the EU and the US as 
a preemptive response to the threat of global terrorism.
The second allusion in my title is to Lee Edelman’s 2004 book, No Future: 
Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Edelman 2004). In remediating Edelman’s title, 
I want both to borrow from and to expand his argument. I borrow from his project 
the concern to destabilize or “queer” normative notions of time, particularly of 
reproductive futurity. Both the nation state and the academy operate according 
to a temporal framework in which their institutional form is reproduced indefi-
nitely into the future. Insofar as the contributors to this volume have been asked 
to imagine the institutional reproduction of an academy in which the study of 
culture will still have a place, the editors of this volume imagine the reproduction 
of an academic future that looks very much like the present. For Edelman a queer 
ethics negates the conservative political project of reproductive futurism. Queer-
ness, Edelman argues, “comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, 
the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form” (Edelman 
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2004, 4). I want, then, in this chapter, to try to “queer” the future of the study of 
culture. Although I follow Edelman in thinking about how we might queer the 
future of the study of culture in the twenty-first century, I want to move beyond 
the concerns with the human and the literary that Edelman’s book foregrounds, 
and that the notion of culture customarily entails.
My thinking about the future of the study of culture in the twenty-first century 
was first formalized in September 2010 when I delivered a lecture to mark the 
commencement of my directorship of the Center for 21st Century Studies at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a position I held until August 2015. In that 
2010 lecture I described the state of twenty-first-century studies at the start of the 
century’s second decade to articulate what I saw as some of the key issues that 
should occupy scholars as they invented this emergent interdisciplinary field. So 
what did I mean by twenty-first century? My initial response was to define twenty- 
first century in the following three ways. These definitions focus mainly on the 
humanities, arts, and culture. But as I will suggest later in this chapter, the future 
of twenty-first-century studies cannot end with these disciplines. Nonetheless, it 
is here that twenty-first-century studies must begin.
First, twenty-first-century studies can be defined as the interdisciplinary 
studies of the humanities as they are currently being practiced in the twenty-first 
century, i.e., contemporary, cutting-edge study of the arts, humanities, and 
culture in all fields, and at all historical periods. In other words, twenty-first-cen-
tury studies names the most up-to-date, contemporary manifestation of work 
in the academy. To help explain what this means I would borrow the words of 
Walter Benjamin who described the vocation of an educated journal as being “to 
proclaim the spirit of its age. Relevance to the present is more important even 
than unity or clarity” (Benjamin 1996, 292). In proclaiming the spirit of its age, 
twenty-first-century studies should not be about establishing a coherent program 
or intellectual project but rather about an active engagement with and represen-
tation of contemporary thought and criticism. This commitment to the contempo-
rary does not mean that twenty-first-century studies is only concerned with the 
present moment. Indeed, as Benjamin would be the first to argue, it is often the 
past that can most effectively illuminate the present moment in its specificity.1
1 An interesting recent example of how the study of the humanities in any historical period can 
engage with issues of contemporary concern can be found in the decision of the Medieval Stud-
ies Association NOT to move its 2011 meeting from Arizona in protest of its current immigration 
laws but to use the conference to highlight the way in which the concerns at stake in Arizona’s 
recent legislative attempt to criminalize immigrants could also be seen at work in different ways 
in the medieval period. As detailed in the online Inside Higher Education: “So rather than move 
the meeting, the academy plans ‘to ensure that the program of the meeting reflects and relates to 
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In addition to being defined as the current state of interdisciplinary research 
in the arts, humanities, and social sciences, twenty-first-century studies can also 
be defined as the study of the key issues of the twenty-first century, which means 
in the first instance studies of the present and very recent past, of issues of press-
ing concern for the twenty-first century. But the study of the twenty-first century 
also means, now, that the study of the twentieth century has become historical in 
its incarnation as the century prior to ours as well as in its role as the final century 
of the second millennium. In this sense, then, the twentieth century is the new 
nineteenth century. Already in the first decades of the current century scholars 
have set out many of the key themes for the decades to come, almost all of which 
have emerged from the concerns of the late twentieth century but take particular 
forms when placed in relation to our twenty-first century future. Thus, issues like 
climate change, terrorism, finance, mobility, migration, security, sexual equality, 
water, food, health care, networked media, biotechnology, geo-engineering, and 
other concerns provide an ample field of research for twenty-first-century studies. 
Add to this the growing interest in future studies and it is easy to see that twenty- 
first-century studies is clearly a growth field.
Third, twenty-first-century studies can be defined as a synthesis of the first 
two definitions. That is, as I have found to be the case in my own work, partic-
ularly on digital mediation, by studying what is distinctive about the issues of 
the present or near future, we are also able to rethink or reconceptualize our 
study of the past, which in turn allows us to understand our present situation 
in a different light. This scholarly feedback system operates in almost every field 
of the humanities and social sciences, as, for example, contemporary concerns 
with questions of gender and sexuality prompted scholars to investigate earlier 
historical formations of queer, straight, and other sexualities, which in turn pro-
vided new insights on our own gendered and sexual formations. The same thing 
can be seen in the way in which, say, an enterprise like critical race studies has 
both provided new perspectives on and been strengthened by historical study of 
racial science. Similarly, interest in new forms of digital media has helped both 
to accentuate study of earlier media formations like photography, print, or linear 
perspective and to remind us that what was most new about our new media was 
the way in which they remediated prior media formations. This is one of the most 
interesting consequences of studying the concerns of the twenty-first century, the 
way in which they help to transform our received understandings of the history 
similar issues at stake in medieval society, including such topics as race, ethnicity, immigration, 
tolerance, treatment of minority groups, protest against governmental policies judged unjust, 
and standards of judicial and legislative morality.’” [http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/
set/print/news/2010/08/04/medieval].
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of the humanities, arts, and social sciences, and how these new historical under-
standings help transform our current moment.
Indeed, one thing that should be evident from the definition of twenty-first-century 
studies I offered in 2010 is that for this emerging interdisciplinary field to engage 
the key issues of the day, it cannot focus on the humanities, arts, and social sci-
ences alone. If twenty-first-century studies is to engage the crucial issues of the 
day, it is going to have to engage all of those other academic disciplines that 
have traditionally been seen as distinct from the concerns of the humanities. 
Because the dividing lines between science, technology, art, society, and culture 
are becoming increasingly blurred, it is essential for the humanities to collabo-
rate with and reach out to scientific, technological, political, and economic dis-
ciplines. And conversely, if scientific and technological disciplines are going to 
answer the complex transdisciplinary questions that mark the first decades of 
the twenty-first century, they are going to have to engage and enroll the human-
ities, arts, and humanistic social sciences in doing so. Although in the twentieth 
century the study of culture has been distinguished from the natural, physical, 
and social sciences, from computation, engineering, or business, much as the 
human has been opposed to the nonhuman, in the twenty-first century these 
clear-cut divisions can no longer obtain. Borders are becoming increasingly dif-
ficult to draw, as questions of genetic engineering, for example, turn into ques-
tions of ethics, or questions of film, music, and literature become questions of 
sampling technologies and intellectual property, or questions of war and coun-
terterrorism become questions of computer programming or the design of video 
games. The study of culture in the twenty-first century must expand the idea of 
culture if it is to remain relevant and vital not only to the academy but to the 
world at large.
2 No Future?
So, having just articulated a framework for the future of the study of culture in the 
twenty-first century, why do I want to argue that there is “no future” for the study 
of culture? Haven’t I just articulated a vision of what the future of the study of 
culture should look like? Well, yes and no. For if I am right about how we should 
pursue the study of culture in the twenty-first century, then culture as it has been 
understood for over three hundred years will no longer exist as an autonomous or 
self-sufficient realm. The future of the study of culture will in that sense be inco-
herent, and will be usurped by the study of media technologies, or the Anthropo-
cene, or surveillance technologies, and so forth.
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In singling out ‘climate’ and ‘terrorism’ I mean to signal not just the impor-
tance of interdisciplinarity but the increasingly vital threats that both ecological 
and geopolitical concerns pose to the continued future not just of the study of 
culture, but of culture itself. Indeed the idea that there is no future for human 
culture is today most often associated with questions of climate change, partic-
ularly with the concept of the sixth mass extinction or the Anthropocene, which 
imagines a time after humans are gone and when the impact of humans and their 
culture on the planet is evident only in nonhuman traces and effects. But argu-
ments about the end of civilization have also been made in response to the pro-
liferation of radical acts of terrorism in the post-9/11 world, and the preemptive 
responses by nation-states and transnational organizations to the threats posed 
by such acts. In my five-year tenure as director of C21, we pursued many of these 
ideas in trying to define and develop the field of twenty-first-century studies. 
Increasingly our treatment of the future of twenty-first-century studies moved 
from global to local issues, as we began to address the threats to the future of 
higher education in Wisconsin from our own state government. Ironically, doing 
so often entailed in part not the move away from the study of humanities and 
culture in the name of interdisciplinarity, but the attempt to protect the value of 
the study of culture for its own sake, without resorting to neoliberal arguments 
about utility and economic value. Doing so did not mean a refutation of the argu-
ments for interdisciplinarity but a refusal to subordinate those arguments, as 
they often are in work that goes under the name of digital humanities, to instru-
mentalist claims for the value of the study of culture. In light of real threats to the 
reproductive futurism not only of the academic study of culture, but to culture 
and society as they have come to exist in institutional modernity, we need to do 
more than make the study of culture interdisciplinary.
Perhaps this is what Ulrich Beck had in mind when he claimed in World at 
Risk that “cultural criticism” was inadequate as a means of approaching the 
problems of climate, terrorism, and other twenty-first century threats: “Even 
the most radical cultural critiques look like caricatures compared to the cata-
strophic potentials of full-blown modernity. Indeed, one must even go an essen-
tial step further; in comparison to the horizon opened up by the negation of 
the basic principles of modernity, most cultural criticism looks outdated and 
‘idyllic,’ i.e., blind to its own presuppositions or even downright affirmative” 
(Beck 2009, 229). In dismissing cultural criticism as a means to address the 
imminent catastrophes of global risk society, Beck takes it to task for failing to 
realize that the end of nationalist modernity, which the principles of modernity 
itself have brought about, is not the end of the world but the end of a particular 
historical formation. He accuses thinkers like Foucault, Adorno, or Weber for 
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failing to “realize that where [cultural criticism] sees a world coming to an end 
the world order is in fact being transformed, that the rules and structures of 
power and domination are being renegotiated in the global age” (Beck 2009, 
219). This renegotiation is prompted by the global risk brought about by such 
imminent threats as climate change and terrorism: “For there is no greater threat 
to the Western way and quality of life than the combination of climate change, 
environmental destruction, dwindling energy and water resources and the wars 
they could spark” (Beck 2009, 65). Beck sees cultural criticism as unable to get 
past its immanent critique of culture, “which presupposes and reinforces the 
basic principles of modernity as a measure of value without questioning them” 
(Beck 2009, 229).
While I share Beck’s concern with the need to anticipate or premediate 
future risks, and his analysis of the way in which media proliferate potential 
global catastrophes, I am not entirely convinced that his invocation of the “‘cos-
mopolitan moment’ of world risk society” is necessarily the best alternative to 
the problems of climate or terrorism that threaten our future. Take, for example, 
the cosmopolitan anticipation of the always-imminent threat of global terrorism, 
Islamic or otherwise, which has generated the development of the largest trans-
national infrastructure of surveillance and securitization in world history. Such 
transnational cooperation has led to the widespread collection of as much com-
munication and transaction data as technically possible, spearheaded by the 
NSA and Great Britain’s GCHQ, but also supported by the BND in Germany and 
the DGSI in France, with the aim of preempting potential threats or catastrophes 
before they happen. But because such preemption is often unsuccessful, we have 
also witnessed the concomitant development of militarized securitization forces 
ready to respond immediately to a presumed terrorist attack. My concern here is 
that the everyday terror of such surveillance and securitization runs the risk of 
having a far greater negative impact on freedom and safety than the threats they 
are designed to counteract or preempt. Rather than dismiss cultural criticism 
for failing to keep up with these new global social formations, there is a role 
for the study of culture in resisting the abuses and overreaching of security and 
surveillance.
To put it differently, I would agree with Beck that there is no future for the 
study of culture if such study does not take as one of its foremost tasks the resis-
tance to the forces of neoliberalism and austerity that threaten the very existence 
of the academy as we have come to know it. But this resistance cannot simply 
be a defense of reproductive futurism, of the institutional reproduction of the 
academic study of culture as it has existed for the past century and more. There 
is still, I would argue, pace Beck, Latour, and others, a role for critique in the 
study of culture, but that role must include taking on not only the discourse of 
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humans but also the mediations of nonhumans, technical and otherwise (Latour 
2004). While we are well on our way to doing just that, to breaking down the tra-
ditional barriers between humanistic and non-humanistic disciplines within the 
walls of the academy, we must at the same time defend the walls of the academy 
against the barbarians at the gate, the incursions of globalization and securitiza-
tion brought about to protect us from the threats posed by climate and terrorism. 
While these threats are very real, and I would not in any way want to diminish 
them, I want also to challenge the way that these threats have been used as an 
occasion to strengthen and reinforce the control of global capitalism and mili-
tarized securitization over individuals and societies as well as academic insti-
tutions. More than twenty years of climate change summits have done little or 
nothing to reform or dismantle the economic structures of industrial and post- 
industrial global capitalism that have brought us the environmental and geopo-
litical catastrophes that we are now facing.
Indeed, we can see in the emergent paradigm of ‘resilience’ the acceptance 
of catastrophic change and the determination to create contingency plans to 
increase the chances that our economic and political institutions will survive 
in the face of environmental disaster. Barack Obama’s historic “Climate Action 
Plan” of June 2013 was celebrated for being the first official acknowledgment by 
the US government that global warming has been scientifically proven to be real 
(Executive Office of the President 2013). But what I found most telling about this 
plan was not its commitment to cut carbon pollution in America but its recog-
nition that no matter what changes might be able to be made, America (and by 
extension the world) must act now to prepare itself for the impacts of dramatic 
climate change by increasing the resilience of infrastructure, buildings, and com-
munities, as well as economic and natural resources. Nowhere does the question 
of reducing production or commodification or development ever come into the 
equation, but only the question of developing new technologies that might reduce 
environmental damage in order to allow capitalism to continue unchecked. In 
other words, the significance of Obama’s “Climate Action Plan” was less its com-
mitment to reverse or even to end global warming than its commitment to prepare 
the United States to deal with catastrophic environmental change by increasing 
its ‘resilience.’
Similarly, the paradigm of resilience is also at the heart of counter- terrorism 
planning. Despite the declared goal of using total data surveillance to preempt 
terrorist attacks a la the pre-crime unit in Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report, 
the collection and mining of data and the unprecedented proliferation of 
hyper-militarized homeland security police forces is designed mainly to insure 
that communities and institutions will be resilient in the wake of inevitable 
acts of terrorism. For like Obama’s ‘Climate Action Plan,’ his and other nations’ 
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plans to defeat terrorism begin with the acknowledgment that terrorism, like 
climate change, is inevitable, and therefore focus mainly on preparations for 
surviving these inevitable attacks. In the case of terrorism what this means is an 
increase in the militarization and securitization of society, evident in the US in 
the dramatically increased use of military equipment and tactics by local police 
forces, spurred on by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, which was 
signed into law during the Clinton administration. While the Obama adminis-
tration moved to limit such military-style weapons, particularly in the after-
math of the riots in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, there has been little change in 
the degree of militarized police control in the United States, ready to be brought 
to bear at a moment’s notice, as we saw in responses to shootings in places like 
the gay nightclub in Orlando or, to bring this issue closer to home, on college 
campuses.
I want to close by briefly addressing the overwhelming show of militarized 
police force that occurred in response to a murder-suicide at UCLA, on the first of 
June, 2016, as a way of underscoring my concern that securitization is as much 
or more to be feared than the acts of criminal violence that are lumped under the 
rubric of ‘terrorism.’ For those not familiar with this event, at around 10:00 AM 
police received the first of several 911 emergency calls reporting three shots fired 
and possible victims.
Fig. 1: Police force assembled on UCLA campus [public domain].
According to the Los Angeles Times, the shooting “prompted a massive response 
from state and federal law enforcement.
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Fig. 2: Militarized police vehicle on UCLA campus [public domain].
Police officers in riot gear ran across campus, guns and battering rams drawn, 
while students exited buildings with their hands above their heads.”
Fig. 3: Police officers in riot gear on UCLA campus [public domain].
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Fig. 4: Students with hands up on UCLA campus [public domain].
In addition to shutting down the campus for two hours, police searched every 
student carrying a backpack, which as we all know means almost every student 
on campus.
Fig. 5: Students being searched by police on UCLA campus [public domain].
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In retrospect this response proved to be massively disproportionate to the threat, 
which ended when the murderer, a former graduate student, killed himself after 
killing his advisor. Of course, one might argue that because there was no way to 
know this at the time, it was better for the police to be safe than to be sorry. And 
this argument makes a certain kind of practical sense. But what I find most trou-
bling about this event is not the murder itself, as tragic as it was, nor the threat 
of future murders with greater numbers of victims. No, what is most troubling 
to me is the fact that such a massively militarized law enforcement infrastruc-
ture pre-exists and that the authority of the police to take complete control over 
any public space, including a college campus, is undisputed, particularly when, 
as was the case in this incident, every student on campus is transformed into a 
potential suspect.
Fig. 6: Students with hands up on their knees being searched by police on UCLA campus [public 
domain].
The metaphorical force of this event was quite powerful. Even in a supposedly 
“free” society like the United States, we live, work, and study on campus at the 
behest of the forces of securitization, and our permission to do so can be revoked 
at a moment’s notice, and with very little evidence or explanation. In light of the 
mass school shootings that occur periodically in the US, calls to arm schoolteach-
ers or to install armed guards in public schools from kindergarten through high 
school have only intensified. Indeed, since the Columbine school shootings in 
1999 there are more than 10,000 additional police officers stationed in US public 
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schools. Clearly these officers have not stopped the shootings – as evidenced, for 
example, in the February 2018 school shootings in Florida, which killed 17 stu-
dents and teachers. But what they have done is to criminalize students, who are 
arrested at a pace of 70,000 per year for offenses that in the past would likely have 
resulted in disciplinary actions like detention, suspension, or expulsion. And 
like all police arrests in the US, these arrests have occurred disproportionately to 
black students (“Militarizing Schools, Criminalizing Students” 2018). Rather than 
safe spaces for the free exchange of ideas and the education of American youth, 
schools, colleges, and universities in the United States have become militarized 
zones to discipline and punish students. To return to the language of the 2016 
GCSC/GGK symposium, and to the thesis of this paper, there appears to be no 
future for the study of culture that is free from the authority of militarized securiti-
zation and global capitalism, which means that unless we are vigilant in exposing 
and resisting these forces there may be no futures for the study of culture at all.
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Beyond the Colonial Shadow? Delinking, 
Border Thinking, and Theoretical Futures 
of Cultural History 
It’s as if the colonial event belonged to another age and another place, and as if it had abso-
lutely nothing to teach us about how to understand our own modernity, about citizenship, 
about democracy, even about the development of our humanities. (Mbembe 2006, 4)
1  A Past Future: The Birth of New Cultural History 
and the Boom of Anthropological Theories
In the year 1989, Lynn Hunt proclaimed nothing less than the beginning of a new 
cultural history (Hunt 1989, 10) and pleaded for consequential anthropological 
theoretical receptions. Already eight years prior, Natalie Zemon Davis wrote, 
“anthropology can widen the possibilities, can help us take off our blinders, and 
give us a new place from which to view the past and discover the strange and sur-
prising in the familiar landscape of historical texts” (Davis 1981, 275). In Germany 
in 1984, Hans Medick published his legendary – and subsequently updated – 
article Missionaries in the Rowboat? stating that anthropological knowledge and 
theories could help enlighten the “complex mutual interdependence between 
circumstances of life and the concrete practice” of historical actors – their “expe-
riences and modes of behavior” (Medick 1995, 43).
All three authors, and many other cultural historians, argued against 
socio-historical approaches that they considered deficient, particularly due to 
their theoretical framework. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, new cultural 
history, as well as historical anthropology (a specific German version of cultural 
historical approaches), were coined by the constant pleas for an injection of 
anthropological theories and methods into historical theoretical and method-
ological approaches. Anthropology might help, the argument went, to see the past 
as a “strange foreign territory” and the everyday life of historical actors akin to 
those of “‘primitive’ or ‘archaic’ societies” (Davis 1981, 272). With this approach, 
Note: I thank my research assistant A. Tancrède Pagès for his important remarks, corrections, 
and the editing.
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new innovative research could be pushed forward in order to produce analyses 
less determined by socio-historical master narratives and present prejudices but 
rather by local experiences and negotations as well as multiperspectivity or coun-
ternarratives. Quite similar was the second major influence in the formation of 
new cultural history, French post-structuralism, notably Michel Foucault’s work 
on discourse (see Burke 2008, 56).
In this article, I will critically discuss this “paradigmatic shift” (Kuhn 
1970, 6) – this anthropological and poststructural turn – that was so fundamen-
tal in the formation of new cultural history. When Achille Mbembe said, in a 
2006 interview, that colonialism seems to be far away and seems to belong “to 
another age and another place” (Mbembe 2006, 4), he hit the neuralgic point of 
central theories within new cultural history. While anthropologists had already 
considered the need for methodological and theoretical revisions in their disci-
pline, in part due to the colonial heritage of their epistemic landscape (Coma-
roff 2010; Kohl 2010), cultural historians have paradoxically argued for a quite 
ahistorical reception of the very same anthropological theories derived from 
colonial research practices that have been criticized by the aforementioned 
anthropologists.
To illustrate this line of argument, I will analyze in the following article three 
central anthropological theories that have been thoroughly integrated into cul-
tural history and cultural studies. By concentrating on these three examples, 
I wish to emphasize the colonial roots of anthropological theories and the ways 
in which they allow for, and cloak, analytical shortcuts and heuristic, theoretical, 
and methodological assumptions. The examples to be examined are as follow: 
ritual theory by Victor Turner, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus,’ and last, 
but not least, Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis. I will also reflect upon the 
individual experiences these scholars had with colonialism – this might give us 
an idea about the “thought style” (Fleck 1979, 38–50) that pushed forward their 
thoughts and was subsequently reflected in their theories. At the end of the article, 
I will discuss scholarly efforts to overcome the colonial limits of cultural histor-
ical theories. Altogether, I would like to offer some space to discuss the futures 
of cultural history, allowing for the reconsideration and reformation of cultural 
historical theories. In the last decades, scholars have formulated tools for going 
beyond colonial shadows and eurocentric perspectives including ‘delinking’ and 
‘border thinking.’ These tools might be helpful in efforts revolving around the de- 
colonization and revision of cultural historical theories. I will shortly introduce 
and discuss these tools and ventilate their possible benefits for the theoretical 
future of cultural histories.
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2  The Danger of Rituals: Victor Turner  
and the Homogenous Societies
Since the 1980s and 1990s, cultural historians have worked extensively with 
anthropological ritual theories (Bell 1997), particularly those of Victor Turner and 
his approach to liminality (Turner 1964, 1969; Deflem 1991). Turner, in developing 
Arnold van Gennep’s (1960 [1909]) threefold structure of rituals of passage further, 
argues that rituals are usually based on a “liminal phase” with several “liminal 
spaces” followed one after another. These spaces are categorized in observed tran-
sitions performed over the course of a ritual. Turner was primarily interested in 
the transitions in which individuals were – as he wrote – “betwixt and between” 
(1964), exceeding and crossing boundaries of the liminalities of rituals that would 
create a sense of community among all involved (Turner 1967, 1969).
In reference to Turner, the sociologist and anthropologist David Kertzer pro-
claimed that rituals have a key role in the formation and cohesion of social groups. 
They make it possible to create social consensus even if there are substantive con-
tradictions within or conflicts among the social groups. Through their constant 
repetition, rituals ensure the maintenance of social bonds. On the other hand, 
they are also to be constantly adapted to changing political conditions in order to 
maintain their socially stabilizing effect (Kertzer 1988, 189–196).
These assumptions made anthropological ritual theory, with all its symbolic 
interpretations, tremendously attractive for cultural historians; rituals seemed to 
represent key phases and elements of societal developments. Meanwhile, limin-
ality appeared to give answers to questions of historical change and to the ques-
tion of how societies are organized and restructured. Historical change can be 
seen as being condensed in the ‘in between’ phases of rituals.
Already in the 1970s, Natalie Zemon Davis worked with ritual theories for her 
analyses of violence and its religious roots in seventeenth-century France (1973). 
Subsequently, Roger Chartier (1984, 1989, 1990) investigated structures of expe-
riences with the help of Turner’s ritual theories and drew conclusions from the 
manifestations of rituals on the intentions of the organizers of these rituals and 
the perceptions, feelings, and thoughts of their participants. In Germany, Barbara 
Stollberg-Rilinger promoted ritual theories for the cultural historical analyses of 
early modern forms of governance (2013). Johannes Paulmann revisited the clas-
sical field of monarchical meetings in the long nineteenth century. In line with 
Turner and Kertzer’s observations on rituals, Paulmann came to the conclusion 
that symbolic presentations of power would have had a direct impact on polit-
ical relations (2000, 402–416). Both authors contributed to new and  innovative 
 interpretations within the field of political history and showed how rituals can 
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establish, negotiate, and structure power relations. Altogether, the works men-
tioned above demonstrated how ritual theory can offer novel research findings. 
Most notably, it could cast analytical light on overlooked or ignored public 
rituals, ceremonies, and performances that were important elements of societal 
and political expression and negotiation. Although receptions of anthropological 
theories of ritual have undoubtedly led to new, innovative interpretations of more 
classical political-historical phenomena, the theoretical premises of ritual theory 
are problematic in that it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle them from 
colonial ways of producing and accruing knowledge.
Similar to most of his contemporaries, Turner was deeply involved in the 
colonial establishment; he worked in Northern Rhodesia (modern day Zambia) 
as a research officer for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI). The RLI, founded 
in 1938 to conduct demographic studies on the local population, was the first 
anthropological research facility in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was mainly financed 
by the Colonial Office in London (Schumaker 1996, 238–240). Therefore, it was 
clearly embedded within the colonial system of governance, contrary to constant 
official claims that the RLI would stand for liberal and anti-racist research pro-
moting African independence (Brown 1973). Turner, like all researchers of the 
institute, was tasked with providing colonial authorities with useful information 
about the customs, needs, and thoughts of the natives to facilitate colonial rule 
by avoiding conflicts and frictions with and within colonized populations. It is 
within this context that we have to understand Turner’s studies on the Ndembu 
people (Turner 1967). In his approach on ‘social drama,’ he took the experiences 
of colonialism and colonial civilizing missions into account to develop his theo-
ries about rituals as a form of symbolic conflict management and crisis resolu-
tion in the Ndembu villagers’ society living between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
life – he was also interested in the experiences of cultural suppression and losses 
caused by the colonial encounters. Turner’s research, in combination with the 
needs to serve the colonial authorities with information for their future policies, 
had to deal with the assumptions of a quite homogenous Ndembu society follow-
ing the notion of the colonial concept of a static and, in its practices, ‘mechanistic’ 
(Comaroff 2010, 531) ‘tribe’ (Ekeh 1990). Turner’s conception of the liminality of 
rituals and his focus on the ‘tribe’ can be explained with his training as a colonial 
expert; individuals were not of interest here. Instead, the focus lied on collective 
moods and events as these were the categories through which colonial experts 
could plan and calculate their policies. The figure of the ‘tribe’ as a constructed 
and imagined basic social unit was central. It conditioned the ways in which colo-
nial administrators negotiated, planned, and eventually deployed their modes 
of governance entailing systematic cultural oppression through so-called ‘civi-
lizing missions.’ In addition, Turner’s theoretical roots and role models were 
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 profoundly colonial. Above all he was influenced by the founding father of British 
anthropology, Edward B. Tylor, who, among others, had developed the so-called 
“animistic theory” that emanated from the “soulfulness of magical-sacral pre-
sentations in primitive societies” (Tylor 1871, 424). By 1871, Tylor wrote that it was 
through magical rites and symbols in a “primitive” society that a collective belief 
could be evoked alongside a “sacralization and ensoulment” of all individuals in 
a society (Tylor 1871, 424).
As Suzanne Desan, among others, has pointed out, this notion seeped into 
the reception of anthropological theories of ritual in the new cultural history 
and formed itself primarily for “the methodological assumption that an analysis 
of the patterns of crowd activism will reveal its meaning and offers clues about 
community structures” (Desan 1989, 56). This approach was deeply criticized by 
scholars, such as the medieval historian Philippe Buc, who coined the slogan 
“dangers of rituals” and pointed to the heuristic problems of inferring the forms 
of rituals on their intentions, perceptions, and receptions. Buc claimed that indi-
vidual resistance, reservations, or simply social performances without social 
consequences have to be taken into consideration (Buc 2000, 183–186, 2001, 
8–11). While Buc and others objected to the methodological and heuristic short-
cuts of anthropological theories of ritual, one can also assume that it would be 
possible to draw conclusions from the appearance of rituals that their intentions 
and effects were to be determined by colonial thoughts in two respects: First, the 
theories are reminiscent of typical colonial conceptualizations of native societies 
as homogenous, static, and passive; second, we can see the deeply colonial and 
even racist conception of ceremonies that everything has a cohesive meaning of 
the highest value within so-called ‘primitive societies’ or community. A similar, 
but slightly different, conception of community can also be found in Pierre 
Bourdieu’s cultural historical theories, principally in his concept of “habitus” 
 (Bourdieu 1977).
3  In the Imperial Gaze: Pierre Bourdieu’s  
Colonial Concept of “Habitus”
In the aforementioned 1989 key publication New Cultural History, Aletta Bier-
sack praises the usefulness of Bourdieu’s theory of practice for cultural histo-
rians when they are interested in investigating the practical side of everyday 
life in the past (Biersack 1989, 90). Roger Chartier was influenced by Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice as well as by ritual theory (Burke 2008, 59). Simon Schama, in 
his famous book The Embarrassment of Riches (1987), analyzed several “Dutch 
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obsessions” like the ongoing preference of cleanliness through Bourdieu’s con-
cepts of “habitus” and “distinction” (see Gorski 2013).
Like Turner, Bourdieu had his own colonial experiences. In the year 1955 
he arrived in Algeria during the war of independence. Once there, he absolved 
his military service and was first employed as a typist at the Air Force and then 
as a clerk at the news and documentation service of the General Government in 
Algiers. Bourdieu was fascinated by the country. He decided to stay and took over 
the position as a lecturer at the University of Algiers. In the following months, 
he became interested in anthropology and started to conduct fieldwork on the 
colonized Algerian society.
Bourdieu undertook two intensive, and sometimes dangerous, field studies: 
the first on the living conditions in cities during the war; the second on villages in 
rural Kabyle in northern Algeria hedged in between the Atlas mountain range on 
the one side and the Mediterranean See on the other. People from Berber societies 
and peasants who were imprisoned in French resettlement camps were the pre-
dominant demographic living in this region (Free 1996; Herzfeld 1987, 7–8; Lane 
2000, 13–16). Around three million people – nearly half of the Muslim rural pop-
ulation – were relocated by force not only for ‘security reasons’ but also to push 
forward development programs of ‘modernization.’ These camps were structured 
like village communities in order to push forward a variety of colonial devel-
opment programs including “modern agriculture,” “rational economies,” and 
“everyday life hygiene” (Wilder 2003, 2005; Büschel 2014, 169–171).
Bourdieu was aware of the colonial violence the establishment and opera-
tion of these camps represented as well as the ways in which the French civiliza-
tion mission had caused deep political, social, and cultural ruptures within the 
Kabyle societies. He called the colonial development and education programmes 
“social vivisection” and “social surgery” (Bourdieu 1962, 131–133). There is no 
doubt that Bourdieu shared critical thoughts about colonialism as a racist system 
of suppression and domination, enforced through violence, manifest in both 
physical and psychological force, that destroys and restructures social relations 
(Go 2013, 49–74).
In spite of possessing deep sympathy for the colonized Algerians, illustrated 
by his profound critique of colonialism (Wacquant 2004), Bourdieu never adhered 
to the Third Worldism promoted by Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, and others 
(Kalter 2016; Le Sueur 2001; Ahluwalia 2010). In fact, he opposed Third World 
activists who seemed to him far too involved in promoting violence. The depth of 
Bourdieu’s involvement in the mental horizons and style of thoughts of French 
colonizers becomes clear when analyzing his theoretical conceptions (Seibel 
2004; Yacine 2003, 2004, 2008; Go 2013, 51). During his time in Algeria, and along-
side his fieldwork in the Kabyle villages, Bourdieu developed his most central 
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concepts for new cultural history in “symbolic capital” and “habitus” (Bourdieu 
1977, 1990; Hammoudi 2009; Goodman 2009; Silverstein 2009). He did this while 
describing the Kabyle society in terms such as “collective consciousness” – very 
much in line with the epistemic culture of colonial expertise  (Bourdieu 1977).
Critics argue that Bourdieu cultivated in his early writings a “romantic 
redemption of ethnic culture” (Burawoy 2011, 8) as well as a “structural nostal-
gia” about the local cultures, seen as passive and defensive instead of active and 
creative (Silverstein 2009). Edward Said and others have accused Bourdieu of 
developing Eurocentric theories and of being an example of a European scholar 
who constantly portrays non-Western societies as “different, static and homo-
genous” (Said 1989; Go 2013, 50). Furthermore, the concept of ‘habitus’ carries 
assumptions quite similar to ritual theory. Foremost, it makes it possible for one 
to draw conclusions about the social conditions of groups from a phenomenolog-
ical analysis of incorporated collective intentions and thoughts (Callhoun 2006, 
1403). Bourdieu has thus been criticized for sharing, or even reproducing, the 
imperial gaze of colonial knowledge systems (Go 2013, 50).
Indeed, the late and post-colonial humanitarian attitude of the colonial 
expert or development worker went hand in hand with deep colonialism impli-
cations as can be seen in Bourdieu’s theoretical assumptions. It should be taken 
seriously that concepts like ‘habitus’ are entangled with ethnocentric colonial 
collectivism and systematic silencing of the colonized ‘Others.’
4  Eurocentric Discourse and Knowledge: 
Michel Foucault and Colonialism
Similar to ritual theory and Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus,’ Michel Foucault’s 
 theoretical assumptions became fundamental for new cultural history. Three 
aspects have been particularly influential. First, in his notions about discourse, 
Foucault seemed to serve the linguistic turn, which also deeply affected cultural 
history, whilst simultaneously asserting that discourse always means practice and 
that words are highly political and embedded in dispositives and governmentality. 
Therefore he also served the needs for theoretical framing of the study of practices 
in the past. Second, Foucault opposed ideas of teleological developments or prog-
ress in history. Instead, he emphasized discontinuities, ruptures, and shifts, which 
conforms to new cultural history’s opposition against socio-historical master nar-
ratives. Finally, Foucault’s attempt for ‘epistemes’ and ‘regimes’ of truth has been 
met with interest by many cultural historians investigating the cultural and histor-
ical development of ideologies and knowledge (Burke 2008, 56–57).
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The important influence of Foucault on both cultural history and postcolonial 
studies can be traced in Said’s study Orientalism (1978) that examines the West’s 
patronizing and imperialistic representations of ‘The East’ – the people and their 
cultures who inhabit areas in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Foucault’s 
concept of ‘discourse’ was central for Said (1978, 48–49). Many scholars have 
criticized Said for employing a determining univocal and unidirectional notion 
of discourse. This was seen as a result of Foucault’s reception within historical 
research, especially “The Order of Discourse” (1981), in which Foucault stressed 
the restrictive and homogenizing qualities of discourses as tools of power and 
violence (Foucault 1981; Young 1995, 60; Nichols 2010). The most prominent cri-
tique of Foucault’s theories and their reception in cultural history was raised by 
Gayatri Spivak who wrote that Foucault’s analysis would carry the “danger” of 
re-inscribing the West as a subject of analysis (Spivak 1985, 18, 1988, 291; Kaplan 
1995, 90).
Similar to Turner and Bourdieu, Foucault had his own (post-)colonial experi-
ence. He arrived in Tunis in 1966 to take over a teaching position at the University 
of Tunis. Tunisia became a constitutional monarchy and gained independence 
from France on March 20, 1956 but was still determined by colonial elements in 
its governance, like an autocratic police state lacking any democratic element. 
Foucault lived in the coastal village Sidi Bou Said, known for its romantic atmo-
sphere, occupied since 1900 by numerous European artists such as August Macke 
and Paul Klee. Shortly after his arrival in Tunis, there were violent clashes between 
students and authorities (Lazreg 2017, 176). Foucault’s biographers claimed that 
the immense violence of the police entering the university campus, injuring stu-
dents, and arresting them had a great impact on Foucault’s thoughts who finally 
supported the protests in multiple ways including hiding a printing machine in 
his garden to clandestinely produce critical leaflets on behalf of students (Lazreg 
2017, 177).
Taking these experiences into account, it is remarkable that Foucault’s the-
oretical assumptions and his thoughts about discourse, dispositive, and govern-
mentality almost completely lacked reasoning about race and colonialism (Young 
1995, 5). Timothy Mitchell noted that the narrative of history in Foucault’s writing 
is coined by a deep eurocentrism and is the story of Europe (2000, 3–7). Time 
and space are imagined homogenously; encounters, influences, cultural trans-
fers, or entanglements from the non-West are irrelevant (Fernández and Esteves 
2017,  141). The ‘normalization’ of suppression, discipline, power, punishment, 
and violence that Foucault describes in his writing is the narrative of “every-
where” (Foucault 1977, 304) and is thus a universal ‘truth’ that disregards, and 
ahistoricizes, its embedment within the Western classical Westphalian model of 
statehood and governance.
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Considering this, it seems quite paradoxical that Foucault was the most cited 
theorist in studies about colonialism in the last decades (Stoler 1995, 1). One could 
say colonial studies with Foucault might carry the danger of Western asymme-
tries and silencing locals, thus necessitating innovative critical re-assessments 
and reflections of how his theories are implemented in the field of study.
5  Theoretical Futures? Decentering, Delinking, 
and Border Thinking 
Taking into account the colonial limits of the aforementioned theories in new cul-
tural history, it becomes clear that the theoretical futures in the study of culture 
need revisions and reformulations. In addition to the colonial shadows of these 
theories, one could argue alongside Dipesh Chakrabarty that new cultural history 
and the pleas for anthropology and post-structuralism carry typical elements of 
Western historiography’s historicism of universalizing attempts to come closer to 
something that one may call the “truth about the past” (Chakrabarty 2000, 6–11; 
Young 1990, 142).
Since the early 2000s, scholars from all over the world have claimed a funda-
mental epistemic turn in the study of culture and therefore also in new  cultural 
history (Grosfoguel 2007); they have called the result of this set of theoretical 
operations ‘decoloniality.’ ‘Decoloniality’ does not mean post-colonialism or 
adding post-colonial perspectives to research agendas and perspectives. Indeed, 
it does not seem to be fruitful to just add post-colonial theories to the canon of 
cultural historical concepts. ‘Decoloniality’ is a more fundamental approach with 
a whole set of operations to move “beyond the post-colonial” (Mignolo 2007, 452).
One of the operations gaining theoretical ‘decoloniality’ is ‘decentering,’ 
brought up by Natalie Zemon Davis as a response to Chakrabarty: ‘Decentering’ 
refers to new heuristic perspectives with particular emphasis on cultural cross-
ings and counter-histories (Davis 2011, 190–191). Therefore ‘decentering’ includes 
the stance and the subject matter of the historian. The ‘decentering’ historian 
does not tell the story of the past from the “vantage point of a single part of the 
world or of powerful elites, but rather widens his or her scope, socially and geo-
graphically, and introduces plural voices into the account” (Davis 2011, 190).
A recent form of ‘decentering’ can be found in the initiative of Ulinka Rublack 
that has led to a collection of articles by historians. Rublack asked several experts 
to ‘decenter’ their own professional views and standpoints and to write about 
areas, approaches, and periods beyond their expertise in order to gain new and 
fresh analyses beyond the established self-confidence (2011). Davis’ claims and 
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Rublack’s initiative were important steps of ‘decentering’ on the way to ‘deco-
loniality.’ But both approaches still remained within the context of Western 
 historiographical epistemology when it comes to methods, theories, and narra-
tives. What we need is a more fundamental epistemological ‘delinking’ and ‘decen-
tering’ from Western and sometimes even colonial dominated forms of thought.
An early example of this radical fundamental cultural historical ‘decenter-
ing’ is First-Time: The Historical Vision of an African American People, authored 
by the anthropologist Richard Price (1983). Oral testimonies, songs, stories, 
and artefacts of the Saramacca Marrons from the Suriname rainforest are com-
posed together; the result is a masterpiece of historical bricolage, full of non- 
hierarchically presented records and thoughts about a formerly marginalized and 
silent society and their past experiences in violence, suppression, and slavery. 
‘Decentering’ here means the absence of a master narrative and any voices of 
external Western observers, which makes it possible to perform a history of the 
peoples their own.
Walter Mignolo goes far beyond the non-hierarchical multiplication of voices 
in his attempt to de-silence the silenced. He speaks vehemently for a radical 
epistemic ‘delinking’ in the theories of cultural studies – the ‘delinking’ from 
heuristic, theoretical analytical, and methodological approaches from Western 
thought and culture (Mignolo 2007, 2009). This might entail the abandonment 
of Western modes of reasoning and epistemological practices and their replace-
ment by ‘indigenous’ or ‘local’ thoughts. ‘Delinking’ implies the destruction of 
colonial networks of knowledge and power in order to give those who have his-
torically been silenced a voice. This can happen with heuristic operations but 
also with theoretical ‘delinking.’ This introduces crucial theoretical questions: 
can we ‘delink’ ritual theory from its colonial framing sketched above and what 
is left then? Can we go beyond the colonial attitude of studying liminality with 
the holistic presumption of a crowd of individuals’ feeling and thinking all the 
same in a ritual process (Desan 1989, 56)? Does bypassing the “dangers of rituals” 
with the heuristic operation of inferring the forms of rituals on their intentions, 
perceptions, and receptions mean that ritual theory have to come to an end (Buc 
2000, 183–186, 2001, 8–11)? I do not think that this has to automatically and con-
sequently be the case. ‘Delinking’ ritual theories from its colonial methodological 
and theoretical presumptions can mean ‘decentering’ the heuristic perspective 
and its analysis away from the form of rituals to its local conditions and commen-
tators (Davis 2011, 190). Furthermore, in cultural history rituals are oftentimes 
seen as a form of societal cohesion and governance in a constant field of balance 
and imbalance between obedience and resistance (Desan 1989, 57). Already quite 
some time ago, Jean and John Comaroff coined the phrase of a “dialectically 
neomodern” analysis, which means a constant attention on  transformations, 
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 processes,  hegemonic practices, and cultural boundaries (Comaroff and Coma-
roff 1992, xi–24). Indeed, the colonial shadow of ritual theory also carries a 
potential; tracing it and taking it into account can help us to understand and 
criticize our own hegemonic practices and open our analyses for further criti-
cal reflections about the  non-homogenic, non-linear, and non-conform. There-
fore, theoretical ‘decentering’ and ‘delinking’ can have at least three dimensions. 
The first revolves around switching theoretical perspectives beyond hegemonic 
Western epistemic systems; the ‘Other,’ the supposed peripheral becomes 
central or at least a field of reasoning, discussion, and exchange. Second, there 
is a  methodological-heuristical dimension that attempts to excavate and listen to 
marginalized and silenced sources of historical epistemology. Finally, there is the 
chance for constant critical revisions of hegemonic epistemic master narratives 
on the path for the multiplication of narrated analyses (Adichie 2009).
After ‘delinking’ might follow ‘border thinking’ (Anzaldúa 1987; Mignolo 
and Tlostanova 2006, 206), which focuses on all those theoretical and concep-
tual approaches that are so far excluded from the master narratives of cultural 
studies – these include different concepts of time, space, narration, plausibility, 
and epistemology. All these theories beyond the Western – or even beyond the 
colonial matrix of epistemic power – should help establish an “epistemology of 
the exteriority; that is, of the outside created from the inside” (Mignolo and Tlos-
tanova 2006, 206). ‘Border thinking’ can also favor the creation of new analytical 
narratives beyond “epistemic ranking” and Western knowledge based hierarchies 
(Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006, 214). In practice, ‘border thinking’ could mean 
not just multiple narratives – like we can see it in ‘decentering’ – but also mul-
tiple theories with a new sensitivity of alternative knowledge traditions beyond 
Western hegemony as well as alternative theoretical inspirations – or at least 
the non-hierarchical multiplication of theories. Therefore ‘border thinking’ can 
produce a “redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, 
humanity, economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by Euro-
pean modernity,” how Ramón Grosfoguel points it out (Grosfoguel 2006, 178). 
[However] “border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism. It is a deco-
lonial transmodern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity” (Gros-
foguel 2006, 178–179). What can this mean in the practice of cultural historical 
analysis?
Can ‘border thinking’ help us to liberate concepts like Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ 
from its imperial gaze as it was described above? Bourdieu has been criticized for 
implementing a colonial view in concepts like ‘habitus’ (Go 2013, 50) by drawing 
conclusions of a human being’s behavior and applying generalized projections 
onto inherent collective thoughts, feelings, or customs. Should we therefore give 
up ‘habitus’ and forget about an insightful tool for generations of sociologists, 
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scholars of cultural studies, and historians whose goal is to trace the connection 
between human environment and behavior? Mignolo writes that ‘border think-
ing’ is “de-subalternizing knowledge” itself and can help to pluralize epistemic 
frameworks as well as make the “rigidity of epistemic and territorial frontiers” in 
assumptions visible (Mignolo 2000, 12–67). It might be useful to reread concepts 
like ‘habitus’ beyond the rigidity of Western presumptions and to understand 
that the phenomenology of the ‘habitus’ as well as the customs, feelings, and 
thoughts are localized and in constant fluidity between individuals and their live 
worlds, kinship, and societal relations. What could be given up by ‘border think-
ing’ and concepts like ‘habitus’ is the danger of holistic/universal conclusions; 
what could be preserved is a postcolonial turned tool for historical and societal 
analyses and the ambivalences, fluidity, locality, and last but not least wonderful 
diversity of human behavior in the past. Similarly, ‘border thinking’ offers great 
potential as a critical tool in reconfigurations of the Foucauldian concepts of dis-
positive and governmentality and its eurocentric determination (Young 1995, 5; 
Mitchell 2000, 3,7). ‘De-subalternizing’ mechanisms of power, influence, and 
governance might help to trace ‘other’ non-Western – but also “modern” (Gros-
foguel 2006, 178–179) – governmental tools and show the pluralities of concepts 
in constant negotiations of societal domination, participation, and resistance far 
beyond the state and its Westphalian model.
In sum, I hope to have sketched that ‘decentering,’ ‘delinking,’ and ‘border 
thinking’ might be possible tools for a new theoretical future of cultural history 
beyond Western and colonial presumptions as “eternal and untouchable truths” 
(Rose 1997, 308). These approaches might help us to de-colonize important 
anthropological, social, and philosophical theories that were central for gen-
erations of cultural historians. Furthermore, they might help us to inspire re- 
readings and rethinking practical cultural historical research and prepare the 
theoretical design of cultural history more for the future of global exchange and 
local  epistemic cultures.
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Andreas Reckwitz
The Society of Singularities
Regardless of where we look in contemporary society, what is socially and 
 culturally expected on both the local and global levels is not the general but the 
particular. What is increasingly being advanced and demanded and what has 
become the focus of people’s hopes and longings is not the standardized and 
regulated but the unique, the singular.
Travel destinations, for example, can no longer simply be uniform vacation 
locations suited for mass tourism. It is the uniqueness of a place – a special city 
with an authentic vibe, an exceptional landscape, an unusual local culture – that 
attracts tourists’ attention. A similar development has taken hold of the entire 
late modern global economy. True for material goods and services alike is the 
fact that the mass production of uniform products so characteristic of the old 
industrial economy has been replaced in the cultural capitalism of the present by 
events and objects that are not similar or identical but that strive to be singular. 
The passions of subjects are focused on extraordinary live concerts and music 
festivals, on sporting and artistic events, as well as on lifestyle sports and the 
imaginary worlds of computer games (see generally Rifkin 2000; Howkins 2001).
And yet the displacement of the general by the particular goes far beyond 
this, extending, for example, into the field of education. It is no longer sufficient, 
as it was 20 years ago, for schools to teach the material mandated by the state. 
Every school wants and is compelled to be different, to cultivate its own profile, 
to enable students to shape their own education, to have its own spirit. Or take the 
field of architecture, where the International Style, with its now purportedly dull 
serial buildings, has been cast aside in favor of the predictable surprises of star 
architects and their singular museum constructions, concert houses, residential 
buildings, and flagship stores (see McNeill 2009). The singular has quite clearly 
extended its reign over the subjects who move about in these different settings 
as well. In late modernity the subject is not just responsible for themselves, as 
is typically suggested by the term ‘individualization,’ but strives above all to be 
unique. Digital social media – perhaps paradigmatically the Facebook profile 
with its carefully curated and updated postings from one’s personal life, with 
photos and likes and links not to be found anywhere else – offer a central location 
for the presentation and formation of this singular self and its performance of 
authenticity (see Miller 2011).
Note: This article is touching on a topic that I explore in greater detail in Reckwitz 2017a.
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But this displacement of forms of generality by those of particularity also 
extends to the social, collective, and political realms. Formal organizations, 
major political parties, ultimately even the modern form of the bureaucratic 
state are on the defensive, having lost some of their appeal. On the rise are those 
particularistic and temporary forms of sociality that are not universally identi-
cal but claim instead to be unique. This is true of a wide range of forms of soci-
ality, including professional and political projects, each of which is singular 
as an emotional entity with selected participants and an expiration date. It is 
true of scenes, events, short-lived aesthetic networks, and gatherings. And it is, 
finally, true in a different sense of neo-collectives – the new religious, national, 
or regional imagined communities that promise to endow members with iden-
tity in a way that bureaucracies or institutional churches do not seem capable of 
(see Castells 1997).
I have begun with a kaleidoscope of empirical phenomena that all point in 
the same direction. In late modernity, societies are being reconfigured based not 
on a social logic of generality but on a social logic of particularity – a particular-
ity that I will attempt to define by means of the term singularity. This phenome-
non involves a very crucial transformation of what defines modernity and modern 
society. I would like to sketch out this fundamental argument and then explore 
it in greater detail. I consider it of central importance that as a result of this logic 
of singularities, the structural principles of classic modernity, a modernity of 
industrially organized societies, are being eclipsed by new structural principles. 
The basic precepts of classic modernity were generalization and standardization, 
which were associated with the process of formal rationalization (see Wagner 
1994). The antithesis to modernist rationalization is culturalization, and the phe-
nomena of singularization and culturalization are inextricably connected to one 
another. In the first part I will therefore examine the oppositional differences 
between a social logic of generality and a social logic of particularity.
In the second part I will look more closely at two institutional mainstays 
at the center of late modern society. One is the transformation of the capitalis-
tic economy from industrial mass production to cultural production, that is, to 
an economy of singularities (Karpik 2010), with the associated restructuring of 
markets, labor, professions, and forms of consumption. The second is the digital 
revolution of media technologies, which in turn also fosters singularities in sub-
jects, images, texts, and other cultural elements. This is a decisive insight that I 
would like to emphasize: while in classic modernity the economy and technology 
were the most important motors of the standardization of the world, that is, of a 
social logic of generality, the most advanced forms of this same modern economy 
and this same technology have become powerful generators of singularities and 
culturalization.
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1 The Social Logic of Singularization
To justify my diagnosis, I must first clarify how a modernity of rationalization and 
generalization and a modernity of singularities and culturalization are distinct 
from one another. To do this I will first describe the structural principles that gave 
rise to modern industrial society. Though quite easy to oversee, the fundamental 
trait of classic modernity is that it systematically strives to achieve the total gener-
alization, schematization, standardization, and universalization of all elements. 
At the core of classic modernity is what I would call a social logic of generality. 
This standardization and universalization of social structures and processes, of 
subjects and objects, is closely related to the fundamental process of modernity 
that Max Weber (1968) referred to as formal rationalization.
The formal rationalization of classic modernity attempts to systematically 
foster a social logic of generality. The social logic of generality means that all 
potential elements of the world are observed, evaluated, produced, and adapted 
as copies or instances of generally valid patterns. The social logic of generality 
follows in part the principles of theoretical generalization (as required by the 
modern sciences) and in part those of normative universalization (as required by 
modern law with its precepts of equality). Yet, above all, formal rationalization is 
an expedient to achieve a comprehensive optimization of all societal conditions 
and an institutionalization of rules, which are intended to generate predictability, 
efficiency, and innovation. The reign of the general is to be found on all levels: 
objects are produced and used in a standardized and uniform manner. Disci-
plined subjects find orientation in functional roles and performance standards 
that apply to everyone. Space is utilized in invariable constructive series so that 
industrial cities appear interchangeable. Time also becomes an object of ratio-
nalization in the sense that it is systematically controlled and the future is, so to 
speak, colonized. Rationalized orders are objectified orders in which emotions 
are controlled and emotional intensity is minimized.
Of course, the modernity of formal rationalization and the reign of general-
ity and uniformity are not dead. Many of these structural principles have been 
retained in late modernity, that is, in the period after 1980. Yet the countertend-
ency that I mentioned at the outset is also to be observed: the spread of a social 
logic of singularities that is connected to a process of culturalization. To clarify 
this, I would like to more precisely define the term ‘singularity,’1 which up until 
now I have been using in a somewhat ad hoc manner based on different  examples.
1 Two major sources of inspiration for this concept are Kopytoff 1986 and Karpik 2010.
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1. An entity is singular in a sociocultural context when it is not produced, 
experienced, and evaluated as a uniform copy of a general type but as some-
thing particular. As such it appears to be unique, incomparable, and non- 
interchangeable. Singularity makes reference to a certain quality and cannot be 
reduced to quantitative properties,2 which places it outside the schemata of gen-
erality. For in the realm of generality, entities can also differ from one another 
to some extent, but these differences can be described by such terms as better/
worse, more/less, that is, they can be compared. Singularities, on the other hand, 
do not just vary to a greater or lesser extent, they have a completely different 
quality, they are distinct – and for this reason do not seem interchangeable. 
A  Bach cantata seems fundamentally different from a Janis Joplin song. A trip 
to Venice is completely different from one to Nepal. And for the creative agency, 
employee X with his special profile and talents isn’t just slightly different – the 
way applicants with different exam notes might be – but offers a critical qualita-
tive advantage for the company. Of course, as Kant (2000) pointed out, there is 
always and inevitably the general and the particular, whereby – at least accord-
ing to Kant – the general emerges from concepts (Begriffe) and the particular 
from intuition (Anschauung). But what is sociologically interesting is the fact 
that dependent on the form of society, a complete social logics of singularity can 
emerge, in which singularities are observed, evaluated, fabricated, and adapted 
in a certain way.
2. It is of central importance that singularities emerge in the form of very 
different entities and elements relevant to the social world. For this reason, sin-
gularity differs from the concept of individuality, though the two are, of course, 
related. As a rule, individuals are human subjects, yet to attribute singularities to 
humans alone would be to greatly underestimate their importance. Singularities 
can be observed on one initial level that I would like to put special emphasis 
on: in the realm of things and objects. This is true of fabricated things, which 
in modernity often assume the form of products and goods, but also of images 
and texts, of works of art or religious relics, and of three-dimensional things 
like architecture (as well as natural entities). Singularities can, however, also be 
identified on the level of spatial and of temporal entities. Spatial singularities 
are in the field of spatial analysis generally known as places (in opposition to 
spaces)  – non- interchangeable, non- comparable locations. Temporal singular-
ities are moments or episodes: a single instant perceived as such or a unique, 
discontinuous episode with a distinct beginning and end. Humans can of course 
also appear as singularities and be introduced to the world as such, here we are 
2 See in this regard also Callon et al. 2002.
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in the realm for which classically the term individuality was reserved. Finally, 
on a fifth and particularly interesting level certain kinds of collectives can also 
become singularities.  Traditionally this is the case for what Ferdinand Tönnies 
called communities, but it also holds true for nations, and in late modernity it 
applies to such new socialities as projects, collaborations, and scenes.
3. In a social context singularities are ascribed a cultural value. In this sense 
they differ from the social logic of generality: while in the framework of the latter 
the individual element is attributed a derivative use or function in the framework 
of the rational order, singularities seem to have a value in their own right. This is 
true of works of art or relics, as well as of locations, moments, events, communi-
ties, scenes, and individualities. Singularities are to a certain extent not so much 
a means to an end but an end in itself. They are cultural in the active or robust 
sense of the term. This cultural autotelism of singularities can have an aesthetic 
dimension, but it can also have a hermeneutic, symbolic or narrative dimension, 
or a creative or ludic one. Yet, all in all, singularity always involves a certain 
 performance, it is enacted in front of an audience. The intrinsic value of singular-
ities is, however, not simply present: it depends on social processes of value attri-
bution, on valorization.3 Such valorizations can be consensual and hegemonic, 
but they can also be – at least in the modern period – extremely controversial, 
dynamic, dependent on discourses about valorization. Thus, there is a process of 
singularization taking place within the processes of valorization.
4. Singularities are generally associated with strong affects. It is not the 
general but the particular that leaves no one cold. While affective reactions to the 
universalities of modernity – rules and roles, mass-produced goods and statistics, 
serial buildings and serial cities – are minimal, affects related to singularities are 
all the more pronounced. These can include fascination, arousal, enthusiasm, 
and quiet satisfaction – or, on the other hand, such negative affects as aggression 
and hate. Closely connected to the emotional power of singularity is the fact that 
an intrinsic value is not just assigned but also experienced (or not experienced, 
as the case may be) in the participants’ practical processes.
5. Singularities are in this sense to be distinguished from idiosyncrasies. 
Idiosyncrasies are unique traits that come about unintentionally and are often 
disregarded. They disappear or are viewed with indifference. Singularities, on 
the other hand, are socially and culturally fabricated. They are made, fabricated, 
intentionally shaped, or encouraged. In modernity this is true of works of art 
and design objects, for cities shaped by cultural regeneration and, of course, for 
3 See for an analysis of valorizations Muniesa 2012 and Thompson 1979.
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 subjects who are not just individual but who work more or less consciously on 
their own individuality, who produce performances and profiles. Singularities are 
to be understood here as processes of singularization. Whether referring to objects 
(artefacts), subjects, events, or collectives – all of them are singularized through 
practices of making (Verfertigung), practices of observing, practices of valoriza-
tion, and practices of perceiving. To speak of singularities as a noun can only be a 
snapshot. Henceforth, singularities exist solely in the process of singularization – 
whose downside is the desingularization, the loss of the unique status.
One additional explanation is also necessary: What do I mean by culturalization 
and how is it related to these singularities? It may initially seem strange to speak 
of the process of culturalization as antithetical to the process of rationalization. 
What can culturalization even mean if culture is everywhere, that is, if every activ-
ity depends on broader contexts and systems of meaning? Here I would like to 
distinguish between a general, weaker use of the term culture, and a more robust, 
narrower understanding of the term culture. In a general sense, of course – and 
this is an insight achieved by the study of culture – the social is always cultur-
ally determined, is based on often implicit systems of classification. In this way 
rationalization processes always have cultural preconditions, for example mea-
sures of efficiency or equality. This is the cultural realm. Against this backdrop, I 
would like to apply a more narrow yet more robust understanding of culture that 
allows for sociotheoretical distinctions. In this robust sense cultural objects and 
cultural practices only refer to those select objects and practices to which not a 
use or function is ascribed but rather an intrinsic value. Raymond Williams (1958) 
has correctly stressed this aspect of value as a component of culture. The antith-
esis to culture is in this case rationality, especially purposive rationality. While in 
the logic of purposive rationality an action, object, text, or image is the means 
to a further end and thus has instrumental significance, a cultural practice or 
cultural object has an intrinsic value in its social context. This intrinsic value 
can be and often is aesthetic in nature, yet it can also be narrative, hermeneutic, 
creative, or ludic.
In principle, cultural practices and objects can be quite varied, extending 
far beyond those related to art or religious rituals: playing football or collectively 
watching a football match, political ceremonies, experiences in nature, designing 
and decorating an apartment, or even work, provided it is not wage labor as a 
means to an end but work with an inherent value – all these things are cultural 
practices and objects in the strong sense of the term. In contrast to rational and 
normative practices, cultural practices thus contain a distinct element of lived 
experience and a distinct element of affective identification. To echo Georges 
Bataille’s (1991) somewhat hyperbolic anthropological position: In comparison 
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to purposive rationality with its dictate of efficiency and thrift, that is, in compar-
ison to the world of necessity, the world of culture always contains an element of 
overexertion, of excess, of more than what is rationally needed.
We thus can see to what extent singularization and culturalization are related. 
Singularities are cultural in this robust sense of the word, laying claim to an intrin-
sic cultural value: the event and ritual, the specific location of a city or landscape, 
the singular object (be it work of art or of design), the individuality of the subject, 
the project, the scene, or the post-traditional community – these are not primarily 
purposive-rational institutions, rather to them an intrinsic value is ascribed. My 
principle argument is that following certain historical precedents that emerged 
from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, in late modernity the social logic 
of cultural singularities has spread both quantitatively and qualitatively. The social 
logic of singularities implies that at the center of society processes are taking place 
in which objects, subjects, collectives, locations, and temporal episodes are seen, 
evaluated, produced, and adapted as singularities, i.e. are singularized. All the 
examples that I cited at the beginning of the article are instances not just of the 
societal force of singularities but also of a process of culturalization.
2  Structures of the Late Modern Society 
of Singularities
Yet what form does a society that is oriented around cultural singularities assume? 
I will now list six traits that will be explained in greater detail in the second part 
of the article:
1. While historically cultural practices and objects and their singularities are 
often defined and shaped by the state, church, or a dominant social group, the 
widespread culturalization and singularization of late modernity is defined 
by an economy, a global cultural economy, that is also closely  connected to a 
specific technological structure: the digital world. The  structural framework 
is what I would call the global cultural creative complex (see Reckwitz 2017).
2. Cultural elements are valued highly in late modernity for their singularity 
because they are associated with the modern idea of authenticity.
3. The cultural creative complex seeks to continuously fabricate new singulari-
ties, which means that it is based on a regime of innovation, a regime of the 
culturally new, a regime of creativity.
4. In essence, cultural elements are negotiated in a social constellation made 
up of creators and an audience. Cultural elements are thus enacted and pre-
sented as performance.
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5. Singular cultural elements are presented to an audience in a constellation of 
competition for attention in a hypercompetitive market of visibilities.
6. New forms of purposive rationality are emerging that are adapted to the inter-
change of cultural singularities. These forms are no longer based on a logic of 
generality but on one of particularity. The result is what I would call general 
infrastructures for particularities.
In fact, the spread of the logic of the culturally particular in late modernity can 
only be explained as part of the far reaching structural transformation of the 
economy from the mass production of industrial goods with utilitarian value to 
a post-Fordist fabrication of singularities, that is, of singular goods and services 
that contain the promise of something authentic and non-interchangeable. It has 
been possible to observe this incremental transformation since the 1970s. Yet the 
spread of the logic of the culturally particular also depends on a second phe-
nomenon: the media technological revolution of computing, algorithms, and the 
World Wide Web, which, since the 1990s, has enabled not only the introduction 
of new cultural elements to the world (photos and stories, works of graphic art, 
films, games) in a historically unprecedented manner, but also the creation of 
a mobile realm of permanent competition for attention, in which singularities 
are to be made visible for potentially everyone and everything. The cultural cre-
ative complex encompasses the development of cities into creative locations by 
means of cultural regeneration as well as the global computer, internet, film, 
and music industries. It encompasses the development of such personalized ser-
vices as individual care and counselling and the pervasion of everyday life by 
digital search engines like Google, by computer games and by social media like 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. It now also encompasses virtually all consumer 
goods ranging from aesthetic design and so-called moral consumption to religious 
markets and the spiritual practices industry. Last but not least, it encompasses 
the vast touristization of global landscapes.
However, the emergence of the social complex of cultural singularities cannot 
be reduced to those economic and media technological structural  conditions 
alone. Rather, the Western culture of authenticity is an ultimately discursive back-
ground for the triumph of such a social logic of singularities.  Initially established 
within the social niches of artistic subcultures at the end of eighteenth-century 
Romanticism, it gradually spread throughout society (see Taylor 1989;  Reckwitz 
2006): Against the rationalism of mainstream modernity in the culture of authen-
ticity, the idea and conviction emerged that the subject – if freed from all con-
straints – strives for authenticity, self-realization, and self-expression. To be 
authentic, however, means to be special, singular. In a second step, this search 
for authenticity is projected onto the whole world, which now is perceived in 
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the expectation of the singular: a singularization of nature, places, communi-
ties, objects (artefacts), beliefs, and other subjects. Furthermore and ab initio it 
is closely linked to an ideal of creativity, a permanent self-creation and creative 
shaping of the world as well as a culture of intense emotions. Against this post- 
romantic background, which acted as an irritant countermovement of an ‘other 
modernity,’ classical, organized modernity of formal rationalization and the reign 
of generality seemed to suffer from a chronic lack of affect, authenticity, creativ-
ity, and singularity.
Now, Ronald Inglehart (1977) already described a fundamental change in 
values in the 1970s – certainly influenced by the counter culture of the late 60s – 
which was critical of rationalism and appreciated post-materialistic values, such 
as self-realization, the singular, the authenticity of a way of life, and the creative. 
Its social dominance could only be established by the onset of cultural capital-
ism and digitalization since the 1980s. This economic and media technological 
modelling generated a novel and very specific form of singularity. Late modern 
economy and media technology is driven by the subjects’ orientation towards 
singularity, but is pushing it in an altered direction. This new social logic of the 
singular, which is institutionalized widely by the cultural creative complex, con-
tains the characteristics that I already mentioned briefly above and which can 
be summarized as a constellation of competitive singularities. One prerequisite 
is the creator-audience-constellation: The cultural creative complex actively and 
purposefully produces singularities for an audience. The creation and design of 
singularities is thereby linked to a creativity orientation: it’s all about the singu-
lar, which acts with a demand for novelty (see Reckwitz 2017a). These  fabricated 
cultural elements with a claim for particularity can be aesthetically interest-
ing artefacts as well as stories growing around goods, offered by therapists or 
narrated by an institution about itself. It can involve whole atmospheres fabri-
cated for an experience of driving and living, live performances of various kinds, 
 political-ideological models of identification or a moral value of a certain diet; it 
may concern luxury pleasure, beauty or sentiments of security, education, or – 
not least – the participation in a game (gamification).
It must be stressed that rather than disappearing, forms of purposive ratio-
nality are undergoing a transformation within this late modernist dynamic. Of its 
own accord, purposive rationality has begun to adapt from a logic of generality to 
a logic of particularity, or better: they develop into general infrastructures for the 
production of singularities. Here, systems of purposive rationality are developing 
an interest in and capacity for – and this is historically new – the production, 
analyses, and comparative assessment of singularities. With the help of soft-
ware and 3D printers, unique products can be manufactured. Human resource 
management of the singular talents and potential of employees in the cultural 
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economy and algorithmic data tracking of consumer profiles are focused not just 
on general patterns but on unique properties.
Decisive here is the fact that this creative cultural production of singularities 
is aimed at an audience made up of potential consumers. We have become so 
accustomed to the ubiquity of audience functions that it is easy to oversee how 
historically extraordinary they are. Yet the cultural elements produced in this 
context always exist as performance – a performativity for and in the presence of 
an audience. The cultural elements in the cultural economy, like those found on 
the Internet, are aimed at an audience. But in both the cultural economy and the 
Internet, there is now the constellation of a permanent competition between sin-
gularities for the attention of audiences (see Franck 1998). This is a constellation 
of competitive or even hyper competitive singularities, which are circulated on a 
market of visibilities. It is quite striking how the post-Fordist cultural economy 
and the Internet have institutionalized the same constellation of competitive 
singularities. Socioeconomic studies on cultural markets, that is, on markets 
for products of cultural singularity ranging from films to design objects, have 
shed light on this special phenomenon (see Caves 2000). In cultural singularity 
markets there is always a certain amount of overproduction of cultural goods, 
of which ultimately only a few will attract an audience’s attention, though this 
attention is correspondingly massive. At the same time a great amount of cul-
tural products will attract very little attention and have no appreciable success. 
This is precisely what is so peculiar about singularity markets: what appear to 
be minimal differences between products are perceived as absolute, qualitative, 
emotionally distinct differences between non-interchangeable items.
The culturalization of economic markets tendentially transforms them into 
nobody knows-markets as well as so-called winner takes it all-markets with strong 
asymmetries of visibility, attention, and success (see Frank and Cook 2010). 
Industrial economy pursued a standardized production, i.e. a standardized work 
process of standardized goods in a standard matrix organization of controlled 
markets for customers within a schematized mass consumption. The cultural 
economy on the other hand pursues a production of cultural singularities – goods 
or services – within a work process, which has itself a singularistic structure in 
ways of non-exchangeable projects on a market with consumers who work for a 
singular way of life by means of consumption.
A similar competition between the singularities regarding their visibility also 
structures the World Wide Web. Interpreting the process of digitalization only as 
another step to information and knowledge, society falls short. The discourse on 
knowledge and information society remains rooted in the logic of the industrial 
society, where texts and images could primarily be understood as cognitive and 
affect-neutral parts of information. However, the digital medialization means to a 
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lesser extent an accumulation of cognitive knowledge but takes shape as a porta-
ble cultural space of images, narrations, game situations – a cultural hypertext, 
which constantly accompanies every subject and wherein an overproduction of 
cultural singularities is taking place (see also Stalder 2016). These singularities 
are under an on-going battle for the scarce attention by subjects and this battle 
is usually not one between pieces of information, but rather between affective 
intensities of images, narrations, and games with their aesthetic or hermeneutic 
offers. Not least, it is the subjects that are affected by the competition of visibility 
between the singularities who present themselves on the web, be it on YouTube, 
in Blogs, on Facebook, on Twitter, or future social media. The social media appear 
in fact as late modern generators of singularization.
The social media make particularly apparent how late modern subjects no 
longer take shape aligned to an organized modernity, but rather as singular sub-
jects with a strive for authenticity and what it entails: this singularization con-
verges in one social format, which is typical for the society of singularities in 
general – the profile. Digital subjects present themselves primarily through such 
profiles. In their profiles they compete with each other for visibility. Within these 
profiles there is a practice of what I would call a compository singularity: because 
here the subject becomes singular, especially in the composition, the configu-
ration, the combination of various elements: news of the life of the self, likes 
showing certain cultural preferences, links relating to ones’ interests, the time-
line of biographical events of the past and not least, of course, the photographs 
from ones’ own life. Singularity thus is not owned, it is curated. The authentic-
ity of the singular subject here always adopts the paradox form of performative 
authenticity: authenticity has to be presented in front of an audience and hope to 
be perceived.
The exact same mechanisms of profile development can be seen in the cul-
tural economy. Here again the singular cultural good has to develop a profile to 
attract attention as sustainably as possible – a whole brand is working on such 
a profile. In the cultural economy every single employee has to create a singular 
profile – beyond the standardized job requirements of the industrial society – to 
be of interest to projects of the working world. Overall, the culturalization of late 
modernity that has institutionalized a structure of competitive singularities leads 
to both an intensification of emotions and a dehierarchization of the cultural. 
While the formal rationalization of organized modernity has cooled off and mini-
mized emotions, in the culturalization of late modernity we see an intensification 
of emotions and affects related to singularities. This is true of both the goods and 
services of cultural capitalism and of the events, experiences, claims to authen-
ticity, and moralistic sensitivities that it fosters. Likewise, this holds true for sin-
gular labor in the creative professions and to a great degree for the emotional 
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charging of images and narratives that circulate in the media, especially in digital 
form. It is true of the subjects whose performative authenticity emotionally cor-
relates to their success or failure, and it is, of course, true of the cultural collec-
tives that emerge within this same framework. Yet, at the same time, as a result of 
this focus on singularity, culture has been dehierarchized. Cultural hierarchies, 
such as the familiar stratification of high culture and popular culture, are being 
eroded. Every singularity can claim to have a legitimate value: football game or 
opera production, yoga retreat or computer game. By placing emphasis on the 
qualitative differences between singularities, the culturalization of late moder-
nity has led to a de jure equality of singularities. De facto, however, there is an 
ongoing dynamic of inequalities and asymmetries among the singularities on the 
market for valorization and attention.
Two factors are primarily responsible for these asymmetries among singular-
ities. The first is the antithetical processes of valorization and devaluation that 
affect cultural elements. The second is the self-reinforcing effect of the inequalities 
in attention mentioned above. That a singularity is recognized and experienced 
as such is neither self-evident nor obvious. Instead, in a society of  singularities, 
societal processes of valorization and devaluation are of great importance. A cul-
tural item in the cultural economy can, for example, lose its singularity and its 
cultural value if it does not appear or ceases to appear authentic. Locations or 
brand names – Ibiza or Adidas, for instance – that lay claim to an intrinsic cul-
tural value can be de-singularized, reduced to little more than the expression of 
cheap mainstream consumption. In a society of singularities nothing is more fatal 
than to appear fake, a product of mass appeal, a mere expression of generality. 
The flip side of this kind of devaluation process is re-singularization, by means 
of which something that was once perceived as conformist or mainstream sud-
denly appears singular and non-interchangeable. The canned Hollywood movies 
from the 1950s will then be discovered as complex works of art and the nerd 
suddenly achieves the status of a hipster. Especially regarding subjects, the attri-
bution or non-attribution of recognized, attractive singularity contains a consid-
erable potential of cultural discrimination as well as glorification. Whereas the 
subject became problematic when subverting standards of normality during the 
organized modernity, it now risks – in a much subtler, but partly even more fatal 
way – to lose its recognition as being singular.
Concurrent to these processes of valorization and devalorization of quali-
ties and singularities is the extremely disparate or unequal attention paid to ele-
ments on cultural visibility markets. This inequality of attention is at the outset 
of the career of a product, subject, location, etc. highly coincidental. Striking 
are the self-reinforcing effects of visibility that follow: once something manages 
to become visible it is not likely to lose this visibility very quickly. Analogous 
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to the Matthew effect, attention is given to that which is already known, which 
is also the logic according to which such statuses as classic, celebrity, famous, 
cult, or star are assigned – exactly this is what winner takes it all-markets are 
about. Sighart Neckel (2008) observed in the context of the transformation of 
social inequalities that in late modernity the criteria that determine a subject’s 
status have shifted from achievement-based to success-based. In fact, this shift 
from  achievement-based to success-based criteria can by and large be explained 
in terms of the late modern structural transformation from industrial societies and 
their logic of generality to post-industrial societies and their logic of cultural sin-
gularity. In rationalistically organized modernity, gradual differences in objective 
achievement, especially in the professional world, lead to gradual differences in 
status. Yet, an economy that rewards absolute differences in exceptional singu-
larity, visibility, and the successful accumulation of attention (regardless by what 
means) tends in fact to legitimize far more drastic social inequalities. These asym-
metries in inequality affect products, companies, locations, and subjects alike. 
While achievement was defined by the fulfillment of general standards of better/
worse or more/less, success results precisely from the seemingly non-rational 
properties of the singular performance that prevail on the attention market: the 
particular brand name, the particular location, the particular individual.
In contrast to organized modernity, the society of singularities gives thus rise 
to a new range of societal problems. The society of cultural singularities does not 
in any way imply that the classic modern realm of necessity has been replaced by 
a post-modern realm of liberty, free of cultural expediency. Instead, the societal 
preference for the unique is associated with a devaluation of the general, which 
yields, in turn, new problems: not least of which are problems of equality.
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The notion of culture, as it circulates in contemporary studies of culture, combines 
two distinct meanings. On the one hand, culture designates an anthropological 
field of life forms, social relations and living conditions, and the habits, modes of 
interaction, and infrastructures that support them. On the other hand, there exists 
a more restricted notion of culture, as artistic and symbolic production: ‘high’ 
culture in its different forms as they have been examined and conceptualized by 
scholars of images, literature, and performative and spatial forms of creation. 
 Traditionally, there has been a quite strict academic division of labor along the lines 
of this distinction, leaving the first for historians and social scientists of different 
specializations, and the second as the subject of aesthetic disciplines, heralded 
by an idea of ‘the aesthetic’ that parallels those notions of politics and economy 
at work on the other side. Against this backdrop, a recurrent and perhaps even 
defining feature of the study of culture as it has developed over the last decades 
has been to contest this distinction and its corollary distribution, between a realm 
of social phenomena on the one hand, and one of artistic objects and experiences 
on the other, to be understood and researched independently by scholars of dif-
ferent skills. As an academic endeavor, the study of culture has aimed especially 
at bridging these two approaches to culture (or indeed at criticizing the reifying 
consequences of the divide), and at developing a conceptual framework to gauge 
the relationship between the corresponding two levels of what we call culture.
If we think of these levels as pertaining respectively to the way we live and 
to the ways in which we picture this life, the relationship between them can be 
conceptualized as one of representation. Artistic and other symbolic forms rep-
resent the way we live, our conditions and experiences, our modes of seeing and 
our structures of feeling: in short, they display a menagerie of ways of inhabiting 
the world. But they are also, at the same time, representative of this world and 
the way we inhabit it; they respond to it, examine it, and, in the final analysis, 
provide it with intelligible, symbolic expressions. “A society,” Émile Durkheim 
noted in 1912, “is not constituted simply by the mass of individuals who comprise 
it, the ground they occupy, the things they use, or the movements they make, but 
above all the idea it has of itself” (Durkheim 1995, 425). Cultural representations 
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cater to society with images of itself and thus suggest “[how] individuals imagine 
the society of which they are members and the obscure yet intimate relations 
they have with it” (Durkheim 1995, 227). To Durkheim, there is no culture (in the 
broad sense) that does not nurture its cultural artefacts (in the narrow sense), and 
inversely, there are no such artefacts that do not in some way or other contribute 
to building and consolidating the self-fashioning of culture and society at large.
The study of cultural representations thus necessarily shuttles back and forth 
between the social and political aspects of culture and the aesthetic artefacts 
and events it produces, reassessing, as it were, the constant process of sutur-
ing through which a society culturally reproduces itself. It lays bare the images 
that a society produces of itself, the “obscure yet intimate relations” that bind its 
members together, as well as the social dynamics, conflicts, and crises they rep-
resent. The future of the study of culture, understood in these terms, is of course 
contingent upon the recognition of the societal relevance of such an undertaking. 
On a more analytical note, it is also contingent upon the framework conditions 
of the practices and media of representation it scrutinizes. As some of its aca-
demic predecessors in the aesthetic disciplines have occasionally been accused 
of doing, cultural analysis cannot restrict itself to study the forms, imageries, and 
historical lineages of artistic works and events. To understand the cultural work 
of representation, we need to pay equal attention to the institutional scaffolding 
of its practices, and to the conditions of possibility of its modus operandi: the 
framing, in short, of its representing and representative activity.
This essay is an attempt to gauge some of the specific conditions of possibility 
that presently undergird the practice that we call ‘literature,’ and particularly the 
contemporary challenges and transformations that arguably confront it. A start-
ing point for this enquiry can be found in the Nobel Laureate lecture given by 
Svetlana Alexievich in 2015:
So what is it that I do? I collect the everyday life of feelings, thoughts, and words. I collect 
the life of my time. I’m interested in the history of the soul. The everyday life of the soul, the 
things that the big picture of history usually omits, or disdains. I work with missing history. 
I am often told, even now, that what I write isn’t literature, it’s a document. What is litera-
ture today? Who can answer that question?  (Alexievich 2015, n.p.)
As a first step towards an answer, one should note – however truistically – that 
the word ‘literature’ itself has two different meanings. In a broad sense, it refers 
simply to letters and written texts: This literal sense of the word literature still 
prevailed in the eighteenth century, and it is still the usage of reference in, say, 
scientific literature, or opera literature. But by now we are also accustomed to 
a more restricted sense of the word, referring to artistic texts: schöne Literatur, 
belles lettres, or fiction as opposed to nonfiction. Such texts have become objects 
After Literature   157
of scholarly scrutiny in academic studies of literature where they are read not 
only as texts, but as artworks, presupposing that they possess a particular kind 
of aesthetic value and consistency. Literary scholars have scrutinized such works 
individually and comparatively with a particular interest in their form and struc-
ture, their meaning and function, and how their forms and themes have devel-
oped historically, and the scholarly community has tailored specific concepts and 
approaches to address these questions of literary analysis, literary interpretation, 
and literary history.
Our modern idea of literature, and the academic protocols for studying it, 
thus focuses on a particular and delimited set of texts, which are given a particu-
lar status, and which are produced, circulated, and consumed in particular ways. 
This specific literary realm is situated in a wider context of other texts. So what is 
literature? How is its realm constituted, and when it interacts with other realms 
of making and using texts, how is this metabolism regulated? The definition of 
literature is a distribution of the sensible, identifying a subset of texts and assign-
ing those texts to a particular societal sphere where they are understood and used 
in a special way. This distribution has been in place from the mid-eighteenth 
century until today. Answering the question “What is literature?” along these 
lines does not put any considerable emphasis on the proper characteristics of the 
‘literary’ texts, moving the focus instead to understanding the distribution of the 
sensible – or the systemic differentiation – through which the particular realm of 
‘literature’ in the modern sense of the word has come about. The “what” of liter-
ature hence becomes an institutional issue, a question of framing that enables us 
to distinguish between literature in general from literature as artistic texts.
The institution of literature has emerged over three centuries as a system 
of social conventions and protocols for the production, circulation, and con-
sumption of a select set of texts. Michel Foucault famously identified a liter-
ary “author-function” (Foucault 1994) radically distinct from the scientific 
author-function; and similarly, we have developed a notion of the literary work 
with a specific juridical status and concomitantly a particular attitude we are 
expected to observe when understanding and interpreting it. And around this is 
built a corresponding economy and system of handling procedures executed by 
publishing houses, schools, newspapers, libraries, and so on. This entire institu-
tional frame, ranging from social expectations and habits to very tangible princi-
ples for categorization and canonization, executes and reproduces the existence 
of this social thing that we call literature. We don’t recognize the ‘whatness’ of 
literature in well-defined textual qualities, but rather in that small tag that this 
system has attached to it declaring it to be literature. This mode of being is of 
the same nature as Marcel Duchamp’s famous urinal becoming a work of ‘art’ 
from the moment it is installed in the gallery space. The idea of literature in the 
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modern, restricted sense stems from what Jacques Rancière in a different context 
has baptized “the aesthetic regime” (Rancière 2000, 31) where different artefacts 
retain a homogenous appearance by circulating in a particular economy.
Answering Alexievich’s question in this way, i.e. by not identifying some 
essence of the literary thing as that which assures its identity to itself, but analyz-
ing it as a product of an institutional framing of the historical production, circula-
tion, and consumption of texts, we are in turn also invited to ask how the modern 
framing of literature might change over time, contingent on political, technolog-
ical, and cultural transformations at large. We also eventually must consider if 
Alexievich’s question indicates that literature might be in the process of changing 
its historical guise. In the following pages, I will try to make this question a bit 
more tangible by discussing some recent changes within three seminal aspects 
of the institutional framing of literature – what, in the title of this piece, I have 
referred to as the geographies, technologies, and epistemologies of literature.
1 Geography: After the Nation State
That the geography of literature is changing has been clearly indicated by the 
new relevance and wide circulation of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s concept of 
world literature, developed nearly two hundred years ago. The concept itself is 
still somehow contested, and although many definitions have been suggested – 
ranging from a new understanding of literature in general to an exclusive canon 
of allegedly world-literary works – none have really won a general consensus. 
Nonetheless, this does not preclude a widespread acclaim for the concept as sem-
inally important for the present time. In this sense, ‘world literature’ has become 
something like a fetish among scholars of literature, a still ambiguous expression 
of the feeling that something important is happening to the relationship between 
literature and the nation state that will hold consequences for our profession. 
What is happening, then, is probably first of all that a historic and otherwise solid 
alliance between national languages and their literatures is being demounted. 
The bland observation that literature is written in a national language was an 
important instrument for the forging of ideologies based on the nation state that 
accelerated after the Napoleonic wars. “Imagined communities,” using Bene-
dict Anderson’s famous title, provided a shared cultural identity and political 
adherence to the national territory that were imperative to the consolidation 
of the modern nation states (Anderson 1991). Here, literature eventually came 
to play a prominent role, partly as a medium for cultivating the particularities 
of the national tongues, and partly as a repository of national mythologies, not 
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least through the canonization of a literary pre-history that could contribute to 
the process of what Eric Hobsbawm has aptly called “the invention of tradition” 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992).
This amalgamation between territory, tradition, and language has been 
under progressive liquidation since the Second World War, under pressure from 
the increasing circulation of people, commodities, technologies, capital, and 
information usually conveniently wrapped up in the notion of globalization. As 
the nation state and its genealogies become contested as a relevant frame of refer-
ence for the still more cosmopolitan space of our everyday experiences, this inev-
itably affects the ways in which literature is produced, circulated, and consumed. 
Stuart Hall coined the concept of “epistemic spaces” to portray the connections 
between our localization and our ways of thinking and feeling, how a spatial posi-
tion also serves as a frame of reference for our expectations and predispositions, 
our patterns of agency and ways of seeing the world (Hall 1996, 396). During the 
nineteenth century, the nation state was the prime epistemic space for literature, 
but throughout the twentieth century we have seen the advent of more differ-
ently organized spaces. Thus, postcolonial epistemic spaces emerge from the con-
flictual superposition between imperial and local orders, and new urban spaces 
emerge as global and relational spaces with completely different geometries than 
territorially bundled spaces. Such epistemic spaces function on a different scale 
than the ancient national territorial spaces and gradually outline a new context 
of experience. Concomitantly, we tend to focus more on strictly local or regional 
epistemic spaces than on national territorial formations, and on trans- local 
spaces – using Arjun Appadurai’s helpful term (Appadurai 1996,  192)  – where 
different local horizons merge without any need for the coordinates of the nation 
state, like Bangladesh and East London, or Anatolia and Kreuzberg.
Such post-national epistemic spaces gain still more importance as a back-
drop for contemporary literary creation, ranging from Salman Rushdie to Kamila 
Shamsie, and from Junot Diaz to Gary Shteyngart, where different versions 
of globalized epistemic spaces are evidently more relevant than the spaces of 
national communities. These four writers all write their books in English, but it is 
a globalized kind of English, which in stunning and effective ways captures and 
articulates the codes of globalized communication. Or to put it differently: even 
when the nation state is no longer the primary epistemic space, literary texts are 
still written in languages that have a national index, but this language is also 
shot through with lexical and idiomatic hybridizations to a degree where liter-
ary writing itself already seems to be partly also a work of translation. In turn, 
this is probably also why precisely the idea of translation has occupied such 
a prominent position in the cultural and literary studies of the latest decades. 
Translation, traditionally considered as a craft of transposing a work from one 
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national language to another, is no longer a mere matter of post-production, but 
becomes an intercultural literary force of production in its own right with a steep 
increase in significance. Literary creation has increasingly become a question of 
tele-poesies, as suggested by Gayatri Spivak in her farewell to literary studies from 
2003, Death of a Discipline: Creation by way of transpositions in time and space 
exactly mirrors the complex and layered time-spaces of our globalized epistemic 
space (Spivak 2003, 29).
The vitality of the contemporary literary scene surely testifies to the fact that 
it does indeed thrive beyond the epistemic space of the nation state, and that it is 
an ideally suited companion to getting a sense of direction in a globalized culture. 
It is questionable, however, if literature will be able to retain the central role it had 
in national culture and education under these new circumstances. The consecra-
tion of literature to become a privileged medium for culture and education – the 
proper word in this context is the German Bildung – does actually stand out as 
something quite extraordinary, in the educational system, where the teaching of 
language and of literature have been inseparable, in the propagation of national 
canon formations, in the endowments for public libraries, and in the leading 
public media. In this sense, the institution of literature has been intimately entan-
gled with the political project of the nation state as an important point of reference 
for a shared tradition and a shared language. And to the extent that literature and 
the nation state actually come to parting ways – as literary creation encroaches 
itself in differently organized epistemic spaces, and as the weight of cultured liter-
acy withers away from the societal sectors of education and of culture – literature 
eventually risks being left behind, devoid of the underwriting it has been privi-
leged with, as a ghost in want of its blanket: another marginalized art form afloat 
on an aggressive global marketplace for mass-produced text.
2 Technology: After Gutenberg
The technology of literature has long been an underrepresented topic in liter-
ary studies, most often relegated to a corner of literary sociology; it first really 
flourished with the young discipline of book history, whose materialist corrective 
to the traditional spiritual air of the discipline has been both provocative and 
benign. Moreover, this direction of research seems to have surfaced at exactly 
that point in time when its object, the material book, started to lose its perceived 
obviousness, and when literature started to become mediated through new small 
screen technologies. In not too many years, we have come quite a long way in the 
transition from book to screen, from codex to Kindle, from Gutenberg to Google.
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It remains contested what this transition actually entails, and it is a favored 
subject of conversation between reading people to ponder what it actually means for 
the experience of literature. Friedrich Kittler once remarked that “the new literary 
recipe for success” in the nineteenth century was “to surreptitiously turn the voice 
or handwriting of a soul into Gutenbergiana” (Kittler 1999, 9). Making “Gutenbergi-
ana” into a language of the soul, addressed to the dispersed national communities 
of readers, and consequently considering reading as a mode of being attentive to 
the soul’s voice, is probably an important albeit somehow intangible characteristic 
of how literature became institutionalized. It has been associated with a particular 
emphatic attitude, as observed by Georges Poulet, where one finds oneself thinking 
the thoughts and seeing the sights of somebody else: “The extraordinary fact in the 
case of a book is the falling away of the barriers between you and it. You are inside 
it; it is inside you; there is no longer either outside or inside” (Poulet 1969, 54).
In October 2014, the British writer Will Self published a piece in The Guardian 
entitled “The Transformation of our Gutenberg Minds,” arguing that the transfer 
from book to screen would erode a significant component of our attitude towards 
literature, namely what he called “deep reading” – the absorptive devotion to a 
made-up universe that requires seclusion and contemplation, something which 
network-connected screens negate almost by definition. Even if it is by no means 
obvious that he is right about this, and even if the argument has more than a 
taint of nostalgia to it, it does highlight something like a historical phenomenol-
ogy of the reading human body by taking into account how an entire array of 
rituals, expectations, and experiences pertaining to reading keep resonating in 
our understanding of what literature is.
Digital text is also, on a different note, instrumental in changing the rou-
tines of academic literary studies. If ‘deep reading’ has been the so-to-say civilian 
attitude to the reading of literature, the hermeneutic scrutiny of literary texts in 
academia has been one of ‘close reading’ (not necessarily to be associated with 
the programmatic myopia that characterized the North American new critics, 
who originally coined the term). Contrary to this, Franco Moretti has forcefully 
launched the concept of “distant reading” (Moretti 2013), which is no longer 
based on the interpretation of textual finery, but on parsing and statistical 
metrics based on big textual data that now has become available thanks to the 
large data repositories of the written cultural heritage. This is of course first of all 
a methodological change of perspective, where we have been given control of a 
powerful apparatus that we might still not be completely aware of how to handle. 
But it surely contributes to a gradual reorientation in literary studies, away from 
analyzing literary works in order to analyze text, text in large quantities, which 
enables us to extricate precise and numeric acute answers to even the vaguest 
questions we might ask.
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In addition to his observations on the changing phenomenology of reading, 
Will Self also points to the broader societal infrastructure built around the mate-
rial book and the way it is inflicted by new technologies:
The relationship between words and revenue has become a debatable one – we can wax all 
we like about the importance of the traditional gatekeepers and the perspicacity of editors 
and critics in separating out the literary wheat from the pulpy chaff, but the fact is that 
these professions depend on the physical book as a commodity. It is the sad bleat of the 
book world that we’ll be sorry once they’re gone – and with them all the bookshops, literary 
reviews, libraries and publishing houses that supported their endeavors – but it was their 
mistake to assume their acumen to be inelastic. I mean by this, that a certain kind of exper-
tise was understood to have a value to its consumers that was both constant and capable of 
being monetized at a fixed rate. The web has grabbed hold of this inelasticity and stretched 
it until it has snapped back in the myopic faces of the literati.  (Self 2014)
Self here delivers a diagnostic of how the literary ecology is being rationalized by 
way of a more efficient and lean business model bringing the commodities directly 
to the consumers without costly intermediaries, and where whatever is saved is 
probably being shared in equal parts between the entire reading community on 
the one side and Jeff Bezos on the other. But this is also a potential eradication 
of the entire, ramified, and complex societal infrastructure that came with the 
historic technology and afforded the reproduction of what we called literature. 
Digitization and the substitution of the book with a file displayed on a screen 
emaciates the institutional eco-system around the literary thing. Moreover, this 
new apparatus also intervenes in the production of texts. In an industrial per-
spective, digital social networks open up a new production line: Fifty Shades of 
Grey, for example, was originally a blog, which morphed into literature when it 
had rounded a critical number of hits; something similar seems to be the case for 
the increasing production of fan fiction. Content production now becomes veri-
tably industrialized in a way that short-circuits the slow grinding mechanisms of 
the historic literary system, partly by tapping into the immense text production 
that takes place on social platforms, partly by systematically (i.e. algorithmically) 
surveying the patterns of our purchasing and reading of electronic books and 
using this information for marketing as well as for literary production proper.
On a short-term basis, it is no doubt the commercial exploitation of the 
changing media technology that draws the largest profits from this transforma-
tion (all while Will Self’s myopic literati get snaps on their noses), but the digital 
production environments eventually also become an important spur for new 
and experimental modes of literary creation. Thus, Mark Danielewski’s novels 
would be unthinkable without a thorough familiarity with the workings of digital 
media, just like the new, platform-specific formats of links, tweets, and real-time 
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 postings contribute to altering our sensibility to the literature’s media ecology 
and to the creation of new non-linear forms of composition and modes of reading.
These different and admittedly quite heteroclite tendencies obviously inter-
act in a number of different ways, but most notably, I will argue, they converge in 
denaturalizing the ‘book’ as a literary object and the ‘work’ as an aesthetic cate-
gory. For one thing, we come to realize what book history has already attempted 
to teach us: namely that a text is actually a quite fuzzily delineated object that 
cannot easily be disentangled from what we have otherwise tried to contain as 
‘para-textual’ features, i.e. the social and technological protocols and processes 
through which the text is materialized as a cultural object. This becomes increas-
ingly evident when dealing with digital text, where the material and technologi-
cal para-textual stuff we have become accustomed to over a long stretch of time is 
discarded and replaced by other features, now pertaining to hardware and soft-
ware and providing scalability, searchability, linking, sharing, statistics, algo-
rithmic parsing, and much more. Eventually, we might become less inclined to 
think about ‘a’ text and instead prone to recognize ‘some’ text that cannot ideally 
be separated from the material forms and temporal processes that undergird its 
actual appearance. To this effect, N. Katherine Hayles remarks:
Perhaps it is time to think the unthinkable – to posit a notion of text that is not dematerialized 
and that does depend on the substrate in which it is instantiated. Rather than stretch the 
fiction of dematerialization thinner and thinner, why not explore the possibilities of texts that 
thrive on the entwining of physicality with informational structure?  (Hayles 2003, 275)
Literature as we have understood it rested on a certain regime of the text whose 
material form was the Gutenbergian codex and whose corresponding aesthetic 
form was that of an institutionalized work of art. With the denaturation of the 
inherited material form, a more generalized sense of textuality is unleashed: in 
terms of writing, in guise of processing a highly malleable scroll on a screen; in 
terms of processing by different forms of capture and postproduction; in terms 
of distribution based on data files; and in terms of reading, no longer handling 
a book object, but reading a fragment of text on a screen which is virtually sur-
rounded by endless expanses of more text, as a haphazard spotlight flickering 
over an endless surface of written stuff.
In the early nineteen-seventies, Roland Barthes prophesized the transition 
from work to text; perhaps we are now witnessing a surprising version of this 
transition, where commercial producers no longer trade in works, but capture 
and repackage text, where reading is not confined to a volume with two covers 
but to patches of luminous flicker on a screen. In this situation, we are obviously 
still somehow dealing with literature; it is produced in unprecedented  quantities 
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and is amazingly accessible, but still it somehow differs from the product we 
knew that had its material foundation in the ancient printing press. The tech-
nology of the book helped to frame that thing we called literature and the liter-
ary works we came to cherish; this thing is now coming unframed in the digital 
propagation of a new kind of generalized textuality that modifies the traditional 
modes of production, circulation, and consumption of literature and instigates 
new practices, new business models, and new sensibilities, eventually leaving us 
less with ‘literature’ and literary works than with much more generic forms of text 
that are captured, distributed, and used in slightly different ways.
3 Epistemology: After Fiction
Between 2004, when Michael Moore won the Golden Palm at the Cannes Film 
Festival, and 2015, when Svetlana Alexievich was awarded the Nobel Prize in Lit-
erature, the question of how to distinguish reliably between documentary and 
fiction has gradually gained increasing importance. We have learned, throughout 
the modern history of literature, that literature belongs to the realm of fiction, 
where utterances are not supposed to – or rather, are supposed not to – have a 
real referent. Fiction, here, is really to be understood rather as a legal category: 
a particular discursive practice where beings that are designated do not have a 
referent. This is why Flaubert was not indicted in the trial on the morality on 
Madame Bovary, and why we so abhorred the fatwa on Salman Rushdie. Rep-
resentations are not designations: Within the modern regime of literature, we 
have applied the caveat of fictionality to allow imaginary tales about our world 
to circulate as a testing ground for conjecture and speculation. The trade-off of 
fiction, magisterially condensed into a formula by Catherine Gallagher, is that it 
combines non-reference with probability (Gallagher 2006, 344).
This contract of fictionally, however, seems to have come undone. On June 21, 
2013, at the publication of the American translation of the second volume of Karl 
Ove Knausgaard’s My Struggle, the reviewer for The New York Times wrote: “imme-
diately striking is the ways in which fiction is born of fact,“ and then thoughtfully 
added, “and the question whether this is fiction at all.“ This question has occu-
pied literary scholarship and the literary public to a quite remarkable degree over 
the last years, not only in the case of Knausgaard, but in the panoply of instances 
where contemporary writers in different ways transgress the ancient contract 
of fiction, from W.G. Sebald to Michel Houellebecq, from Marie Darrieussecq to 
Rainald Goetz. All the prominent theories of fiction in store have been invoked 
to accommodate this new situation, and new sub-generic  classifications have 
After Literature   165
 laboriously been devised, but somewhat, it seems, in vain. In the different experi-
ments undertaken by writers like these, we are no longer dealing with new, subtle 
negotiations of the contract of fiction, but rather with a practice to which the con-
tract and the divide it implies is simply becoming increasingly irrelevant. With 
characteristic, unfailing perspicacity, James G. Ballard already in 1995 stated:
I feel that the balance between fiction and reality has changed significantly in the past 
decades. Increasingly their roles are reversed. We live in a world ruled by fictions of every 
kind – mass-merchandizing, advertising, politics conducted as a branch of advertising, the 
pre-empting of any original response to experience by the television screen. We live inside 
an enormous novel. It is now less and less necessary for the writer to invent the fictional 
content of his novel. The fiction is already there. The writer’s task is to invent the reality.  
 (Ballard 1995, i)
Now, twenty years later, the tendencies spotted by Ballard have come to full-
blown fruition, and we are presently dealing with a double-faced erosion of the 
threshold that used to separate fiction from the document. From one side, creative 
literary practices defy and provocatively transgress the borderline set down in the 
traditional contact of fiction, overtly juxtaposing and intertwining real references 
and invented things. And from the other side, we see media and political dis-
course flooded with ‘alternative facts’ and generally blending alleged accounts of 
states of facts with improbable figments of imagination, in the increasingly toxic 
conglomeration of storytelling and statistics, branding and bigotry.
The differentiation of the public sphere, as magisterially theorized by Jürgen 
Habermas, implied a thorough separation of discursive modes and their spheres 
of validity, combined with a gradual development of different rationalities for 
political deliberation, for the organization of production, for the market place, for 
art and literature, for scientific inquiry, and so forth (Habermas 1962). The institu-
tion of literature took place under the aegis of such a societal differentiation; the 
present situation, however, seems to be one of rolling back, of de-differentiation, 
inflicting the ability for – or the interest in – distinguishing between facts and 
fiction. Matters of fact are becoming rarefied, as Bruno Latour has noted, leaving 
us in an acute perplexity about how then to identify and negotiate the matters 
of concern we need to face up to (Latour 2005, 29). So one thing is that literature 
today seems still more preoccupied with toying with sometimes ludic, sometimes 
dead-serious references to mundane reality, and with blending discourses that we 
are accustomed to identifying as fiction and documentary, respectively, into new 
hybrid forms. But this also stands out as a reaction to the way in which our present 
reality is becoming saturated with what we would otherwise have expected to find 
only in the inoffensive realm of fiction. Referential stuff of all kinds now abounds 
inside this realm, and outside of it, reference is shot through with fiction.
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This new distribution of discourses – and the hybridization of otherwise dis-
tinct rationalities it brings along – evidently has serious repercussions when it 
comes to how we (are to) understand what literature is. Literature no longer holds 
the privilege of being the one, specific discourse that could produce imaginary 
versions of the world and hold them up against the actual world outside. Within 
the new disorderly distribution of discourses in society, such properties now 
surface everywhere, whether in politics, advertisement, or journalism. In this 
sense, the new and sometimes confusing literary involvement with something 
we identify as documentary is not primarily an attempt on the part of literature to 
break out of the institutional enclosure it has found itself confined to, but more 
accurately a reaction to the undermining of the architecture of social discourses 
that upheld this enclosure. The divides that scaffold the epistemological differ-
entia specifica of literature are coming down, not through pressures from within, 
but washed away from the outside. This can be regarded as a waning of the power 
that was once endowed to literature, as it now loses its privilege do be the dis-
course that can say something which is not true, but is still much more than a lie. 
But it can also be regarded as an unbinding of this very power, the speculative 
power of fabulation that has been bred within the confines of the literary institu-
tion for a couple of centuries, now eventually in a position to directly address – 
beyond analogy, beyond allegory – the narratives and imaginaries that make up 
our cultural space of experience.
4 Literature After Literature
When studying the cultural practices of representation and their role and func-
tion in the life of society at large – and indeed when gauging the future of this 
academic endeavor – we need to factor in also the framework conditions upon 
which the representations under scrutiny are contingent and the particular his-
torical transformations they undergo. In the case of literature, and admittedly 
based on a haphazard set of observations that does not allow for too far-reaching 
conclusions, I have nonetheless tried to sketch out how changes are underway 
that might eventually affect three fundamental pillars supporting our modern 
notion of literature and perhaps alter the representational regime of literature 
in the twenty-first century. Thus, with the new geographies, technologies, and 
epistemologies of reading and writing I have touched upon, literature as we 
have known it for some three hundred years could be morphing into something 
slightly different: a literature based on a new trans-local idiomatic, beyond the 
nation state and the national language; a new proteiform textuality, beyond the 
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book and the work; and a new art of fabulation, beyond the particular category of 
fiction as opposed to the referential.
The literary creativity of the present in no way seems to be impeded by these 
transformations of the framework within which it operates; on the contrary, it is 
stimulated by the new vistas that open up and the novel possibilities they entail. 
And literature remains, to be sure, a powerful medium of representation. Yet the 
cultural logic of representation it is about to develop has different coordinates 
than the one we knew from the classical modern regime of literature. The publics 
it caters to and to whom it offers the images it confects are less those who can 
be circumscribed by way of a geography of nations, but instead by dispersed 
communities engaged in intricate processes of translation and negotiation based 
on new trajectories and encounters. Moreover, literary representations are not 
only subjected to new and aggressive business models, they are also morphing 
beyond the book and the circuit of books as we know it. This textual practice in 
turn connects to other forms of live-ness and to the practices of the other arts, as 
it nests itself in ramified guises within a different media ecology, which in turn 
also facilitates new encounters and different platforms for producing stories and 
images of the way we live. And finally, the mimetic faculty of literature is bleed-
ing into neighboring discursive practices of wording our experience within differ-
ent forms of post-fictional fabulation, intervening in the discursive fabric of the 
present in more subtle ways, taking risks outside of the comfort zone of what is 
‘mere fiction’ and renegotiating its legal and political interaction with a host of 
other representations among which it is increasingly enmeshed.
One challenge to the study of culture today is of course to chart such complex 
processes that presently affect the framework conditions for aesthetic represen-
tations. We should keep a broad outlook not only on what is happening to the 
cultural practices as we know them, but also on the social and infrastructural 
changes at work, in a continuous dialogue with an array of other sciences of 
society, technology, and culture. The trans-disciplinary horizon of the study of 
culture is going to expand further, and we will have to keep learning new disci-
plinary languages and research designs, and probably engage even more in col-
lective research projects that are equipped to properly handle the polyvalence of 
the objects we are dealing with.
The social institution of literature does seem, as argued above, to undergo 
quite dramatic changes in respect to its inner geometry and its interfaces with 
the world around it. In this process, the relations it builds to its audiences are 
diversified, all while it aims to gain a different foothold in a mobile, ubiquitously 
mediated and de-differentiated discursive sphere. Literature, and the other arts, 
are becoming less distinctive as objects, more flexible in their articulation and 
their address, operating more transversally in an increasingly complex and 
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 amalgamated sphere of social practices. As such, literature is about to become 
less distinctly identifiable as an object of scholarly inquiry, eventually also chal-
lenging our intellectual habits of object construction and scientific protocol. The 
study of culture will find itself increasingly in the position of a partner in dia-
logue and interaction with art practices rather than an impartial observer and 
interpreter. In this dialogue, artists and scholars are going to navigate the same 
waters, and most likely in a common endeavor of an ultimately political nature: 
to make sure that there remains sufficient room for maneuver for a creative and 
critical inquiry into the way we live now.
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The Integrative Potentials of Arts-based  
Research for the Study of Culture: 
A Reflection on The Lagoon Cycle by  
Helen Mayer Harrison and Newton Harrison
The future of the study of culture can generate reflections from several different 
perspectives involving issues related to contents, methodologies, and political 
stances, as well as academic and/or social relevance, and epistemological ethics 
and responsibility. For early career researchers like myself, this can be ambig-
uously motivating, as a set of opportunities to engage in new and challenging 
endeavors, but also can sometimes seem a tiring and frustrating practice, partic-
ularly when one encounters outdated academic structures that are too rusty to be 
moved and transformed.
In this sense, one crucial consideration in the future of the study of culture 
is related to the future (or the ‘crisis’) of the humanities. This topic has been 
gaining increasingly concerned attention, mainly from scholars concerned not 
only with the future of their field but also with the course and extent to which 
human knowledge is framed and used as a tool for power and manipulation 
(Nussbaum 2010; Bono et al. 2008; Delbanco 2012). This concern arises from a 
growing and perceptible decrease in investment in the humanities and the arts 
in recent decades, and the consequent reduction in disciplines offered in and 
projects related to these fields (Nussbaum 2010; Delbanco 2012). Other symp-
toms of this crisis refer to mechanization processes in the production of knowl-
edge, and investment solely in technical programs or projects that might bring 
immediate economic results but fail to generate a critical self-reflexive practice 
among students, researchers, professors, and other professionals in academic 
and non-academic worlds (Nussbaum 2010; Kristeva and Davidson 2014). This 
issue is reflected in the field’s constant effort to validate the study of culture as 
‘science,’ and its emphasis on the adoption (or adaptation) of what is accepted 
as a ‘standard scientific method.’ At the expense of this effort, in many cases, 
comes the disregarding of methods that are considered more ambiguous or 
subjective because they fail to reach the criteria of scientific measurability and 
reproducibility.
In an effort to address this issue, this article discusses the integrative poten-
tial of arts-based research for the field of the study of culture, in its encourage-
ment of self-reflexive thinking processes about the statuses of academia and of 
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research themselves. Accordingly, this is not an empirical study based on  concrete 
empirical evidence, but an invitation to reflection, based on the example of an 
artistic project that opens the possibility of thinking about research from different 
perspectives.
The interest in arts-based research as a potential methodology for qualita-
tive research originated within the field of art education in the 1970s. Since the 
1990s, it has been growing in connection to different academic areas, primarily 
within the social sciences, educational sciences, and the study of culture, but 
also in other scientific areas like psychology, psychotherapy, and environmen-
tal science.1 In many cases, arts-based approaches are subordinated to fit into 
expected scientific accounts of measurability, applicability, predictability, repro-
ducibility, credibility, and so on, despite that these are not always compatible 
to what arts-based research stands for. Scholars Natalia Eernstman and Arjen 
E.J. Wals describe the role of arts-based research in sustainability studies: “The 
arts techniques involve improvisation, intuition, spontaneity, lateral thinking, 
imagination, co- operation, serendipity, trust, inclusion, openness, risk- taking, 
provocation, surprise, concentration, unorthodoxy, deconstruction, innovation, 
fortitude, and an ability and willingness to delve beneath the surface, beyond the 
present, above the practical and around the fixed” (Eernstman and Wals 2013, 
1648). These qualities are not only important for arts-based research, however. 
On the contrary, they are relevant to the process of innovative thinking and self- 
reflexive practice in any field of research, even as they require some distancing 
from the limitations of predictability and mechanical reproducibility. The arts, 
in this sense, can play a fundamental role in enabling the possibilities for over-
coming a scientific- mechanical-rationality, and allow for the emergence of more 
humane and unexpected characteristics in the process of doing research.
First, it is important to highlight that it is not the goal of this paper to dismiss 
the importance of scientific research or the standards of scientific methods. Its 
focus lies, instead, on trying to bring unpredictable characteristics of research to 
the surface, and rather than denying or suppressing them, indicating their value 
as legitimate steps of the research process that could and should be embraced in 
the study of culture.
Second, there are different forms in which arts-based research can be under-
stood, interpreted and applied and the goal here is to briefly indicate this variety 
1 References to arts-based research in relation to art education can be found in Eisner 1991; 
 Barone and Eisner 1997; Irwin and deCosson 2004. It was also expanded to other areas of the 
social and cultural sciences as in the examples of Pink 2001; Pickering 2008; Knowles and 
Cole 2008, as well as to art therapy in McNiff 2013 or environmental sciences and education in 
 Mantere 1998; Curtis et al. 2014; Eernstman and Wals 2013.
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of approaches and to focus on one specific kind of arts-based research that is not 
often given credit within the scientific community, which is defined in this article 
as research through art.
1  Multiple Forms to Think About in Arts-based 
Research
As previously mentioned, in the last decades there has been a growing number 
of different approaches to arts-based research: trying to understand it, define it, 
and integrate it into qualitative research (Barone and Eisner 1997; Knowles and 
Cole 2008; McNiff 2013). From a recent literature review of arts-based approaches 
used in fields related to the study of culture and the humanities, there are at 
least three different basic forms in which the role of the arts can be interpreted in 
relation to research. The first and more commonly identified one can be defined 
as research about art, in which the ‘products’ of artistic practice are analyzed 
according to the methods of other disciplines: For example, works of art that are 
analyzed using art-historical methods, or some forms of anthropological inter-
pretations of cultural manifestations. In this kind of practice, the researchers are 
usually not artists themselves and they are not involved in the process of produc-
tion of such artistic/cultural expressions. Instead, they engage theoretically with 
different works of art, or cultural manifestations, and combine these personal 
encounters with previous knowledge and theories to produce different readings 
and  interpretations of that work, expression, or practice.
A second role for the arts is in research with art, in which the artistic practice 
is taken as a method and is incorporated into the interpretive processes of other 
disciplines. This happens, for example, in approaches of visual anthropology 
or art therapy (Pink 2001; McNiff 2013), wherein artistic practice is turned into 
a process of data production or collection and is combined with other research 
methods to achieve the desired results of a specific project. In these cases, the 
researchers can also come to be the producers of the analyzed artistic expres-
sions, or they work closely with the people producing such expressions. However, 
the focus usually lies on analyzing the ‘final result’ or applying the ‘final result’ as 
an analytical tool to attend to a specific research question. The processual aspects 
of the artistic production are not completely disregarded, but they do not hold 
as a significant role as the ‘end product.’ In many practices and accounts of art 
therapy, the line between research with art and research through art, is not clearly 
defined (McNiff 2013): Both aspects can be identified but slight differences in 
focus or expectations of the analysis are perceivable.
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Finally, another way in which arts-based research can be understood 
is in relation to the very process of artistic thinking. This can be defined as 
research through art, and this is the understanding of arts-based research that 
is explored in this article. In research through art, the artistic thinking process 
is understood as a methodological procedure in itself and the different stages 
of the creative process can be identified as distinguished methods for the devel-
opment of the research (Irwin and deCosson 2004; Sullivan 2005). If one thinks 
about the centuries-old artistic habit of writing about creative processes in per-
sonal journals or in letters shared with fellow artists, this is not a completely 
new idea. The practice has often simply been obfuscated in the academic world 
(holding some recognition perhaps only in art schools) and it is now getting 
more visibility in other fields of research as well. Other common practices 
among artists that indicate the importance of procedural development include: 
the sketchbooks that many artists develop during the creative phase of their 
work; portfolios that often highlight finalized works but that also indicate a 
certain ‘line-of-thought’ among these works; as well as the journal publications 
that invite the contribution of artist-produced texts that reflect upon creative 
processes. These practices demonstrate that creative thinking, although it may 
be chaotic and subjective, is also systematic (Sullivan 2005), and not only can it 
be incorporated in the process of research related to various fields, it is actually 
inherent to the process of developing research. However, it is usually underes-
timated and not taken into consideration as a method or a part of the method-
ology applied to research.
As already indicated, these three different understandings of arts-based 
research are not mutually exclusive, and varied forms of arts-based research can 
be identified simultaneously in different research practices. Furthermore, there 
are other authors that might define these (and other) interpretations of arts-based 
research with different concepts, indicating the multiplicity of forms in which the 
arts can be integrated into research.2
2 Sullivan (2005), for example, focuses on the practice of research in visual arts. He develops 
different sets of complex triangulations between agency, structure, and action, which work in 
connection with different levels of research practice and theory. Furthermore, he emphasizes the 
importance of the role of the artist as researcher and provides a distinction among arts-based 
research and other quantitative and qualitative methodologies, denoting the distinguished char-
acteristics of arts-based research. He does not conceptualize the visual-arts-research practice in 
the same sense as it is done in this article, but the emphasis on the processual characteristics of 
the artistic research shows a similar interpretation for it.
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2  Three Integrative Potentials of Arts-based 
Research
With these considerations about arts-based research in mind, there are some inte-
grative potentials enhanced by research through art that are emphasized in this 
section of the paper, and that can make meaningful contributions to discussions 
about the future of the study of culture and the humanities.
An example of the ‘artworld’ that initiates such reflections and makes con-
nections involving the practical and theoretical potential of arts-based research 
is The Lagoon Cycle, by Helen Mayer Harrison and Newton Harrison, more com-
monly known together as the Harrisons.3 While not the most contemporary work 
of art to emphasize in this context, nor the most contemporary work produced by 
the Harrisons, it has several important qualities that are suitable for this paper. 
Also, since it is not such a recent work, it allows the possibility for readers to find 
other references and reviews of this work that might be enriching for the devel-
opment of their own critical analyses of the integrative potentials highlighted in 
this article.4
The Harrisons are well-known environmental artists and activists, and their 
artistic research usually addresses ethical issues of the human relationship with 
the environment. The Lagoon Cycle is an examination of the processes and link-
ages between food production and watersheds along the perimeter of the Pacific 
Rim, developed by the artists in collaboration with other professionals between 
1973 and 1985 (Harrison and Harrison 1993). The ‘final product’ is a portable 
mural, which is about 100 meters long and is divided into sixty sections that show 
representations of their research in drawings, paintings, photographs, collages, 
and poems. The artistic process, however, entailed a lot more than what is per-
ceivable in this ‘final product.’ It involved many different encounters between the 
artists and the environments they investigated; performative actions; the creation 
of poetic metaphors based on processes of self-reflection about the conditions 
for life; and the production of imagined maps and poetic dialogues between two 
characters that represented the artists themselves, the Lagoon Maker (Newton) 
and the Witness (Helen) (Harrison and Harrison 1993). The artists describe the 
work as follows:
3  I would like to take this moment to respectfully acknowledge the passing of Helen Mayer Har-
rison on 24 March 2018 and express my condolences to her loved ones.
4 Notable references for the work of the Harrisons and The Lagoon Cycle are: Matilsky 1992; In-
gram 2013; and the writings of the artists themselves, many of which can be found at their official 
website: <http://theharrisonstudio.net/> [accessed: 25 July 2017].
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This 360 foot long and eight foot tall mural is an extended semi-autobiographical dialogue, 
with stories and anecdotes, plays between two characters, a ‘Lagoon Maker’ and a ‘witness’, 
and serves to establish the philosophical basis for the ecological argument in many later 
works. Beginning in Sri Lanka with an edible crab and ending in the Pacific with the green-
house effect, it seeks ever-larger frames for a consideration of survival. It looks at experi-
mental science, the marketplace and megatechnology, finally posing the question, “What 
are the conditions necessary for Survival” and concluding that it is necessary to reorient 
consciousness around a different database.  [sic]5
Furthermore, through their international recognition, which allowed them to 
expose parts of this work, accompanied by performances and manifestoes, in dif-
ferent museums, the artists managed to bring these local environmental issues to 
the attention of an international community (Matilsky 1992). In 1984, The Lagoon 
Cycle was also published in the form of a handmade book titled The Book of the 
Lagoons. The publication presents the story of the seven lagoons examined in 
The Lagoon Cycle with poems, hand-colored photographs, collages, and drawn 
imaginary maps: The First Lagoon: The Lagoon at Upouveli; The Second Lagoon: 
Sea Grant; The Third Lagoon: The House of Crabs; The Fourth Lagoon: On Mixing, 
Mapping and Territory; The Fifth Lagoon: From the Salton Sea to the Pacific; From 
the Salton Sea to the Gulf; The Sixth Lagoon: On Metaphor and Discourse; and The 
Seventh Lagoon: The Ring of Fire; The Ring of Waters.
The first integrative potential that I would like to emphasize in relation to 
this work is that there is no ‘unique’ model of the ‘ideal’ artistic research. It is 
always re-modeled according to the specifics of each case, as in many projects 
in the social sciences and the study of culture. However, in arts-based research, 
neither non-reproducibility nor errors and flaws are seen as negative aspects of 
the research process. On the contrary, they are often taken as new points of depar-
ture and knowledge creation (Sullivan 2005), enabling the artist/researcher to 
reconsider particularities and perceive the object of research from an unexpected 
point of view.
This is one of the fundamental aspects of The Lagoon Cycle. In the process of 
developing their work, the artists realized that because their perspectives were 
constantly affected by their experience, they needed to constantly reconsider the 
conceptual frames of their work:
The story concerns two characters who begin a search for a ‘hardy creature who can live 
under museum conditions’ and who are transformed by this search. The characters define 
themselves in The First Lagoon by the differences in their values and perceptions, with one 
5 Information available at the Harrisons’ website: <http://theharrisonstudio.net/the-lagoon- 
cycle- 1974-1984-2> [accessed: 25 July 2017].
The Integrative Potentials of Arts-based Research for the Study of Culture   175
naming himself Lagoon Maker and the other naming herself Witness. Both proceed to live 
up to their names although they finally surrender them as circumstances push the two char-
acters into constructing ever-larger frames for their discourse.  
 (Harrison and Harrison 1993, 371)
Furthermore, in order to be able to engage with each of the different explored 
 envi ronments in a meaningful manner and find the connections among these envi-
ronments for the larger bioregional connection, it was necessary for the artists to 
develop a renewed singular examination and expression based on the specific char-
acteristics of each particular region. Their brief description of the Fifth and Sixth 
Lagoons exemplifies this:
The Fifth Lagoon deals with the Salton Sea, which was formed by flood flow released by 
human error from canals along the Colorado River. The Sixth Lagoon treats the entire Col-
orado River basin. Lagoon Maker and Witness reflect on the insights they have gained 
through observing aquatic systems. They expand the scale of their thinking from the Salton 
Sea to the Colorado River watershed, which has been changed by lifestyles that demand 
vast amounts of electricity and irrigation.  (Harrison and Harrison 1993, 372)
One important reflection upon issues of uniqueness and universal models in 
research can be related to the concept of creativity. In the academic world, creativ-
ity is usually overestimated as a form of generating completely innovative research 
questions, methods, and/or results that should nonetheless also be reproducible 
and aim for universal applicability. However, creativity is an endless exercise of 
combining and re-combining the material of previous experiences, re-orienting 
structures of thoughts, and re-creating knowledge. In artistic research, this even 
includes ‘stealing’ forms of knowledge from other disciplines and recombining 
them in new formats without following the strict methodological structures of 
such disciplines, since the artistic research feeds from other disciplines but does 
not necessarily have to give them back a functional product.
In this sense, artistic research is a processual and unfinished form of research. 
Even if there is a ‘final product,’ there are also always infinite new ways in which 
it could be expressed, re-thought, and transformed. It does not move to enhance 
certainty or universality. On the contrary, it looks for ambiguities and different 
forms to uncover the questions that have been buried by answers.
Sensibility provides a second integrative aspect of the artistic thinking 
process, in its basis in the multisensorial experiences and imaginative capabil-
ities of the artist/researcher and the perceiver. Since there is no urgent need to 
prove or disprove any thesis, it is also open to the imagination. Its persuasive 
techniques seduce its perceivers and instigate both the perceivers and the artists 
themselves to revisit the world from a different perspective. Reimagining the 
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world and reality departing from their own sensorial experiences. This is nicely 
expressed in The Lagoon Cycle through the dialogues created between the two 
characters, the Lagoon Maker and the Witness. These dialogues involve different 
levels of imagination with the real experiences that the artists encountered in the 
explored environments, which are poetically combined and summarized in the 
symbolic metaphors of the cycle of the lagoons with the cycle of life:
For us it was a moment 
We didn’t know it had begun 
until we were already in the middle 
Then we looked forward 
And knew how it should end 
but we didn’t know how to get there 
You could as well say that knowing the ending 
we worked backward to what we must have been to begin it
as forward to what we must become to end it
I said
What would happen if I told 
the story just as it occurred
You said
How could you 
Every time we recreate the past 
it is different
I said 
Then let us reinvent ourselves
You said 
We are always doing that anyway
I said
Let’s do it publicly
You said
From one point of view or another
everything is visible and public
I said
Let us experiment with a moment
You said 
A moment may have no existence whatsoever
I said
A moment may have no boundaries and
may be expanded indefinitely
You said 
A moment is like an atom and can be exploded
I said
Then let us choose a radioactive moment
with a ten year half-life. 
        (Harrison and Harrison 1984a)
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The (self-)reflexive practice and poetic forms of expressing it can have transfor-
mative influences on individual and collective perceptions of the world and, con-
sequently, can instigate collective actions. As indicated by Sullivan:
Reflexive practice is a kind of research activity that uses different methods to work against 
existing theories and practices and offers the possibility of seeing phenomena in new ways. 
[…] a reflexive practitioner will question content and contexts as problematic situations are 
revealed within particular settings. Issues-driven inquiry of this kind not only identifies 
problems but also opens up areas whereby participants become responsive to potential 
change.  (Sullivan 2005, 110)
In some of the cases of this work of the Harrisons, the process of poetic self- 
reflection did generate practical outcomes. Through their metaphorical, poetic, 
and imaginative expression of the situation of these watersheds, they generated 
political reactions to engage in finding solutions for some of the environmental 
problems of the areas that were part of the research. Many of the Harrisons’ proj-
ects have indeed become long-term community projects (Ingram 2013). Nonethe-
less, that is not the primary goal of artistic research. The functionality of such 
research may arise in the process and generate great impacts (and that is of course 
a good thing), but the very process of artistic thinking is about finding new poetic 
forms of expressing something and not necessarily solving it.
The last potential that I want to emphasize for this article is that artistic 
research, in the sense of this example, is based on transdisciplinary collaborative 
work. That is not necessarily always the case, but it happens very often mainly 
in contemporary artistic practices. Thinking processes are developed in forms 
of collaborative works, which can instigate an integrative relation to the artis-
tic ‘products’ and slightly dissolve the sense of authorship and ownership over 
a piece of artistic expression, or over the research project itself. The process of 
thinking depends on the act of expressing it and sharing it, in order for it to gain 
meaning, and be reinterpreted and transformed. Furthermore, the experience as 
a whole becomes a meaningful exchange of knowledge between different collab-
orators in non-hierarchical forms. There is no division between the value of the 
knowledge of the artist, the local community, or the other professionals involved 
in the project.
In the case of The Lagoon Cycle, the artists developed a first-hand study 
through interviews with ecologists, biologists, and community planners of the 
specific visited areas. After that, they created photographic narratives that iden-
tified the problem, questioned the systems of beliefs (that allowed the problem to 
develop) using specific aesthetic and poetic strategies like irony and sarcasm, and 
proposed initiatives to counter the damages departing from the process of self- 
reflection and imagination expressed in the poetic dialogues (Matilsky 1992). As 
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stated by the artists themselves: “Our work begins when we perceive an anomaly 
in the environment that is the result of opposing beliefs or contradictory meta-
phors. Moments when reality no longer appears seamless and the cost of belief 
has become outrageous offer the opportunity to create new spaces – first in the 
mind and thereafter in everyday life.”6 The Harrisons actually define themselves 
as a collaborative team and try to turn their initiatives into community projects 
that can become independent of their presence:
Their work process is singular. It begins with the question, ‘How Big is Here?’ Here may be 
a street corner, as in California Wash or a sub-continent, such as Peninsula Europe. They 
only do work that is the outcome of an invitation to engage a particular place or situation. 
Typically, they agree to go to such a place to see, think, speak, research and engage a broad 
spectrum of people and groups. They will only take on a work if there is a general agree-
ment that their actual client is the environment itself. The agenda is created by the artists in 
discourse with the larger community. Thus, the Harrisons see themselves simultaneously as 
guests and co-workers. They stay only as long as the invitation continues, or until they deem 
that they have done all that is possible for them to do.7  [Italics mine]
Furthermore, they emphasize the importance of bridging different kinds of knowl-
edge among the artistic, the scientific, and the ‘popular’ spheres of human life:
The formation of ideas about complexity appears to us as a complicated process primarily 
because these ideas often do not lend themselves readily to translation into other forms of 
communication. We suspect that complexity theorists also need more grounded modes of 
comprehension. Our opinion is that if complexity science groups wish to make more com-
prehensible and concrete the imagery of complex systems, two things are necessary. First, 
ennobling issues need to be taken up directly. By ‘ennobling’ we mean envisioned actions 
that most people would accept as prima facie good to do, whether or not they believed 
they could be done. Second, we think that new language is needed that makes clear the 
juxtaposition of culture and ecology in a way that can be easily understood in the context of 
everyday discourse.  (Harrison and Harrison 2007)
Although this particular quote does not refer to The Lagoon Cycle but to a more 
recent work of the artists, Peninsula Europe, it nicely summarizes the problematic 
gap that can be very common between academic research (and not only the work 
of complexity theorists) and other dimensions of social behavior and human 
knowledge.
6 Information available at the Harrisons’ official website: <http://theharrisonstudio.net/> 
 [accessed: 25 July 2017].
7 Information available at the Harrisons’ official website: <http://theharrisonstudio.net/> 
[accessed: 25 July 2017].
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3 Concluding Remarks
This article aimed to instigate a reflection about the integrative potentials of arts-
based research for the future of the study of culture, primarily concerning meth-
odological procedures and epistemological production. For this matter, it began 
with a critical reflection about the future of the humanities, its entanglements 
with the study of culture, and the possibilities for arts-based research. It did not 
intend, however, to provide an extensive review of the current state of arts-based 
research, nor the ‘crisis’ of the humanities. There are many controversial ideas 
about the benefits for the arts (or the subversive potentials of artistic thinking 
processes) of being given academic credit and institutionalized, then suffering a 
process of ‘academic commodification’ that is counterproductive to the subver-
sive potentials and aims of artistic practice (Holert 2011). Nonetheless, this article 
aimed to highlight the benefits that the scholars in the field of the study of culture 
might have if they were to embrace some of the distinguished characteristics of 
arts-based research (in the sense of research through art mentioned above).
The article then moved to the exploration of the multiple forms in which arts-
based research can be interpreted, providing a brief description of three basic 
forms in which the arts can be integrated in research: research about, with, and 
through art. Exposing different characteristics of each of these forms of arts-
based research emphasized that they are not mutually exclusive and that differ-
ent forms of arts-based research can be identified and applied within a single 
project. The distinction among these forms of research exemplifies the different 
possibilities in thinking about arts-based research without determining any hier-
archical distinction among them. The focus was then directed to research through 
art because it is a form of research that is not commonly recognized in fields that 
are not necessarily related to the arts.
Finally, three integrative potentials of arts-based research were explored 
through the example of the artistic project The Lagoon Cycle by the Harrisons. 
The reflections about the potentials of arts-based research that emerged from spe-
cific characteristics of the work of the Harrisons were expanded to examine their 
benefits for the practice of research in a more general sense and in relation to the 
study of culture.
I would like to conclude by stating again that this article did not intend to 
deny the importance of scientific methods in research (which is not even the goal 
in artistic research); rather, it meant to indicate the ways in which the study of 
culture could benefit from such processes. The product of research in the study 
of culture is expected to meet scientific standards of verifiability, but perhaps, 
at least in the process of doing research, it would be beneficial to embrace some 
of the ambiguities, openness, and imaginative, or even utopian strategies of the 
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artistic thinking processes. Such strategies may even open the eyes of cultural 
researchers to new possibilities in their own research that they would be other-
wise unable to see because they do not fit their chosen methodological models.
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Uwe Wirth
After Hybridity: Grafting as a Model 
of Cultural Translation
“All translation,” Walter Benjamin states in his essay The Task of the Translator, 
“is only a somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of 
languages” (Benjamin 2007 [1921], 75). The notion of cultural translation as it was 
suggested by postcolonial studies in the past decades stands, as it seems, under 
the heading of a similar idea, namely coming to terms with the foreignness of 
‘other cultures.’ This is, to mention just one famous example, especially true for 
Mary Pratt’s ethnographic notion of “contact zone,” when she is stressing – quite 
similar to Benjamin – that contact zones refer to a situation in which the modali-
ties of contact are not yet determined, “where disparate cultures meet, clash, and 
grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination 
and subordination – like colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived 
out across the globe today” (Pratt 2003 [1992], 4).
Here, a second aspect comes into play, which is not about the fact of foreign-
ness but rather about the need for negotiation: Whenever the contact of different 
cultures is influenced by the circumstance that one party wishes to sell something 
to the other – whether this ‘something’ is merchandise, technology or ideology – 
the situation of cultural contact implies a translational process that adapts and 
integrates the ‘own’ to the ‘foreign’ – different traditions, different life styles, dif-
ferent world views. Peter Burke addresses this point in his book What is Cultural 
History with regard to Christian missionary attempts. Missionaries often tried to 
present their message in such a way that it would seem to be in harmony with 
the local culture. In other words, “they believed Christianity to be translatable.” 
At the same time indigenous individuals and groups in China, Japan, Mexico, 
and Africa, “who were attracted by particular items of western culture, from the 
mechanical clock to the art of perspective, have been described as ‘translating’ 
them in the sense of adapting them to their own cultures, taking them out of one 
context and inserting them into another” (Burke 2004, 121–122).
In this paper (see also Wirth 2015), I would like to understand this adapting 
and inserting with reference to the concept of grafting, and thereby differentiate 
my approach from others that conceive of cultural translation simply as a process 
of hybridization. In addition, I would like to contrast adaptation and insertion 
with two notions that have been highly problematic in the debate concerning 
transcultural relations: namely assimilation and integration. The term ‘assimi-
lation’ implies not only that one adapts to foreign ways of life – or that one gets 
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forced by others to adapt their way of life; it also implies that the self and the other 
are to be understood as identifiable, homogeneous entities. This is hinted at in 
the definition of assimilation offered by Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson in the Encyclope-
dia Judaica – according to which assimilation is a socio-cultural process
[…] in which the sense and consciousness of association with one national and cultural 
group changes to identification with another such group, so that the merged individual or 
group may partially or totally lose its original national identity.  (Ben-Sasson 2007, 605)
Three questions arise from this definition, which are, first of all: What are the impli-
cations of “original national identity” when such an identity is determined by a 
fixed cultural frame-set consisting of one language and specific national traditions?
The second question pertains to the understanding of a “merged individual”: 
to merge means ‘to incorporate,’ ‘to conglomerate,’ ‘to fuse’ – and thus refers to the 
concept of ‘hybridity.’ Robert Park pioneered the modern notion of hybridity with 
his influential essay “Human Migration and the Marginal Man,” which began with 
the premise that: “Every nation, upon examination, turns out to have been a more 
or less successful melting-pot” (Park 1928, 883). This implies both: fusions at a 
bodily- sexual level and the mixture of traditions, which Park calls “cultural hybrid” 
(Park 1928, 891). As already mentioned in the beginning: In postcolonial studies 
hybridity has become a central concept, in order to negotiate the ‘foreignness of 
the other.’ Hereby the main thesis is that the relations between different cultures 
can be described as cultural contact between bodies, languages, and worldviews of 
highly different backgrounds, whose mixture generates something new, something 
‘third’ (see Bachmann-Medick 2006, 200). The classical terms for describing this 
dynamics of fusion are, as García Canclini points out in his book Culturas Hibri-
das: creolization, synchretism, mestizaje. These fusion dynamics are personified 
by Malinche, the indigenous translator of the Spanish conqueror Cortés, who bore 
Cortés’ child to become the primordial mother of the so-called ‘mestizos.’ To this 
day she is a highly controversial figure – and of course, the term ‘mestizo’ is very 
problematic, too (see García Canclini 2005, xxxii). What seems interesting about 
Malinche, however, is that she became an allegory of all the interferences of bodily 
and conceptual aspects that cultural contacts carry with them. One could even see 
her as a protagonist in a constellation that Homi Bhabha calls colonial mimicry 
(see Bhabha 1994, 75–76): a notion that refers to situations in which the colonized 
appropriate the mixing of their own culture with that of the colonizer as a subver-
sive strategy. Here, of course, ‘mixing’ stands for the mere pretense of assimilation.
This brings a third question to the fore, which proceeds from these consider-
ations; it has to do with the relationship between assimilation and translation: To 
what extent do translation processes presuppose a ‘making similar,’ an imitation, 
an assimilation of the foreign language into one’s own language? A question that 
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extends beyond purely linguistic problems of translation, and touches upon what 
Homi Bhabha is referring to as cultural translation, basing his considerations 
on Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Task of the Translator.” Bhabha understands 
 cultural translation as a process in which we can no longer assume that there is 
something like an original self with a static identity.
In that sense there is no ‘in itself’ and ‘for itself’ within cultures, because they are always 
subject to intrinsic forms of translation. This theory of culture is close to a theory of lan-
guage, as part of a process of translations – using that word […] not in a strict linguistic 
sense of translation […], but as a motif or trope as Benjamin suggests for the activity of 
displacement within the linguistic sign.  (Bhabha 1990, 210)
According to Bhabha’s reading, translation becomes a “way of imitating […] an 
original” (Bhabha 1990, 210), in which the predominance of the original dissolves 
through the possibility of being copied and transformed, and thereby reveals a 
notion of an original “that is never finished or complete in itself. The ‘originary’ is 
always open to translation” (210). This implies a concept of the ‘original’ that does 
not appear as a homogeneous, static unit, but rather as something unfinished, as 
something still in motion. Such a conception of a constructed, non- homogeneous, 
not-yet-complete original impacts the understanding of both assimilation and 
cultural translation: The original is no longer considered an unchangeable arche-
type around which processes of adjustment and translation orient themselves; 
instead, the original itself becomes an object that changes during the translation 
process – an original in progress. Or maybe even: an original in motion.
The idea that the original itself undergoes change during the translation 
process, that it leads a life of its own and is not oriented around the principle 
of equivalence or fidelity, falls in line with Benjamin’s thoughts on the task of 
translation, namely that 
no translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for likeness to the origi-
nal. For in its afterlife – which could not be called that if it were not a transformation and a 
renewal of something living – the original undergoes change.  (Benjamin 2007 [1921], 73)
With this passage, Benjamin clearly rejects the idea of an assimilating attempt 
to achieve similarity between a translation and its original. Instead, the trans-
lation is described as a living process, which is capable of changing the original 
in the course of translation. Within this context, the question emerges how such 
a concept of translation can be applied to the different definitions of hybridity 
described above. Doing so leads to a striking realization: namely, the extent 
to which the historical semantics of translation theories has been based on 
 biological and organological metaphors. Above all, we find the image of ‘trans-
planting’ languages, which we also see in Benjamin’s work when he writes, “thus 
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translation, ironically, transplants the original into a more definitive linguistic 
realm since it can no longer be displaced by a secondary rendering” (Benjamin 
1991 [1921], 75). Apparently (and ironically) Benjamin joins here a tradition in the 
history of translation theory that sees transplantational displacements and relo-
cation as a form of translation: a tradition that engages in cultural translation.
In the following I would like to attempt to illustrate the implications of this 
engagement as it pertains to the concepts of assimilation and integration. In 
doing so, I will also show why the concept of ‘hybridity’ alone is not sufficient to 
do justice to the complexity inherent in processes of cultural translation. Indeed, 
my thesis is that we need a second concept as well, namely that of ‘grafting’ (see 
Wirth 2011a, 2014, 2017).
1  ‘Hybridity Model’ and ‘Grafting Model’ 
in the Sphere of Translation
At this point I should make plausible, why I think the concept of grafting is rel-
evant for addressing problems of translation, before I will go into some details 
about the actual notion of grafting.
In his treatise On the Different Methods of Translation Friedrich Schleier-
macher compares the task of translation to an exotic, agricultural intervention 
when he writes that the “diverse transplantation of foreign plants have made our 
soil richer and more fertile” (Schleiermacher 1973 [1813], 69, my translation). The 
decisive question is, of course, what actually happens in this translational trans-
plantation. Schleiermacher described the method of translation as a “composure 
of language that is not grown freely, but is rather bent over towards a foreign sim-
ilarity” (Schleiermacher 1973 [1813], 55, my translation). What is that supposed to 
mean? Apparently Schleiermacher refers to a form of translation that attempts, as 
accurately as possible, to “match the phrases of the original writing,” thus giving 
the reader the feeling that “they have something foreign in front of them” (Schlei-
ermacher 1973 [1813], 54, my translation). Schleiermacher’s theory thus represents 
an example of what has been called an ‘alienating translation.’ Anne Bohnen-
kamp – drawing from Mikhail Bakhtin – has suggested that this kind of transla-
tion should be classified as a “phenotypically hybrid translation” that seeks 
to mix elements of the original text and the original language in such a way that the mixture 
remains recognizably a mixture – that is, demonstrates the heterogeneity of parts. The 
antithesis naturalizing [einbürgernd] – alienating [verfremdend] would thereby be replaced 
by a model that makes not only the differences, but also the similarities of different transla-
tion processes obvious.  (Bohnenkamp 2004, 20, my translation)
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The point of this reformulation affects the linguistic surface of the translation, 
because it is obvious that from a genotypic perspective, translations are always 
‘hybrid.’ Here, the reference to Bakhtin comes into play, who analyses the interde-
pendence between “hybrid culture and hybrid literary forms” (Bakhtin 2002, 63) 
in relation to operations of “translation,” “reworking,” and “re- conceptualizing” 
(Bakhtin 2002, 377–378). According to Bakhtin, languages change historically pri-
marily by hybridization, “by means of a mixing of various ‘languages’ co-existing 
within the boundaries of a single dialect, a single national language, a single 
branch” (Bakhtin 2002, 358–359). In contrast to the non-intentional form of an, 
as Bakhtin calls it, “historical, organic, obscure language hybrid” (Bakhtin 2002, 
360), the artistic hybrid does not function as a mere melting pot, but rather as 
an arena, where different points of view on the world collide: These two points 
of view are not mixed, but “set against each other dialogically” (Bakhtin 2002, 
360). For Bakhtin, this becomes particularly obvious in parodistic novels, where 
we find intentional hybrids as “hybrid compounded of two orders,” for instance 
two contradictory styles (“low” and “high”). In these cases, Bakhtin states, “two 
‘languages’ (both intra-lingual) come together and to a certain extend are crossed 
with each other” (Bakhtin 2002, 75). In my view this is not only true for parody but 
also for translation: Translation is a process, where different styles of thinking, 
different ways of speaking, different points of view on the world collide.
This ambivalent aspect of linguistic and cultural hybrids is also an issue in 
Schleiermacher’s essay, when he writes: “who would not rather have children that 
represent the fatherly lineage purely, rather than as Blendling?” (Schleiermacher 
1973 [1813], 54, my translation). With the term “Blendling” Schleiermacher explic-
itly introduces the concept of hybridity into his theory of translation – but also a 
curious discourse of purity (see Latour 1993, 59–60). With reference to the Greek 
expression hibrida, Grimm’s Dictionary defines a Blendling as a, “bastard and her-
maphrodite in whom the pure, natural type is blurred and mixed, from humans, 
animals, and plants” (Grimm 1854, my translation). Interestingly, Schleiermacher 
shifts to another metaphorical register as soon as the “strange similarities” 
between two languages are overlaid by the cultural differences between world-
views, and the question of contamination is overshadowed by the question of 
how to make foreign styles of thought compatible. In Hermeneutics and Criticism, 
Schleiermacher states that the “Christian spirit” in the New Testament “emerges 
from a mixture of languages in which Hebrew is the root within which the new 
is originally conceived, while the Greek is grafted on to it [das Griechische aber 
aufgepfropft]” (Schleiermacher 1977 [1838], 90, my translation).
Apparently, the agricultural technique of grafting – as a form of ‘transplan-
tation’ – is used as a metaphor in which ‘transfer’ into a new syntactic context 
becomes a conceptual and linguistic ‘translation’ into a different cultural context. 
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At the same time, grafting becomes literally a model for the adaptation processes 
of foreign elements – be it language, be it thoughts, be it bodies – in which the 
‘self’ and the ‘foreign’ become connected, but do not mix. In grafted compounds 
foreign elements get naturalized but not completely assimilated, since they 
remain visible as foreign elements. At the same time, we can also read Schlei-
ermacher’s two-sided description of translation as an indication that recourse 
to a model of hybridity alone is not sufficient. Indeed, the situation surround-
ing translation seems to be characterized by the interferences and interactions 
between a model of grafting and a model of hybridity.
2  Agricultural Implications of ‘Grafting Model’ 
and ‘Hybrid Model’
At this point it is time to explain the notion of grafting in contrast to the notion 
of hybridity: Together with selective breeding, hybridizing and grafting can be 
conceived as fundamental techniques of culture (see Siegert 2011). While selective 
breeding is the purposeful strengthening and weakening of specific genetic traits 
within a biological species, hybridization is the mixing of different species. The 
crucial point of hybridization is the genetic mixing of heterogeneous elements. 
This is how the mule is generated by horse and donkey, as well as how new breeds 
of fruit trees spring from successful crossings. In contrast to hybridization, graft-
ing does not result in a genetic mixture. It is not a blending, but a binding of two 
different parts into one organic unit: a combination in a literal sense, whereby 
the bound parts remain genetically different, and that also means each com-
pound “maintains its own genetic identity” (Mudge 2009, 440), even when they 
are grown together. While hybridization follows the logic of sexual reproduction 
(and hence, the logic of sexual contact), namely: a third is made from two, grafting 
boils down to the idea: make two into one.
A look at a special issue of the Time-Life Encyclopaedia of Gardening on 
Pruning and Grafting, makes clear what the formula means:
In essence, grafting involves the wounding of two growths and the arranging of them so 
that they heal together. One of the two growths is called the stock, understock or rootstock. 
It is the host plant, rooted in the soil and providing nourishment for the other growth, the 
dependent top section, which is called the scion.  (Allen 1978, 60)
The graft is described as a “friendly parasite” (Serres 2008, 65) that grows with 
its host. This requires an accurate cut – with the help of special tools – that 
allows the injured cambium of the rootstock to come into direct contact with the 
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injured cambium of the grafted scion. Both parts are subsequently united and 
adhered with tree wax. Thus, grafting proves to not only be a botanical bricolage 
that unites foreign bodies in processes of cut and paste; it also proves to be a 
concept that pertains to a cultural technique of intervention in which the natural 
circulation of plants juices is not cut off but rather ‘rechanneled.’ At the same 
time grafting – like cloning – is a technique of copying, which aims to maintain 
the purity of a species: hundreds of scions of the same sort (perhaps even twigs 
from the same tree) are grafted onto suitable roots. The result is a fragile entity 
of heterogeneous, artificially joined, non-assimilated parts that are still organ-
ically integrated with one another. Still, such grafting requires a minimal level 
of ‘compatibility,’ which is referred to in biological terms as “vegetative affinity” 
(see Hertwig 1923, 505).
Particularly in the eighteenth century, grafting also gained a biopolitical rel-
evance (see Foucault 2004, 70): It became an economic figure of amplification, 
stressing the possibilities of maximization of natural powers, namely the quali-
tative and quantitative maximization of output. This is what we read in Zedler’s 
Encyclopedia:
Tree grafting is also called impffen, pelzen, and zweigen, and in gardening refers to the work 
through which a wild and infertile tree-trunk is combined with another that is set upon it, 
and which is improved by the broken branch of a fertile tree or the so-called graft scion. This 
is a glorious invention through which wild trees are tamed, the infertile are made fertile and 
prolific […], indeed even the color and taste of these trees is transformed and changed.  
 (Zedler 1961 [1753], 762, my translation)
Although most of these claims are – biologically speaking – false, they express 
a biopolitical ideology: by combining different parts, by creating a new element, 
the forces of nature are simultaneously deployed, enforced and controlled. Thus, 
around 1800, the making fertile, transformation, change and improvement of 
nature become codes for an attitude in which the cultural technique of grafting 
appears as a kind of governing technique. This is made especially clear in the 
encyclopedia of Diderot and D’Alembert. Under the lemma “Greffe,” grafting is 
called the “triomphe de l’art sur la nature” (D’Alembert 1757, 921), because this 
process enables one to force nature into producing new kinds of plants. This 
means that nature is modelled on culture understood as practice.1 Grafting is 
1 This also applies to hybridization, as long as this term is used to refer to crossbreeding ini-
tiated by human intervention. The best example to illustrate hybridization in this sense is the 
mule. Although a mule can result from an ‘evolutionary coincidence,’ its artificial crossbreeding 
is determined by an economic motive: A mule is more robust than a horse but less stubborn 
than a donkey. This controlled procreation implies a biopolitical concept in which hybridization 
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Fig. 1: Robert Sharrock, various methods of grafting, in: The History of the Propagation & 
Improvement of Vegetables by the Concurrence of Art and Nature, 1659, p. 59.
becomes what Foucault calls a dispositif [device] (Foucault 2004, 70). What is at stake here are 
natural resources that can be controlled and even improved by grafting or hybridization with 
the aim of economic exploitation. This is also the way to overcome the nature/culture split: The 
total, or even totalitarian economic framing of everything we refer to as nature puts nature at 
our disposal and into a ‘stand-by mode’ – what Martin Heidegger referred to as “Bereitstellung” 
[state of preparedness] (Heidegger 1967, 16). This stand-by mode is the very basis of what is called 
biopower (Foucault 1984, 257; Bertilsson 2003, 120).
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herewith ascribed the potential to transform primordial plant species into some-
thing new, and to transform by means of bringing one species into contact with a 
foreign graft scion: refinement and cultivation through ‘contact’ with other plant 
cultures. At the same time – and until today – one can observe another tendency, 
namely the metaphorical employment of the agricultural technique of grafting to 
describe the symbolic cultural technique of ‘writing’ (see Böhme 1999). Since the 
eighteenth century one finds ‘grafting’ used within the framework of poetological 
discourses as a metaphor for practices of quoting, copying, and commenting.2 
Indeed, in French, the term greffer signifies not only grafting in the sense of 
botany and surgical transplantation; the graft is also the concept for an agency of 
transcription. The “greffier” is, as we learn in the Encyclopédie, a notary scrivener 
who copies pieces of writing, registers, and archives (D’Alembert 1757, 924).
The German Romantic author Jean Paul even wrote an entire novel about 
grafting as a plagiarizing, collage-like process of text production: Leben Fibels 
(1811). The novel depicts the life of a certain Gotthelf Fibel who presents himself 
as a gifted literary writer even though he actually works as a writer in the literal 
sense: His passion is copying the Alphabet. Through a series of coincidences, he 
surprisingly succeeds in becoming famous as the author of an ABC primer (in 
German commonly called ABC-Fibel). As a consequence of his fame, a 40-volume 
biography (written by some of his employees) is published. Within the turmoil 
of the Napoleonic Wars, however, the pages of this biography disperse, and only 
fragments of the original remain – becoming part of every-day life and serving for 
various purposes such as wrapping paper or spice bags.
The premise of the story is that the editor-narrator Jean Paul attempts to 
gather and glue together these “fliegende Blätter” as “flying pages” or “loose 
leaves.” The result is a fictional cut and paste in which the titles of the individual 
chapters announce the location where the fragments are found. In the “20th or 
Pelz chapter,” we read:
This entire chapter was found in the grass of an Impf- or Pelz-garden and seems to have 
been used to bind Pelz wounds, which the reader could interpret as subtly allegorical if he 
so desired.  (Jean Paul [1811], 464)
Since “pelzen” is (as we saw in the Zedler-Article) an old-fashioned German 
synonym for ‘grafting,’ the model of grafting evoked here becomes an allegory 
for a poetics that draws the lines between original and copied writing. And there 
2 See, for instance, Shaftesbury, who describes in his Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opin-
ions, Times authors who do nothing other than to write commentary in the following way: “They 
have no original Character […]; but wait for something that may be call’d a Work, in order to graft 
upon it […] at second hand” (Shaftesbury 1711, 269).
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is more: An expert in print by the name of Master Pelz shows Fibel how one can 
imprint one’s own name on the title pages of anonymous works. Thus, the Pelz-
ing as an act of engrafted insertion becomes a gesture of appropriation as well. 
With this idea Jean Paul gives somehow advance notice to a concept that Jacques 
Derrida will call greffe citationelle. In his influential essay “Signature Event 
Context”, Derrida introduces grafting as a metaphor for the “essential iterability” 
of all sign. Due to its iterability, 
a written syntagma can always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given 
without causing it to lose all possibility of functioning, if not all possibility of ‘communi-
cating,’ precisely. One can perhaps come to recognize other possibilities by inscribing it or 
grafting it onto other chains.  (Derrida 1988, 9)
Here, grafting represents the possibility of a ‘force of rupture’ with external (his-
torical, spatial, social) contexts, but also internal, linguistic-syntagmatic con-
texts. And in this sense, as Jonathan Culler puts it, “the graft is the very figure of 
intervention” (Culler 2007, 141).
Whilst John Austin’s speech-act theory is based on the assumption that the 
process of citation results in a loss of “illocutionary force” in what is said and 
that citation is a “parasitic” form of language use (Austin 1975, 21), Derrida’s con-
ception turns grafting as a citational graft [greffe citationnelle] into a figure that 
fosters the circulation of communicative power through an act of removing and 
re-inscribing signifying bodies, that is: through an act of displacement. At the 
same time one has to admit: re-inscribing or re-inserting signs into other contexts 
is an ambivalent gesture. Especially with the act of re-integration, the differences 
between graft and rootstock are marked: The new entity emerges from heteroge-
neous, artificially combined, unassimilated parts that are forced together.
3 Implications for a Notion of Cultural Translation
Here, two aspects of the grafting model are of significant relevance for cultural 
studies: on the one hand the role of grafting as a figure for describing ambiva-
lent cultural integration and translation processes, in which the foreignness and 
difference of the translated remain visible; on the other hand the role of graft-
ing as a figure of describing political constellations marked by nonsymmetrical 
power-relations. It is in this latter sense that Max Weber speaks of “grafted social 
orders” (Weber 1988 [1918], 516) and describes the relationship between Euro-
pean and Chinese culture as a merely extrinsic grafting of foreign mentalities (see 
Weber 1986 [1920], 440). Hence, grafting turns out to be a dominant gesture of the 
Western civilizing mission, since it contains “in germ the idea of  transplanting the 
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European spirit” onto the traditions of other cultures (Acheraïou 2008, 33). Robert 
Young followed a similar line of thought in his book Colonial Desire: Hybridity in 
Theory, Culture and Race, in which he traces the political, and most centrally the 
terminological politics, of using organic metaphors to describe social forms of 
organization. The concepts of hybridity and grafting stand at the center of inter-
est, because both terms denote the phenomenon “of forcing incompatible entities 
to grow together (or not)” (Young 1995, 4).
Maybe it is time to pursue a research project that analyses all the metaphor-
ological (sensu Blumenberg) implications that models of hybridity and models of 
grafting bear (working-title could be: Graftology). The aim should be to develop a 
notion of cultural translation that is taking into account all the interactions and 
interferences between the ‘hybridity-model’ and ‘grafting-model’ – such as for 
instance the dynamics of forcing incompatible entities together, or the process 
of negotiating the modalities of how these entities come into contact. The argu-
ment could be this: As we saw in the initially quoted passage by Bhabha, the term 
‘translation’ became a trope for the “activity of displacement within the linguistic 
sign” (Bhabha 1990, 210). The term ‘displacement’ obviously signifies two things 
in this context: First, similar to the way it is employed by Derrida, it refers to 
the internal sign structure of statements and is then projected onto the external 
dynamics of sign usage. Second, ‘displacement’ stands for a political dynamic of 
‘rupture’ in which people are torn from their ‘original’ home contexts and forced 
to migrate to new contexts, ‘foreign’ to them.
In my view, such an interpretation of the concept of cultural translation dis-
plays the same dynamic as that which Derrida calls greffe citationelle: The dis-
placing ‘rupture with context’ and the grafted insertion into another context finds 
its re-entry here in form of a greffe culturelle.
At the same time some of the precarious political implications that the grafting 
model carries with it become visible: It carries traces of the state of being torn out 
and placed as a mark of cultural difference onto another, foreign context; and it 
becomes herewith a model not only for justifying the possibility of integrating signs 
and people, but also for mobilizing forces that repel migrants as ‘foreigners.’ Maybe 
one could say that grafting is a parasitic model of what Pratt calls “contact zone,” 
where disparate cultures “meet,” often in “highly asymmetrical relations of dom-
ination and subordination – like colonialism” (Pratt 2003 [1992], 4). Indeed, the 
model of grafting also implies a specific form of cultural dominance: in the context 
of colonial constellations, it gives expression to a superior position of power. It 
relegates the colonized to the role of a wild substratum that can be cultivated by 
quasi- horticultural interventions. The hybridity model, on the contrary, encounters 
this play of power with a semantics of subversion, through which an interference 
between the logic of grafting and the counter-logic of hybridity emerges.
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In consequence, a relationship of strained interference between a logic of 
hybridity and a logic of grafting arises. This interference is indicative of a highly 
complex situation similar to the situation Bruno Latour describes in his book We 
Never Have Been Modern. According to Latour, the project of modernity is initi-
ated by an ambiguous dynamic; the word ‘modern’ designates, as he points out, 
two entirely different sets of practices:
The first set of practices, by ‘translation,’ creates mixtures between entirely new types of 
beings, hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by ‘purification,’ creates two entirely 
distinct ontological zones: as for instance that of human beings on the one hand; that of 
nonhumans on the other.  (Latour 1993, 10–11)
While the “modern critical stance” (Latour 1993, 11) always tried to keep these 
two sets of practices separate, the pre- and postmodern styles of thinking have 
confused the practices of translation and purification. I would like to argue 
that this confusion can also be understood as a certain kind of interference 
between ‘hybridity-model’ and ‘grafting-model.’ Since in grafting the com-
bined genetic elements are not altered, it is an operation to produce a ‘pure 
copy’ – the concept of combining different bodies is connected to an emphasis 
on the genetic difference of the elements. Hence, grafting stands for a strategy 
of purification. In hybridization, on the other hand, the genetic differences are 
overridden by ‘crossing’ and ‘translation.’ But the most interesting aspect is, 
I would like to suggest, the style of confusion between ‘hybridity-model’ and 
‘grafting-model.’
In Homer’s Iliad we find a famous description of a hybrid called chimera: Its 
front part is that of a lion, the back is that of a dragon and in the middle it is a goat. 
In a chimera, apparently, the style of confusion between logic of grafting and 
logic of hybridization is significant: The connected parts are not represented as 
mixed together, but as placed together: a phantasmagorical cut and paste. To put 
it in another way: Maybe fairytale creatures, monsters like chimeras or centaurs, 
are figurations of hybridity represented in the representational mode of grafting. 
Today, we have become aware again of such phantasmagorical and monstrous 
creatures (see Paré 1841, 23), which raise the question of the borders and limits of 
the human body in the context of biopolitical ideologies. For instance, we have 
representations of a chimera-like combination of human and machine – think of 
the movie Robocop (1987) – and maybe our high-tech culture is a culture in which 
the hybridization of machines and organisms is becoming a normality. Taking 
into consideration the various possibilities of using prostheses or of transplan-
tation medicine (see Hamilton et al. 2012), we find ourselves, as Donna Haraway 
stated in her “Cyborg Manifesto,” “to be cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, chimeras” 
(Haraway 1991, 177).
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In fact, the various modes and styles of confusing grafting-model with 
hybridity- model are quite puzzling, since it is by no means clear why and when 
they occur – maybe they indicate situations similar to what Hans Blumenberg 
called “Logical Embarrassment” [Logische Verlegenheit] (Blumenberg, 2005 
[1960], 10). It is very often literature that becomes the playground where the con-
sequences of these logical embarrassing confusions between grafting and hybrid-
ity are represented and negotiated. Just to mention one example, well known in 
postcolonial studies: In Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988), the relation 
between graft and hybrid is re-negotiated in a very obvious way. It is not only 
that the “genetic possibility of centaurs was being seriously discussed” (Rushdie 
1988, 467); on another occasion we even find the confusion of graft and hybrid 
as a keyword. One of the protagonists, Otto Cone, a Polish Jew who immigrated 
to England after he survived Nazi-Concentration Camps, tries to assimilate to his 
new home-land: not only by changing the family name from Cohen to Cone, but 
also by starting to adapt to one of the most popular hobbies in England: garden-
ing. Rushdie chooses to let a tree become the symbol of Otto’s wish to assimilate 
in an “incompatible world” (Rushdie 1988, 471):
After Otto’s death Alicja […] planted vegetables in what Otto had insisted should be an 
English floral garden (neat flowerbeds around the central, symbolic tree, a ‘chimeran graft’ 
of laburnum and broom).  (Rushdie 1988, 476)
Apparently, for Rushdie the “chimeran graft” also becomes a metaphor for the 
paradoxes and logical embarrassments of cultural translation. The crossing of 
laburnum and broom implies a special kind of cultural contact taking place 
‘in-between’ the logics of graft and hybrid. At the same time, it transposes and 
translates two central horticultural – and biological – questions of the nineteenth 
century into twentieth century discourse about assimilation, integration, and 
intercultural contact.
When Charles Darwin was dealing with the problem of explaining the phys-
iological processes involved in heredity and reproduction in his book The Varia-
tion of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1886), he chose the Laburnum 
Adamii as an example of the rather puzzling phenomenon of transition: “Mr. 
Adam inserted in the usual manner a shield of the bark of C. purpureus into a 
stock of C. laburnum; and the bud lay dormant, as often happens, for a year” 
(Darwin, 1886, 390). In other words, Adam practiced a certain technique of graft-
ing, called oculation.
If we admit as true Mr. Adam’s account, we must admit the extraordinary fact that two dis-
tinct species can unite by their cellular tissue, and subsequently produce a plant bearing 
leaves and sterile flowers intermediate in character between the scion and stock, and 
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 producing buds liable to reversion; in short, resembling in every important respect a hybrid 
formed in the ordinary way by seminal reproduction. Such plants, if really thus formed, 
might be called graft-hybrids.  (Darwin 1886, 390)
For Darwin, graft-hybrids point to an extraordinary fact. Between grafts and 
hybrids there are intermediary forms: figures not only of transition, but of what 
I suggest can be called translation, to which both the formulas two into one and 
two into three apply. In Rushdie’s text, the graft-chimera (a term that in biology is 
still used synonymously with graft-hybrid) becomes a model for the connection 
of multiple parts of different origin. It not only stands for the “body eclectic” in 
an “incompatible world” (Rushdie 1988, 647), but also represents the condition of 
an all-encompassing ‘in-betweenness.’ In both cases – Darwin and Rushdie – the 
graft-hybrid functions as the ambiguous figuration of a classificatory undecid-
ability. It incorporates and embodies the condition of ‘in-between,’ being subject 
exclusively neither to a logic of grafting nor to a logic of hybridization. This con-
dition questions the plausibility of the dichotomy of grafting and hybridization 
and, at the same time, marks an ambiguous situation that configures not only 
the split between nature and culture but also the gap between one culture and 
another.
4 Cultural Translation
Against the backdrop of what was said so far, I would like to come back to Schlei-
ermacher and pose the question what it means when he describes the act of trans-
lation as a “transplantation of foreign plants” that “have made our soil richer 
and more fertile” (Schleiermacher 1973 [1813], 69). In my view it is noteworthy 
that Schleiermacher did not introduce this motif of reciprocal influence between 
foreign plants and native ground in the sense of a concept of terroire in which 
the ground influences the plant through the roots. Instead, his conception is 
reversed: The ground is influenced by the plant. This is an opposing model to 
the concept of originality made prominent by the European genius-aesthetic as 
proposed by Edward Young. In his 1759 work Conjectures on Original Composition, 
Young makes the assumption that the original is rooted in the fertile ground of a 
natural genius: “an Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spon-
taneously from the vital root of Genius” (Young 1759, 12). In contrast, the imitator 
appears as a, “transplanter of Laurels, which sometimes die on removal, always 
languish in a foreign soil” (Young 1759, 10). In other words: The process of copying 
and imitation is described here as transplantation to new ground, which leads the 
transplanted plant to become weaker.
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There is a third possibility to reformulate the problematic relationship 
between assimilation and transplantation, namely with recourse to a concept of 
originality that uses botanical metaphors without paying homage to the idea of a 
homogeneous primitive nature as found in Young’s writings. Such a concept can 
be found in Herder’s Fragments on Recent German Literature (1768), where he first 
writes, following Young, that, “every book is a bed of flowers and growths; every 
language an immeasurable garden of plants and trees” (Herder 1985 [1868], 552, 
my translation). Shortly after this, however, Herder provides a totally different 
kind of linguistically critical summary when he – in contrast to Schleiermacher – 
strikes rather xenophobic tones while remaining in the garden paradigm:
Which revolutions did the German language undergo, partially within its own nature 
and partially through the admixture of foreign languages and ways of thinking in order 
to change its mind while its body remained the same? How full is the language taught in 
foreign colonies [fremde Kolonien], which have taken on German dress, German civil rights, 
and German habits? How many foreign branches have been grafted onto the tree-trunk of 
our literature – how they are on the trunk where it is not degenerated, but rather changed 
and often refined?  (Herder 1985 [1868], 567, my translation)
The question is, of course, what Herder meant when he used the term ‘foreign 
colonies.’ I would like to suggest that this expression is referring to the so-called 
Antiqua-Fraktur-dispute. In my view it is an allusion to the typographical con-
vention of printing all foreign words in Antiqua, while the German text was 
printed in Fraktur. According to this convention, the difference between Antiqua 
and Fraktur becomes a cipher for ostentatious non-assimilation: Foreign words 
remain foreign within a field of native Fraktur script (see Wehde 2000, 216). At the 
same time, foreign words also represent an externalized ‘foreign similarity’ that 
forms the basis of Schleiermacher’s concept of an alienating translation.
But if foreign words are ‘colonies’ that are marked as ‘foreign words’ by a 
different typographical form (Antiqua), then don’t the German words written 
in Fraktur take on the systematic position of an indigenous people? And when 
Herder claims that foreign colonies have taken on “German dress, German cit-
izenship, and German customs,” then the formulation “German citizenship” 
obviously plays with the possibility of a naturalizing form of translation. The 
naturalization of a foreign word, the translational adoption of a ‘foreign similar-
ity,’ appears here as a form of colonial mimicry within the framework of written 
culture: on the one hand, an assimilation of the typographical dress-code; on the 
other hand, a linguistic assimilation of foreign words with regards to ‘German 
grammar.’ In this respect, Herder’s metaphorical reference to foreign colonies 
points to the sensitive political problem of linguistic incorporation that remark-
ably parallels the so-called ‘integration debate’ seen in Germany today.
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Fig. 2: Page from Herder’s Fragmenten über die neueste deutsche Literatur (1768) 
(Third Collection).
What I find most remarkable about Herder’s writing, though, is that despite 
the somewhat lachrymose tone with which he first characterizes the German 
language as an entity that has been grafted together, he also recognizes that the 
“original, peculiar” nature of the national language is a result of exactly this 
historical grafting: a language that, as he puts it, “is as it is, after its branches 
have been trimmed and transplanted, with all of its grafted foreign twigs, but still 
standing as a self-grown tree-trunk, injured but not dismembered by bare hands” 
(Herder 1985 [1768], 571, my translation). To the extent that around 1800 (but also 
for the remainder of the nineteenth century) language as ‘national language’ con-
stituted the definitive point of reference for what was described above as  “original 
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national identity” (Ben-Sasson 2007, 605), Herder describes in this passage a 
conception of national language in which originality and grafted-togetherness 
interfere with one another. The national language that has been grown on native 
soil proves to be a pieced together entity, namely a grafted together language tree 
that is remarkably unstable and incomplete – and remains, “never finished or 
complete in itself” (Bhabha 1990, 210). National language, thus, appears to be 
an ‘original in motion’ that becomes ‘an original’ as soon as it is grafted together 
with linguistic branches from other cultures.
5 Conclusion
I would like to conclude by claiming that grafting should be considered to be an 
indispensible component of any model of culture in which national identity and 
originality are no longer considered to be paradigms of homogeneous purity, but 
rather as always unfinished modes of being assembled. This ‘being assembled’ 
is, as I tried to make plausible, to be understood not only as a hybrid mixture 
but also as a grafted combination. This also implies a new conceptualization of 
‘cultural translation,’ which stands at a point of tension between hybridity and 
grafting. This has two consequences:
Firstly, grafting is a model for the process of cultural translation in the sense 
of the transplantation of branches of language.
Secondly, the grafted tree becomes a model for an original in motion.
This view gets support from a rather unexpected side: In his book Word and 
Object, the analytical philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine raised the question 
of how processes of understanding can be conceived of as processes of transla-
tion. In trying to answer this question, he draws from an eminently botanical 
register in the beginning of his investigation, when he writes:
Different persons growing up in the same language are like different bushes trimmed 
and trained to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of twigs and 
branches will fulfill the elephantine form differently from bush to bush, but the overall 
outward results are alike.  (Quine 1960, 7)
What is quite surprising in this context is the strange interference between a 
natural rootedness of language on the one hand, and its cultural formation via 
gardening interventions on the other hand. It seems that Quine introduces a ruth-
less French gardener who trims the flora until it can be used for the presentation 
of fauna (a colonial fauna, by the way).
There is a second passage in which a botanical register is employed; a passage 
in which the problem of cultural translation is explicitly addressed – more spe-
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cifically, it addresses a situation of cultural contact in which one does not under-
stand the language of the other at all. In order to assign meaning to words of a 
foreign, unknown language, we need, as Quine calls it, a “radical interpretation” 
that begins with the positing of analytical hypotheses about possible meanings:
The method of analytical hypotheses is a way of catapulting oneself into the jungle lan-
guage by the momentum of the home language. It is a way of grafting exotic shoots on to the 
old familiar bush […] until only the exotic meets the eye.  (Quine 1960, 69)
I wonder, how this metaphor relates to the translation theories of Schleier-
macher, Herder, and Benjamin (but, of course, also to the theories of Bakhtin 
and Derrida). Is the “old familiar bush” possibly understandable as a functional 
analogy for the “self-grown tree-trunk” of Herder upon which one has grafted all 
sorts of “foreign twigs”? 
If this were the case, what would the poem of Yoko Tawada, which appeared in 
her book Abenteuer der deutschen Grammatik, [Adventures of German Grammar] 
mean?
Fig. 3: “Die Flucht des Mondes“ by Yoko Tawada from: Abenteuer der deutschen Grammatik, p.41.
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A poem which, as she writes in a comment, is the transcription of the translation 
of her poem “Flight of the Moon” – written according to the same method that is 
used when combining Japanese and Chinese ideograms and phonetic transcrip-
tions.
In order to write Japanese, one must write the roots of the meanings with Chinese ideograms 
and everything else (hands and feet of words) with a phonetic script. The poem shows that 
one can also write German with this mixing method.  (Tawada 2000, 41)
Here, the foreign colonies are no longer foreign words typeset in Antiqua that 
stand out against the Fraktur of ‘native words.’ The foreign colonies are now 
Chinese ideograms that are combined with German phonetic transcriptions 
according to the Japanese method of mobilizing foreign typographical charac-
ters. This is a conceptual and bodily form of the transplantation of characters 
that aims to bring them into an adventurous grammatical situation of a ‘ grafted- 
script-culture-contact,’ and at the same time gives birth to a model of cultural 
translation adapting and inserting the elements of a foreign language as a ‘graft.’
References
Acheraïou, Amar. Rethinking Postcolonialism: Colonialist Discourse in Modern Literatures and 
the Legacy of Classical Writers. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Allen, Oliver. Pruning and Grafting: The Time-Life Encyclopedia of Gardening. New York: Holt, 
1978.
Austin, John L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975 [1962].
Bachmann-Medick, Doris. Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften. 
Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2006.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2002.
Benjamin, Walter. “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers.” Gesammelte Schriften IV.1. (Kleine Prosa, 
Baudelaire Übertragungen). Ed. Tillman Rexroth. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991 [1921]. 
9–21.
Benjamin, Walter. “The Task of the Translator.” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry 
Zohn. New York: Schocken, 2007 [1921]. 69–82.
Ben-Sasson, Haim, et al. “Assimilation.” Encyclopedia Judaica. Ed. Fred Skolnik and Michael 
Berenbaum. Farmington Hill: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 605–613.
Bertilsson, Thora. “The Social as Trans-Genic: On Bio-Power and Its Implications for the Social.” 
Acta Sociologica: The Knowledge Society 46.2 (2003): 118–131.
Bhabha, Homi. “The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha.” Identity: Community, Culture, 
Difference. Ed. Jonathan Rutherford. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990. 207–221.
Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. London/New York: Routledge, 1994.
Blumenberg, Hans. Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie. 3rd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
2005 [1960].
After Hybridity: Grafting as a Model of Cultural Translation   201
Böhme, Hartmut. “Vom Cultus zur Kultur(wissenschaft). Zur historischen Semantik des Kultur-
begriffs.” Literaturwissenschaft – Kulturwissenschaft: Positionen, Themen, Perspektiven. 
Eds. Renate Glaser and Matthias Luserke. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999. 48–68.
Bohnenkamp, Anne. “Hybrid statt verfremdend? Überlegungen zu einem Topos der Überset-
zungstheorie.” Linguistische Aspekte der Übersetzungswissenschaft. Eds. Peter 
Colliander, Doris Hansen, and Ingeborg Zint-Dyhr. Tübingen: Julius Groos, 2004. 9–26.
Burke, Peter. What is Cultural History? Cambridge: Polity, 2004.
Culler, Jonathan. On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2007 [1982].
D’Alembert, Jean Le Rond, and Denis Diderot, eds. Lemma “Greffe.” Encyclopédie. Vol. 7. Paris: 
Briasson, 1757. 921–924.
Darwin, Charles. The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication. London: John 
Murray, 1868.
Derrida, Jacques. “Signature Event Context.” Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988 [1972]. 1–23.
Foucault, Michel. The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
Foucault, Michel. Naissance de la Biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France. 1978–1979. 
Paris: Seuil, 2004.
García Canclini, Néstor. Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity. 
Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Giuriato, Davide. “‘Blendlinge.’ Zur Theorie der Übersetzung bei Friedrich Schleiermacher.” 
Impfen, Pfropfen, Transplantieren. Ed. Uwe Wirth. Berlin: Kadmos, 2011. 121–134.
Grimm, Jacob, and Wilhelm Grimm. Deutsches Wörterbuch. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854–1971.
Hamilton, David, Clyde Barker, and Thomas Starzl, eds. A History of Organ Transplantation: 
Ancient Legends to Modern Practice. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012.
Haraway, Donna. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century.” Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. Ed. Donna 
Haraway. New York: Routledge, 1991 [1985]. 149–181.
Heidegger, Martin. “Die Frage nach der Technik.” Vorträge und Aufsätze. Ed. Martin Heidegger. 
Tübingen: Neske, 1967 [1953]. 5–36.
Herder, Johann Gottfried. “Über die neuere deutsche Literatur. Fragmente. Erste Sammlung. Zweite 
völlig umgearbeitete Ausgabe.” Werke in zehn Bänden. Vol. 1 (Frühe Schriften 1764–1772). 
Ed. Ulrich Gaier. Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985 [1768]. 541–650.
Hertwig, Oskar. Allgemeine Biologie. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923 [1906].
Latour, Bruno: “Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together.” Knowledge and 
Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present. Ed. Henrika Kuklick. Oxford: 
JAI Press, 1986. 1–40.
Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Ed. and transl. Cathrine Porter. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993.
Mudge, Ken, Jules Janick, Steven Scofield, and Eliezer E. Goldschmidt. “A History of Grafting.” 
Horticultural Reviews 35 (2009): 437–493.
Paré, Ambroise. Œuvres Complètes d’Ambroise Paré. III. Paris: Baillière, 1841 [1573].
Park, Robert E. “Human Migration and the Marginal Man.” American Journal of Sociology 
33.6 (1928): 881–893.
Paul, Jean. Leben Fibels. Werke in zwölf Bänden. Vol. 11. Ed. Norbert Miller, Munich: Hanser, 
1975.
202   Uwe Wirth
Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. 2nd ed. 
London: Routledge, 2003.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960.
Rushdie, Salman. The Satanic Verses. New York: Penguin, 1988.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. “Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens.” Das Problem 
des Übersetzens. Ed. Hans Joachim Störig. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 1973 [1813]. 38–69.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Hermeneutik und Kritik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1977 [1833].
Serres, Michel. Der Parasit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2008.
Shaftesbury, Anthony. Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Treatise VI. 
London: Printed by John Darby, 1711.
Sharrock, Robert. The History of the Propagation & Improvement of Vegetables by the 
Concurrence of Art and Nature. Oxford: Lichfield 1659.
Siegert, Bernhard. “Kulturtechnik.” Einführung in die Kulturwissenschaft. Eds. Harun Maye and 
Leander Scholz. Munich: Fink, 2011. 95–118.
Tawada, Yoko. Abenteuer der deutschen Grammatik. Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag, 2000.
Weber, Max. “Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen.” Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-
soziologie. Ed. Max Weber. Tübingen: Mohr, 1986 [1920]. 238–442.
Weber, Max. “Der Sozialismus.” Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik. Ed. Max 
Weber. Tübingen: Mohr, 1988 [1918]. 492–517.
Wehde, Susanne. Typographische Kultur. Eine zeichentheoretische Studie zur Typographie und 
ihrer Entwicklung. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000.
Wirth, Uwe. “Gepfropfte Theorie. Eine ‘greffologische’ Kritik von Hybriditätskonzepten als 
Beschreibung von intermedialen und interkulturellen Beziehungen.” TheorieTheorie. 
Wider die Methodenmüdigkeit in den Geisteswissenschaften. Eds. Mario Grizelj and Oliver 
Jahraus. Paderborn: Fink, 2011a. 151–166.
Wirth, Uwe. “Kultur als Pfropfung. Pfropfung als Kulturmodell. Prolegomena zu einer 
Allgemeinen Greffologie (2.0).” Impfen, Pfropfen, Transplantieren. Ed. Uwe Wirth. Berlin: 
Kadmos, 2011b. 9–27.
Wirth, Uwe. “Between Hybrid and Graft.” From Literature to Cultural Literacy. Eds. Naomi Segal 
and Daniela Koleva. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 232–249.
Wirth, Uwe. “Pfropfung als Kulturkontakt.” Kulturkontakte. Szenen und Modelle in 
deutsch-japanischen Kontexten. Eds. Yuichi Kimura and Thomas Pekar. Bielefeld: 
transcript 2015. 29–48.
Wirth, Uwe. “Poetisches Paperwork. Pfropfung und Collage im Spannungsfeld von Cut and 
Paste.” Paperworks. Literarische und kulturelle Praktiken mit Schere, Leim, Papier. Eds. 
Magnus Wieland and Irmgard Wirtz. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2017. 7–29.
Young, Edward. Conjectures on Original Composition. London: A. Millar; R. & J. Dodsley, 1759.
Young, Robert J. C. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London/New York: 
Routledge, 1995.
Zedler, Johann Heinrich, ed. Großes vollständiges Universal-Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und 
Künste, welche bißhero durch menschlichen Verstand und Witz erfunden und verbessert 
worden. Vol. 3. Graz: Akad. Dr.- u. Verl.-Anst., 1961 [1753].
 Open Access. © 2020 Dirk van Laak, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110669398-013
Dirk van Laak
Liquid Spaces in Modern Historiography
It is astonishing how much the ranges and spaces of history have changed and 
extended in the past generation of historical research. In what follows I will 
present, and attempt to explain, some key categories of recent historical writing 
in ‘the West.’ In hindsight, they document a tendency toward spatial concepts and 
disciplinary boundaries becoming more and more liquid. These are, in order of their 
appearance: the history of everyday life, the comparative history of nations, inter-
national history, history of international organizations, history of globalization, 
colonial history, transnational history, entangled history, global history, universal 
history, area studies, glocalization, and finally big history. My discussion will be 
conducted from a Central European viewpoint, and, I admit, this may narrow or 
confine my scope. To conclude, I will add some observations about the intersec-
tions of general and cultural histories, and will dare to look upon what appears to 
be relevant in the near future with regard to methodology and to contents.
1 Histories Going Global
When, in the early 1980s, I began to study the science of history, the specter of 
the Cold War still lingered. It was marked by an immobile, almost static concep-
tion of time, and an apparent distinctness of spatial borderlines and ideological 
frontiers (Leffler and Westad 2010). Germany was divided into separate political 
systems, and East- and West-German historians were primarily concerned about 
their respective national backgrounds, researching their own pasts and their 
liberal or socialist traditions. Historical interest tended to focus more on smaller 
sections of the German society and minor units of national spaces: The order of 
the day was the history of everyday life, granting common people their share in 
suffering, and in the shaping of history.
In this historical examination of one’s local region, city, neighborhood, 
or workplace, many amateur and professional researchers discovered – not to 
everybody’s surprise – that women had also participated in history, as did people 
beyond the ruling or propertied classes, members of minorities, and outsiders. 
In these years, it seemed that anything concrete and exemplary for a distinct 
historical place, person, or case study roused public interest. Little was changed 
concerning national boundaries in the 1980s, but historical spaces were opened 
up in a more and more refined way, zooming into smaller levels of investigation.
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While a few methodological suggestions from beyond national borders were 
taken up and incorporated into German research strategies during the 1980s – 
for instance, the history of everyday life or from below came from Sweden or the 
United States, France, Italy, or Great Britain (van Laak 2003) – German histori-
cal research of that era still remained largely within national confines. Very few 
German historians actually followed the history of international relations and 
even fewer were interested in world history, which, rather, was assessed a special 
interest of eccentrics. In the later 1980s, a long-lasting dispute among German his-
torians was staged as to the legitimacy of comparing National Socialism to Stalin-
ism. For different reasons, many renowned representatives of the historians’ guild 
rejected the acceptability and logic of such comparisons (see Augstein 1987).
This, however, changed in the years following the dramatic upheaval of 
1989–90. When the wall between East and West Germany came down, I was at 
home studying for my final exams at the university. Accordingly, I paid very little 
attention to the epic events taking place in Berlin and elsewhere: Even histori-
ans are not always aware of history as it actually happens. My academic thesis 
was devoted to certain aspects of German fascism and to the persecution of the 
German Jews, and it was exemplified by the cities in which I had grown up. In my 
ensuing dissertation, which was again dedicated to an aspect of German history 
but also went beyond a German setting, I turned my attention to a broader scope, 
focusing on a law professor who was famous throughout Europe, the United 
States, and even Japan (van Laak 1993). My first professional position at a univer-
sity led me to Jena, a city that prior to 1989 had existed under the socialist system. 
In Jena, I gathered many experiences and gained insights on what the dissolv-
ing of borderlines entails: for instance, how this leads to cultural amalgamations 
and hybrids, but also to new kinds of social segregation. Seen from today’s per-
spective, what happened in Jena was something like a transnational integration 
within a national framework.
For a certain period during the early 1990s, people tended to believe that the 
fatal history of the twentieth century – with all its brutal wars and ideological 
confrontation – would come to a definite end, and expected that an era would 
arise in which nations and states would cooperate peacefully, and would not 
challenge existing borders. The concept of the nation-state and its associated 
nationalism was rarely questioned even by historians, although they already 
had recognized that since the eighteenth century, national traditions had often 
been invented from close to scratch (Gellner 1983). More and more historians did, 
however, embark upon comparing with each other the histories of nations as they 
had established since the nineteenth century (Kaelble 1999).
For the “age of extremes” – that is, the short twentieth century, as Eric 
Hobsbawm labeled it – it actually did make sense to compare national histories 
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(Hobsbawm 1995). In 1989–90, a distinct era appeared to reach its conclusion, and 
was in anticipation of becoming historicized. During my working years in Jena, 
I witnessed many historical myths of the former German Democratic Republic 
being challenged and liquefied (see, for instance, Niethammer 1995). Those who 
had to adapt to the Western political and economic system constantly compared 
the histories of East and West Germany (Kleßmann, Misselwitz, and Wichert 
1999). When they asked what had kept the histories of both societies together 
despite more than 40 years of separation, the answer turned out to be much more 
than many analysts initially believed (Wengst and Wentker 2008). Additionally, 
during the 1990s, the European (Economic) Community – which since the 1950s 
had evolved and developed rather slowly – suddenly expanded vigorously. Fol-
lowing the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the European Union was established, 
and was quickly implemented by many (East-)European countries (Loth 2014). 
However this process is evaluated in detail, Europeans were quite amazed to 
learn about and actually experience falling borders, more freedom and mobil-
ity, and formerly separated societies moving closer together. In the formation of 
the European Union, Europeans came to understand that they shared political 
and economic interests with countries that previously had appeared quite distant 
and inaccessible. Together with immigration from very different countries – and 
influences from postcolonial thought (Said 1978, 1993) – this generated disputes 
on how to deal with and encompass cultural differences. It would be mislead-
ing, though, to state that Germans, Spaniards, or Italians of today are exceed-
ingly interested in neighboring countries or their histories: this is just the case for 
selected people. But no European citizen can dismiss the fact that more Germans, 
Spaniards, and Italians travel to their respective countries than ever before, that 
work migration is rising, and that there now exists a soaring interdependence in 
economic and administrative systems.
Nevertheless, in European countries the prevailing concepts of history still 
follow national orientations and confines. This path dependency is due to the 
fact that modern historiography came along with and was marked by the creation 
of nation states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Conrad and Conrad 
2002; Duchhardt 2006; Berger 2007; Carvalho and Gemenne 2009). The writing 
of history was even seen as a kind of auxiliary science of building up a nation 
state, and establishing grand national narratives effectively contributed to the 
creation of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983) and “invented traditions” 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). Largely for this reason, many politicians and his-
torians of today still pretend nation states to be something like the principal unit 
of history, based on a clear-cut territory, an integrated language and culture, and, 
last but not least, an ethnically coherent population (Smith 2001; Wehler 2011).
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However, with the possible exception of isolated locations like Iceland, such 
consistency in a nation has never existed in history. Rather, it was the other 
way around: Attempts to unite all of these factors into unique and independent 
national bodies must be ranked among the most violent aspects of recent history. 
Such efforts have led to forceful relocations of borders, to the displacement of 
peoples, to absurd actions like ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and subsequently to much suf-
fering. Recent research has quite bluntly revealed just how the idea of the nation 
state, and also the purported ‘right of self-determination’ proclaimed after World 
War I, would entail a lot of very violent outcomes (Manela 2007).
It is almost a natural consequence that the 1990s sparked renewed interest in 
international history in its classic sense, a history of international relations. The 
clear frontiers of the global Cold War had dissolved and were replaced by a situa-
tion that longed for the analysis and explanation that history could provide (Loth 
and Osterhammel 2000). Why, for instance, did a country like Yugoslavia split, 
break down so violently, and sink into war, in a process that Europe – luckily – 
had not seen for more than 50 years? The international situation changed fun-
damentally, not just for Europeans or the dissolving Eastern and Western Blocs, 
but for the countries in the Global South as well. Before decolonization, Eastern 
and Western Blocs had courted them for a generation; now, they were almost 
left alone to subsequently pursue a status of being non-aligned (Prashad 2008; 
Westad 2007; Sluga 2013). International history predominantly revolves around 
conflicts and cooperation among nation states, but during the 1990s it was faced 
with a historically incomparable situation. So, in the end, it could not really con-
tribute much to our understanding, and it experienced just a temporary boom.
For the modern phenomenon of internationalism this was different. Inter-
nationalism was mainly rooted in the nineteenth century and was sparked 
anew by the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. What is not meant here 
are political movements like communism or socialism. Internationalism as it is 
understood here was marked by the realization in the nineteenth century that 
increasing technology, science, travel, and exchange of goods had a tendency 
to integrate mankind, and that there should be people or agents to organize and 
moderate this process in a peacekeeping and humanitarian direction (Geyer and 
Paulmann 2001). Institutions like the International Red Cross, the International 
Postal Union, news agencies like Reuters or Agence France Press, or initiatives to 
implement a common international language like Esperanto or Volapük were par-
ticularly persuasive. Compared to the often-ostensible actions of statesmen and 
politicians, their activities were indeed obscured and disregarded by historians 
for too long (Gorman 2012; Housden 2012; Löhr and Wenzlhuemer 2013). After the 
Cold War’s demise it became more and more evident that the security and stabil-
ity of the international order was fundamentally based on and depended upon 
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shared international interests, and these agencies of international cooperation 
have exactly promoted that for many decades (Schot and Lagendijk 2008; Bade-
noch and Fickers 2010). Consequently, the history of internationalism, of human 
rights, of the international fights against slavery, against epidemics, or for the 
protection of the environment presently ranks among the most vivid and expand-
ing branches of historical research. Part of it is the history of international organi-
zations, which are neither engaged nor authorized by governments. Instead, they 
act as independent individuals or agencies beyond and across national borders, 
e.g. technical or scientific associations or international conferences, which took 
place to exchange and coordinate knowledge internationally (Iryie 2002; Herren 
2009; MacKenzie 2010).
This renewed interest in internationalism was accompanied by a history of 
globalization. In dictionaries, the term ‘globalization’ emerged not earlier than 
during the 1960s to denote processes that before had been characterized as ‘world 
politics,’ ‘world interior policy,’ ‘internationalization,’ ‘one world,’ or equiva-
lents.1 The history of globalization addresses actions and endeavors to progres-
sively entangle nations, regions, or continents that had previously lived in a more 
separated state. This is first of all a history of travelers, discoverers, and explor-
ers, mainly in parts of the world that until then were foreign and unknown; it is 
a history of collecting things and knowledge about places and people that Euro-
peans often assessed as ‘exotic’ (Pratt 1992; Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox, and Zantop 
1998). On another level, the history of globalization is a story of the intensified 
exchange of people, goods, ideas, and information across existing or imagined 
borders. It is a history of economic, political, and cultural transfers, a history of 
creative adaptation, adoption, and interaction, and also a history of backlashes 
within those groups of people that have initiated all this (Stuchtey 2004; Raj 
2007). The history of globalization identifies periods in which these processes of 
entanglement and interaction tremendously accelerated – for example, the late 
nineteenth century – and periods in which such an exchange stagnated or even 
decreased, like in the Interwar years or during Cold War years with respect to the 
‘Iron Curtain.’ 
The history of globalization raises questions concerning the causes, the 
ranges, and the effects of networks and interconnectedness. It is world history 
in a specific sense; it takes its point of departure from the matter of fact that the 
globe of today is interconnected, and it asks how, historically, this came into 
reality (Mattelard 2000). Following a definition by Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels 
1 The term ‘global village’ was coined by Marshall McLuhan 1964.
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Petersson, it is concerned with the “expansion, consolidation and speeding-up of 
global connections” (Osterhammel and Petersson 2003, 10).
Social protest and critique provided a major stimulus for taking up and 
further developing this perspective. The obvious power of globalization in par-
ticular – which often appears to be irresistible, subordinating individuals or even 
governments – provoked questions on who or which power actually was behind 
all of this. Since Karl Marx, this was often answered by pointing at internation-
ally operating business interests or trusts, to multinational banks or enterprises, 
which allegedly sought financial benefits and left behind their loyalty to home 
countries as well as social responsibilities (Barber 1995; Winseck and Pike 2007). 
I will not decide here whether or not that is true, but I will point out that there is 
a relatively new and telling differentiation being made often in recent historiog-
raphy, which is the distinction between winners and losers of globalization. To 
highlight effects like these only makes sense, however, if one understands global-
ization as a process that is manmade, and that is neither natural nor irreversible.
Returning to myself again here: In my academic career, I have approached 
global questions like many others did, addressing a specific aspect of global 
entanglement in turning towards colonial history (van Laak 2004). For a long 
time, in Germany it had almost been forgotten that from 1884 to 1914 the German 
Empire had ‘possessed’ a range of colonies in Africa and in the Southern Pacific. 
Colonial history is a part of most national histories in Europe, even in countries 
like Belgium, Denmark, or Switzerland (Purtschert, Lüthi, and Falk 2012), but 
first of all and primarily it plays a very powerful role in the story of globalization. 
Colonialism developed from the exploration of foreign territories, and it aimed at 
appropriating and subduing those territories and the people living in them.
Seen from the perspective of governance, colonial policy was a failure in 
almost every respect, and during the era of decolonization after 1945, colonial 
rule could be abolished almost everywhere in the world. However, during the pre-
ceding era of imperialism, which was full of conflicts, both the colonizing and the 
colonized societies were deeply altered. This can also be recognized with respect 
to Germany, even though its involvement in colonial policy compared to France, 
Great Britain, or the Netherlands did not last for long (van Laak 2005).
In 2014, and together with students at Giessen University, I embarked upon 
tracing the imprints that German colonialism left in the history of Hesse. Among 
other stories, we found out that one of the most important schools for the educa-
tion of colonial farmers and settlers was opened in 1898 quite close to Giessen, in 
the small city of Witzenhausen, north of Kassel. The school still exists today, of 
course not as a colonial training center, but as part of the University of Kassel; it 
instructs in tropical and subtropical farming, and among its students of today are 
many Africans and Asians (Linne 2017). We also found out that a lot of  memorials, 
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street names, or places that refer to colonialists or other colonial aspects still 
exist, as do museum collections generated in the era of German colonialism.2
Our research, which mixed together the global and the local, conveyed 
exactly what often makes the history of globalization surprising: It accounts for 
the fact that our present world is deeply permeated by global references even to 
the remotest places, and these references often document a long and complex 
prehistory. To give an example: For many centuries we have enjoyed foods that 
originate in other continents, yet we are rarely aware of the twisted roads these 
foods have taken to please us today: coffee and tea, spices, sugar and salt, fruits 
and cereals, tobacco and textiles, fish and meat, oil and timber, and many other 
products had to travel far and long to finally become an everyday matter of course 
for Europeans (Wendt 2007).
If we apply historical perspectives to these flows of people, ideas, and com-
modity chains, often very exciting stories emerge. Take, for instance, the trian-
gle trade between Europe, Africa, and the Americas, in which money, goods, 
and slaves were exchanged, or the extended routes that many plants, crops, or 
animals have taken to become domesticated and acclimatized in very different 
places. Quite generally, the hunger for resources – be it gold or diamonds, food-
stuffs or rare metal – was a kind of leitmotif for transcending existing borders, 
for appropriating different objects, for subduing foreign people, for influencing 
them to work for the Europeans, or for simply establishing trade. These actions 
are salient subjects of transnational history, which furthermore has been driven 
by interventions into the natural habitat, by the building up of facilities for travel 
and communication, by the transfer of goods and ideas, or by environmental 
disasters as generated by industrialization or global touristification.3
Many of these global and transnational aspects formerly were odd subjects 
for historical research because they were focused on national units, and because 
actors and agents therein were neither governmental nor confined within given 
borders. For a couple of years, historians have discussed the methodology of a 
‘histoire croisée’ or entangled history (Werner and Zimmermann 2002). It tries to 
explain processes of interaction among actors of different localities and cultures, 
by which all involved actors are challenged. Often, something happens that has 
been called ‘hybridization,’ something that none of the involved actors actually 
has intended. It absorbs and transforms elements from all involved cultures, but 
2 See <www.inst.uni-giessen.de/hessen-postkolonial> [accessed: 5 June 2019].
3 A great example of ‘new’ stories to be told from this perspective are Iriye and Saunier 2009 and 
Espagne, Geyer, and Middell 2010.
210   Dirk van Laak
at the same time represents something that has a quality of being new and sover-
eign (Fischer-Tiné 2013).
This said, it is crucial to characterize global history as separate from the history 
of globalization. This approach can be understood as a more general invitation 
to add historical dimensions and narrations to the existing one world of today.4 
This offer, however, involves a lot of questions and problems. For instance: Do 
we have to imagine global history as a kind of history that converges towards an 
integrated and homogeneous world? And what will this unified world eventually 
look like?
Asking questions like these moves global history very close to the universal 
history approaches of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when world 
history was conceptualized and written with philosophical aspiration. Writers 
like August Ludwig von Schlözer, Friedrich Schiller, or Georg Friedrich Wilhelm 
Hegel assessed history as a gradual fulfillment of human rights, freedom, 
peace, democracy, and equality. Taking a similar attitude, some recent macro- 
sociologists have suggested space and time being categories of the past, not of 
the future, wherein everything would merge and become networked into a global 
system, which would eventually be defined by coexistence, connections, and 
synchrony (Castells 1996; Khannah 2016).
However, there is more evidence that global history does not evolve toward a 
synthetic or certain goal, but should instead be viewed as something that neither 
develops in a straight line nor with purpose. It displays many rupture zones, as 
nation states and empires rise and fall, territories seem to return to oblivion like 
in some parts of Africa, former centers again become provincialized, etc. Global 
history is especially considerate of activities that constantly change without 
arriving anywhere, which is why the transfer and migration of people, ideas, 
goods, and things are saliently represented in it to such an extent (Middell and 
Engel 2005).
Seen from this perspective, the problem arises as to whether ‘natural borders’ 
in fact do exist, or whether this concept is a fixed idea of a certain time or specific 
interests (Butlin 2009). The political geography of the late nineteenth century 
had stressed this notion of ‘natural borders’ to legitimize the expansion of nation 
states and the manipulation of existing borderlines, but in fact, borders can be 
justified almost exclusively by arguing historically. Globalization and the defi-
nition of national confines were reciprocal forces that intensified each other. 
The emphasis with which coherent nation states and integrated territories were 
4 See the six volumes of A History of the World, edited by Akira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel 
(2012–2018).
Liquid Spaces in Modern Historiography   211
 conjured up since the early nineteenth century can only be interpreted by taking 
into account existing definitions becoming liquid, people increasing in mobility, 
and flows of commodity diffusing more and more (Conrad 2010). Consequently, 
global historians like to talk about processes of re- or deterritorialization, about 
imagined communities, mental maps, and other categories that paraphrase 
spatial concepts as hypothetical constructs (Anderson 1983; Schenk 2002).
In this view, the building of nation states was an act of defense: One that 
could create unities and establish transitional political control before transna-
tional processes soaked these voluntary definitions again and provoked further 
modification. Global history mirrors the complex interplay between national sov-
ereignty, on the one hand, and the ambition to cooperate internationally, on the 
other. One of the main advantages of global history is that in applying to regions 
and nations a view from above, almost nothing appears to be ‘natural’ or self- 
evident. Rather, it were compromises, migrations, and mixtures that constituted 
global history (as a good example see Fischer-Tiné 2007).
Whereas international history in its traditional style explored obvious ques-
tions of power, global history finds them concealed in factual issues like tech-
nical questions, the setting of international standards, the competition among 
political, economic, technological, or cultural systems, and their scaling and syn-
chronization, e.g., in air traffic or financial transactions (Murphy and Yates 2008; 
Wenzlhuemer 2010). Global historians are less inclined to research large political 
conferences at which the fate of peoples or nations were decided. Rather, they 
frequently turn towards congresses of scientists or experts at which decisions 
were made about topics such as the implementation of the metrical system, the 
technological adjustment of radio or telegraphy, the sustainable management of 
timber, or the coordinated exploitation of the Arctic regions.
Likewise, the League of Nations and the United Nations have become subjects 
of an intensified historical research (Mazower 2009; Yearwood 2009; Housden 
2012). And indeed, in analyzing what they and their sub-organizations have 
achieved – often in the background – their records are much more impressive than 
if one only takes into account official politics and diplomacy where lofty expec-
tations often were not fulfilled (see www.lonsea.de; Löhr 2010; Pedersen 2015).
There is also a rising historical interest in the phenomenon of large empires. 
Seen from a global perspective, empires have been longer-lasting and in many 
respects even more successful than nation states. Their existence is questioned 
not only for the centuries of hegemony and dominance that their military power 
allowed, but also as a successful model of integrating migrants and tolerating 
minorities (Darwin 2010; Leonhard and von Hirschhausen 2012). In some aspects, 
empires, with their rather flexible frontiers and their social stratifications, appear 
even more modern than nation states do.
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In the 1990s, US political scientist Samuel Huntington predicted that the 
world would usher in a ‘clash of cultures.’ This sparked attention in its assertion 
that the global networks of traffic, communication, goods, people, and ideas 
do not automatically create a unified world, but also provoke defense actions 
that legitimize themselves culturally or religiously (Huntington 1996). There 
seemed to be a dialectic process of cross-border opening on the one hand, and 
on the other, a need for man to define distinctive spaces of law, culture, religion 
and  morality. This dialectic is still valid and is one of the major problems of 
our time.
Today, more than ever before, global history has to deal with a problem that 
traditional world history was also faced with from its beginning: Who is allowed 
to research and write history? Who is capable of adequately surveying differ-
ent world regions, provinces, and cultures? Such is a difficult task for a single 
person. Consequently, it has often been scholars working outside of the guild of 
 historians  – like Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, or William H. McNeill – 
who dared to do so. Nonetheless, there are some encouraging examples of global 
syntheses with respect to the nineteenth century coming from Christopher Bayly 
(2005) or Jürgen Osterhammel (2009). Other global histories resort to assembling 
a number of specialized authors to portray certain aspects of world history, and 
this also works well.
In earlier times, writing a coherent history of one nation seemed the most pres-
tigious job that a historian could seek, while writing world history was regarded a 
field of mavericks, and writing local history was seen as an enterprise mostly for 
amateurs. Today, it seems as if historians should be ready to adapt to all regional 
and spatial levels. A ‘natural’ hierarchy of competence and of allegedly more and 
less important fields of historical research is about to dissolve (Geyer and Bright 
1995; Manning 2003). In their everyday work, of course, historians have to focus 
and specialize on certain aspects; usually they are well educated to do so. But as 
everything is connected to everything in the end, a historian should be able to 
keep her or his eye on all these levels.
Today, more than ever, historians must stress the tentativeness of their find-
ings and assertions. It was a distinguishing mark of former research that histo-
rians tended to assess their own national histories to be the most important in 
the world, to claim their own positions as being the most advanced, and also to 
rank their own virtues as the most significant (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). 
The perspective on world history that the writer presented was centralized and 
aligned to the writer’s position in society. Historians generally spoke of the world 
that was familiar to them at a given moment, and they tended to divide that world 
between leading civilizations on the one hand, and barbarians and antediluvians 
on the other. Following this path, meaningful histories of salvation were written, 
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which tended to legitimize one’s own position while devaluing counter-positions 
(see Osterhammel 2002).
Today, regional histories or area studies are researched and written beyond 
such presumptions – or at least they should be (Schäbler 2007). One of the most 
salient and exciting aspects of global history is that it shows quite plainly how 
restricted our historical knowledge actually is, especially with respect to non- 
European affairs. The notion of Europeans to assess certain cultures of Latin 
America, Africa, or Asia as ‘people without history’ has been unmasked as a colo-
nial attitude (Wolf 1982). Even more important is that it’s not true. The more we 
know about other regions, the more we realize that Europe is just one of the world’s 
provinces among others, the more Europe is ‘provincialized’ (Chakrabarty 2000).
To refer to two striking examples: what would have happened if, in 1485, 
Sultan Bayezid II had not prohibited the printing of books, a ban that remained 
in effect in the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century? How would world 
history have developed if, in the same century, the Chinese fleet had turned away 
from the African coast because Emperor Zeng-He’s successors were too afraid 
of adventure expeditions? Chances and accidents are major forces of history, as 
are often-disregarded aspects like the weather or changes of climate. This has 
changed fundamentally (Grove 1997; Crosby 1986; Diamond 1997).
In recent book productions, there has been a revealing boom of histories 
telling exemplary stories of certain objects. Sometimes this is about crossroads, 
or supposed ‘magic moments’ of history (see Demandt 2004). Sometimes this is 
the story of things shaking the world like resources, inventions, or ideas, and 
their global impact, like the histories of spices, or tulip bulbs, or certain weapons 
like the notorious Kalaschnikow gun (see, for instance, Dash 1999). Alternatively, 
it is a story, sometimes referred to as glocalization, that describes or encom-
passes global changes as they are reflected in local settings (Epple 2007, 2013): 
For example, the protection of certain animals, like elephants, had far- reaching 
effects for the ivory industry in the Odenwald, a region located southwest of 
Frankfurt. This is another dialectic process, with the global and the local influ-
encing each other. The ways in which global changes affect locals can most fre-
quently be traced in the spheres of economy and industry (Giese, Mossig, and 
Schröder 2011). In this respect, telling the story of cocoa or cotton in a ‘glocalized’ 
way can be extremely illuminating (Beckert 2014).
There is yet another revealing approach that exemplifies global develop-
ments. Biographies enable historians to describe a multitude of activities and 
experiences, especially if the subjects in question traveled a lot and collected 
impressions about many places. A lot of them have lived ‘transnational lives,’ 
and the more closely we approach the present day, this kind of life, instead of 
being an exception, becomes a common phenomenon (Woollacott, Deacon, and 
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Russell 2010). This concept definitely applies to histories of human migration, 
irrespective of the motives that are responsible for the ‘restlessness’ of people 
moving (Bade 2003, Harzig and Hoerder 2009). There are many good reasons to 
stress ‘nomadic’ aspects of human life and to place them on an equal footing with 
‘settled’ variations of human existence.5 Thus, it is no coincidence that the very 
person who wrote one of the first comprehensive records of European migration, 
Eugene M. Kulischer, also coined the phrase of ‘displaced persons’ (1948; see also 
Schlögel 2005).
History and cultural sciences should contribute to a better or more appro-
priate analysis of, and also a justification for, people being on the move and 
migrating. Today, everything is expected to circulate: goods, ideas, energies – 
why should people of all things stay home and nourish their ‘fixed identities’? It 
is certain that nothing as a ’fixed identity’ exists.6 In contrast to the domesticat-
ing tendencies of modern nationalism, people more and more were ‘on the road’ 
and understood this as their prime mode of existence.7 Therefore, a ‘heuristic of 
flows and circulation’ should prevail over a heuristic of what is statically deter-
minable. Today, relations are more relevant than causalities and comparisons, 
movements more relevant than conditions, transitions and mixtures more relevant 
than differences (Dommann 2016). I would add that this also applies to processes 
of synchronization, to perceived asynchronicities of simultaneous processes, 
and to (attempted) blockades of circulation as caused, for example, by terrorists. 
From current perspectives, this appears even more relevant than questions of war 
and peace.
2 Some Conclusions and Outlooks
To sum up some of the evidence here: Whereas in the 1980s, national histories 
were extended to many more agents and actors, since the 1990s, world history 
has been globalized, and also extended to allow even more actors to be involved. 
This can emphatically be assessed as a process of democratizing history. At the 
same time, it has also become much more difficult to identify distinctive tenden-
cies of historical development, because the more factors one must regard, the 
more elaborate one’s conclusion must be. The times are gone when the course 
of world history could be attributed to a chosen few actors, such as statesmen or 
5 This aspect is methodologically discussed by Monika Dommann 2016.
6 For an archaeology of the concept, see Niethammer 2000; Assmann and Friese 1998.
7 The fatal effects of nationalism are portrayed by Philipp Ther 2014, 2017.
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inventors. And the times have also passed when the history of a globalized world 
could be viewed from a ‘Eurocentric’ perspective, unless one were to consciously 
and intentionally choose that as a central theme (Diogo and van Laak 2016).
Global history, however, carries the risk of almost everything it approaches 
appearing convertible and constructed. To counterbalance this notion, histori-
cal research should collaborate with other sciences to describe the more stable 
aspects of life, like the natural environment or anthropological constants, from 
the more diversified aspects – much as the French historian Fernand Braudel 
did in the 1940s in his classic study on the Mediterranean Sea (Braudel 1949). 
Research results from biology, meteorology, or medicine can provide fresh per-
spectives and insights for our historical understanding. This has already been 
exemplified by another version of recent historiography that is called Big History. 
It discusses relationships between natural and human history, and puts man-
made history into a much longer developmental perspective (Spier 1996; Chris-
tian 2005). In doing so, certain findings are given a dramatic twist, such as the 
insight into how deeply man has interfered with the natural environment during 
the last two or three hundred years, creating a manipulated environment called 
the ‘Anthropocene’ (Möllers, Schwägerl, and Trischler 2014).
Historians have once been labeled as ‘prophets of the past’ (see Brenner 
2010). But it seems more appropriate to view them as experts of collected and 
evaluated experiences. We cannot contribute to the future, but we definitely can 
help others to come to terms with the past. Given the explosion of complexity in 
a world being networked on a global scale, this certainly is no trivial task. We 
realize broadening gaps between those people obviously profiting from ‘global-
ization’ and people who reckon they just pay the bills. Cultural scientists and 
historians should do more on explaining the term ‘globalization’ and its com-
plexities, and they also should discuss and historically better explain ‘diversity,’ 
‘identity,’ ‘exile,’ ‘diaspora,’ or ‘home’ – categories that desperately deserve to 
become historicized.
The recent past has experienced an incredible extension of phenomena being 
subjected to cultural historians’ scrutiny: past emotions, space, time, animals, our 
built environment, pictures, sleep, the senses, and perceptions of all kind – for 
my part, I am quite determined that the next big thing will be a history of plants. 
This extension of phenomena has occurred because many traditions of restricting 
topics to certain disciplines have obviously eroded – and this is another liquid-
ity being welcomed. What is needed, now, is a cultural history that is open and 
sensitive to different rhythms and paces of change – without preferring perceived 
‘avant-gardes’ or depreciating purported ‘backwardnesses.’
Using examples from my own generation I have aspired to show how the 
horizons of recent historical research have expanded with respect to contents, 
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to space, and to methodology. Spaces have not been liquidated, but rather have 
been liquefied. The great privilege of historians remains that they can devote 
themselves to virtually every question, provided that it somehow addresses the 
past. Concerning the future, I am quite convinced that cultural and historical sci-
ences that further promote globalization are about to enter into astonishing new 
spheres of knowledge.
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Culture in the Marketplace
1 The Hypostasis of the Market
In one of his final publications, Stuart Hall noted that “Marketing and selling 
metaphors now threaten to swamp public discourse. The market is hypostacized: 
it ‘thinks’ this, ‘does’ that, ‘feels’ the other, ‘gets panicky’, ‘loses confidence’, 
‘believes’” (Hall 2011, 722). In the light of this hypostatization of the marketplace, 
it is important to consider possible futures of the study of culture in the age of 
the mass market and mass consumerism. This is a formidable task, since market 
thinking now permeates almost every aspect of society. Market forces help to 
determine not only which cultural artefacts get produced and consumed, but also 
the conditions under which people produce and consume them and the technol-
ogies available for their dissemination. The market also helps to determine how 
the study of culture is funded and conducted, in and beyond the universities, 
as well as which studies are published and how they are received. Given such 
complex entanglements, this short essay can only provide a few programmatic 
observations, combined with personal reflections drawn from the experience of 
that highly marketized being, the ‘early career academic.’ In the process, it offers 
some thoughts about how those working within the study of culture might deal 
with the fact that not only their objects of study, but also their critical languages, 
and their own existences as students and teachers, are increasingly determined 
by the market logic that Hall describes. It also suggests that the ‘consumer turn’ 
might eventually become the turn that subsumes all others in the study of twenty- 
first-century cultures.
Since Marx’s original formulation of the dynamic between base and super-
structure, generations of writers have considered how relations of production 
affect cultural, and specifically artistic, activity. In one of the classic texts of 
Marxist criticism, Terry Eagleton argued that:
Each element of a society’s superstructure – art, law, politics, religion – has its own tempo 
of development, its own internal evolution, which is not reducible to a mere expression of 
the class struggle or state of the economy. Art, as Trotsky comments, has ‘a very high degree 
of autonomy’.  (Eagleton 2002, 13)
However, this ‘degree of autonomy’ is precisely what Hall and others saw being 
progressively eroded by the continual hypostatization of the market. In his 
seminal analysis of postmodernism, Fredric Jameson asked “whether it is not 
precisely this semiautonomy of the cultural sphere which has been destroyed 
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by the logic of late capitalism” (Jameson 1991, 48). Since the appearance of this 
text, the 2008 financial crisis has given the market and its metaphors even more 
prominence in public life. As early as 1959, Reinhart Koselleck analyzed how the 
state of crisis came to be “practiced as the referent from which history is both 
apprehended and comprehended” in modern societies (Koselleck 1988, 69). 
Since 2008, however, this “ubiquitous, apparently ‘self-evident’, characteriza-
tion of contemporary life in terms of crisis” (Crosthwaite, Knight, and Marsh 2015, 
129) has been anchored ever more securely in the language and logic of modern 
financial markets. Although relations of production have always influenced cul-
tural activity, the new trend is for marketing and selling metaphors to be applied 
self-consciously in every facet of life. Johannes Angermuller has shown that this 
is no less true in universities, where academic discourse has become a “multilev-
eled positioning practice” in which the “driving force[s] for researchers are power 
structures in academic organisations and markets” (Angermuller 2013, 265, and 
2017). One challenge for those in the study of culture is how to remain objective 
when the critical metalanguages that govern not only their research, but also its 
reception and management are influenced by the market. First, however, it is nec-
essary to consider how the concept of culture itself has been affected by the rise 
of consumerism.
2 The Widening Remit of the Study of Culture
One of the most notable trends within the study of culture in recent years has 
been its widening remit. Doris Bachmann-Medick has noted that the emergence 
of “multifaceted reorientations in the study of culture is by no means attributable 
only to a postmodern fragmentation. They also have a clear material-economic 
and social foundation” (Bachmann-Medick 2016, 8). On the one hand, this plural-
ism of approaches may be interpreted as the result of a marketized “competition 
between theories” (Bachmann-Medick 2016, 8). From this perspective, the aca-
demic marketplace described above drives a perpetual but possibly illusory quest 
for innovation, as scholars are encouraged to anticipate ‘trends’ in the market.1 
On the other hand, Bachmann-Medick shows that this new pluralism within the 
1 I say “possibly illusory” because what may at first seem like a free choice between topics and 
approaches is actually governed by the logic of the academic marketplace: If (untenured) aca-
demics do not follow the current market trend, then their work is proportionally less likely to be 
published. To this extent, academic research may be seen to replicate the principle known as 
‘reputational herding’ in financial markets; see Roider and Voskort 2016.
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study of culture has the beneficial effect of breaking down what Bourdieu called 
the “profound conformisms” of the intellectual world (Bourdieu 2007, 106). This 
corresponds to Jameson’s prediction that:
[T]he dissolution of an autonomous sphere of culture is rather to be imagined in terms of 
an explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at 
which everything in our social life – from economic value and state power to practices and 
to the very structure of the psyche itself – can be said to have become “cultural” in some 
original and yet untheorized sense.  (Jameson 1991, 48)
The breaking down of academic disciplines and cultural canons has been wel-
comed as liberation on many grounds. One must be mindful, however, that there 
is always a principle of selection at work when audiences and academics choose 
where to focus their attention. Arguably, the new logic of selection at work in what 
Thomas H. Davenport famously termed the “attention economy” is the logic of the 
marketplace (Davenport 2001). In the process, not only the field known as the study 
of culture but also the concept of culture itself has been profoundly transformed.
As Jameson predicted, the concept of culture has expanded in recent years to 
encompass every aspect of social life. Raymond Williams famously claimed that 
culture became available during the nineteenth century “as the court of appeal in 
which real values were determined, usually in opposition to the ‘factitious’ values 
thrown up by the market and similar operations of society” (Williams 1960, 37). 
However, scholars like Williams and E. P. Thompson inevitably recognized the 
influence of the market, as the cultures they studied became increasingly commer-
cialized throughout the twentieth century (Williams 1960, 319–320). Accordingly, 
Stuart Hall describes how the concept of ‘high culture’ gave way to that of ‘mass 
culture’ or ‘popular culture’ and then to an ‘anthropological’ definition, which 
emphasizes “participants interpreting meaningfully what is happening around 
them, and ‘making sense’ of the world, in broadly similar ways” (Hall 1997, 2). In 
recent years, this anthropological definition has once again been challenged by 
the development of ‘corporate culture’ and ‘organizational culture.’ These terms 
were popularized by Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy in their 1982 book Corpo-
rate Cultures, which defined organizational culture matter-of-factly as “the way 
we do things around here” (Deal and Kennedy 2000, 4). In business schools, the 
sociological and anthropological tools of cultural studies departments have been 
successfully adapted for the purposes of “maximizing the value of human capital” 
and ensuring “organizational success” (Baker 2002). Although these definitions 
have not yet migrated from management to cultural studies departments, it is clear 
that the concept of culture has undergone a major transformation, if not a rever-
sal, in the past fifty years. In the era of bestsellers, blockbusters, and downloads 
charts, it is no longer possible to define culture in opposition to the marketplace.
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A corollary of this redefinition of culture is that the types of cultural practices 
and artefacts being studied has also altered dramatically. For example, a recent 
Facebook post by the Bodleian Libraries in Oxford noted that “Bodleian readers 
have access right now to over 165 different dissertations that name Harry Potter in 
their titles, and over 4,000 more that reference the Potter books or films as part of 
their arguments” (Bodleian Libraries 2017). Naturally, there are reasons to study 
a global phenomenon like Harry Potter, but this concentration of effort may prove 
detrimental if researchers (particularly in the early stages of their careers) feel 
compelled to follow the market. In contrast, while the pioneers of cultural studies 
never excluded mass-market and commercial products from their studies, they 
were often critical of their value. Richard Hoggart’s ground-breaking study of The 
Uses of Literacy concluded that “[m]ost mass-entertainments are in the end what 
D. H. Lawrence described as ‘anti-life’. They are full of a corrupt brightness, of 
improper appeals and moral evasions” (Hoggart 1992, 340). Nowadays, this state-
ment might seem dated for two reasons: The first is its overt and perhaps anti-
quated value judgments (‘corrupt,’ ‘improper,’ ‘moral evasions’) and the second 
is its dismissive attitude towards the more commercial forms of popular culture.
The first objection is symptomatic of what Helen Small terms a care to 
“eschew the language of moralism for critical reason” and “not to be seen to assert 
that the activities of the humanities are necessarily ethically driven” (Small 2013, 
144–145). Though the renewed focus on critical reason over moralism is surely 
to be welcomed, it is worth considering the implications if academics within the 
humanities renounce what Williams called the focus on ‘real values.’ Recently, 
commentators like Stefan Collini and Martha Nussbaum have argued that, faced 
with the increasing marketization of higher education, those in the human-
ities must continue to emphasize values other than those of the market or risk 
“becoming door-to-door salesmen for vulgarized versions of their increasingly 
market-oriented ‘products’” (Collini 2009, 18–19, qtd. in Nussbaum 2012, 130). 
Ultimately, a value-neutral version of the study of culture is unachievable, since 
attempts to realize this vision of neutrality replicate the logic of the free market.
The second possible objection to Hoggart’s statement above – namely, its dis-
missal of commercial products – raises questions about what stances those within 
the study of culture can adopt towards the marketplace. Arguably, this is more of a 
concern within the British tradition, where the model of cultural criticism/critique 
implied a more politicized stance than the German tradition of Kulturwissenschaft. 
The German tradition, founded on the works of thinkers like Max Weber and Georg 
Simmel, was quicker to examine the effects of the marketplace on modern cul-
tures. Following Walter Benjamin’s seminal analysis of the transformative effects 
of mechanical reproduction, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer described 
the development of a ‘culture industry’ that replicated the logic of the market:
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The less the culture industry has to promise and the less it can offer a meaningful explana-
tion of life, the emptier the ideology it disseminates necessarily becomes. Even the abstract 
ideals of the harmony and benevolence of society are too concrete in the age of the universal 
advertisement.  (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 118)
In a similar vein, Jürgen Habermas argued that: “Along the path from a public crit-
ically reflecting on its culture to one that merely consumes it, the public sphere 
in the world of letter […] has lost its specific character” (Habermas 1991, 175). 
This permeation of culture by the logic of the market raises questions for both 
the German and the Anglo-American traditions. Should those within the study of 
culture celebrate the market for its achievements? Should they attempt to describe 
its cultural effects objectively (which, as discussed above, brings challenges of its 
own)? Or should they attempt to maintain a position of criticism or critique (in 
which case, the question arises: In what ways and to what extent is this possible)?
It seems inevitable that the trend is towards greater engagement with the 
marketplace. Arguably, anyone studying contemporary cultures cannot overlook 
its influence if they wish to explain them comprehensively. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a move away from earlier oppositional approaches to the market 
towards greater objectivity. The introduction to a recent volume on Cultural 
Studies and Anti-Consumerism recognizes that:
Inquiries into consumption as a cultural process have emerged from a range of fields […] 
many bearing the influential stamp of cultural studies’ early inquiries into consumption as 
a rich semantic domain […].  (Binkley and Littler 2011, 3)
Increasingly, these studies have dropped the ‘anti-’ from their titles to investigate 
the relationship between culture and consumerism on a more objective footing. 
However, the fields of culture and economics, culture and finance, and culture and 
consumption are relatively new and the complexities of their supposed objectivity 
regarding the marketplace remain to be fully explored. As those within the study 
of culture embark on this exploration, it is important for researchers to acknowl-
edge their situatedness within the economy. More than ever, those working in the 
study of culture need to reflect on how their critical languages and methods are 
influenced by market thinking. Equally, there is a need for tenured and untenured 
academics alike to recognize the constraints of their positions within the aca-
demic market. It is sometimes tempting for those who teach culture to present the 
academy as an autonomous sphere that is hermetically sealed from the market-
place. Naturally, the values of scholarship and diligence need to be upheld, but it 
is also important for those who teach culture to educate their students about the 
knowledge economy and to give them a realistic understanding of the challenges 
they face as they seek to enter it.
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3  New Methods in the Study of Literature 
and Economics
Many working within the study of culture have attempted to meet the challenges 
of explaining the mutual influence of markets and cultures. This section focuses 
on the field of literary studies to investigate the development of new methods for 
studying the marketplace. It also examines the surge in projects dealing with lit-
erature and economics since the 2008 financial crisis. In the process, the chapter 
considers the extent to which the fields of literature and economics can and 
should remain autonomous, as well as how those undertaking interdisciplinary 
work between these fields might transfer methods from economics and finance 
and attempt to describe the effects of the market objectively.
Until recently, there was a relative dearth of critical methods in the field of 
literature and economics. From the 1960s to the 2000s, the pace of technological 
and financial innovation in the marketplace arguably outstripped the develop-
ment of literary methods for studying the marketplace. Though Marxist criticism 
became increasingly sophisticated through the development of cultural mate-
rialism and new historicism, some perceived a need for alternative, more polit-
ically ‘neutral’ methods for the study of literature and economics (Osteen and 
Woodmansee 1999, 12).2 Inevitably, these new methods needed to explain why 
their worldview was more ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ than earlier approaches. Rather 
than importing market thinking uncritically into literary studies, they needed to 
devise methods to analyze the interdependence of markets and cultures. Within 
literary studies, this need was initially met by Mark Osteen and Martha Wood-
mansee’s collection The New Economic Criticism. Osteen and Woodmansee noted 
that the first wave of economic criticism primarily comprised historicist studies, 
which attended to “contextual discursive formations – law, banking, art history, 
etc. – as they impinge upon literary texts” (Osteen and Woodmansee 1999, 12). 
Such studies tended to focus on the market as a context or theme, rather than 
attempting to translate methods from economics and finance into literary studies. 
Although not interdisciplinary at the level of method, the historicist study of lit-
erature and the marketplace continues to provide a rich field for exploration. 
Raymond Williams’s model of the opposition between culture and marketplace 
has been complicated by later scholars like Philip Connell, who noted the “extent 
to which early nineteenth-century political economy […] played a formative role 
in the emergence of the idea of ‘culture’ itself” (Connell 2001, 7). In a similar vein, 
2 The term ‘neutral’ is applied in this sense by Mark Osteen and Martha Woodmansee to the 
work of Marc Shell.
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Mary Poovey has shown how profoundly the developing credit economy in the 
nineteenth century influenced the development of literary genres and the defi-
nition of literature itself (Poovey 2008). Such studies have proved important in 
breaking down the traditional, and often historically questionable, dividing lines 
between disciplines.
However, one challenge facing studies of literature and economics is that 
their themes and methods are extremely disparate. For this reason, some have 
questioned whether economic criticism represents a new school of literary crit-
icism, with distinct methods for studying the market, or whether it constitutes 
a series of discrete studies that use existing methods and take aspects of the 
market as their theme. In an often-cited contribution to the collection Money 
and the Age of Shakespeare, Douglas Bruster referred to new economic criticism 
as an “open unity, an emergent mode of criticism defined by its willingness to 
treat the economic basis of social interaction both in and out of literary texts, and 
supporting the production of literature itself” (Bruster 2003, 69). This openness 
certainly offers the potential for innovation, but it also suggests that the devel-
opment of new methods for studying the marketplace is still in its infancy. Given 
the absence of established methods, there remains great potential and a need for 
new methods that enable literary scholars to study the market objectively, disen-
tangling the (historical) economic world of the text from that of the critic. A recent 
survey of new economic criticism noted that works professing this approach are 
often characterized as ‘apolitical’:
The analyses explored herein largely appear to have no ideological axe to grind; freed from the 
dialectics that underpinned previous modes of economic criticism, these works instead seem 
to assume that the economic was an intrinsic part of early modern life.  (Grav 2012, 133)
As described above, however, it is not possible to be apolitical when writing 
about culture in the marketplace. Elizabeth Hewitt remarks that “for all our savvy 
about the intersection between art and commerce, we nonetheless seem nostal-
gically to hold out hope that our scholarship will offer some loophole from the 
tyranny of commerce – even as we describe its all-consuming embrace” (Hewitt 
2009, 621). Those studies that set traditional dialectics aside are often the ones 
confronted most urgently with the need to explain the vexed relations between 
literature and economics, culture and the marketplace. Here, the hypostatization 
of the market described by Hall becomes highly problematic. The field of culture 
and economics is perhaps uniquely challenging, because scholars in this area 
must seek – possibly in vain – to prevent their studies from being colored by the 
market thinking and relations of academic production in their own time.
In addition to pre-existing historicist approaches, Osteen and Woodman-
see perceived a new avenue of exploration in the work of Marc Shell and Kurt 
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Heinzelman. Beginning in the 1980s, these scholars investigated the relation-
ship between language and money, arguing that “all metaphors are in a sense 
economic, since the etymology of ‘metaphor’ contains within it the concept of 
transfer or exchange” (Osteen and Woodmansee 1999, 18). In a seminal passage, 
Marc Shell suggests that “money, which refers to a system of tropes, is also an 
‘internal’ participant in the logical or semiological organization of language, 
which itself refers to a system of tropes” (Shell 1982, 3). As a result, a distinct 
approach has developed within new economic criticism that examines how liter-
ary texts “produce and respond to reformulations of the nature of representation 
and credit embodied in money and in the economic system in general” (Osteen 
and Woodmansee 1999, 4). This approach is rich in possibilities and provides 
the opportunity for a rigorous rethinking of the relation between language and 
money, as well as how the relations of production influence semantic systems 
and the production of meaning. However, this approach faces two key challenges. 
Firstly, the metaphor of language as money upon which it is based is fraught 
with complexities. To what extent can one speak of metaphor as ‘exchange’ or 
of money as a ‘system of tropes’ without distorting the object of study? More 
than ever, it is necessary to ensure that the implications and imperfections of 
these metaphors are foregrounded before any false critical assumptions are 
made. Secondly, although these approaches are important in turning the focus 
onto language as the medium of both literary and economic texts, the inevitable 
result is that the language of academic criticism also becomes embroiled in the 
metaphor.
The last few years have seen a burgeoning interest in the relation between 
language and money. With its emphasis on semiosis, the field of literary studies 
is often seen to be in a strong position for “developing a theoretical value for 
understanding money’s mimetic and textual implications” (Crosthwaite, Knight, 
and Marsh 2015, 118). Many have seen similarities between poststructuralist theo-
ries of language, which emphasize the inexhaustibility of meaning, and money’s 
virtue of being infinitely exchangeable. However, there is a danger that equating 
language with money, especially if this is done in a reductive or simplistic way, 
may damage our understanding of language as a system capable of producing 
types of knowledge and discussing types of value other than those of the market. 
In the context of the financial crisis, Ansgar Nünning has shown the detrimental 
effects of too easily accepting the metaphors of crisis and illness:
In short: metaphors of money and financial crises serve to narrativize and naturalize 
complex cultural, economic and political transformations, projecting ideologically charged 
plots onto the developments they purport merely to represent or to illustrate.  
 (Nünning 2015, 63)
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The same is true of metaphors that attempt to compare language with money. 
Such metaphors can yield enlightening results about the similarities and differ-
ences between the organization of meaning in markets and texts. Yet the condi-
tion for this is that critics must consider any ways in which the metaphor may be 
imperfect, ‘ideologically charged,’ or misleading.
Georg Simmel famously argued that: “Money is not, by its nature, a valuable 
object whose parts happen to have the same proportion to each other or to the 
whole that other values have to each other. The significance of money is only to 
express the value relations between other objects” (Simmel 2004, 145). Yet the 
linguistic turn in the humanities has shown that (abstract) language does not 
merely express value relations between other objects, but that it constitutes those 
values and shapes people’s perception of reality. To equate language with money 
therefore has profound implications. On the one hand, treating language as a 
currency foregrounds the fact that values are determined by a kind of market 
consensus among language users. On the other hand, denying the role of lan-
guage in producing and constituting value risks undermining the objectivity that 
academic writing tends to assume. As language approaches the status of money, 
its critical purchase upon the marketplace is reduced. It is no longer capable of 
conveying meanings whose value can be independently assessed, but becomes 
an inherently valueless medium of exchange whose worth is determined solely 
by the market of readers. Instead of being descriptive and analytical, the critic’s 
language merely reproduces the market relations it attempts to explain.
The view of language as money exists in an ambivalent relation to the prin-
ciples of poststructuralist criticism. Recently, several critics have suggested that 
post-structural and deconstructionist models of language may be more indebted 
to economic ideas than was previously assumed. In the Course in General Linguis-
tics, a founding text of both structural and post-structural linguistics, Ferdinand 
de Saussure argued that:
Unlike language, other human institutions – customs, laws, etc. – are all based in varying 
degrees on the natural relations of things […] Language is limited by nothing in the choice 
of means, for apparently nothing would prevent the associating of any idea whatsoever with 
just any sequence of sounds.  (De Saussure 1966, 75–76)
Having rejected these institutions as analogies for language, Saussure suggests 
that a better comparison might be made with economics, arguing that in linguis-
tics “as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of value; both sci-
ences are concerned with a system for equating things of different orders – labour 
and wages in one and a signified and signifier in the other” (De Saussure 1966, 
79). For Saussure, linguistics and economics are alike in requiring both a static 
(synchronic) approach, which studies the structure of the system in a moment 
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of time, and an evolutionary (diachronic) approach, which examines how the 
system changes over time. However, this equation of semantic and monetary 
values has led some to question the economic basis of Saussure’s synchronic 
model of language.
As David Holdcroft points out, Saussure’s synchronic approach assumes that 
“it is the present state of the language which determines for the speaker [which 
signs are] to be considered, not the history of the signs themselves, of which most 
speakers can be presumed to know nothing” (Holdcroft 1991, 74). With history 
stripped away, the arbitrary series of relations between a system of signs in the 
present becomes reified as a self-determining structure. This parallels Simmel’s 
description of how the “function of exchange, as a direct interaction between 
individuals, becomes crystallized in the form of money as an independent struc-
ture” (Simmel 2004, 174). In both cases, the cultural context of human actors 
negotiating values and reaching a consensus over time is overlooked. In a recent 
discussion of securities markets, Andreas Langenohl argues that “securitization 
is part of a discursive structure that ‘becomes self-referential. It does not refer 
to an external, objective reality but establishes a security situation by itself’” 
(Langenohl 2017, 136). The synchronic approach to language envisages a simi-
larly self-referential structure, in which the ‘direct interaction between individu-
als’ becomes ‘crystallized’ as a series of arbitrary relations between signs. As Roy 
Harris observes, once the “notion of a synchronic system applies both to language 
and to economics”, there is no reason why it should not “apply to all human activ-
ities where signs and values are involved” (Harris 2001, 199). Saussure’s analogy 
between linguistics and economics thus gives rise to a  “philosophical thesis of far 
deeper import,” which proves “very subversive of the limits of historical expla-
nation” (Harris 2001, 199). Following this line of thinking, there is a chance that 
language and culture itself will be ‘hypostacized’ as another market.
4 Conclusion: Futures in the Study of Culture
The study of culture in the marketplace is an extremely rich and complex field, 
which urgently invites the development of new methods. In the process, it may 
be necessary to revisit fundamental assumptions about the study of culture from 
the bottom up, beginning with the definition of culture and with the prevailing 
theories of language and metaphor. Given the hypostatization of the market, it is 
important for those working in this field to develop critical languages to describe 
the marketplace without simply replicating its logic or applying its  assumptions 
unquestioningly. There is also a need to move beyond reifying the market as 
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a series of ‘forces,’ ‘movements,’ and ‘trends’ towards understanding it as a 
complex series of human interactions within social and technological networks. 
In this way, the market can be analyzed in cultural terms as an arena within 
which individual and collective decisions are made about fundamental human 
needs, desires, values, and priorities. There exists a huge potential for interdis-
ciplinary exchange between cultural studies and economics departments. Along 
the way, however, it will be necessary for those working in the study of culture 
to be open about their position within the attention economy and academic 
funding structures. The futures of the study of culture may be greatly curtailed if 
cultural studies departments attempt to increase their visibility and relevance by 
simply following the market and adopting economics as a theme. Instead, what is 
required is the further development of rigorous methods – building on the great 
number of studies already published in this area – which consider how one can 
gain critical purchase on the market after it has been hypostacized to incorporate 
every facet of human life.
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Cultural History, Science Studies, and Global 
Economy: New and Future Approaches
While the concept of a ‘global economy’ becomes more and more central in 
current debates, the history of such a conception of economy has hardly been 
investigated. Since when has the economy been perceived as a global issue? 
What ethical values were related to it, and what “epistemic virtues” (Daston 
and Galison 2007) were related to economics as a discipline dealing with global 
issues? What institutions and networks contributed to shaping the conception of 
the global economy? These and other questions should become the subject of a 
cultural history of the global economy. With a few exceptions, the perspectives of 
cultural history, science studies, and the history of knowledge are largely missing 
or at least underrepresented in economic history, where scholars have mostly 
taken the categories of economics for granted, basing their research upon these 
categories instead of examining their historicity (Dejung et al. 2011). However, 
other approaches are possible and, in part, they are already an emerging reality. 
As Michel Callon poignantly expressed it in an interview with Michel Ferrary: 
“Si l’économie-chose existe, c’est parce qu’elle a été performée par l’économie-
 discipline: ‘no economy without economics!’” (Callon and Ferrary 2006). In 
the following pages, I will attempt to sketch these new approaches, and point 
to possible foci for future research and new ways of understanding the history 
of the economy and economics. At the same time, I will exemplify one possible 
approach through an analysis of discourses on the global economy between the 
second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.1
An entangled history of knowledge of the global economy should approach 
economics as a scientific discipline not through its own categories, but through a 
discourse-analytical approach that allows taking a critical distance from the con-
cepts of classical economic theory, and questioning their universal validity, thus 
historicizing economics as a science in the same way that classical categories 
within the humanities are increasingly historicized.2 In recent years, some schol-
1 I would like to thank my colleague in Siegen and former GCSC member, Katharina Kreuder- 
Sonnen, for critically reading my paper.
2 On questioning the universality of the categories of the humanities, see Bachmann-Medick 
2014; for discourse analysis applied to economy and economics, see the contributions in Diaz- 
Bone 2015; on the history of discourses on the relationship between economy and politics in the 
twentieth century, see Scholl 2015.
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ars in the fields of history, sociology, science studies, and cultural studies have not 
only unveiled practices and conceptions in the economic sphere as being cultur-
ally determined (Berghoff and Vogel 2004), but also, and most importantly, have 
argued that the categories and methods of the discipline of economics play a key 
role in shaping economic processes themselves (Callon 1998, 2007; Knorr- Cetina 
and Preda 2005; Speich Chassé 2013). Among historians, Dejung, Dommann, 
and Speich Chassé (2014) have attempted to question the assumption that ‘the 
economy’ be a given rather than the product of historical transformations, nego-
tiations, and shifts of meaning. They pled for an analysis of the relations between 
economy and economics on the one hand, and ethics, religion, and politics on the 
other hand, which should uncover their reciprocal intertwinement. Other histori-
ans have done research on the practices and techniques of economic knowledge 
production (e.g. Tooze 2001; Schneider 2013).
In this paper I would like to highlight emerging approaches to the history of 
economy and economics, as well as to suggest new ones. As I explained above, I 
will concretize one of these possible new approaches through a short analysis of 
discourses on the global economy. Thus, my aim is to uncover the historicity of the 
‘global economy’ not by studying the development of economic processes, but by 
questioning the very understanding of these processes and the development of eco-
nomics as a discipline being concerned with global economic processes. Like Monika 
Dommann argues with regard to legal history in her book on the history of copy-
right, Autoren und Apparate (2014), I maintain that economic history should also be 
approached with the methods of cultural history and the history of knowledge (see 
Speich Chassé and Gugerli 2012). The suggested approach is inspired by research in 
the humanities (Bod et al. 2014; in particular Daston 2014); by what Michel Foucault 
has initiated through his archeology of knowledge especially in the fields of medi-
cine, psychiatry, and systems of punishment (Foucault 1969); as well as by what the 
history of science and the actor-network-theory have achieved in the history of the 
natural sciences and technology (Lenoir 1997; Mitchell 2005; Latour 2005). 
The approach I exemplify seeks both to deconstruct the discourses on global 
economy and to reconstruct the networks of experts who contributed in spreading 
conceptions of world economy. “Travelling concepts” (Neumann and Nünning 
2012; Bachmann-Medick 2014) between both disciplinary and national borders 
constitute a key theoretical approach for such an entangled history of economics, 
which should be both interdisciplinary and transnational. This approach implies 
a broadening of the future study of culture to a field, economics, whose laws are 
often considered to be universal and independent from cultural variances. At the 
same time, it potentially allows for interactions between historical disciplines 
on the one hand, and sociological and economic disciplines on the other hand, 
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joining their efforts in the examination of the self-understanding of economics as 
a discipline and finally questioning its very categories.
The sources I will analyze are not limited to scientific publications, but 
include non-scientific publications that were influenced by, and themselves pos-
sibly influenced, scientific discourse.3 I do not adhere to an internalist conception 
of science, and therefore I do not think that considering economics as an abstract 
sphere isolated from other disciplines or from popularizing and political dis-
courses would do justice to the breadth of the dynamics of knowledge  circulation.
The time between 1850 and 1945 is of particular interest for my questions, 
which include: how did the term ‘global economy’ originate and spread? What con-
texts and constellations favored its multiplication and stabilization? What shifts 
in its meaning and what processes of translation were involved? To address this, 
I will indicate a few case studies as well as possible answers to these  questions.
1 The Emergence of the Concept of Global Economy
In the following pages, I will describe a concrete example of a discourse- 
analytical approach to the emergence of discourses on world economy. That 
is: applying discourse analysis to some sources on the ‘global economy’ dating 
approximately from 1850 to 1945, I argue that discourses on the global economy 
(not ‘global trade’ or ‘global commerce’) emerged in this period of time. In fact, 
a bibliographic search based on library catalogues or databases will show that 
the term ‘global economy,’ in its variants of ‘world economy,’ ‘Weltwirtschaft’ or 
‘Weltökonomie,’ ‘wereld economie,’ ‘économie mondiale’ and ‘economia mondi-
ale,’ is nearly impossible to find before 1850.4 There are isolated examples from 
the 1830s, a few more since the 1850s, and the frequency always increases until 
the twentieth century, when the term becomes omnipresent after the 1940s.
The following examples show that, around 1870, discourses on world 
economy started to spread among economists. In a book on American Political 
Economy dating from 1870, the author, the American Francis Bowen (1811–1890), 
3 On the circulation of scientific knowledge even beyond the scientific or academic sphere, and 
back, see Fleck 1980.
4 See Karlsruher Virtueller Katalog, https://kvk.bibliothek.kit.edu; Anno, Volltextsuche in Zei-
tungen und Zeitschriften, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Suche: ‘Weltwirtschaft,’ http://anno.
onb.ac.at/anno-suche#searchMode=simple&query=weltwirtschaft&resultMode=list&from=1: 
the search in ANNO gives the following results for each of the following time periods: 1867–1881 
(7 results); 1882–1897 (46); 1898–1912 (455); 1913–1928 (3.259); 1929–1945 (2.988) [both last ac-
cessed: June 2016].
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Professor at Harvard, criticizes Malthusian theories appealing to a greater dimen-
sion in the economic space, namely “world’s economy”:
We can now see with sufficient distinctiveness the two great facts which afford a complete 
refutation of Malthusianism. The first is, that the limit of Population, in any country whatever, 
is not the number of people which the soil of that country alone will supply with food, but 
the number which the surface of the whole earth is capable of feeding; and it is a matter of 
demonstration, that this limit cannot even be approached for many centuries. The inability 
of England alone, or of Ireland alone, to supply her teeming population with food, is a fact 
of no more importance in the world’s economy, than the inability of the city of London 
alone to supply her two millions of people with farm-produce from her own soil. London 
taxes all the counties of England for her sustenance; England taxes all the countries of the 
world for her sustenance; – I cannot see any difference between the two cases.  
 (Bowen 1870, 140, emphasis mine, italics in the original)
As we can see from this justification of colonial politics, expansionism and eco-
nomical exploitation of the resources of other continents entailed thinking in a 
global scale, and it is in this context that talking about a national economy was 
not sufficient any longer.
In a German source from 1873, an article by the political economist Karl 
Knies (1821–1898), a representative of the historical school, the “global economy” 
(“die Weltwirtschaft, als ein großes Ganzes betrachtet”) is opposed to isolated 
national economy (“eine von allen übrigen Völkern isolierte Volkswirtschaft”), 
thus also implying that the global economy represents a higher dimension, to 
which national economies are subordinated (Knies 1873, 307, italics in the orig-
inal). However, ‘world economy’ was already present also beyond the scientific 
discourse. In the same year, the international exhibition in Vienna also spoke of 
a global economy as opposed to national economy, and its journal pled for a tran-
sition from a national to an all-encompassing global economy:
However, we should not lose sight of at least one characteristic of our times at the World Exhi-
bition in Vienna: the transformation of national economies [Volkswirtschaften] into the global 
economy [Weltwirtschaft]. International conventions and boards should be established as 
basis for later diplomatic or political action.  (Anonymous 1873, 2; my translation)5
From this example we can induce that international exhibitions, such as the one 
that was organized in Vienna in 1873, were places where the world economy was 
actively performed, and its very conception was actively shaped and spread. In 
5 “Zumal aber einen Charakterzug der Zeit dürfen wir bei der Wiener Weltausstellung nicht 
aus dem Auge verlieren: den Uebergang der Volkswirtschaften in die Weltwirtschaft. Interna-
tionale Einigungen und Berathungen sollen als Grundlage für eine spätere diplomatische oder 
politische Action geschaffen werden.”
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the following decades, the higher dimension of a world economy acquired an 
increasing important role in economic theory, and already in 1905 we can find 
that a congress was held in Belgium on the “world’s economic development” 
(“Congrès international d’expansion économique mondiale”) (Anonymous 1905). 
A search in the abovementioned databases lets us also see that the frequency of 
the term increased from 1919, after World War I, and especially in the 1930’s and 
40’s. In particular, we can observe a stabilization of the term in scientific lan-
guage, as well as in handbooks: in 1919 we can find, for instance, a publication 
called Die Weltwirtschaft der Fettstoffe (Fitzner 1919), in 1916 one called U-Boot 
und Weltwirtschaft (Thielemann 1916); some books asked about “the place” of 
particular nations in “world economy” (Arndt 1908; Rathgen 1911; Schumacher 
1917), other books opposed the global economy to national economy (“Volks-
wirtschaft” or “Nationalwirtschaft”) (Dietzel 1900; Oppenheimer 1915).
Besides that, the proceedings of conferences relating to economic and polit-
ical matters, organized by supranational entities such as the League of Nations, 
show that the term was becoming more and more present in the political sphere 
between the 1920s and 1930s (see League of Nations 1927). This is confirmed by 
publications such as L’économie mondiale et la Société des Nations (Hantos 1930). 
A further important step in the institutionalization of the study of the ‘global 
economy’ was the foundation of the journal Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv in Kiel in 
1913 (still existing as Review of World Economics), edited by Bernhard Harms. The 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv presented itself as a scientific journal with the aim of 
studying the history and the functioning of world economy, an issue that, as the 
editor maintained, was highly important but had not received the due attention 
until that moment (Harms 1913, 1–36). Bernhard Harms founded the “Königliches 
Institut für Seeverkehr und Weltwirtschaft” at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität 
in Kiel in 1914, another step in the institutionalization of the ‘world economy.’6 
As we will see later on, its importance went beyond national borders and contrib-
uted in spreading the concept in the international scientific discourse; in fact, the 
German concept of ‘Weltwirtschaft’ and, in particular, the translation of (the titles 
of) some works by German scholars publishing in the journal Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, played a significant role in the European scenario. Another example is the 
“Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv,” founded in 1908 and being part of the 
Hamburgisches Kolonialinstitut (Thilenius 1920); as we can see, even in this case 
the idea of global economy went hand-in-hand with colonialism.
6 On scientific disciplines and institutions, in particular on the natural sciences, see Lenoir 
1992 and 1997, as well as Stichweh 1994. On economics as a scientific discipline: Schneider 2013, 
Hesse 2010, and Mitchell 2005.
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2 Socialism and the Concept of World Economy
In the 1920s, socialist and communist economic theories were an important 
factor of the increased popularity of concepts of global economy. Above all, they 
brought the term outside the scientific discourse, as we can see from the commu-
nist newspaper Die Rote Fahne, published in socialist Vienna of the 1920s. Here, 
‘world economy’ was conceived in opposition to ‘national economy’:
For years, the principle of global economy has been competing with the one of national 
economy. The longer the struggle went on, the clearer it was that the idea of the global 
economy, of the increasingly more intimate economic connection of all countries, is the 
stronger one.  (Anonymous 1920, 2; my translation)7
According to these lines, the global economy, where all countries are econom-
ically bound to each other, had proved to be “stronger” than the principle of a 
national economy, and had triumphed over it. As we can see from the follow-
ing passage, capitalist economy was perceived as being bound to older, national 
economic models, and the war was conceived as a break in global economic 
 relations:
Short before the beginning of the war, capitalist economy was showing its weakest side. 
Almost everywhere there was a quite heavy crisis, unemployment was remarkable. At this 
point, the war administered the heaviest blow to the principle of the global economy. Great 
nations broke all relations with one another and wanted to support only the resources and 
the laws of development [economic development, but the analogy with Darwinism and the 
natural sciences is obvious, L.M.] of their own country. From then on there was no global 
economy for the Central Powers anymore, but only an economy, which did not overcome the 
national borders. For years, the capitalists considered the decline of the global economy as 
a fruitful result. Instead of the economic relations on the world market, military [relations] 
on the battlefield emerged.  (Anonymous 1920, 2; my translation)8
7 “Jahrzehntelang kämpfte das Prinzip der Weltwirtschaft mit dem der nationalen Wirtschaft. Je 
länger der Kampf währte, desto offenbarer wurde es, daß der Gedanke der Weltwirtschaft, der 
immer innigeren ökonomischen Verknüpfung aller Länder, der stärkere sei.”
8 “Kurz vor Ausbruch des Krieges zeigte die kapitalistische Weltwirtschaft ihre schwächste Seite. 
Beinahe überall herrschte eine ziemlich schwere Krise, die Arbeitslosigkeit war bedeutend. In 
diesem Augenblicke wurde dem Prinzip der Weltwirtschaft der schwerste Schlag durch den Krieg 
versetzt. Große Staaten lösten alle wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zueinander und wollten nur 
die Hilfsquellen und die Entwicklungsgesetze des eigenen Landes zur Geltung kommen lassen. 
Von nun an gab es für die Mittelmächte keine Weltwirtschaft mehr, sondern nur eine Wirtschaft, 
die über die Staatsgrenzen nicht hinausreichte. Jahrelang galt für die Kapitalisten der Verfall der 
Weltwirtschaft als fruchtbringendes Ergebnis. An Stelle der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen auf 
dem Weltmarkte traten die militärischen auf dem Schlachtfelde.”
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Capitalism took advantage from the crisis of world economy, it is stated, substi-
tuting trade relations with military relations. Of course, communist and socialist 
papers were not the only that interpreted the war as interruption of global eco-
nomic relations: in the Habsburg Monarchy of 1915, the Fremden Blatt encour-
aged the development of national economy, since the global economy had been 
destroyed by the war:
Since the global economy is destroyed, there are no international relations anymore, and we 
must strive with all our forces to nationalize our economy again […]. 
  (Wurm-Arnkreuz 1915, 4; my translation)9
The concept of the global economy can be found in the socialist discourse well 
before the 1920s, and constituted a topic of socialist congresses already in 1894: 
for instance, it was mentioned in the Protokoll des Internationalen Sozialistischen 
Arbeiterkongresses held in Zurich in 1894.10 In this case, the fact that the world’s 
economy was accompanied by a condition of constant warfare was identified as 
one of the contradictions of capitalism.
The importance of the ‘world economy’ for communist and socialist discourses 
was well known, and the term was recognized as being directly connected with 
these currents of thought. For instance, an Italian scientific publication already 
described ‘world economy’ as an economic category typical for communism as 
early as 1876 (Ciccone 1876, 178).11 At that time, the expression was rare to find 
in other Italian-language contexts. Socialism from Genesis to Revelation (1892), 
by Franklin M. Sprague, also mentioned “world economy” in relation to socialist 
economy (Sprague 1892, 404). Socialist newspapers thus possibly played a key 
role in spreading the discourse on world economy beyond the scientific domain of 
economics. As Ludwik Fleck maintained with regard to knowledge circulation in 
the natural sciences (Werner and Zittel 2011, 23), economic knowledge was trans-
ferred beyond the scientific sphere and became exoteric knowledge (which then 
eventually might have come back into the esoteric sphere of economics, having 
been transformed and adapted).
9 “Weil die Weltwirtschaft zusammengebrochen ist, gibt es keine internationalen Beziehungen 
mehr, und wir müssen mit allen Kräften bemüht sein, unsere Wirtschaft wieder zu nationalisie-
ren […].”
10 Protokoll des Internationalen Sozialistischen Arbeiterkongresses in der Tonhalle Zürich vom 
6. bis 12. August 1893: “Nur das Proletariat hat ein Lebensinteresse, den Widersinn der heutigen 
Gesellschaft zu beseitigen: Weltwirtschaft – und ständige Kriegsgefahr […],” 1894, 2.
11 Ciccone: “[...] economia pubblica, economia politica, cui aggiungono i comunisti una econo-
mia mondiale,” 1876, 178.
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3  Technology and Communication: Changing 
Representations of Global Space and Economy
Focusing on the conception of space, we can ask how the idea of a global eco-
nomic space was constructed, but also which economic processes were seen as 
influencing economy on a global scale. For instance, the first issue of the Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv contains an article on the Panama Canal (Stubmann 1913), 
as well as on the global significance of railways (Thieß 1913). It would also be 
interesting to explore the connection between technical innovations – especially 
infrastructures – and conceptions of global economy.
In fact, means of communication such as the telegraph and the telephone were 
understood as being deeply bound to the development of global economic rela-
tionships, as we can see from volume fifteen of the British Board of Trade Journal, 
which at the end of the nineteenth century stated: “The Americans were the first to 
realise the importance of telephony and to appreciate the part it was likely to play 
in the world’s economy” (Commercial Department of the Board of Trade 1893, 264).
At the same time, means of transport and communication routes – and thus 
technical innovations in general – were also conceived as a way of fostering the 
‘world economy.’ In the 1893 handbook Descriptive Economics: An Introduction to 
Economic Science, we can read:
Fast lines of steamships bring all parts of the globe into communication. They have facilities 
for transporting all products. The Suez canal went a long way toward furthering the world 
economy. A Nicaragua canal may sometime do even more.  (Bly 1893, 233)
Thus, we can infer that the growth of communication and transport routes, as well 
as technical innovations that allowed faster exchange of goods and opened up new 
trade relations, signified a change in the perception of space, and that these changes 
favored thinking of economy not as a national or colonial but as a global issue.
For this reason, the spatial turn (Bachmann-Medick 2016, 211–243) and the 
history of technology must also be considered central theoretical approaches for 
an entangled history of economy and economics, whereas questions of mobil-
ity (of persons as well as of objects) should be as important as the questions of 
knowledge transfer that I examine in the next section.
4 Travelling Concepts in World Economy
Finally, a possible research focus in the history of the global economy lies on trans-
national and interdisciplinary transfer: on knowledge transfer on the  international 
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level, on the one hand, and on conceptual transfer between disciplinary and social 
fields, on the other. Knowledge transfer can be analyzed through a comparison of 
economic journals from different countries, and by asking how their terminology 
and conception of world economy show reciprocal influences. Conceptual transfer 
could be highlighted through the analysis of metaphors and imageries from fields 
other than classical economic theory. In both cases, we can conceptualize these 
phenomena as ‘travelling concepts’ in the history of economics.
Interestingly, the translation of German book titles (though not necessarily 
of their contents) in the 1920s seems to have been important for the diffusion of 
the term ‘économie mondiale’ in French.12 However, even well before the found-
ing of the Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv in Kiel, discourses on global economy were 
triggered by the translation of the German word ‘Weltwirtschaft.’ For example, 
in 1855 the Annali universali di statistica, published in Milan, displayed the term 
‘world economy’ in Italian (‘economia mondiale’), which at that time was still 
very rarely used, in the translation of a German title, System der Weltökonomie 
(Anonymous, 1855, 117–118).13 The use of the term in English was also influenced 
by German terminology: for instance, Kaufmann’s Socialism (1874), declaredly 
“based on” Schäffle’s book Kapitalismus und Socialismus (1870), uses the words 
“universal economy” with the meaning of world economy. It relates the concept 
to a series of negative values:
Over-little as well as over-much state help is undesirable. The individual citizen now-a-days 
is so intimately connected with and dependent on the movements of the great social body, 
and with the progressive extension of the economic circle all over the world (comprehend-
ing not only individuals but whole nations), every isolated domestic economy is drawn so 
completely into the general vortex of universal economy, or at least the economy of nations, 
that it becomes the undoubted duty of the society to protect its component members against 
those contingencies which arise from such a complicated system of economy.  
 (Kaufmann 1874, 284)
As we can see, the text reflects the German opposition of “Weltwirtschaft” and 
“isolierte Volkswirtschaft” discussed above. In this quotation, however, the 
global economy was presented as dangerous and complicated. Moreover, in this 
12 Brocard 1929, 25, quoted Bernhard Harms, Économie nationale et économie mondiale, 1924; 
von Tyrka, Problèmes d’économie mondiale des états industriels modernes, 1916; Nachimsen, 
Économie mondiale avant et après la guerre, 1926. The expression ‘économie mondiale’ is rare to 
find in French titles in the same period.
13 The title referred to is Winkelblech 1853, translated as: Ricerche sull’organizzazione del lavoro, 
o Sistema d’economia mondiale.
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 publication, dating from the 1870s, the concept was projected onto other epochs, 
and it was understood as a typical feature of capitalism:
From times immemorial capitalism has maintained its place among other systems in the 
world’s economy. It was the ruling principle in the commerce of the Phoenicians, the Ital-
ians, the German towns, long before slavery and feudalism ceased to dispute its pretension 
as the exclusive motor of society.  (Kaufmann 1874, 63)
In fact, communism and capitalism were identified as two different “modes of 
world’s economy”:
To return then to a public state communism, pure and simple, as the best mode of the 
world’s economy, instead of simply purifying and further developing our present capitalis-
tic forms, would be a lamentable step backwards.  (Kaufmann 1874, 247)
In this passage, the author suggested to modify, improve, and “purify” capital-
ism, opposing “public state communism.”
The projection of the concept of global economy onto other historical periods 
can also be conceived as a form of conceptual transfer or translation. This began 
around 1915, and developed especially after the 1930s and 1940s, when the 
concept was stabilized in scientific language and enjoyed increasing usage also 
beyond the scientific field. English imperial and colonial economy, for example, 
was now described as “Englische Weltwirtschaft,” an expression that was not 
used before the twentieth century (Predöhl 1949, 65–66). Thus, discourses on the 
global economy, whose beginnings I have briefly sketched, can be better under-
stood through the analytical category of “travelling concepts” or “concepts in 
translation” (Bachmann-Medick 2014, 119–136). In this way, we can relativize and 
historicize concepts that have often been considered as being obvious and uni-
versally valid – their universality being granted by economic ‘laws.’
5  Conclusion: Approaches to Deconstructing 
Economics
In this article, I have pointed to a new way of looking at economics and its con-
cepts and categories. Furthermore, I have tried to exemplify this through a brief 
analysis of discourses on global economy and how they were translated from and 
into different languages and contexts. This is, of course, only a short and exem-
plary case study, and there is still much work to do in order to uncover the making 
of the global economy and to deconstruct the categories of economic science. Such 
a process of deconstruction of economics implies several  challenges, but at the 
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same time new and interesting results. First, it means questioning the universality 
of economic laws, as has been done with the categories of the humanities and the 
natural sciences, thereby also paving the way for a “cross- categorical translation” 
(Chakrabarty) of even too “obvious” economic terms (see Bachmann-Medick 2012, 
33–35). Second, it allows a deeper understanding of the ethical and epistemic 
values attributed to economic concepts and ideas, following the methods that his-
torians of science have applied to the history of the natural sciences (Daston and 
Galison 2007) and of the humanities (Daston 2014). Third, it results in studying 
the multiple processes of translation and adaptation of the categories of economic 
science. Last, but not least, science studies applied to the history of economy 
and economics entail analyzing the construction of scientificity, of ‘the market’ 
and of ‘the economy’ in and through the discipline of economics, which can be 
both visual (e.g. through diagrams or other visualizations of statistical data) and 
textual (Latour 2006 [1986], 279).
In order to point to how one could go even further than discourse analysis, I 
have suggested studying the perception of global economic processes in its inter-
action with the perception of new media, means of transport and communication, 
and mobility (see Callon and Ferrary 2006). In this sense, a cultural history of the 
global economy cannot be conceived without history of science and history of 
knowledge, science and technology studies (STS), and media studies. However, it 
would only then be truly interdisciplinary when engaging in a dialogue with liter-
ary studies (see the contribution by Tom Clucas in this volume as well as Joseph 
Vogl 2002). Its dimensions should go beyond Eurocentric approaches and consider 
the translational, transnational, global, and (post-) colonial aspects of the under-
standing of economy and the development of economics as a discipline. Since this 
implies that researchers can understand the languages and have a deep know ledge 
of the history of geographic areas other than those traditionally belonging to the 
‘West,’ area studies are indeed much needed for such new approaches to an entan-
gled history of economics. Finally, those who dare to go beyond the traditionally 
established borders attributed not only to written sources, but also to the textual 
as a form of publishing research results, should follow Peter Galison’s (2014) and 
Andressa Schröder’s (in this volume) hints and allow filmmaking and art to enter 
the domain of scientific research. As Peter Galison has argued in his 2014 article and 
shown through movies he has (co-)directed, documentaries can represent a com-
plementary way of doing history of science. I would suggest that the same is true 
for economic processes and the understanding of economics, where historians and 
sociologists could only profit from cooperation with visual artists and filmmakers. 
It is a question of materiality, too: indeed, what could be a better means than film 
to make the voices of the (subaltern) people heard, the technological and natural 
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soundscape listened to, and the interplay of nature, humans, animals, technology, 
and economic interests seen? For instance, in the documentary Sonic Sea (2016), 
dealing with man-made ocean noise and related environmental problems, the film 
directors Michelle Dougherty and Daniel Hinerfeld succeed in this aim. I thus con-
clude encouraging more openness to non- traditional, non-textual forms of expres-
sion from the side of historians, not only as sources and as means of knowledge 
dissemination, but also as epistemic tools, as ways of doing research and producing 
knowledge they should seriously confront.
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Silke Schicktanz
Normativity and Culture in the Context 
of Modern Medicine: A Prospective Vision 
of an Elective Affinity
Cursed, cursed creator! Why did I live? Why, in that instant, did 
I not extinguish the spark of existence which you had so 
wantonly bestowed?
– The ‘monster’ in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; ch. 15
Mary Shelley’s romantic novel Frankenstein (1818) symbolizes a particular posi-
tion towards the means and achievements of modern life sciences: It is marked by 
hopes and fears related to the outcomes of such research as well as an ambivalent 
admiration for the courage of those inventors’ desire to try out what is at least 
thinkable. Apart from the rich ambivalence of this novel, it is a kind of irony that 
‘Frankenstein’ as term still appears in many public debates on genetic modifica-
tion, transplantation medicine, or synthetic biology as a label to classify such 
innovations as repugnant and dismissible. Hereby, the creator and the creation 
are almost equated.
Almost two centuries later, pop-cultural phenomena such as the 2011 Hol-
lywood movie Rise of the Planet of the Apes, directed by Rupert Watt, show, in 
a similar vein, the subtle ways in which science fiction serves as platform to 
address various ethical issues and concerns. This film tells the story of the appli-
cation of a new somatic gene therapy targeting dementia in a near future. When 
applied in human primates it significantly boosts the primates’ social and cogni-
tive intelligence. Feeling inspired by the outstanding intelligence performances 
of the tested chimpanzees, the young leading researcher (here rather a failed hero 
than a mad scientist) is tempted to apply the new drug to his demented father. 
He does so by bypassing the common professional ethics of informed consent of 
his father or any review board assessment, though his actions seem justified as a 
case of ‘ultimate ratio,’ and by his passionate love for his father. While the movie 
overall presents more fiction than science, it touches upon many ethical concerns 
related to modern science: From animal testing and the underlying arbitrariness 
of a human-ape distinction, to the ethics of inserting artificially genes into the 
genome of a species, and finally experimental drug testing, the movie seems to 
leave nothing out.
Considering both, Frankenstein and Rise of the Planet of the Apes, what is 
most relevant is the observation that novels and other types of cultural  narratives 
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allow the expression of concerns, feelings, or worldviews otherwise easily 
neglected by the rational language of scientific enthusiasm. These examples 
mark a period of almost two hundred years of cultural reflection on science and 
medicine, each embedded within a framework of understanding of science and 
narrative techniques typical to its own era.
It is exactly this interplay between the socio-cultural dimension and the 
norms expressed that is worth reconsideration. In the following, I use the terms 
‘socio-cultural’ and ‘cultural’ synonymously as umbrella terms, to signify ‘culture’ 
in a wide sense. By this, despite the difficulties in defining such a highly loaded 
term, I mean meanings, understandings, and practices ‘presenting’ or ‘symboliz-
ing’ our interactions with other beings or the environment by verbal or non-verbal 
forms. According to my definition, ‘culture’ stands here for the robust and histor-
ically (partly) stable system of ideas and practices within a collective, expressed 
in various forms of mediality.1 By this definition, culture differs significantly from 
psychological attempts or spontaneous social inter-individual interactions.
Culture overlaps with economics, politics, and law, which are also collective, 
public endeavors, but is less explicit than those orders and rules. It is – to use Clif-
ford Geertz’s metaphor – a “web” (1973) in which we collectively feel cocooned 
without often being aware of it. Culture exists only when we give it a cultural 
meaning – and we tend to do so, when others ask for explanations of things that 
are not self-evident. However, I am aware – and it might be particular method-
ologically relevant – that social interactions and cultural forms can strongly 
differ with regard to their material, spatial, and temporal validity. The study of 
culture – as I here understand it – can therefore range from ethnographic, anthro-
pological, sociological, or empirical-ethical approaches to the study of literature, 
media, or art.
For instance, a cultural study of German science fiction novels of twentieth 
century and an empirical study of social interactions by non-participatory obser-
vation of doctor-patient-communication during cancer care differ significantly 
with regard to their methodological accounts and, perhaps, theoretical assump-
tions. However, what these studies share (or can share, according to the idea I 
defend here) is that they allow us insights in the often-hidden meta-structure of 
providing ‘meaning’ to the way how norms or values and medical practices or 
ideas regarding the human body are mutually shaped in a particular setting (see 
Schicktanz 2007). The reservoir of cultural attempts can help us to reflect upon 
1 In a broad sense, I am interested in the parallels of different media (including literature, mov-
ies, artistic performances, or even images and paintings), but of course I am aware that each 
media has its historical meanings and methodological constraints.
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both, the hidden as well as the explicit meanings that the body ‘has’ and that 
inform so even our normative reflections of what one ought to do with the body.
The relationship between applied ethics and cultural studies is not an easy 
one to determine. The juxtaposition of culture and normativity can provoke 
objection, when norms and values are seen already as part of ‘culture.’ However, 
such an almighty concept of culture seems almost impenetrable and therefore 
unproductive for any reflective study. Still, there exist many ways to conceptu-
alize the relationship between culture and normativity. At one end of this spec-
trum, as in post-modern cultural studies, there is a trend to see things from a 
social-constructivist point of view (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Bauman 1993). In 
such a view, all explicit and hidden values and norms are construed as arbitrary, 
local, or contingent. Any underlying moral message is seen as just one of many 
possible messages, and the body is understood as a text that can be rewritten and 
reinterpreted in various terms. At the other end of the spectrum, where analytical 
(Searle 1995) or structuralist approaches (Douglas 1970, 1992; Lévi-Strauss 1961, 
1963) are located, the cultural narrative provides a vehicle to infect its listener 
with ‘true’ propositions of what is and what ought to be. However, whether one 
of these extreme positions really does justice to the normativity embedded and 
entangled with cultural interpretations of our bodily practices and images must 
be critically questioned.
In the following, I suggest a third, alternative way to conceptualize and 
analyze the productive joints and links between current approaches of applied 
ethics and socio-cultural studies. The aim of the approach I propose is to open up 
future cultural studies for an ‘ethical turn,’ but not in the naïve sense of ethics, 
which conflates it with a pre-fixed set of norms and values (whether western 
or non-western morality does not matter here). As I will illustrate later on, the 
ethical perspective that can propel cultural studies further requires a reflective, 
participatory, and theoretically informed take.
Given the various meanings that ‘culture’ has gained within the broad field 
of cultural studies, it seems almost impossible to provide one simple working 
definition of the term.2 In the following, therefore, I will use various concepts of 
‘body’ as analytical lenses to illustrate how culture and normativity can be fruit-
fully brought together at the intersection of medicine and bioethics. My  restriction 
on this particular intersection has its historical and pragmatic reasons: science 
and medicine have reconstructed the (late-) modern worldview with regard to 
2 This is an almost unavoidable problem that various ethicists and political philosophers strug-
gle with when reflecting on ‘culture’ from a normative point of view, as Seyla Benhabib 2002 
illustrates.
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ontology and epistemology and almost replaced the former religious hegemony. 
They have also fundamentally restructured our everyday life (at least in highly- 
industrialized societies). Even without any explicit reference to high-tech med-
icine, human life is from its beginning now structured by modern practices of 
hygiene, birth control, or prenatal care. The body serves as a locus of all inter-
ventions, projects, and expectations. Life expectancy, still an average likelihood, 
is a mutually shaped result of modern medicine and social conditions, including 
the composition of expectations and life plans regarding education, family plan-
ning, working career, or retirement. That said, the massive impact of other factors 
such as capitalism, communication technologies, or political orders must be rec-
ognized as signifiers of late-modern culture. All of these culminate in the field 
of medicine. No current debate on medical advancements such as embryonic 
stem cell research, uterus transplantation, or robotics in health care can restrain 
the economical, communicative, or legal frameworks in which such debates and 
research practices are embedded.
It seems almost impossible to escape modern medicine’s influence from the 
minute ‘we’ were created in a pre-birth stage. In a similar vein to the question 
that Frankenstein’s monster rhetorically asks its creator, should we be anxious 
or thankful about medicine as structural creator of our lives? To escape the emo-
tional stalemate of such a question, I propose to address both the ethical and 
cultural dimensions attached to this matter.
For this purpose, I want to suggest the term of ‘elective affinity’ (Wahlver-
wandtschaft). It is a productive concept for describing the relationship between 
normative ethics and socio-cultural studies of medicine that I suggest here. I use 
the term much as it was used by the German sociologist Max Weber, to describe 
the fact that two social systems or mentalities are related to or gravitate to each 
other, even though there is no simple causality or natural logic for such a relation-
ship (see also Swedberg 2005, 83).3 To construe this relationship as elective affin-
ity is an attractive alternative to the idea that morality and culture are bound by 
natural kinship. Both the naturalization of cultural values as well as the universal 
justification attached to social norms neglect the structural differences between 
the study of norms (the ‘ought’) with the study of social facts (the ‘is’). The elective 
decision to relate normative judgements to a social practice of morality, embed-
ded in cultural practice, allows for a critical distance to the facts as well as to 
commonly made claims about how people should behave. The affinity, however, 
stresses the compatibility of understanding and interpreting social norms and 
3 The term Wahlverwandtschaft itself stems from early chemistry and was culturally made pop-
ular by Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften 1808.
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cultural practice as an expression of moral judgements how things should be. By 
this, a pragmatic assumption is shining through, meaning that social practice is 
coined by and therefore expresses moral convictions.
The programmatic shift I suggest by bringing cultural studies and ethical 
analysis into a productive interplay – intended to allow for an important future 
turn in cultural studies – intersects on four different dimensions:
First, a mutual critical reflection upon underlying basic assumptions within 
each area – bioethics as well as cultural studies – is needed. The cultural assump-
tion within applied ethics – here understood as a theoretical reflection on moral 
practice and everyday norms – often includes limited descriptive conceptions 
of the self, society, or hegemonic structures. On the other side, the normative 
premises often buried under the attempt of a ‘critical’ analysis in cultural studies 
should be made transparent, visible, and explicit.
Second, on the descriptive-analytical dimension, we need a better, more 
detailed understanding of the dynamics between biomedicine, lived morality, 
and socio-cultural factors and how they interact in specific time-space constel-
lations. Here, we are interested on the one side in the processes of negotiations 
between the somatic, material body defended in biomedicine, and the under-
standing of the body as locus of cultural inscriptions on the other. Examining this 
dynamic requires theoretical openness and detailed descriptions of global, local, 
or glocal developments in the area to enrich our understanding of the complexity.
Third, on a methodological dimension, we should involve lay and patients’ 
moral perspectives beyond the scholars’ view. By this, we may appreciate the 
complexity of the sensing body as promoted by phenomenological or some fem-
inist approaches. Until now, bioethical expertise as well as cultural scholarli-
ness methodologically prioritize the scholar’s view on problems, outcomes, and 
norms. While this, as such is legitimate, it limits our epistemology as well as the 
range of justifiable claims for generalization. Methodological experimentation 
and diverse models of inclusiveness need to be addressed as important innova-
tions for the future studies.
Fourth, on a normative dimension, we need to consider integrated ap -
proaches to addressing commonalities and parallels in the ethical and cultural 
space. I suggest the concept of responsibility to increase our analytical sensibil-
ity for the political, social body. The ‘social body’ refers to the power relations 
defining and ascribing vulnerability, personhood, or injustice related to medical 
practices. The language and concepts of bioethics need to bring in such concepts 
for practical and social reasons to overcome the still-unquestioned paradigms 
of individualism and (neo)liberalism prevailing in bioethics. This opening up of 
a  political-ethical space allows us to rejoin attempts from both sides, from the 
cultural and the ethical perspectives.
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In the following, I will enfold each of these four dimensions. Hereby, I under-
stand each dimension in itself as a field worthy of future research, while the 
combination of more than one dimension is also welcomed. My programmatic 
approach takes its self-reflective starting point from bioethics. Regarding the 
potential of future cultural studies, I do not promote a concrete way to ethicize 
cultural studies, but I suggest to use the approach I propose here as an analytical 
lens for disciplinary self-reflection and inspiration. This implies rethinking the 
underlying assumptions regarding political impacts, the conceptualization of the 
body, the tendency toward expertocracy and scholarly elitism, as well as issues of 
responsibility (as scholar, citizen, or society) within cultural studies.
1 Culture and Bioethics: Where to Start
Bioethics is a wide field. On one end of its spectrum, it covers political activities 
undertaken to implement expert advice (e.g. in form of council or committee). In 
this context, ‘ethics’ or ‘bioethics’ does not mean one clear-cut scholarly way of 
moral philosophical reasoning; instead, it extends to a broad range of social roles 
and practical functions. Experts involved are rarely philosophers or ethicists, but 
can be any kind of academics or legal scholars. Ethicization herein aims at setting 
up so-called ‘soft-law,’ often bypassing democratic structures such as parliament 
or civil society. It presents a governance solution to regulate new social and tech-
nological trends (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001; Jasanoff 2003). This part of 
bioethical practice suffers from an underdevelopment of political-ethical theo-
rization as well as from a lack of deliberative and participatory methodologies 
(Schicktanz, Schweda, and Wynne 2012).
On the other end of its spectrum, bioethics describes a purely scholar activity, 
based on analytical or sometimes hermeneutic approaches, for developing theo-
ries, arguments, or concepts to address ethical problems related to medical prac-
tice or life sciences research. As Stephen Toulmin (1982) once put it, this ‘applied’ 
context has saved the life of ethics within twentieth-century philosophy. Before 
then, the area was generally preoccupied with theoretical debates over meta- 
ethics and formalistic analytical approaches; and moral philosophy fell victim to 
this priority. The approach of bioethics as academic endeavor can be character-
ized by a strong analytical methodology (i.e., considering the moral status of an 
embryonic stem cell in comparison to a living animal, etc.) or by a narrow focus 
on very practical questions (i.e., solving clinical ethical conflicts).
A third alternative aims at a cultural and empirically informed bioethics. Apart 
from all of the challenges and limitations inherent to such an  interdisciplinary 
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enterprise, its real advantages and strengths lie in the integration of intersub-
jective approaches into a wider context of political-ethical considerations. While 
conventional bioethics has a strong focus on doctor-patient relationships and on 
ethical conflicts arising for patients or citizens facing modern science, the cul-
tural and political context (e.g., consumerism and capitalism, Western values 
and medical ethos, expertocracy and health illiteracy, etc.) in which such a rela-
tionship is already embedded is otherwise neglected or disregarded.
Re-contextualizing bioethics as an intellectual activity that acknowledges 
the political needs and requirements for the public as well as for the academic 
means to bring back the political-ethical argument. But why was academic bio-
ethics stripped of political-ethical considerations?
This can be explained by at least three factors. First, as a close political- 
institutional perspective reveals, medicine and life sciences operate mainly 
outside of parliamentary political structures in many western democracies. While 
other areas of social life such as trade, work, or education have been highly polit-
icized and heavily regulated since their beginnings, medicine and health care 
often operate in a rather loose web of political structures. The number of state 
laws regulating medicine and life science research is rather specific (and are often 
only a result of public ethical controversies, i.e., as it was the case for embryonic 
stem cell research, abortion, or organ transplantation). In most western democ-
racies, it is an expertocracy that self-regulates the dos and don’ts by soft-law.4 
Differences between countries exist and it is therefore crucial to study and reflect 
on the medico-legal culture when examining any particular medical practice and 
its ethical framework.
A second perspective, in line with a more Foucauldian understanding of 
‘biopolitics,’ acknowledges that there are strong state or institutional inter-
ests directly implemented in modern medicine and health care (Lemke 2006). 
However, they remain implicit and are hidden in the rational language of needs, 
diagnoses, or treatments. They are already internalized by modern citizens or 
patients looking after their healthy lifestyles, reproductive behaviors, or end-of-
life planning. Such a biopolitical perspective in governance risks eliminating the 
individual’s perspective. The political is all and everywhere, and therefore the 
productive, analytical tension of the political vs. the non-political is suspended 
(Bishop and Jotterand 2006). This supra-political perspective might be relevant to 
understand  hegemonic grammar and hegemonic position but it underrates and 
4 This argument is supported by the immense impact not only of national academies of science 
and medicine but also of international organizations such as the World Medical Association or 
the World Health Organization etc. on the health policy regulation.
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oversees practices of resistance or renitence by affected persons (Fraser 1989). 
Another worry about the domination of biopolitical power as discursive power is 
that it hides biosociality, unutterable sensation, or embodiment as human factors 
(Hazan 2015, 27).
A third explanation acknowledges that dominant bioethical approaches such 
as utilitarian, deontological, or principle-oriented approaches are always embed-
ded in political-ethical assumptions of modern liberalism. However, this political 
framing became almost invisible because of its presumption of priority given to 
individualism, to the moral principle of individual choice, and to respect for indi-
vidual autonomy. This ‘naked’ version of liberal bioethics suffers from the fact 
that political assumptions about liberalism entail much more than just this trium-
virate. Political-ethical assumptions of liberalism should always include in-depth 
analyses of the relationship between state, expert, and the citizen; questions of 
tolerance and its limits; the meaning of collectivity for self-understanding and 
understanding other’s citizens interest; and so on. All these questions surface from 
time to time in conventional bioethics, but are yet insufficiently addressed. The 
alternative would be to enlarge the bioethical analysis from the bedside beyond 
the doors of the hospital: to explore how inter-individual decisions, expectations, 
and negotiations of lays and professionals are embedded in a broader context 
of state-market-citizen relationships. Of course, such a zoom is methodologically 
challenging and limited. However, focusing, for example, on central actors or new 
political institutions such as patient organizations and patient collectives, allows 
for such an expanded perspective, which brings together the socio-cultural prac-
tices of such collectives (Brown et al. 2004), their political-ethical claims and 
legitimacy, as well as their impact on bioethical controversies (Beier et al. 2016; 
Raz, Jordan, and Schicktanz 2014; Schicktanz 2015). Such a normative perspective 
would complement the cultural study of the collective body – in its explicit as 
well as more implicit versions – reflecting on the gendered, the disabled, and the 
colored body, as those bodies are always collectivized.
2  The Body as Local Inscription or as Global 
Soma: The Dynamics of Medicine, Morality, 
and Culture
Cultural studies and STS (science and technology studies) have revealed many 
astonishing facts regarding the dynamics of medicine, cultural practice, and 
norms. On the one hand, there are areas that can be characterized by strong local 
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differences or even local resistance against global standards. One example here is 
the non-acceptance of postmortem organ donation and brain death in Japan and 
in many other countries of the Asian or Arabic world, while the western world 
seems to see this as self-evident and taken for granted (Lock 2002; for limits 
within the western world, see Schicktanz and Wöhlke 2017). On the other hand, 
there are cases of strong global uniformity and global conformance in medicine, 
based on assumptions of the body as purely materialistic soma, detached from 
any interpretation or value (see also Joralemon and Cox 2003).
An example for the global spread of new body technologies is the genetic 
selection of in-vitro fertilized eggs before they are implanted into a woman’s 
uterus, called as pre-implantation diagnosis (PGD). It is now a commonly accepted 
practice in most regions of the world across the western/eastern division, if such 
expensive reproductive medical technologies are affordable. Given the extreme 
concerns expressed in the early 2000s when PGD was established, its triumphal 
procession since then is quite impressive and a result of an international active 
community of scientists and ethicists defending the idea that the fertilized eggs 
are not yet morally relevant as the ‘adult’ human body and its attached person-
hood.
However, there are also more complex examples, of how modern medicine 
is both globally spreading and locally adapted to fit into the respective cultural 
context. This process can be understood as ‘glocalization.’ Here, the concept of 
glocalization is understood to analyze the process of negotiation, refraction, and 
mimicry between globalization and localization (see Bauman, 1998; Roudometof 
2016, 1–42). In contrast to globalization – here understood as the modern version 
of a market-driven soft-colonialism – glocalization as a conceptual approach sen-
sitizes for a detailed analysis of how the global and the local are negotiated case by 
case in medical and health care practice. The local-global relationship of various 
medical practices might differ with regard to their legal-ethical frameworks (for 
example in the case of organ donation and its different regulations worldwide: 
Shepherd, O’Carroll, and Ferguson 2014; Lopp 2013; Randhawa and Schicktanz 
2013). Economical aspects, regarding when and how much a new medical tech-
nology is covered by public health insurance, are also an obvious striving force 
for global spread. While some public health systems cover all costs for in-vitro fer-
tilization for every woman, others cover a limited number of treatments only for 
heterosexual couples (Brigham, Cadier, and Chevreul 2013). Even the scientific 
practices might also differ, for example, in which gynecological examinations 
are conducted in the US, France, or Germany, as once observed by Lynn Payer 
(1989). More often it remains globally robust, because common medical diagno-
ses or treatments are now conducted along international standards to satisfy the 
quality criteria of the ‘gold standard’ of the World Medical Association.
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To provide a more detailed picture of what I mean by ‘glocalization,’ I will 
expand upon the current practice of surrogacy as an illustrative example of the 
way that medical practice, culture, and morality are mutually negotiated. Surro-
gacy is an artificial reproductive treatment where a so-called surrogate, the ges-
tational mother, is implanted with a genetically often non-related embryo, then, 
after birth, hands the baby over to the so-called social parents. The surrogate and 
the intended parents are bound via a contract, and the intended parents normally 
adopt the child after birth or are legally acknowledged because the embryo is 
genetically related to them.5
The idea to implant a fertilized egg into a womb of a woman not genetically 
related became technically possible after the introduction of in vitro fertiliza-
tion, from the end of the 1970s on. Two decades later this practice has spread 
worldwide (see Mitra, Schicktanz, and Patel 2018, 3–6). While some South Asian 
regions are often portrayed in the media as hot spots for surrogacy markets, 
surrogacy is also now practiced in all other continents of the world. However, 
the concrete practice varies extremely with regard to the selection process of 
surrogates as well as access for potential parents. The surrogate can include a 
close relative acting out of ‘altruistic’ reasons, or an almost unknown person 
selected from an internet databank. Defense of a commercialized practice of 
surrogacy sees the surrogate as a ‘womb to rent,’ and the delivery of a baby as 
bio- labor, which needs to be reimbursed in ‘fair’ prices. Alternately, the pro-
ponents of ‘altruistic’ practice assume an emotional bond between surrogate 
and baby via physical unity, and therefore want to avoid any commercializa-
tion or allow bonds between the child and the surrogate. The legal justifica-
tions for eligible intended parent(s) differ strongly, too: in India, currently, only 
heterosexual couples are allowed for medical reasons, while in Israel religious 
reasons determine who can be a surrogate in relation to the intended parents 
(e.g., only a Jewish surrogate for Jewish-intended parents). In California, homo-
sexual couples or single (male or female) parents can approach a surrogate as 
intended parents. This is for conservative reasons in many countries not pos-
sible because their sexuality is seen as ‘unnatural’ or ‘immoral.’ Moreover, the 
scientific practice differs among countries according to the selection procedure 
of fertilized eggs or the absolute number of embryos to be implanted into the 
surrogate’s uterus. In most European countries, one, two, or a maximum of three 
embryos are permitted for implantation, while in the US or India more are pos-
sible, despite the significant increase of medical risks associated with  multiple 
5 In some cases, sperm or egg or both stem from the social parents, but there are also cases 
where both, eggs or sperms, are donated by another third party.
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 pregnancies for the surrogate and for the fetuses. In India, selective abortion is 
practiced to reduce again the number of fetuses if the intended parents want 
this (see Mitra and Schicktanz 2016).
These variations are inevitably linked to different ethical and social debates 
regarding the problem of exploitive market conditions for surrogates in low- and 
middle-income countries (such as India or Thailand), the right of reproductive 
freedom for intended parents or surrogates, the question of agency of surrogates 
under unequal social conditions, and the right of intended parents to select or to 
not come for the baby. The social concerns might be even more general regarding 
the impact of such a medical practice on the mundane understanding of kinship 
and motherhood, gender, or ethnicity – always attached to the body.
While an international overview of the debate offers a broad or even balanced 
picture of the ‘pros’ and ‘cons,’ the question needs to be posed whether national, 
local discourses are also so broad. They seem rather be dominated by few or selec-
tive arguments. Such a cultural taming of the ethical debate must be understood 
as a result of negotiating between the local and global context in which such 
debates are evolving and – at least for a particular moment in time – are fixable 
as culturally ‘significant.’ From a distant, comparative view there gleam some 
peculiarities: for instance, Indian sociologists have pointed out, despite critiques 
of the large economic and caste disparities, that it would be important to see the 
agency and opportunities for self-determination for surrogates, even in situa-
tions of commercial surrogacy (Tanderup et al. 2015). In Germany, the agency of 
surrogates is rarely considered as leading point but ethicists have emphasized 
rather the ‘best interest of the child’ as a criterion of legitimization. Whether this 
argument results in a permission or moral veto is dependent on how the ‘best 
interest of the child’ is then concretely interpreted (see also Wiesemann 2016, 
133; Beier and Wiesemann 2013). In the US, various scholars have focused on the 
social risks of commercialization as it might increase social disparities between 
races or classes and could lead to the exploitation of poor women or to a racist 
practice of dismissing non-white women as surrogates or egg donors (Thompson 
2005, 66). Again, such points to consider are yet rarely addressed in the German 
context, although might perhaps in the same way be relevant once the practice 
is implemented.
While none of these points is made exclusively in any of these three different 
national discourses, it is striking how some main lines of argument prevail in 
each context. We need more detailed studies to understand how the bioethical 
discourse depends on the culture in which it is embedded. Such a descriptive- 
analytical reflection, however, does not solve the quest for a more rational or uni-
versal understanding of moral norms – a project still worth to be defended as an 
ideal orientation, not as a simple solution.
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But indeed, such cultural framing of differences in the discourse6 has led 
to some misunderstanding within normative ethics: This misunderstanding 
assumes that the socio-cultural study of differences in bioethical positions results 
in “normative relativism” (Schicktanz 2018, 117–119). Normative relativism means 
that we are not allowed to question each other about the local forms of norm 
validation and norm hierarchy, because all moral considerations are only locally 
valid. In a more pervasive form of neoliberal argumentation, such relativism is 
even used to justify any permissive stance towards new technologies: because 
nation A, B, or C (e.g. the US, India, or the UK) is doing X (e.g. surrogacy), it would 
be also acceptable in D (e.g. Germany) to do X. The underlying premise is then 
that there exists no universally valid argument to forbid it.
However, the here-defended idea of ‘post-conventional’ bioethics’ interest 
in cultural and social studies of medical practice means nothing more or less 
than contextualizing the leading moral justification by taking into account the 
‘real perceived’ social conditions in which the respective agents (e.g., patients, 
doctors, citizens) live, as well as the interpretation given to these living condi-
tions. ‘Post’ because conventional bioethics neglects any cultural embedding or 
social factors such as gender, ethnicity, class, etc. to influence bioethical posi-
tions. Such a distinction between conventional and post-conventional bioethics 
might provoke objections, because the generalization does injustice to individual 
scholars who are already open to interdisciplinary exchanges with sociology and 
cultural studies. However, it is used here to mark a more general shift in the field 
without discrediting any of those former approaches. Furthermore, it is impor-
tant not to conflate post-conventional bioethics with postmodern approaches, as 
the analytical focus on non-relativistic normative traditions is still viable. In a 
same vein, it would be productive to reflect on normativity within cultural studies 
by leaving the conventional paths of anti-normativity or radical constructivism. 
In such a sense, future cultural studies could try to embed their analysis in the 
lived experiences of moral reflections – not just considering moral standards and 
values as taken for granted, but to put more emphasis on the human practices of 
doubts, concerns, sensing dilemmas, seeking deliberation, and how this is cul-
turally mediated.
6 This might be explained by national law and local regulation, though the law also depends 
on cultural accounts of what is seen as ethical acceptable or not, see Hansen 2012. According 
to most philosophers the proper way should be that law follows ethics and not the other way 
around. However, in political practice, legal regulation is sometimes quicker implemented than 
a thorough ethical deliberation takes place. Therefore, it is important, from a cultural point of 
view, to assume a rather complex interplay between law and ethics.
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The production of hopes, expectations, or fears is accessible through the 
study of cultural media by understanding the body as text or as narrative (see 
Dekkers 1998; Frank 1995; Squier 2004, 20–21). Visual and performative art as 
well as literature are media that allow access to the emotional dimensions in form 
of a bodily narrative. Examples for this can be found in the work of the French 
artist Orlan. She examined in her own body art the relationship of pain, medical 
surgery, beauty, gender stereotypes, and norms. A very different example is Philip 
Roth’s novel Everyman (2006), where he examines aging, dying, and end-of-life-
planning, and how they impact the relationship of body, personhood, and nar-
ration. Both Orlan and Roth share the attempt to display pain and fear of death 
by pointing to scars, fragility, dependency, and by narrating a lived body in its 
particular social, moral, and cultural embedding. And both provide a narration 
of moral doubts and concerns: where are the advantages of modern medicine, 
where are limits?
However, it is also necessary to contextualize the moral claims made in a 
historical course of the discourse. The search for reasons for differences or sim-
ilarities in arguments and norms – and by this, the transgression of geopolitical 
boundaries – serves as part of a rationalization of each claim made. This is a main 
condition for the ‘elective affinity’ of applied ethics and cultural studies and can 
be seen as productive future for both disciplines.
The challenge of such an approach is not to lead to ‘factual fallacy.’ Such a 
factual fallacy would mean jumping directly from empirical or descriptive find-
ings of how people actually think or how practice currently works to the nor-
mative conclusion about how it should be. Such a normative positivism must 
be avoided. Instead, we need a critical assessment of how any moral claim or 
argument brought forward is culturally embedded in a hegemonic presentation. 
A transparent strategy for a comprehensible, proper making of a practical-moral 
judgment refers to an uncontroversial understanding of practical-moral judgment 
as mixed judgment. The mix consists of a prescriptive (normative) and descriptive 
(empirical, factual) statement combined, but avoids any crypto normativity.
Let us consider for a moment the above-mentioned example of surrogacy. Con-
sider that somebody states in a public debate that surrogacy should be allowed 
in Germany, because it allows women a good income and women want this. This 
claim is a conclusion as practical-moral judgment and built on normative premises 
(A) and on descriptive premises (B). The normative premises can be summarized 
as the following: A1) Surrogacy is as such morally not wrong and A2) all women 
should have the right to a good income. Descriptive assumptions that underlie 
such a conclusion are: B1) Good income is the main interest for women, which 
presents an empirical question as to whether this is true and women would not 
value other opportunities to gain more money elsewhere; and B2) It is c ulturally 
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uncontroversial what defines ‘good income’; or B3) Women have no other chance 
to get a good income than by surrogacy. What we see by this is that even if we 
would agree all on A1) or A2), the moral conclusion depends in a paretic version 
from the descriptive part. This descriptive part requires therefore socially robust 
knowledge (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001, 116–119) about social practice, 
effects, opinions, etc. Hence, practical-moral judgments do not only depend on 
common, shared reflections about what is ethically right or wrong, but in a similar 
way on shared robust interpretations of the world.
3  The Sensing Body as Situated and Affected: 
Enlarging the Experts’ View
Conventional bioethics has a one-sided tendency for the expert discourses. Such 
a tendency has its historical roots in the analytical tradition of ethics as well as in 
the close orientation towards the legal discourse. While the analytical approach 
is not necessarily expertocratic, its formalistic methods and abstract language 
often hinders non-experts in participation. The legal discourse definitively has 
an expertocratic manner, given the fact that public education never ever touches 
upon it and we mainly leave it to specialists, apart from some areas where lay 
judges are involved. For post-conventional bioethics, the critical assessment of 
expertocracy is a central element (Schicktanz, Schweda, and Wynne 2012). Cul-
tural insights similarly foster skepticism towards the idea that those not directly 
affected by or outside of the messiness of everyday life struggles (such as physi-
cians, academic ethicists, or lawyers) can anticipate hypothetically and properly 
such a complexity in its ambivalence.
Whether this intellectual representation works for the perspectives of persons 
who are socially marginalized or excluded must be problematized, though, for 
these persons, as social and political inequality hampers their opportunity to be 
represented in exclusive circles of academia or other elite groups. Marginaliza-
tion is here mainly based upon involuntarily, non-mutual membership such as 
belonging to a particular gender, ethnicity, or nationality. Such a group mem-
bership was not voluntarily chosen by these persons, but assigned to them from 
outside. Marginalization only takes place if a particular group identity is seen as 
‘negative’ (Williams 1998, 15–18). As Melissa Williams has convincingly shown, 
typical examples of such marginalization have concerned women, people of color, 
or people with disabilities, depending on particular historical or  political-cultural 
conditions. In relation to such a social exclusion from many intellectual resources 
or access to socio-political decision making, there is a serious risk that social 
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 stereotypes related to such a negative group assignment hinder those in power 
to decide to trust testimonials of those from marginalized groups. By this, many 
public and legal discourses suffer from “epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007) 
due to unbalanced power relations in the presentation of knowledge. Counter- 
measurements include awareness increasing participation or representation by 
members of one’s own group. These very general considerations are particular 
relevant in the field of medicine (Schicktanz 2015). This is because persons with 
chronic illness or with a disability have very specific perspectives and insights in 
the challenges of pain/bodily experiences or social and spatial exclusion when 
it comes to bioethical issues related to their condition. Being marginalized and 
affected (meaning that decisions will have a causal effect on them, see Schick-
tanz, Schweda, and Franzen 2008; Schicktanz 2015 for a detailed definition 
of ‘affected persons’) justifies a significant ethical priority of such voices. The 
embodied or affected experiences as well as the illness identity are legitimate 
and valuable sources for a privileged understanding of the everyday complexity 
relevant to the bioethical issue at stake. People in the fourth age, with dementia, 
or with autism, are too quickly excluded because of the non-translational content 
of their experiences (Hazan 2015, 47).
Experts, in contrast, cannot phenomenologically rely on such  experiences. 
Of course, they can indirectly reconstruct such experiences by referring to social, 
cultural, or psychological studies. But finding the right language, the right trans-
lation, to transform these special experiences into a social, publicly shared space 
is not trivial. Hence, the direct involvement of affected persons – in one way or 
another – is a necessary element for any future bioethics. Because limited 
resources and basic needs of persons affected might restrict their interest or 
factual opportunity to take actively part in such discourses and debates, new, 
joint methods in the cultural and socio-empirical studies can bridge the need for 
such a reconstruction. Here I see a particular area for future cultural studies to 
explore various means and methods to bring the affects, interests, vulnerabili-
ties, and needs of those excluded into the broader discourse. In terms of explo-
ration, more anthropological or ethnographic studies of people in the fourth age 
(Hazan 2015, 46–47, 71) or with dementia are needed to challenge stereotypical 
and often discriminating views of them as “almost dead” or “cognitive zombies,” 
to enlighten their untypical, but yet human nature. Experimental designs are 
required to explore the social and ethical issues of biotechnical innovations and 
their impact on our understanding of humanity. Following the course of cloning 
novels served Solveig Hansen in her dissertation (2016) as an orientation to 
examine the historical practice of social othering. By her joint cultural and ethical 
analysis of how clones have been anticipated and depicted in cultural discourse, 
she provides a thorough and complex picture of how our moral relationships are 
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built upon assumptions of sameness in quality (and not in quantity as the clones 
imply) but also independence and self-reliance as a basis for mutual respect. The 
limited socio-empirical perspective access to these future scenarios can be pro-
ductively complemented with such cultural studies of novels and anticipations.
However, this does not mean to incorporate any view of an affected person 
in an uncritical way. All perspectives shall be reflected with regard to their moral 
and epistemic claims. Assuming that affected persons are neither able nor willing 
to transcend their own personal interest into the social sphere is, however, 
 problematic. Emotional as well as biased views are similarly common in experts’ 
debates about patients, persons with disability, or others who are particularly 
affected. Therefore, any particular position or moral perspective needs to be 
understood as “situated knowledge” (Haraway 1988) or “situated ethics,” but this 
does not hinder the opportunity to enter a mutual discourse for finding the better 
 argument.
Transferring these thoughts to a future of cultural studies means, for example, 
to radically revisit the divide of high/classical and pop culture. Especially for any 
work on medicine and literature, pop culture, such as ‘trashy’ science fiction or 
medical thrillers, provide deep insights in common moralities and understand-
ings of modern medicine and biotechnology (see, for instance, Pethes 2005).
4  Body and Responsibility: The Certainty of Moral 
Tensions as Conjunctions of Deliberation
To illustrate my understanding of post-conventional bioethics as a continuous 
challenge between practice and theory, between descriptive and normative 
claims, I want to refer to the performance Zerreißprobe (tensile test) of the Aus-
trian artist Günter Brus from 1970. As a performance artist he shocked the public 
by making his body to the subject of artistic performances. He injured himself by 
cutting his head and thigh with a razor blade and arranging his vulnerable, naked 
body half stretched and half hanging within a web of strings crossing a room. 
Hereby, the vulnerability of the flesh was shown by means of the extreme display 
of a body disfigured by pain and by interventions from the outside. By being thus 
displayed, the body itself becomes both the medium of the artistic work, and the 
scene in which it takes place. It is this mutual meaning and interaction that sym-
bolizes the performance of bioethics by focusing on particular events or single 
bodies but being aware of the embedding of such entities in a broader context. 
In a second line of thought, the work of Brus also marks in an abstract sense the 
particular meaning the ‘body’ has as intersectional space between bioethics and 
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cultural studies (see Barkhaus and Fleig 2002, 9–23, 27–36). Although the cultural 
irritations such artistic presentations of the body produce on their own is not the 
point here, I assume that almost every viewer of such a performance feels moved, 
touched, or disturbed. This common sense of vulnerability of the human as body 
and as person is a certainty that provokes the claims of relativism and arbitrari-
ness – Brus’s tensile test serves here as a litmus test for the tensions built into 
modern medicine and biotechnology where they produce, via their innovations, 
such anticipations of bodily vulnerability and personhood.
So it is precisely the field of body modification and related bioethics where 
we observe a clash of perspectives in two ways, but which can also serve us as a 
productive intersection for an elective affinity.
In the first place, there is a serious distinction in the normative ways of eth-
ically judging how we assess the right of self-determination towards our bodies; 
secondly, there are solid variations in how the body and embodiment are theoret-
ically addressed. I have suggested earlier a methodological approach of making 
the tension between different meanings of body and autonomy explicit by setting 
out a dialectical method for heuristic use to be made of the recent dichotomies 
in bioethics (Schicktanz 2007). By this we cannot easily resolve moral dilemmas, 
but we can proceed in a dialogical way for addressing theoretically the various 
descriptive and normative claims. At least, we will overcome simplistic pro- and 
contra- debates and we are opening up instead of closing down debates for various 
theoretical relationships between autonomy (and other relevant normative con-
cepts) and body/embodiment. This provides a central interface for the ethical 
reflection about who can decide what, when, and how about one’s own body. 
What elements of a person can be regarded as available or unavailable at which 
points in time during the process of this person’s life or dying? Whether the ‘body 
boom’ in ethics is something avoidable can be questioned (see also Shildrick and 
Mykitiuk 2005). Even supporters of the liberal conception of self- determination, 
who primarily recognize the principle of non-maleficence (the general rule not 
to harm) as morally equivalent, need to clarify the idea of socio-cultural dimen-
sions of embodiment and the framework for the meaning of bodily unavailability 
within social interaction. Who or what is the other entity that must not suffer 
damage, and what constitutes damage (Schicktanz 2007)?
Having said this, I need to propel my own focus on the relationship of the 
normative principle of ‘autonomy’ on one hand, and the conceptualization of the 
body/embodiment a bit further. The political-ethical sphere of social interaction 
requires a constant concern for more than individual autonomy. The most import-
ant concepts are then justice and responsibility. Starting from cultural observa-
tions and political practice, the bioethical enterprise is not only to set out ideal 
theories of justice or responsibility but to address witnessed forms of injustice and 
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irresponsibility. For sure, our sense for such immoralities is neither independent 
nor free of theoretical presumptions of what justice or responsibilities are. The ex 
negativo start is often more robust regarding our intuitions and knowledge, but it 
does not free us from a reflective approach to clarify such presumptions.
Considering an opening-up of cultural studies for ethical thinking might be 
facilitated by art or performative acts that confront us with the limits of textual 
analysis, rising issues of affects. However, it would be a great self-restriction to 
limit the ethical perspective to the sphere of aesthetics. Critical sociology and cul-
tural studies studying the presentation or performances of the liminal, excluded, 
or resistant human existences share a long-standing tradition with concerns about 
injustice along class, gender, ethnicity, national belonging, or injustice regarding 
the exclusion of disabled or sick persons. Their arsenal to address injustice is 
manifold, be it a dense description of exclusion mechanisms or a quantitative 
summary of the suffering of discriminated parties. They can bring often-unheard 
voices into the discourse and highlight the agency of parties often neglected or 
denied: women, children, the ill, or others often overseen (de Beauvoir 2000). 
This sociological practice, according to Wayne Brekhus (1998), devotes greater 
epistemological attention to “politically salient” and “ontologically uncommon” 
features of social life. Addressing women, the elderly, homosexuals, etc., means 
“marking” those excluded entities, but this practice unreflects or even repeats the 
hegemonic grammar and leaves the “unmarked” (whites, heterosexuals, men, 
etc.) unrevoked. Brekhus’ critique of the epistemic practice of identity labels and 
problematic singling-out is important and highly relevant to overcoming simplis-
tic, unreflective assumptions of the good and bad guys. We need to acknowledge 
that this epistemic practice within sociology is already embedded in a normative 
theory of justice and fair treatment of which ethics can help to unmask them in 
future co-operations.
I have suggested somewhere else (Schicktanz and Schweda 2012) that the 
concept of ‘responsibility’ is particularly helpful in linking everyday languages 
of morality and ethical-normative reflection. Providing a theoretical formula for 
what the concept of responsibility entails offers a way to explicate moral claims of 
self-responsibility, social or professional responsibility, or family responsibility 
ubiquitous in medical practice, health policy, or health communication. While 
of course only working in limitations, the concept of responsibility is not just a 
moral idea among others, but as a meta-ethical concept, it provides a meaning 
of how ethical properties are formulated, logically expressed, and epistemically 
assessed. Therefore, using terms of responsibility means that we are explaining 
normative claims embedded in social presumptions about relationships. This 
helps to translate ordinary folk language into a more abstract form to proof for 
consistency or to detect contradictions.
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This need for translation – from the everyday moral grammar to the theoretical 
-analytical level and back – is an endeavor that goes beyond the  conventional 
understanding of ‘education.’ It requires theoretical sensitivity for what consti-
tutes a responsible social relationship: It is always embedded in space and time 
and the relationship is enriched by cultural assumptions (i.e., in the case of the 
earlier mentioned surrogacy: what constitutes good parenthood; who counts as 
morally relevant actor: only the intended parents, or also the mother, the doctors, 
the government, etc.)?
Responsibility, however, in current sociology – especially medical sociology – 
has been narrowed down to a critical notion of moral imperatives, synonymous 
with the social practice of blaming and shaming (Rose 2006, 4;  Arribas-Ayllon, 
Featherstone, and Atkinson 2011), and applied to criticize biopolitical strategies. 
As such, the sociological notion of ‘responsibilization’ emphasizes a very special 
application of the term ‘responsibility’ focusing on the individual or the family 
as both the moral agent and the moral object in biopolitics. As an alternative, the 
productive junction with ethical theory alludes that this application has a strong 
tendency to reduce the understanding and practical usage of responsibility and 
that there are better, more refined ways to address responsibility in its many 
dimensions by using a detailed, transparent description of normative complexity 
(Schicktanz 2016).
5  Summing Up: An Elective Affinity between 
Bioethics and Socio-Cultural Studies 
of Medicine and Life Sciences
I have suggested in the beginning the concept of ‘elective affinity’ to bring forward 
a new relationship between bioethics and cultural studies – and would mean 
somehow a double turn-over: a cultural turn for bioethics and an ethical turn for 
cultural studies. Whether cultural studies have already adopted such an ethical 
gaze, I am not sure. However, a current trend to differentiate ‘critical’ cultural 
studies can be read as tendency to explicitly address issues of marginalization, 
discrimination, and exclusion. Being informed by various strands of critical 
theory might, however, not be the only future direction for cultural studies. Other 
approaches stemming from applied bioethics to address various ethical and 
social concerns can be innovative and helpful, as suggested here.
Normative studies and moral languages provide access to moral practice and 
help to signify the consistency as well as inconsistency in moral practice and 
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ethical thinking. There exists no absolute demarcation between moral practice 
in everyday life and theoretical ethical reflection, rather it is a continuum with 
smooth transitions. The theoretical concept of “reflective equilibrium” serves as 
dialectical model of normative judgment between theory and practice to describe 
and reflect on this continuum as philosophical method (Daniels 1996).
It is, however, seen as a legacy of Max Weber’s idea of value-free sociology and 
economical sciences that until today lead to an unrealistic or even wrong ideal of 
value-free sociology or cultural studies. As the dispute over ‘value-free’ (Wertfrei-
heit) vs. ‘value judgment-free’ (Werturteilsfreiheit) revealed already almost a half 
century ago (Albert and Topitsch 1971), it is not only a strange mythos of modern 
social and cultural studies to be value-free, as the study of values as well as the 
explication of values is part of any scientific activity – in social and cultural sci-
ences, as well as life science areas such as medicine or agriculture aiming for 
‘saving life,’ ‘curing disease,’ or providing ‘better living conditions’ or ‘sustain-
ability.’ However, such scholars should be explicit and transparent when making 
value judgments instead of allowing crypto-normativity in scientific terms 
or scholarly language. Terms and concepts such as ‘critique,’ ‘power,’ ‘social 
inequality,’ ‘vulnerability,’ and ‘colonialism’ always reflect a pejorative, moral 
meaning that we cannot escape as either speaker nor listener (Fraser 1989, 17–20). 
However, not any value judgment can claim to count as well-considered judg-
ment. Applied ethics and moral philosophy provide the methodological arsenal 
to win this battle over crypto-normativity and hidden values in scholarly work.
A flourishing, productive elective affinity between bioethics and cultural 
studies requires a crucial clarification about all own normative premises on the 
why, the how, and the what of ongoing research. The ‘why’-question focuses 
on the motivations and programmatic reasons behind a study and for singling 
out a problem to being relevant for in-depth examination. The ‘how’-question 
follows the lines of a chosen methodology and asks how far normative premises 
are already embedded in the research program (Merton and Storer 1973, 229–250). 
For example, does the selection of qualitative vs. quantitative methods only refer 
to epistemic assumptions of generalization or depth, or might it also include who 
should be in the focus of examination (the lay public, the experts, the media, 
etc.). The ‘what’-question critically reflects which underlying assumptions of 
injustice, responsibility, or vulnerability are already attached to the selection of a 
particular topic (the topic of terror in Europe, the topic of dementia in India, the 
topic of education in Africa, etc.). How does the spot on this topic risk shading 
other topics, and is the priority well-justified?
From a bioethicist’s point of view, there are many good arguments as to 
why and how socio-cultural studies are important or even indispensable for a 
well- defined and well-argued problem definition (what is the moral problem we 
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want to solve) as well as the practical recommendations often following bioeth-
ical inquiries ‘how to solve’ the conflict in the future. The concrete function of 
socio-cultural empirical insights for norm justification is instead very controver-
sial and perhaps for the purpose of the here-proposed collaboration modus not 
needed.
Cultural studies provide not only, but still importantly, a challenge to mono-
logical or one-sided perspectives on bioethics. From a theoretical point of view, 
the solution to the problem of legitimacy lies not in simple forms of public par-
ticipation in research and policy making, but in a conceptual analysis of the 
kind of perspectives needed. I am here assuming that there is no single, ultimate 
perspective. Only a combination and pluralization of different perspectives can 
offer us an approximation of the ‘whole picture.’ This requires a systematic adop-
tion of other perspectives (Schicktanz 2015, 251–252). With this increased com-
plexity, we enhance our understanding of the dependence of morality on affects 
and social dimensions of power. Thinking with stories, narratives, or images as 
cultural studies provides the arsenal and methodology that help us to test for 
consistency, for the wideness of the chosen perspective, or for the peculiarity of 
it. However, there are new risks such as more hidden morality, exclusivity, and 
ambiguity awaiting such concerted efforts. It would be worth going still further in 
this direction in the future.
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Multispecies Futures and the Study 
of Culture
1 Cultural Study and the Shape of Change
When I went to graduate school in the mid to late 1980s, first in Germany and 
then in the United States, it was hard to keep up with the pace of change. New the-
oretical paradigms in literary and cultural studies kept emerging, mingling, and 
inflecting each other: New Left Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, poststruc-
turalism, deconstruction, New Historicism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, gender 
studies, queer studies, and critical race theory all demanded attention to core 
theoretical texts, central concepts, distinctive methodologies, and often partic-
ular styles of argument. Cultural studies itself became another one in the march 
of paradigms. As the cross-disciplinary US offspring of the Birmingham School, 
cultural studies blended Marxist theories of revolution and the Foucauldian rhet-
oric of “circulation of power” with elements of gender and race theory in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. In its case studies, it relentlessly attacked and sought to 
do away with, once and for all, the distinction between high culture and popular 
or mass culture.
Conceived in this way, cultural studies imported methods from anthropology 
and broadened the literary canon of study immensely. At the same time, it paid 
much more direct attention to the users and consumers of texts rather than just 
to their producers, with Janice Radway’s study of romance and its readers and 
Constance Penley’s analyses of technoculture and fan fiction standing as early 
models of this transformation (Radway 1984; Penley 1991). While this altered per-
spective arguably transformed literary studies for good, cultural studies itself ran 
out of steam over the course of the 1990s. The theoretical contradictions between 
Marxist and poststructuralist assumptions about social change, the fear of “total-
ization” and the consequent narrowing of analytical focus, and the detailed atten-
tion lavished on cultural phenomena that were either forgotten or became trivial 
in just a few short years all contributed to the fizzling-out of cultural studies as a 
dominant theoretical paradigm, even as some of its theoretical and methodolog-
ical innovations endured.
Sometime in the 1990s, the shape of change itself changed in a good deal of 
humanistic research. Studies of memory and trauma moved to the forefront at 
about the same time as the focus on varieties of postmodernism in literature and 
the arts gave way to concepts such as globalization, hybridity, cosmopolitanism, 
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and border cultures, to name just a few. But while these concepts worked as pow-
erful organizing categories of research across disciplines in the humanities and 
qualitative social sciences, they did not impose one dominant theoretical para-
digm. Rather, they gave rise to clusters of approaches from different theoretical 
perspectives. This tendency has continued in the disciplinary innovations of the 
last two decades, which, in the United States at least, have mostly taken the shape 
of research areas organized around a central theme that does not in and of itself 
demand specific theoretical assumptions. Typically, these areas have come with 
labels such as ‘x studies’ or ‘y humanities’: disability studies, food studies, and 
human-animal studies, for example, or digital humanities, medical humanities, 
environmental humanities, and urban humanities. Many of them have catalyzed 
innovations in research and teaching that have crystallized in centers, programs, 
majors and minors; few of them, to date, have resulted in the creation of new 
departments.
Many, though not all, of these new areas of study have emerged from or 
sought to create new connections to particular areas of science and technology. 
Disability studies, narrative medicine, and the medical humanities, for example, 
use methods of analysis from anthropology, history, and literary and cultural 
studies to explore historically and culturally varying ideas about “normal” 
bodies, health, and disease; about the roles of doctors, patients, and their means 
of communication; about childhood, maturity, and old age; and about the rep-
resentation of organs, illnesses, and cures in texts and images, including new 
technologies of medical imaging. Food studies focus on the complex interface of 
agriculture, economy, and culture in the production, distribution, consumption, 
and representation of food. In the process, the field draws on the practical knowl-
edge of farmers and gastronomers as well as on the academic expertise of agrono-
mists, anthropologists, ecologists, sociologists, and researchers of literature and 
film. The environmental humanities bring together anthropology, ecocriticism, 
cultural geography, history, and philosophy to analyze assumptions about ecol-
ogies, natures, landscapes, and nonhuman species that inform past and present 
environmental discourses. The digital humanities connect to the electronic 
landscape of computers, the Internet, and social media in two distinctive ways: 
either by analyzing digitally generated texts and images with existing methods 
of historical and literary research, or by applying new digital tools to established 
canons of texts (Fitzpatrick 2011).
The study of culture or, more precisely, of cultures (emphatically in the 
plural) is crucial to all of these fields even when the concept itself is not fore-
grounded. How gender, sexuality, race, and age inflect the practice of medicine 
varies by historical period and region (a question for the medical humanities). 
What foodstuffs are considered edible or inedible, good or bad for one’s physical 
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health, or spiritually acceptable or unacceptable in different communities often 
has deep historical, ecological, and cultural roots, and shapes current practices 
of growing, harvesting, and cooking that food studies explore. Human-animal 
studies engage with recent scientific insights into the cognition, perception, and 
skills of individual animals and the cultures and politics of animal communities, 
often so as to question the exceptionality of the human subject. In the process, the 
field draws on historical and cultural comparisons to explore the different ways 
in which the boundary between humans and animals has been drawn in the past 
and present. The urban humanities explore the historical memories, spatial sen-
sibilities, social inequalities, and cultural frameworks that shape architecture, 
design, landscape architecture, and urban planning. A great deal of the intellec-
tual energy in many of these recent fields, in fact, emerges precisely from their 
cultural, historical, linguistic, and media-theoretical reframing of questions that 
were earlier thought to be the unique purview of biology, ecology, engineering, 
medicine, computer science, public policy and planning, or other disciplines.
The study of cultures today demonstrates its relevance and urgency precisely 
at these intersections. In turn, cultural studies are being reshaped by the central 
research questions around which these new fields revolve. In this article, I will 
briefly highlight two areas in which culture is currently being re-envisioned: one, 
in the tension between discussions about the Anthropocene and the emergence 
of various strands of posthumanism; and two, in the expansion of culture beyond 
the human sphere. As I will show in the last section, this more-than-human 
reconceptualization of culture is also transforming literature and the arts.
2  Culture between the Anthropocene 
and Posthumanism
In my field of research, the environmental humanities, literary and cultural 
studies over the last decade have increasingly been re-envisioned under the dual 
influences of debates about the Anthropocene and posthumanist theories. The 
concept of the Anthropocene, proposed casually at a conference by the ecologist 
Eugene Stoermer in the 1980s and formalized in a series of publications spear-
headed by the atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen since 2000, is now ubiquitous 
in discussions of the environmental present and future. Crutzen and Stoermer 
proposed in their original publications that we no longer inhabit the Holocene, 
geologists’ designation of the last 12,000 years, but a new epoch, the Anthropo-
cene. The name “Age of Man,” they argued, was justified because of humans’ 
pervasive impacts on global ecosystems and the likelihood that traces of these 
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impacts will be visible in the Earth’s geological strata for millennia to come 
(Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002). As of this writing, professional asso-
ciations of geologists have yet to issue their stamp of approval for this change of 
nomenclature. But in the meantime, the idea of the Anthropocene has developed 
a cultural life of its own in a wide range of academic and popular publications as 
well as exhibitions, conferences, and seminars in Australia, North America, and 
Western Europe (less so in other regions).
In the process, different narratives have accreted around the concept.1 For 
Crutzen as well as many journalists, writers, and activists, the neologism of the 
Anthropocene re-emphasizes a narrative that has long shaped environmentalist 
thought and writing: that of the deterioration and destruction of nature under 
the impact of modern societies. In other words, it is a new term for an old story 
that portrays humans’ interactions with nature as a process of nature’s decline. 
But this narrative has not gone uncontested. Diane Ackerman’s The Human Age: 
The World Shaped by Us (2014) takes the opposite tack, interpreting the Anthro-
pocene not as an age of destruction but of unprecedented human ingenuity and 
creativity – qualities that in her view will let humankind overcome the environ-
mental challenges it currently faces. In Ackerman’s approach, the Anthropocene 
becomes a shorthand for the Enlightenment narrative of technological and social 
progress that environmental thinking has persistently criticized over the last two 
hundred years.2 In between these extreme positions, environmentalists such as 
the biologists Peter Kareiva and Joseph Mascaro, the geographer Erle Ellis, and 
the science writers Emma Marris and Christian Schwägerl have sought to map 
out a more moderate landscape of hope. They take the recognition that no part of 
the Earth’s atmosphere and biosphere remains untouched by human impacts – 
climate change alters even terrestrial and marine regions that humans have not 
visited in their own bodies – as a point of departure for envisioning a new envi-
ronmentalism that is less beholden to conceptions of nature and environmental 
cultures of the past, and that does not so much seek to restore the ecosystems of 
the past as to design ecosystems for the future that will allow both humans and 
nonhumans to flourish. In the process, all of them move away from pristine nature 
and wilderness as yardsticks for environmental activism in the future, emphasiz-
ing instead the complexity and value of the mixed and cultivated  landscapes to 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the divergent Anthropocene narratives, see Heise 2016, ch. 6.
2 Over the last two decades, some strands of the environmental movement have turned against 
this critique of modernization and embraced environmental modernization instead; the most 
prominent advocates of this position in the United States have been Breakthrough Institute 
founders Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger 2004, 2007.
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which human intervention has given rise (see Ellis and Ramankutty 2008; Kareiva 
et al. 2007; Marris 2011; Marris et al. 2011; Schwägerl 2010).
At stake in these more cautiously optimistic perspectives on the Anthropo-
cene is the attempt to rethink human cultures as part of the nature that envi-
ronmentalism seeks to conserve and sustain. The idea that climate change, in 
 particular, puts conventional boundaries between nature and culture into ques-
tion is not, of course, new: The environmental writer and activist Bill McKibben 
had already argued in his book The End of Nature (1989), one of the first nonfic-
tion books to ring the alarm about climate change, that for modern societies at 
least, nature is defined by its separation from culture, and that climate change 
therefore implies the end of this type of nature and the experiences it enables. But 
if this change in nature presented itself as a relentlessly melancholy prospect to 
McKibben, writers such as Marris and Schwägerl highlight the opportunities and 
joys that a different understanding of the natural might bring, precisely because 
it does not interpret human interventions as by definition detrimental to what is 
most valuable about the nonhuman world.
From a different theoretical purview, the historians Dipesh Chakrabarty and 
Julia Adeney Thomas as well as the philosopher Dale Jamieson have also ques-
tioned the boundary between nature and culture. Climate change as an outcome 
of human agency though not of human intention, Chakrabarty argues in his by 
now classic essay “The Climate of History” (2009), turns humanity into a geolog-
ical force. Other writers (the paleoanthropologist Richard Leakey, for example) 
had already suggested that humankind’s current environmental impact could 
be compared to the impact of the meteorite sixty-five million years ago that trig-
gered the extinction of the dinosaurs along with more than eighty percent of the 
other species then in existence – another way of suggesting that humans collec-
tively have achieved geological or even cosmological force. But Chakrabarty is 
particularly interested in the challenges this power poses for historical thinking: 
“Humans have become geological agents very recently in human history. In that 
sense, we can say that it is only very recently that the distinction between human 
and natural histories – much of which had been preserved even in environmen-
tal histories that saw the two entities in interaction – has begun to collapse” 
(Chakrabarty 2009, 207). As a consequence, Dale Jamieson has pointed out, the 
sense of humankind’s enormous power as a species goes along with a sense of 
utter powerlessness on the part of individuals, both equally symptomatic of the 
Anthropocene (Jamieson 2017, 15).
Julia Adeney Thomas sees questions about the distinction of human identity 
and culture from nature arising not only from the large scales of time and space 
that climate change forces us now to consider as part of humans’ cultural history. 
She also points to the challenges that have come from other confrontations of 
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culture with biology. Microbiology, she argues, has recently shown that microbes 
are constituent parts of the human body, “inseparably ‘us,’ more responsible 
than ‘we’ are for ‘our’ existence by most calculations” (Thomas 2014, 1594), and 
that they contribute more genes to human survival than humans themselves con-
tribute. In this view, “a person is not an individual but a congregation“ of such 
nonhuman organisms (Thomas 2014, 1594). By the same token, the hundreds of 
thousands of chemicals that twentieth-century societies have introduced into the 
natural environment are now imbricated into the human organism to the point 
where body and environment cannot be categorically distinguished – not only 
in the case of victims of industrial accidents, but quite ordinary humans as well 
(Thomas 2014, 1596–1602). These alterations, all part and parcel of the Anthropo-
cene, not only challenge conventional definitions of the human, but also imply 
divergent understandings of human bodies and practices that are not compat-
ible with each other: “in paleobiology, ‘we’ are an increasingly domineering 
species operating over vast eons of time; in microbiology, ‘we’ are a coral reef of 
many species spreading out in awkward archipelagos of co-dependent beings; 
and in biochemistry, ‘we’ are a semi-industrialized product of the last, brief half- 
century,” Thomas argues (Thomas 2014, 1603). In this context, human agency 
as well as human cultures clearly need to be envisioned in very different terms, 
depending on which perspective on human nature one privileges.
In her multiscalar survey of the different types of human subjects that the 
Anthropocene implies, Thomas already maps some of the territory that theories 
of posthumanism have traversed over the last few decades (though she herself 
does not use the term). Typically, posthumanist approaches envision human exis-
tence, intentionality, and agency as neither singular nor exceptional, but as part 
of networks that also include other modes of being and agency. Posthumanisms, 
though, differ fundamentally in how they envision these networks. The “hetero-
geneous” social networks of actor-network theory, made up of human and non-
human, animate and inanimate agents that relate to each other in material as well 
as semiotic ways, were proposed by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law in 
the 1980s. The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann developed a systems theory 
whose central tenet is that individuals do not “form part” of societies, but that 
individuals and societies constitute one another’s environments in a cybernetic 
model of communication. “New materialisms” such as those more recently for-
mulated by Karen Barad, Stacy Alaimo, Serenella Iovino, and Serpil Oppermann, 
among others, have theorized human minds and bodies as “transcorporeal” 
vectors (Alaimo 2010) in material relations that constitute the human subject 
through ecological networks. Jane Bennett’s new vitalism explores the vibrant 
agency of matter and its assemblages. Object-oriented ontology as proposed 
by Graham Harman, Levy Bryant, Quentin Meillassoux, and Timothy Morton 
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seeks to free objects from their “correlationism” to human agency and to explore 
them on their own terms, even though object-oriented ontology also emphasizes 
that objects will ultimately always remain withdrawn from human knowledge. 
Human-animal studies, elaborated by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Jacques Derrida, 
Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Donna Haraway, and Cary Wolfe, has 
focused on the philosophical underpinnings and political consequences of his-
torically varying distinctions between human and animal. Recent work in plant 
studies by anthropologists Matthew Hall and Edward Kohn has begun to expand 
this argument into the domain of plants.
Some posthumanist theories focus on systems, some on machines, others 
on objects, and yet others on animals, and their foundational assumptions are 
in quite a few cases incompatible with each other. But in the discourse of the 
humanities and qualitative social sciences, including the study of culture from 
various disciplinary perspectives, they have collectively tended to exert a con-
ceptual pull that contravenes the Anthropocene debates. Discussions about the 
Anthropocene have over the last decade often revolved around the question 
of human agency, specifically the question as to whether the emphasis on the 
human species as a whole masks continuing social and economic inequalities 
that distinguish those human populations who mostly cause climate change from 
those populations who suffer most of the consequences. Sociologists such as 
Jason Moore (2016), who has championed replacing the notion of the Anthropo-
cene with that of the Capitalocene, and philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek (2011), 
who insists that capitalism continues to provide the key to solving the ecologi-
cal crisis of climate change, have fiercely criticized the narrative of species-wide 
agency that has typically accompanied the Anthropocene. Posthumanist theo-
ries, by contrast, no matter what their specific assumptions might be, tend to 
converge in questioning the conceptual foundations for human agency, whether 
it is postulated at the level of the individual, the social class, or the species.
The study of culture is today caught up in the tension between the new 
emphasis on the centrality of human agency in the Anthropocene debates and 
its sustained questioning in theories of posthumanism. Julia Adeney Thomas’s 
work shows at least implicitly how the two might be connected to each other if 
the Anthropocene is understood as more than just climate change. The future 
study of cultures will need to be multiscalar, reconceptualizing cultural prac-
tices with different definitions of human collectivity in mind that range from the 
microscopic to the geological scale. And it will need to re-envision the human in 
a context of multispecies networks that take culture beyond the human. Several 
of the new areas of study that have emerged over the last two decades, includ-
ing food studies, human-animal studies, and the environmental and medical 
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humanities, have begun to develop the concepts, methods, and tools for such a 
study of cultures across species.
3 Multispecies Cultures
In my rough-and-ready sketch of posthumanist theorists in the last section, I 
already mentioned human-animal studies or critical animal studies, as it is some-
times called. This field has its historical roots in the animal liberation movement 
as it was initiated by Peter Singer in the mid-1970s and developed by philosophers 
such as Tom Regan and Mary Midgley later on. Certain types of moral consid-
eration that are usually only extended to humans, these philosophers argued, 
should also be applied to nonhuman species that share particular characteristics 
with humans, whether it be the ability to suffer or to function as the subject of 
one’s own biography, for example. The debate over which kinds of moral consider-
ation, including certain “rights,” should be extended to which species, continues 
to this day. But in the 1990s, animal welfare thinkers and activists were sometimes 
criticized by theorists in the poststructuralist tradition – Jacques Derrida and 
Cary Wolfe, for example – for still privileging human subjectivity by considering 
only those animals as deserving of rights who shared certain characteristics with 
humans. The blurry boundary between humans and animals, they argued, should 
rather encourage us to take a critical look at the implied integrity and exceptional-
ity of human identity itself. “Critical” animal studies, then, tend to be skeptical of 
conventional beliefs about human identity, extending poststructuralist critiques 
of meaning and subjectivity into the consideration of biological species.
These debates are clearly crucial for the study of cultures, since they open 
up for analysis the way in which species boundaries have been historically and 
regionally variable, and how they have functioned to legitimate or criticize partic-
ular regimes of power. Giorgio Agamben has famously reminded us that biology’s 
first modern taxonomist, Carl von Linné, who invented the binomial system of 
species designations, hesitated over how to classify humans in relation to other 
primates (Agamben 2004, 23–27). Cary Wolfe has argued that racism and other 
forms of social oppression are historically closely related to speciesism, which 
continues to underwrite social discrimination today (Wolfe 2003, 43). Graham 
Huggan and Helen Tiffin have explored how species distinctions function to legit-
imate colonial regimes by relegating colonial subjects to the less-than-human 
category of the animal (Huggan and Tiffin 2010, 18–19).
These explorations of the cultural and political work that the species 
concept does in different contexts and communities has in recent years been 
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 complemented by two other strands of research. Anthropologists and philoso-
phers such as Vinciane Despret, Eben Kirksey, Stefan Helmreich, Roberto Marches-
ini, and Anna Tsing have developed approaches variously called multispecies 
ethnography, etho-ethnology, or zooanthropology, which analyze what we nor-
mally understand as human societies and cultures as, in reality, assemblages of 
many species, ranging from the microbes inhabiting our gastro- intestinal tracts 
and disease-carrying viruses to food plants and animals, pets, and those plants 
and animals that figure in ritual and religious practices. Tsing has observed that 
“human nature is an interspecies relationship” (quoted in Kirksey, Schuetze, and 
Helmreich 2014, 2) in that human life is inconceivable without its dependence on 
a wide variety of bacteria, microbes, plants, and animals. On this basis, multi-
species ethnography seeks to redefine what ‘the human’ means individually and 
collectively:
Ethnographers are now exploring how ‘the human’ has been formed and transformed amid 
encounters with multiple species of plants, animals, fungi, and microbes. Rather than 
simply celebrate multispecies mingling, ethnographers have begun to explore a central 
question: Who benefits, cui bono, when species meet? To answer this question, multispe-
cies ethnographers are collaborating with artists and biological scientists to illuminate how 
diverse organisms are entangled in political, economic, and cultural systems.  
 (Kirksey, Schuetze, and Helmreich 2014, 1–2)
In this vein, Deborah Bird Rose (2011) has analyzed the relations between dogs, 
dingoes, and humans in Aboriginal and white Australian communities; Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing has investigated the cultivation, harvesting, distribution, and 
consumption of matsutake mushrooms in communities on several continents; 
and Thom van Dooren (2016) has explored processes that lead to species extinc-
tion and conservation efforts in different regions. My own recent work has focused 
on particular communities’ relationships to endangered or extinct species from 
the perspective of narrative analysis. Building on the work of multispecies eth-
nographers, I have suggested the concept of “multispecies justice” as a way of 
thinking together the concerns for environmental justice and biodiversity conser-
vation (Heise 2016, 162–168).
In all of these case studies, the study of human cultures includes nonhuman 
species as a constitutive element without which the meaning of ‘culture’ itself 
could not be established. In future, such research projects may need to consider a 
different but related broadening of the culture concept that has come from ethol-
ogy. The idea that animal communities themselves have cultures, in the sense of 
knowledge and skills that are transmitted from adults to juveniles not through 
genes but through learning, of locally specific practices by a population that is 
not shared by the species as a whole, and even of a sense of aesthetics, is no 
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longer new. Ornithologists and cetologists have for several decades documented 
the existence of “dialects” in the vocalizations of different populations of birds 
and whales, and such distinctive characteristics were also discovered in different 
whale populations’ foraging and migration traditions. Primates are by now well 
known for tool usage, complex social structures and relationships, and behaviors 
that would be difficult to call by any name other than politics, as Frans de Waal’s 
(1998) classic study of power relations among chimpanzees has shown. Richard 
Prum (2017), finally, has forcefully argued that a good deal of animal behavior 
cannot be explained without postulating a sense of aesthetics. In studies such as 
these, the concept of culture migrates beyond the human realm even as it sheds 
new light on human practices. The future of cultural studies, especially but not 
only if culture is envisioned from a multispecies perspective, will need to situate 
itself in this broadened context of cultural structures and practices that humans 
share with other animal species.
4 A “More Than Human” Future
I’d like to briefly explore this path forward for cultural studies through one sug-
gestive example: music. Literature and art have engaged with multispecies com-
munities and conflicts across a wide spectrum of genres and media. Animated 
films often feature a variety of speaking animals, sometimes in the absence of 
any human characters, as in Bambi (1942), and sometimes in conflict or collab-
oration with them, as in Isao Takahata’s Pom Poko (1994), Andrew Stanton’s 
Finding Nemo (2003), or Vincent Patar and Stéphane Aubier‘s Panique au village 
(2009). Comic books, which have conventionally often featured animals that 
were simply humans in a more light-hearted guise, have over the last few decades 
metamorphosed into graphic novels with serious themes, complex plots, and 
three-dimensional characters. Some of them have addressed relations between 
different species in sophisticated ways, as Alan Moore’s reinvention of the 
Swamp Thing comic (1984), Grant Morrison’s reconceptualization of Animal Man 
(1988–1990), and the ongoing Saga series by Brian K. Vaughan and Fiona Staples 
(2012– ) demonstrate. Short stories, novellas, and novels throughout the twenti-
eth century have similarly engaged with questions of relations between species, 
from the critiques of domestication and captivity in works by Franz Kafka and 
Jack London to novels such as Bernard Werber’s trilogy Les fourmis, Le jour des 
fourmis, and La révolution des fourmis (1991, 1992, 1996) and Barbara Gowdy’s 
The White Bone (1999), which integrate scientific knowledge about the cognition, 
perception, and social behavior of nonhuman species such as ants and elephants 
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into fictional scenarios that reach beyond conventional realism to imagine new 
multispecies worlds.
But the translation of multispecies visions into aesthetic form does not occur 
only through image and text. Sound artists, too, have explored multispecies net-
works in innovative ways, by recording, recreating, or musically transforming the 
vocalizations of individual species, as well as entire natural soundscapes. Well 
known in this genre is Bernie Krause’s Wild Sanctuary Audio Archive, first initi-
ated in 1968, which includes “marine and terrestrial soundscapes representing 
the voices of living organisms from larvae to large mammals and the numerous 
tropical, temperate and Arctic biomes from which they come. […] 4,500 hours 
of wild soundscapes and in excess of 15,000 identified life forms” (http://www.
wildsanctuary.com). Krause’s goals are mostly archival and documentary, but 
soundscapes also feature in works that are equal parts documentation and com-
position. The Spanish sound artist Francisco López’ La selva (1997/2001), the 
American composer Steven Feld’s Rainforest Soundwalks (2006), and the Italian 
composer David Monacchi’s monumental project Fragments of Extinction (2001–
2015) all combine sound recordings of multiple species in the natural world with 
original sound creations.
Monacchi’s “environmental sound-art project” focuses, according to his 
own explanations, on the acoustic biodiversity of rainforests and seeks to collect 
“three-dimensional sound portraits of entire circadian cycles. The complex 
network of inter- and intra-specific communication found in these recordings is 
[…] the sonic heritage of millions of years of evolution. We must save fragments of 
it in order to study, understand, experience, enjoy, and conserve it,  preserving 
for future generations imprints of the disappearing sonic intelligence of nature” 
(http://www.fragmentsofextinction.org/mission/; original emphasis). For fifteen 
years, Monacchi traveled to the Amazon, to the Congo, and to Borneo to record 
the sounds of intact equatorial rainforests. In the process, he developed innova-
tive microphones and recording techniques to capture sounds from all the dif-
ferent levels and directions of a given rainforest location, as well as to withstand 
extreme humidity. Ecologists such as E. O. Wilson have argued that the current 
global biodiversity crisis eliminates species before humans have had a chance to 
find and name them. Monacchi, analogously, emphasizes that extinction silences 
natural voices and along with them entire “‘eco-symphonies’ we have not even 
heard or recorded” (http://www.fragmentsofextinction.org/mission/; original 
emphasis). The soundscapes he focuses on have not been documented in their 
entirety, and they occasionally include individual voices that are unknown to 
current science.
Monacchi intends his sound art to communicate the beauty of the natural 
world to the audience, to influence public discourse, and thereby to support 
Multispecies Futures and the Study of Culture   285
 conservation efforts. To this end, he creates continuous twenty-four-hour record-
ings of particular rainforest locations, which he then submits to meticulous anal-
ysis in terms of its spatial information, progressing moments in time, and occu-
pied frequencies. For his performances, he condenses the twenty-four hours into 
ninety minutes and accompanies the recorded sounds with a sound spectrogram 
that translates the voices of different species into dynamically moving neon- 
colored lines, a visual spectacle with a distinctive aesthetic all its own. As part of 
his analysis during the performances, Monacchi includes the insights of acoustic 
ecology: the study of how individual species use particular niches of sound and 
frequency; how they adapt to different sonic environments; and how they work 
around cross-species similarities in calls and frequencies that impede territorial 
defense or mating. Just as topographical and climatic conditions, vegetation, and 
the presence or absence of other species open or foreclose particular possibilities 
for a species, in other words, so does the sonic environment, where certain fre-
quencies and types of calls – acoustic niches – are occupied and others not.
Acoustic ecology also informs how Monacchi himself intervenes into his 
rainforest recordings. He manipulates existing sounds and adds others in what 
he calls “eco-acoustic composition” (http://www.fragmentsofextinction.org/
eco-acoustic-music/), following the principles of acoustic ecology in that the 
human-generated sounds he adds to the soundscapes cannot overlap in time, 
location, frequency, or type with those of other species. Through this procedure, 
Monacchi goes beyond the documentary goal of registering nonhuman voices 
and ecologically significant silences. He adds a human presence to the ecosym-
phony, but meticulously respects the rules that also guide the sound behavior of 
other members of the multispecies rainforest community. The imagination that 
informs eco-acoustic composition is therefore, in the end, in equal parts nostal-
gic, technoscientific, and utopian, in that it technologically generates a sonic 
environment in which human voices are perfectly integrated with the species 
around them – presumably in contrast to the perceived separation of modern 
humans from nature.
Whether one agrees with this narrative about the reintegration of modern 
humans and nature through art that underwrites Monacchi’s compositions or not, 
his work highlights one of the many forms that multispecies approaches to the cre-
ation and interpretation of culture take today. From the perspective of multispecies 
theory, the cultural studies of the future would explore everyday cultural practices 
as well as works of art and literature as imbricated in networks that always reach 
beyond humans themselves to involve other species, often in locally or regionally 
distinctive ways. In some cases, this perspective may combine with the skepticism 
of humans’ singularity and exceptionality that characterizes posthumanist theo-
ries; in others, it may emphasize humans’ impact on the global environment in the 
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way debates about the Anthropocene do. But in either case, the future of cultural 
study will be, in David Abram’s (1996) phrase, “more-than-human.”
References
Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human 
World. New York: Pantheon, 1996.
Ackerman, Diane. The Human Age: The World Shaped by Us. New York: Norton, 2014.
Agamben, Giorgio. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004.
Alaimo, Stacy. Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “The Climate of History: Four Theses.” Critical Inquiry 35 (2009): 197–222.
Crutzen, Paul J. “Geology of Mankind.” Nature 415 (2002): 23.
Crutzen, Paul J., and Eugene F. Stoermer. “The ‘Anthropocene.’” Global Change Newsletter 
41 (2000): 17–18.
De Waal, Frans. Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Rev. ed. Baltimore/London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
Ellis, Erle C., and Navin Ramankutty. “Putting People in the Map: Anthropogenic Biomes 
of the World.” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 6.8 (2008): 439–447. https://
esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1890/070062 DOI 10.1890/070062 
[accessed: 27 June 2019].
Fitzpatrick, Kathleen. “The Humanities, Done Digitally.” Chronicle of Higher Education (8 
May 2011). https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Humanities-Done-Digitally/127382 
[accessed: 27 June 2019].
Heise, Ursula K. Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2016.
Huggan, Graham, and Helen Tiffin. Postcolonial Ecocriticism: Literature, Animals, Environment. 
London: Routledge, 2010.
Jamieson, Dale. “The Anthropocene: Love It or Leave It.” The Routledge Companion to the 
Environmental Humanities. Eds. Ursula K. Heise, Jon Christensen, and Michelle Niemann. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. 13–20.
Kareiva, Peter, Sean Watts, Robert McDonald, and Tim Boucher. “Domesticated Nature: Shaping 
Landscapes and Ecosystems for Human Welfare.” Science 316 (2007): 1866–1869.
Kirksey, Eben, Craig Schuetze, and Stefan Helmreich. “Introduction: Tactics of Multispecies 
Ethnography.” The Multispecies Salon. Ed. Eben Kirksey. Durham, NC/London: Duke 
University Press, 2014. Kindle edition.
Krause, Bernie. Wild Sanctuary. https://www.wildsanctuary.com/ [accessed: 27 June 2019].
Marris, Emma. Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World. New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2011.
Marris, Emma, Peter Kareiva, Joseph Mascaro, and Erle C. Ellis. “Hope in the Age of Man.” 
New York Times (7 December 2011).
McKibben, Bill. The End of Nature. New York: Anchor, 1989.
Multispecies Futures and the Study of Culture   287
Monacchi, David. Fragments of Extinction. 2001–2015. http://www.fragmentsofextinction.org/ 
[accessed: 27 June 2019].
Moore, Jason W., ed. Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of 
Capitalism. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2016.
Nordhaus, Ted, and Michael Shellenberger. “The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming 
Politics in a Post-Environmental World.” 2004. https://grist.org/article/doe-reprint/ 
[accessed: 27 June 2019].
Nordhaus, Ted, and Michael Shellenberger. Break Through: From the Death of Environ-
mentalism to the Politics of Possibility. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.
Penley, Constance. “Brownian Motion: Women, Tactics, and Technology.” Technoculture. 
Eds. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991. 135–162.
Prum, Richard O. The Evolution of Beauty: How Darwin’s Forgotten Theory of Mate Choice 
Shapes the Animal World – and Us. New York: Doubleday, 2017.
Radway, Janice. Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
Rose, Deborah Bird. Wild Dog Dreaming: Love and Extinction. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2011.
Schwägerl, Christian. Menschenzeit: Zerstören oder gestalten? Die entscheidende Epoche 
unseres Planeten. Munich: Riemann, 2010.
Thomas, Julia Adeney. “History and Biology in the Anthropocene: Problems of Scale, Problems 
of Value.” American Historical Review 119 (2014): 1587–1607.
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in 
Capitalist Ruins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Dooren, Thom van. Flight Ways: Life and Loss at the Edge of Extinction. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016.
Wolfe, Cary. Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist 
Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Žižek, Slavoj. Living in the End Times. Rev. and updated ed. London/New York: Verso, 2011.
 Open Access. © 2020 Peter L. Galison and Jens Kugele, published by De Gruyter.  This work is 
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110669398-018
Peter L. Galison and Jens Kugele
Future Trading Zones for the Study of 
Culture: An Interview with Peter L. Galison 
5 September 2019
Jens Kugele: Thank you very much, Peter, for agreeing to this interview. I truly 
appreciate this opportunity to continue our conversations on possible futures of 
the study of culture and to include your perspective as a scholar and filmmaker 
in this dialogical form. In addition to your academic work as a physicist and his-
torian of science, you have also been involved in the production of several doc-
umentary films. In your and Robb Moss’s documentary Containment (2015), for 
instance, you raise questions about possible futures when you shed light on gov-
ernments’ practices in their efforts to (safely) contain overwhelming amounts 
of radioactive sludge for the next ten thousand years. Your film addresses the 
question of how we can communicate with future generations and, indeed, 
future cultures about these containment attempts. In your view, how can we 
in the academic study of culture make sure that we foster communication with 
future generations and with future cultures? What kind of questions, topics, and 
concerns are of central importance in this context? What kind of (new) genres, 
formats, and media might be helpful or even necessary in your view?
Peter Galison: An interesting double question! On the one side, in the United 
States and in Europe, for some years a mix of physicists, futurists, astronomers, 
anthropologists, and material scientists have been grappling with the problem 
of how to warn the far future about the dangers of our buried nuclear waste. It 
seemed to the American Congress that it would constitute a plain moral hazard to 
bury and forget such dangerous materials. But then how does one communicate 
across 10,000 years or more during which the radioactive waste remains danger-
ous? Should one proceed by burying an image, icon, or image sequences? By a 
contemporary version of the Rosetta Stone? By entombing samples of the waste 
itself? By encoding scientific formulae and descriptions of the state of our knowl-
edge of radiological medicine, nuclear physics, and geology? These are hard 
questions indeed, and they push to the limit – to the breaking point – our capac-
ity to imagine the societies ten millennia from now. But the very act of trying to 
grapple with this necessary but nearly-impossible task is itself a great good thing. 
My hope in Containment was that to convey the idea that the very act of think-
ing far ahead – backed by nations – could help dislodge us from the presentism 
that threatens us everywhere. Most dramatically, we must resist our avaricious 
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present moment: The future of the planet depends on addressing the unfolding 
planetary catastrophe of global warming.
Turning to the other side of your good question: How might we, scholars of culture 
today, address matters of consequence, starting with finding ways to bring our 
concerns to an engaged public even today? When the futurists had to decide what 
to do, they felt inexorably drawn to the idea that no single modality could be 
relied upon – our best chance of communicating with the future would necessar-
ily encompass many forms: images, texts, samples, ceramic plates, monuments, 
and scientific information. In some sense I think we face something similar in the 
human sciences today: It behooves us to think not only of a multitude of sources 
for our research, but a multitude of productive forms in which to present it. In my 
work, I’ve tacked back and forth between film, material culture, and text. Text is 
adept at cutting across times and places; it can, more easily than other media, 
take a topic and follow it through a multitude of countries, times, cultures. Books, 
physical and digital, travel relatively easily and can be read in any order. Film may 
more easily register the density of specific circumstance; it generalizes through its 
particularity and unfolds across time. Focus on an individual or family or kind of 
work, and the density of affect, the physicality of circumstance, and the volatility 
of relationships can emerge in ways that are not so easily ignored. Exhibits do yet 
other things, insofar as they can establish new and unexpected kinds of juxta-
positions among objects, images, sounds. Done well, they can make immediate 
a distant time and place: I think of the power of the National Museum of African 
American History and Culture in Washington, DC; artefacts compel a confronta-
tion with the physicality of slavery in a way that text alone cannot. My own sense is 
that the human sciences could do much more with these other (non-textual) forms 
of address: Culture is material and visual as well as textual. I strongly believe that 
we will need to be adept at using these and other modalities to present our work.
Over the last years, this kind of concern has driven me, for example – from writing 
on state secrecy, e.g., “Removing Knowledge” (2004) and “Secrecy in Three 
Acts” (2010), to making the film, with Robb Moss, Secrecy (2008) – all of these 
addressed the question of how historical (and present) attempts to block under-
standing help us frame how knowledge works. Grappling with university knowl-
edge meant also confronting the historical inequity of the university – I made a 
film about a disputation that occurred in 1773 over the moral legitimacy of slavery 
itself – at a time when there was slavery at many American universities. The 
short film I made, No More, America (2017, with Henry Louis Gates), was accom-
panied by a textual exploration of the role of the eighteenth-century debate, its 
antecedent forms, and how academic disputation crossed with slavery on the eve 
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of revolution: “Disputation, Poetry, Slavery” (2019). A work in the history and 
philosophy of science, my book Einstein’s Clocks, Poincaré’s Maps (2003), led me 
to a collaboration with South African artist William Kentridge in the multi-screen 
installation Refusal of Time (2012) and that then carried over to its accompanying 
chamber opera Refuse the Hour (2012).
Jens Kugele: In your research as well as in your editorial work, you have built 
bridges between the natural sciences and other disciplines, particularly the 
humanities: Several of your publications in the ‘history of science’ field explore 
its relation to neighboring fields such as cultural history and art history. Moreover, 
you have also served, among others, on the editorial board of Critical Inquiry, one 
of the leading journals in the humanities. What kinds of methods and strategies 
have you found helpful to bridge the gap between these disciplinary formations 
and the different forms of knowledge construction?
Peter Galison: Many of the societal problems that face us just now can only be 
addressed with a concerted effort by natural sciences working with the social 
and human sciences. Above all, we need to see science and technology as 
part of culture, not exterior to it. To name three such arenas: global warming; 
digital privacy; and artificial intelligence. Each of these is all at once a techni-
cal  problem-cluster and a concatenation of ethical, social justice, and political 
issues. Who lives next to the major sources of carbon production: natural gas, 
methane production, factory-scale animal plants? In country after country they 
tend to be the poorer, the less privileged of society: In these questions at the 
intersection of climate-altering substances and demographics is a zone of culture 
implicated by environmental justice. On computer science: Even to ask a seem-
ingly most basic question, “What counts as online privacy?” takes us beyond 
pure technicalities. So too does the query, “Do Algorithms carry weight beyond 
the data bases on which they draw?” – I’ve written on this in “Algorists Dream of 
Objectivity” (2019). It is a technical circumstance that a DNA swab of a criminal 
suspect also delivers information about that suspect’s blood relatives. But it is 
a social and ethical matter for us to deal with what that means for our society: 
How do we balance criminal inquiry with genetic privacy? This sort of question 
may be grounded in the gene-sequencing techniques but no amount of biological 
reasoning in isolation will confront these broader issues. So it is with the steady 
stream of digital exhaust captured by governments and multinational corpora-
tions: siloed disciplines (computer science, ethics, political science). The pure 
code technicalities of Python or HTML leave open some of the most pressing 
issues of our time, issues that bear on our freedom to think and act, our ability to 
vote, our ability to be treated equally under the law.
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Collaborating across boundaries requires a certain kind of attentive listening. 
When I first started to work in film, I tried to import the structure of a text – a peri-
odization that had done good work in understanding the moral-political history 
of the hydrogen bomb. It was a total disaster – in a text you can scan in a moment 
a five-part structure. In a film such a thematization comes across as unwatchable 
pedantry. Working with William Kentridge (I was the dramaturg) taught me some-
thing else – we learned to think together through episodic stories, the laying of 
pipes carrying compressed air to sync clocks, for example. More than that, the 
logic of the work often proceeded through an associative rather than inferential 
or deductive arc. Entering the trading zones between fields demands a certain 
suspension of our confident, go-to forms of reasoning in order to hear our col-
laborators.
Jens Kugele: How do you envision the future academic work on the intersections 
between the humanities, the social sciences, and the (natural) sciences?
Peter Galison: I envision future work where shared topics, concepts, and 
methods will offer deep and deeply consequential sites for inquiry. Some of the 
great questions about politics and culture in this century, it seems to me, will 
emerge not from classical party politics but from the driving force of seemingly 
technical issues, like the multi-national exchange of data and its impact on 
privacy. The history of our present culture – how we got here – may offer us a 
platform of resistance to the passivity of technological determinism. Things need 
not be the way they happen to be. 
Jens Kugele: With regard to the possible futures of the interdisciplinary study 
of culture, what forms of individual and collaborative research do you see as 
central? Where do you see (new) responsibilities of this academic field?
Peter Galison: Over much of the twentieth century, anthropology, from the work 
of Franz Boas to that of Clifford Geertz, has held the study of culture to be urgent. 
Up until the 1970s and 1980s, it was held (obviously, I’m oversimplifying) that cul-
tures had a certain structural integrity to them; they were not to be ranked hier-
archically. Each particular culture was supposed to carry its own validity through 
the interrelated and co-dependent use of meanings, symbols, and values; each 
had its own account of origins, reproduction, and relation to the outside. There 
was good reason for anthropologists to have treated cultures as self-sustaining, 
quasi-autonomous entities: These ideas had a powerful anticolonial force; it 
offered, in its relativism, a bulwark against racism, subordination, and genocide. 
Cultural holism and relativism seemed necessary: If every culture was the equal 
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of every other one, the imperial subordination of groups outside of white, Euro-
pean Christian ones in Western Europe (or North America) could not be justified.
Since the 1980s, in the highly interpenetrated world in which we live, we have 
come, more and more, to find it impossible to see cultures as isolated, crystalline 
structures; more and more, we see them as overlapping, tied together through the 
movements of people, ideas, objects, and struggles. We no longer see a homoge-
neous culture (singular), not in the nation, not in ‘pre-contact’ third world coun-
tries, not in former imperial capital cities.
In our cacophonous and interrelated world, we need to form new modes of under-
standing these shifting and ever-crossing boundaries of cultures. In my sector of 
inquiry – the study of the physical sciences in its broader cultural frame – it is clear 
that people and ideas are always on the move, there are no strict borders between 
previously separate disciplines and subdisciplines: String theory shares techniques 
with what used to be called condensed matter physics. Biology and physics share 
major spheres of interest as they address the nature of DNA and other biological 
materials. No longer are the sectors of civilian, military, and commercial science 
so distinct. A GPS chip is in your running watch, in a smart bomb, in drones, and 
in more apps on your smartphone than you can remember. Buying a GPS chip is 
cheap and they are ubiquitous. But the impact of these little objects – some just 
a few millimeters long, wide, and high – is vast: as they can report back on our 
positions; as data combines to report who we are with, where we idle, our objects 
of attention. Indeed, understanding our emerging technical world will take the 
collaboration of many disciplines, from economics and anthropology to physics, 
engineering, and surveillance studies. Even this little example of the GPS chip sug-
gests that we will need a myriad of approaches to characterize, understand, and 
intervene in the great issues we face now.
The study of culture going forward necessarily must address the technological 
and scientific domains, it cannot retreat to a belle-lettrist self-definition. But 
the study of culture can and should be more than the study of the “impact” of 
the  scientific-technical, the study of culture is needed to understand how we, as 
society ought to handle these intersections.
Jens Kugele: Where do you see key challenges for interdisciplinary work in light 
of the academic publishing market, tenure reviews, and the high value attributed 
in most Humanities disciplines to single-authored publications, a concept rooted 
in eighteenth-century discourses of individual geniality.
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Peter Galison: I am very worried about the institutional frame that faces a new 
generation of scholars. Right now, I see early-career researchers whose interdisci-
plinary, collaborative work is highly valued, even celebrated, as they are chosen 
for postdoctoral fellowships across North America, Europe, and elsewhere. But 
then, when these same scholars go on the job market, they suddenly face obsta-
cles. They confront resistance to cross-disciplinary work alongside discord about 
the validity of multi-authored books and articles. I see ambivalence about promot-
ing to tenure someone who works in teams or steps over the disciplinary border. 
This switcheroo of values – telling a generation of scholars interdisciplinarity is 
good, until they are told it is bad – is, in my view, misguided academically. It 
ignores some of the best work produced today. But I would say more and with a 
certain degree of anger and frustration: By alternately encouraging and then dis-
valuing collaboration and interdisciplinarity, our institutions are behaving uneth-
ically, betraying an emerging generation of scholars.
The natural sciences have not solved the manifold problems of collaboration 
and interdisciplinarity, but they are ahead of the human sciences: Teams of hun-
dreds, now (at CERN) thousands of physicists work together toward goals of the 
first importance, including the discovery of the Higgs. Over the last four years, I 
have been a member of one such team, with some 207 scientists and engineers, 
distributed over 18 countries and 59 institutions. Some of the collaborators come 
from computer science, some from theoretical astrophysics, yet others are experts 
in electrical engineering, or radio-telescope observation. I come from a mix of 
history and philosophy of science – focused to a certain degree on image- making, 
and theoretical particle physics. Together the many of us constitute the Event 
Horizon Telescope Collaboration, formed to assemble a world-spanning network 
of radio-telescopes capable of imaging a black hole 53 million light years away. We 
are constantly grappling with questions of credit and the advancement of early 
career scientists – and by no means has this or any other big collaboration solved 
the problem. But there are substantive things one can do to promote the visibil-
ity recognition of rising PhDs, postdocs, and assistant professors: They can be 
promoted to give academic and public talks; they can take on recognized roles in 
working groups; they can report at collaboration meetings; they can be leads on 
white papers. We ought to be thinking now about ways to do such things in the 
growing number of interdisciplinary collaborations in the human sciences.
Jens Kugele: In your Image and Logic (1997), among several others of your 
publications, you introduce the notion of “trading zones.” Is the concept of 
“trading zones,” as you understand it, applicable to the study of culture as an 
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 interdisciplinary and international field, i.e., can it help us to shed light on 
dynamics, potentials, and challenges? 
Peter Galison: I introduced the notion of trading zones because I was frustrated 
with the false choice we were offered: Either there was a universal reduction basis 
to all of the sciences, as the notion of a physical thing-language would have it 
(logical positivists). Or cultures depicted as so disjunct that passing between 
them would be like a Gestalt shift, a radical linguistic translation, or a religious 
conversion. That did not (so it seemed to me) correspond to the real, partial, 
ever-developing coordination that is constantly in play between and among cul-
tures. Or put another way, in many fields, certainly in science and technology 
studies, we are used to focusing on local practices (the focus on the local con-
ditions of knowledge production seems to me the single most important inno-
vation in STS). By the 1990s, it seemed to me far too late in the day to call into 
play a global notion of languages and cultures and join it (as was common in 
Kuhnian-inflected studies) with local conceptions of scientific work. Instead, I 
wanted to see language itself as an evolving locally inflected formation, of which 
exchange languages (jargons, pidgins, and creoles) were only the most notable 
manifestation. So too at the boundaries between fields, there is always coordi-
nation that can, over time, develop into fields themselves (think of biochemistry, 
algebraic geometry, physical chemistry, just to name a few).
Jens Kugele: If you think about the possible futures of the study of culture, 
where do you see institutional “trading zones” for this interdisciplinary field of 
research? What kind of “trading zones” should be explored further? What kind 
of competencies should we foster, e.g., in our Ph.D. training, if we are convinced 
that the ability to make meaning in more than one discipline is based on more 
than “interactional expertise” (Collins and Evans 2002)?
Peter Galison: Institutions that can best assist the formation of trading zones are 
not entirely abstract. Instead, they have a focus. Artificial Intelligence offers an 
example. AI systems are being used to determine who, among those accused of 
having committed a crime, should be granted pre-trial release. Here is an arena 
where a technical, computational concern needs to cross with cultural concerns: 
constitutional and ethical questions – questions of social justice. Similarly, we 
have a growing number of institutes that study the cross of genetics with poli-
tics and ethics – modifications of crops, animals, and ultimately humans raise 
pressing issues that demand a way of reasoning that is more than just technical 
drives constrained by cultural constraints. Instead, we need to develop a way of 
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teaching, researching, and applying genetic knowledge that is reasoning about 
ethics all the way down, so to speak.
Perhaps our Ph.D. training should include at least some work in an interdisci-
plinary team. Instead of focusing all our energy on the production of a thesis, we 
could have at least one project, or a chapter within a thesis built on collabora-
tive research, where, say a literary scholar, a historian, and an economist could 
address a body of literature not only in its associations of structure, meaning, 
and allusion, but in the materiality and finances of production and distribution. 
Book history, media theory, and literary analysis could work together rather than 
squaring off as antagonistic approaches. With filmmaker/anthropologist Lucien 
Castaing-Taylor, we set up at Harvard a program called “Critical Media Prac-
tice,” where advanced graduate students from across the university could learn, 
develop, and supplement their thesis work in film, interactive online sites, audio, 
installation, and other digital work (http://cmp.gsas.harvard.edu/). This inter-
field, inter-modal mix aims to be an institutional trading zone.
Jens Kugele: To what extent is the concept of “trading zones” helpful to think 
about future exchange and collaboration between the study of culture, the 
natural sciences, and the life sciences? Where do you see trading partners who, 
as you phrased it, “can hammer out a local coordination, despite vast global dif-
ferences” (Galison 1997, 783)?
Peter Galison: The central concern of trading zones is that it is possible for dif-
ferent domains to work out a local, specific, common form of action and reason-
ing, even if the larger disciplinary demands remain quite disjunct. Nanotechnol-
ogy does require that virology, surface chemistry, and atomic physicists learn to 
work together, create techniques, and develop ways of speaking that are common 
enough for them to generate new work. But productive nanoscience work does 
not require making physicists into biologists or biologists into chemists, much 
less all these groups into an undifferentiated morass. Instead, the human, social, 
and natural sciences come into consequential interaction through a sufficiently 
developed, specific common language and set of actions.
For example, computer science needs to be taught and practiced with concepts 
of privacy built in; not added as an afterthought. And here the humanities and 
interpretive social sciences have much to contribute: What notions of privacy do 
we want to protect? What does the history of the concept reveal? What is under-
stood by taking onboard the way it is understood in psychology, political science, 
or critical feminist theory, to name but a few examples?
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Jens Kugele: Scholars such as Mieke Bal have suggested the idea of a  concept- 
based approach to the study of culture with a notion of “traveling concepts” at 
its core. How do you see the potential of concept-based research in the study of 
culture in the future? Do concepts bear the potential to facilitate such trading 
zones? Do concepts bear the potential to serve as building blocks of a “contact 
language,” a “system of discourse” as you phrase it in the context of your notion 
of “trading zones”?
Peter Galison: I take concepts to be quasi-stable entities, holding practices and 
meanings in a form that is recognizable over some region of time and place, 
but not in any sense absolute. We fight over concepts because they organize so 
much: think of political concepts like liberty, property, rights, nation, citizen-
ship. Understanding their contingency, their remit, their history, is essential 
to moving forward. Marriage may have had certain meanings (who can marry 
whom) but in hard-fought battles, that notion is changing – opening up – across 
many countries. So too is it in science (energy, mass, time, entropy): Einstein’s 
main contribution was to level a critical re-evaluation of space and time. And 
much of my work has been organized around an understanding of how certain 
scientific concepts shifted under the pressure of scientific and philosophical 
engagement: objectivity, simultaneity, secrecy, containment – to name a few.
I certainly agree with Mieke Bal that concepts move – they travel as she has 
called it in her persuasive studies – as she stresses, the points of intersection and 
coordination can be generative. My understanding of trading zones – as a local 
and coordinative venture – sets concepts, material objects, and manipulations in 
 historically-shifting syntactic frames. What we do with concepts (how they relate 
to each other) is also essential. Rules of combination and exclusion figure vitally 
in the notion of a trading zone: There is no building structures from bricks alone. 
We need the mortar binding the bricks; we need guiding principles so to speak: 
For example, you are better off intercalating bricks from one level to another if 
you want the house to stand. This is why I come back to the more-than-metaphor 
of trading languages in which jargons (highly restricted coordinative structures), 
pidgins (more extensive than jargons but still specific), and creoles (interlan-
guages sufficiently rich in structure and metalinguistic development that one 
can grow up in them). There is a semantics, to be sure (the concepts and mean-
ings), but also a syntax.
Of course, not all jargons become pidgins on the way to creoles, some jargons 
and pidgins persist as such, or vanish altogether. This much we know from the 
anthropological linguists. Indeed, I reject the idea that there are pure disciplines 
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as opposed to hybrid fields: Today’s “pure” languages are just the more consoli-
dated and elaborated forms of yesterday’s hybrids. So it is in disciplinary fields. 
Take what many mathematicians would consider the purest of pure mathematics: 
algebraic geometry. The hybrid antecedents of that field (algebra and geometry) 
are worn on its name-sleeve. Purity in disciplines or languages is a product, not 
an essence. For this reason, we ought to be highly suspicious when interdiscipli-
narity is derogated. But which interdisciplinary forms will persist? That is an open 
question.
Jens Kugele: In your newspaper article “Self-censorship in the Digital Age” 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014), you point to ways that surveillance and 
harvesting of communications has and continues to reshape culture and ulti-
mately the self. What are some of the central challenges and potentials that you 
see for the academic study of culture in this digital age? Do you see a changing 
role for the scholar in the field of culture studies?
Peter Galison: It is too late in the day to bemoan the new forms of cultural pro-
duction, circulation, and consumption as if they can be driven back into the key-
boards, cameras, and microphones from whence they came. Instead, those of us 
studying digital cultures have openings. We can study the evolving forms: games, 
tweets, postings, sites, apps, seriality, blogs. We can use them under critical pres-
sure: What kind of subject and object is constructed by these genres? And we can 
take an active role in reshaping them, asking how might they be turned to other 
ends, as in an earlier epoch, film, neon lights, and theatre were bent away from 
classical structures. My hope for the future of cultural studies is that it will have 
all of these elements: a critical history and a productive  taking-up of the forms to 
other, adventurous, and generative ends.
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